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SUMMARY
The objects of this thesis are to examine the conditions which 
necessitated local administrative reforms in Nigeria and Britain. It 
also examines the process of administrative reforms in both countries 
in a comparative and historical context. Administrative reform is a 
continuous activity, a process, and the local government reforms in 
both countries have been treated in sequential trends : Diagnosis,
Formulation of Objectives and Strategies of Administrative Reform, 
Implementation, Evaluation, and Recommendations.
The study concentrates on socio-economic and political changes in 
both countries, and on changing contemporary views concerning the 
processes and purposes of local governmental administration. Local 
government became maladjusted because it did not keep pace with these
societal changes, and hence the need for reform.
We also examine the relationship between the theory and practice of 
administrative reform; and the origins of pressures for reform, the 
processes by which reform proposals were advanced, and the ways and 
means by which they were implemented (or shelved) .
The thesis is structured round a number of variables and
hypothetical questions which were tested in the body of the thesis, such 
as: Was local government reform necessary in both countries because
unchanging values could no longer be realised through an outdated ‘
administrative system ? Or had values changed so that reform was 
needed ? Can a developing country (Nigeria) and a developed one (Britain) 
have similar reform objectives and strategies ? How true is Lee's 
hypothesis that time and leadership are two crucial variables in reform 
implementation ? Answers to these and other hypothetical questions are 
provided in the thesis. The conclusion, based on empirical evidences*, 
is that for any administrative reform to be successful in achieving its
il
objectives - efficiency, democracy, socio-economic development and 
national unity - the citizens must be actively involved. And it is 
this observation that leads us to formulate hypotheses for local 
government reform, local development and participation through the use 
of the age-set institution in Nigeria and neighbourhood councils in 
Britain (though the latter are dealt with very briefly),
INTRODUCTION
This thesis, like any other transnational comparative analysis, 
involved my having to carry out the necessary fieldwork in two countries : 
Britain and Nigeria. I made two trips to Nigeria not only to collect 
materials but also to interview people - councillors, local government 
officers and citizens who are affected by the 1976 local government 
reform. In all I covered six states - Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Niger, Oyo 
and Rivers (see map). There were 238 respondents to my questionnaires,
78 of them being officers and officials of local government. I had to 
tape record oral evidence from a number of people because of the 
high rate of illiteracy in Nigeria. These evidences formed the sub­
stratum of this thesis, especially chapters 8 and 9, 'Evaluation' 
and 'Recommendations', with the theory of administrative reform forming 
the superstratum. I proceeded from the empirical evidence and went 
on to test my findings in the light of available administrative reform 
theory. My conclusion, based on these evidences, is that for any 
administrative reform to be successful-in achieving its objectives - 
efficiency, democracy, socio-economic development and national unity - 
the citizens must be actively involved.
As Rowat (1980, p.XV) says, the comparative study of local 
government reform and politics is at such a rudimentary stage that one 
must start with the basic structural information, which itself is 
extremely difficult to gather, especially in Nigeria as any researcher 
will tell you.
Furthermore, although the study of politics rather than insti­
tutions is currently popular with political scientists and students 
of public administration, attempts at studying local government reform 
on a comparative basis have not been notably successful because we do
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not yet have a deep enough understanding of the varying political 
cultures involved. If academic books about reorganisation do not embody 
their author’s own proposals for 'reform', then they are usually con­
tent to describe the proposals of others and blandly present the debate. 
In Nigeria, and to some extent in Britain, there is no study which 
discusses the various facets of reorganisation as they relate to each 
other and to the environment - social, political, cultural and economic; 
which sees reorganisation as about who will control and benefit from 
local government; and which seeks to understand it all by looking at 
it in the context of the developing political economy. Case studies of 
local policy-making and reform tend to be isolated and a-historical. At 
its most basic, there is no study which situates local government reform 
in the wider societal changes, away from the usual tradition of debate, 
and even the assessments of the effects of reorganisation are of 
limited value because of lack of empirical research which would enable 
academics to make useful and proven recommendations which would benefit 
the ordinary citizen (see however, Buxton, 1973; Redcliffe-Maud and 
Wood, 1974; Dearlove, 1979; Lagroye and Wright, 1979; Pearce, 1980).
More importantly, I know of no writer who has attempted to make a 
systematic comparative analysis of administrative reform in a develop­
ing country and a developed one. These and other problems or aberra­
tions are what I have attempted to solve in this thesis. If the 
arguments I have advanced provide a better understanding of reorganisa­
tion than any currently available in the literature, then this 
research has been worthwhile.
Students of public administration are struck by the fact that 
the 'new ideas' which emerged in disciplines related to public ad­
ministration did not affect the approach to administrative reform.
Even in the United States, where the society is keen on innovations, 
the reform attempts of the late fifties adhered more or̂  less to 
traditional organisation theory. The reasons for this are the conser-
vatiye tendencies inherent in government administration and the se­
quence in which ideas change first, then values, then finally and last, 
basic emotions and actions.
The comprehensive, approach to local government reform analysed 
in this thesis is influenced by an amalgam of the current ideas which 
emerged recently in General Systems Theory, Comparative Politics and 
Public Administration, and modem organisation theory. The framework 
of my research did not start with the theory. I started from the 
empirical facts of the local government reforms in Britain Cmore 
specifically, England and Wales) in 1974 and Nigeria in 1976, and tried 
to test my findings and the hypotheses I formulated in the light of 
current administrative reform theory. This seemingly 'unorthodox' 
orientation stimulated clear thinking and saved me from becoming a 
'prisoner of theory'. Thus my style of writing could have been like 
Conrad's (Lord Jim) peripeteia or 'reverse time sequence' in which 
case the theoretical Chapter 1 could have come at the end of the thesis. 
That it comes at the beginning did not change my research findings 
and hypotheses, instead it became invaluable for me as I was able to 
compare and evaluate my hypotheses with administrative reform theories. 
The aim is to try and disprove theorists who argue that it is impossible 
to advance a theory of administrative reform which is equally applic­
able to a developed and a developing country.
The General Systems Theory was developed to meet a need felt by 
a large number of behavioural scientists. The theory is concerned 
with the elaboration of a systematic theoretical framework for des­
cription of the general relationships of the empirical world. It is 
based on the assumption that there _ exist^ models, principles and 
laws that apply to generalised systems or their subclasses, irres­
pective of their particular kind, the nature of their component elements, 
and the relations of'forces' between them ( Van Bertallanffy, 1956).
1
General systems theory attempts to make assertions applicable to all 
systems, whether physical or behavioural.The principal points of the 
idea of a system are: (a) relationships between a system and its environ­
ment; (h) interaction between several systems; and (c) interdependence 
between the various parts of the system (31alock, 1959). I have used 
the systems concept as an approach to organisation change, that is, 
that local government could not remain static, unreformed while its 
environment - social, political, cultural, technological, economic - 
was changing.
The Structural-Functional approach emphasises cross-disciplinary 
research and attempts to study political systems within a wider theo­
retical framework. -Almond and Coleman's (1960, pp.3-64) 'input- 
output' model is based on the central concept of 'system* involving an 
integration of both structures and functions. The following are the 
main features of their 'input-output' model: (a) The political system 
is a sub-system of a certain culture, being distinguished from other 
sub-systems by incorporation of the mechanism for control of violence 
in the whole culture; (b) all political systems have structures and 
functions. Political structures are multi-functional. Comparison of 
structures of various cultures is Insufficient, because the signifi­
cance of a structure lies in its functioning; (c) political systems are 
mixed systems in the cultural sense. Formal-legal aspects, and diffuse 
and particularistic aspects are combined in the political structure; 
and (d) input functions in political systems include political 
socialisation and recruitment, interest articulation, interest 
aggregation and political communication. This approach is invaluable 
to my analysis, for if local government is a sub-system of the poli­
tical system which is a sub-system of the whole culture, it means then 
that local government must be reformed as the whole system changes.
The Comparative Public Administration approach as elabora­
ted by Riggs (JL962) adopts ’ecology' as its basic concept. He elabo­
rates a wide conceptual framework for constructing sub-models in 
relation to various aspects of both Western and non-Western societies.
He designates the models of modem, traditional and developing 
countries as 'refracted', 'fused', and 'prismatic' respectively. He 
goes on to identify three main characteristics of the prismatic society: 
heterogeneity, formalism and overlapping. 'Heterogeneity' refers to 
coexistence of traditional and modern institutions, which produces 
mixed administrative structures and new patterns of bureaucratic behaviour, 
'Formalism' refers to the degree of discrepancy between norms and 
realities, between'the laws of the statute book' and 'the actual 
behaviour of the official'. 'Overlapping' is reflected by a structural 
d^lity of formally differentiated structure on the one hand, for 
example government offices, parliament, markets, and traditional undif­
ferentiated structures such as family, religious bodies, castes. This 
approach proved useful for local administrative reform study in general 
and development administration as that of Nigeria in particular. This 
approach influenced my Chapter 2 where I had to clarify the histo­
rical, traditional, cultural^etc* differences between Nigeria and 
Britain as a starting point in the formulation of my theoretical 
design for the cross-cultural comparative study.
A combination of decision theory, communication theory, group 
theory and motivational theory forms the central theme of modem organi­
sational theory. The sociological orientation to organisation theory 
is associated with the 'social system approach' of Parsons (J.956).
From this viewpoint a useful way is to consider them as social systems 
of interdependent parts within the broader system of society. According 
to Parsons' conception, all social systems must solve four basic 
problems: (a) adaptation - the accommodation of the system to the demands
of the environment; Cb) goal achievement - the defining of objectives 
and the mobilisation of resources to attain them; (c) integration - 
establishing and organising a set of relations among the member units 
of the system that serve to unify them into a single entity; and 
(d) latency - the maintenance of the system’s motivational and cultural 
patterns. Parsons views a formal organisation as a major mechanism in 
modern societies for mobilizing power in the interest of achieving 
collective objectives. However, each formal organisation is also a 
social system for itè own right with sub-systems for the solution of 
the four basic problemsmentioned above.
Argyris (1959) adopts the system concept for organisation study, 
examines the basic and attains an organisational equilibrium properties 
of social organisations and suggests that organisation models should 
strive toward understanding the patterning of all the relevant parts, 
as well as the nature of each part. He defines an organisation as 
a plurality of parts, each achieving specific objective(js); maintaining 
itself through interrelatedness with the other parts ; simultaneously 
adapting to the external environment; and maintaining thereby the inter­
related state on the parts.
An amalgam of these approaches provides me with the following 
conceptual framework for my analysis of local government reform in 
Britain and Nigeria:
a) Local government administration is a sub-system of the society 
in general, and the political system in particular. It and its reform 
are constantly affected by its ecology and it in turn reacts;
b) in Nigeria, the boderline between local government and other sub­
systems is ill-defined, not being clearly established by formal legal 
norms or by shared conventions;
c) local administrative system consists of interdependent parts 
with interacting patterns. These parts include political leadership, 
organisation members, formal organisation, informal work-groups and
6
finally, the environmental systems which have a direct impact upon 
local government. The most influential among environmental systems 
are the political system which consists of the decision-making body, 
political parties and interest groups, the public at large and to 
some extent the judiciary, the social system, the economic system 
and the culture at large;
d) local government is integrated into the whole system through 
various processes, such as the public policy making process, the com­
munication process, and built-in equilibrium mechanisms which exist 
in every organisation. Local government strives to attain a balance 
among the various forces, political, organisational and personal, 
operating within and upon it;
e) local government has in-puts and out-puts across its boundary, 
as well as a feedback pattern. It takes in political and public de­
mands and supports, and produces authoritative policies, administrative 
actions, and public services (Hasten, 1961). The feedback pattern is
a self moderating mechanism acting by transmission of information 
between local government and the environment. The information obtained 
by the feedback loop enables local government to respond to political 
and public demands, and alters its behaviour accordingly;
f) changes in other parts of the system must go hand in hand with 
changes in local government system lest it becomes malA^usted. Dis­
crepancy between the whole and the part leads to defects which must 
be rectified by administrative reform;
g) local government reform affects the formal organisation, work- 
patterns and standard procedure, status positions, interpersonal and 
group relationships, behaviour patterns, as well as the administrative 
process, public policy making, co-ordination, control, communications, 
etc. ;
h) the process of reorganisation must be integrated with mobilisation
of political and public support and with gaining acceptance of the 
local government officials and officers. The planning process involves 
political and psychological aspects, as well as administrative aspects ; 
and
i) reform is a continuous process as internal and/or external cir­
cumstances change. Local government therefore has to be reviewed 
constantly, modified and readjusted to new developments.
This thesis is divided into ten chapters. In Chapter 1,1 give 
some of the advantages which will be derived from a comparative study 
of this nature. I then go on to a literature review of administrative 
reform theories. Administrative reform is a continuous activity, a 
process, and I have treated the local government reforms in Nigeria 
and Britain in sequential trends. The first stage in the sequence is 
’Diagnosis’ or ’Aware of the need for Reform’. The second is ’Formulation 
of Objectives and Strategies of Administrative Reform’. The third and 
fourth stages are ’Implementation’ and ’Evaluation’ respectively. I 
conclude^ the chapter by formulating a number of hypothetical questions 
which were tested in the body of the thesis, such as :Was local 
government reform necessary in Nigeria and Britain because unchanging 
social values could no longer be realised through an outdated admini­
strative system? Or had values changed so that reform was needed?
That is, was administrative reform necessary because the administra­
tion could not keep abreast of development? Can a developing country 
CNigeria) and a developed one (Britain) have similar reform objectives 
and strategies? How valid is the assertion that there can be no reform 
strategy with universal applicability? How true is Lee’s hypothesis 
that time and leadership are two crucial variables in reform imple­
mentation? Is it true that the greater the comprehensiveness, complexity, 
and magnitude of changes, the lesser the probability of implementa­
tion? How objective can an evaluation of a reform be? Must we base our
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evaluation on the reformer’s goal or the people's feelings and attitudes? 
That is, whose definition of 'success' should we accept? Do the end 
products of the reforms contribute to the stated goals such as de­
mocracy, efficiency, national stability and economic development? Did 
the reformers stick to the reform objectives?
Before going into the aforementioned sequential treatment of local 
administrative reform, however, I give a brief historical background 
of local government in both, countries in Chapter 2. I am comparing two 
administrative systems which are separated from each other by history, 
tradition, culture, peoples, socio-economic and political environment, 
among other things. Clarification of these issues is a necessary 
starting point in a cross-cultural comparative study. Thus in order 
to understand the changing structure of local government in Nigeria 
and Britain, and the origins of their ailments and criticism, it was 
pertinent to give a brief historical description of local government 
in both countries.
My line of argument is that a number of changes - social, economic, 
technological and political - had taken place in both countries since 
the beginning of this century and especially since the Second World 
War while the structure of local government had remained relatively 
static. I believe that because there was no corresponding change in 
the structure, local government in both countries became maladjusted 
and obsolete. Chapters 3 and 4 detail these changes which include the 
following: increase in population and urbanisation; growth in size and 
type of clientele served by local government; changes in problems, 
needs and demands of the people; new technology, new equipment and 
advancing knowledge; advances in medicine; expansion of educational 
facilities and changing and usually rising qualifications of personnel; 
increased local government functions; the growth of communications; 
the franchise; increased centralisation; the intrusion of party politics
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in local government; and the rise of the professional officer in 
local government.
These changes, I argue in the thesis, were responsible for the 
criticisms and 'defects’ of local government in Nigeria and Britain. 
Chapter 5 catalogues the views of critics who believe that the 
boundary problem formed the mediety of local government defects while 
other problems as those pertaining to democracy, efficiency, central 
control and councillor calibre arose mainly because of the defective 
structure. For the sake of my analysis, I reduce the defects which were 
identified by the Royal Commission on Local Government Reform in 
England 1966-69 and the Federal Government of Nigeria to four broad ones. 
First, there were too many too small authorities, lacking the areas, 
population and resources to provide the specialised staff, 
equipment and institutions needed by increasingly technical and complex 
services, and catchment areas were too small to provide the necessary 
standards of service to the growing numbers of minority groups needing 
public help. In northern Nigeria, however, it was felt that the native 
authorities were too big and therefore remote, undemocratic and 
'ungovernable'. Secondly, the existing areas of local government did 
not fit the facts of social life. The obsolete division of town 
and country took no account of their interdependency and in particular 
the division between county boroughs and counties 'builds into the 
system a division of interest where, in fact, there is a common 
interest'. Thirdly, it was believed that this fragmentation meant that 
the citizens did not feel that local government units reflected 
anything meaningful in their daily lives. Local government areas did 
not correspond to what they regarded as communities. And so they grew 
apathetic. Fourthly, the division of local government into competing 
authorities, unable to combine in a common front, and their inadequate 
areas Cexcept in northern Nigeria), meant that the central government was
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increasing its control, and was likely to remove more functions from un­
reformed local government, leaving it with few important activities 
and increasingly unattractive to able people, either officials or 
members, to serve. This relates to the calibre of councillors and 
the local government staff. The low calibre of course meant that 
the authorities were ineffective and inefficient. These problems were 
said to be compounded by party politics and corruption, especially in 
Nigeria. It should be noted that the views of critics are just pre­
sented in this Chapter and I do not superimpose my views on theirs (my 
views are analysed in Chapter 8) except in a few cases where the paucity 
of critical materials on Nigeria leads me to supplement what was available 
with my own experiences and empirical findings.
In Chapter 6, I crystallise the 1974 reform objectives in Britain 
and those of the 1976 reform in Nigeria into three main goals:
Functions and Size, Democracy, and Efficiency. In Nigeria, however, 
the objectives included national stability and socio-economic develop­
ment. I also discuss the main differences in the strategies of both 
countries to local government reform.
The implementation of these reform objectives are outlined in 
Chapter 7. In Chapter 8 I evaluate the whole process of local govern­
ment reform in Nigeria and Britain. I also try to answer the hypo­
thetical questions I set myself in Chapter 1 and at the same time 
present my views on some of the assertions generally made by critics 
and theorists.
In Chapter 9 I not only present a number of general reco­
mmendations which should help in the attainment of reform objectives 
in any future reform efforts, but I also try to expound my own hy­
pothesis which I believe would enhance participation in local affairs 
and help to reduce local government burden. Furthermore, my own 
propositions should give the ordinary people practical experience
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of self-reliance and their ability to create their own solutions to 
the problems they face. All these advantages and many more which I 
identified in Chapter 9 can be achieved through the concept of com­
munity development either by creating community councils or neighbour­
hood councils in Britain, or by integrating the age-set institution 
into the system of local government in Nigeria. And I suggest that 
the creation of growth pole centres would enhance the efficiency of 
such an integration of our traditional institution of age-set and the 
modern quintessence of local government. My propositions may seem 
bold, broad and may be even vulnerable, but they are nonetheless 
valuable. Public administration is a science which must always be 
open to suggestions which may be productive of knowledge. Scientists 
speculate and guess, they are intuitive, all of which is part of the 
'context of discovery'. After all, wisdom does not come to him who 
gapes at nature with an empty head.
Finally, in the 'Conclusion', I summarise some of the themes 
which I have developed in the preceding chapters, elucidate further 
some of the answers to the hypothetical questions in Chapter 1, and 
suggest ideas which I feel need to be developed if we are to progress 
in our understanding of local government reform.
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CHAPTER ONE
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE 
THEORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
INTRODUCTION
What then are the methods of the social sciences?
All the various methods employed may be grouped under one 
term: COMPARISON. The single fact means nothing to us;
we accumulate facts that seem akin; we classify and 
reclassify them; discarding superficial and accidental 
similarities as we discover deeper substantial identities.
We accumulate and compare facts from our own and from 
foreign countries; we accumulate facts from the immediate 
and more remote past, and compare them with each other and with 
present facts. Statistics, comparative legislation, history - 
these are means and models of accumulating facts for comparison... 
Of all these anxiliary sciences, the most important is history.
All other methods of comparative study may be said to operate 
on a single plane - the plane of the present. History gives 
to the Social Sciences the third dimension and thus indefinitely 
increases the range of comparison. But it does far more than 
this. To the application of the historical method we owe the 
discovery that social institutions persist and at the same time 
change from generation to generation and from century to 
century (Smith, 1886, pp.4-5).
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: without raising the
general questions involved in comparative public administration, such 
as its evolution, we shall first outline some of the advantages of 
cross-national comparative analysis. It is only through cross­
national comparison that we can penetrate the many ambiguities and 
confusions in the theoretical writing about local government reform.
A comparison illuminates aspects of each system. After all, it 
is interesting to know not only what a system is, but also what it 
is not, and why it is not. Secondly, we will give a detailed 
analysis of the theory of administrative reform. This is important 
not only because it will enable us to measure the success or failure of
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local government reforms in Britain and Nigeria, but also we will
fbe able to determine how far both countries have conformed (or 
deviated) from the theory of administrative reform process in their 
local government reorganizations. Furthermore, we will be in a 
position to test the universal applicability or otherwise of the 
theory of reform. That is, does the theory of administrative 
reform apply equally to a developed country like Britain and a 
developing country like Nigeria? This will help us to explore some 
of the limitations of our 'taken-for-granted knowledge' about 
local government reform.
SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPARATIVE STUDIES
Without going into the general advantages of comparative 
studies, we can say, for our purposes here, that a comparative 
analysis can make a major contribution towards an improved 
understanding of the way in which different countries' institution 
of public administration actually works. Such studies can also 
lead to a better understanding of the workings of public administration 
in one's own country. That is, in order that reasons peculiar to 
one country are not simply presented as the course of particular 
administrative activities, some elements of comparison are necessary 
to explain the situation. 'To know thyself, compare thyself to 
others'. The comparative approach is an eye-opener to a people's 
self-recognition and to its taking a stand. It is not accidental 
that great civilizations, like the Renaissance, were developed at the 
crossroads of mankind and articulated by the meeting of contrasting 
systems. This encounter alone made an awakening Western Europe 
fully aware of her own character and qualities. It is therefore 
significant
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that the study of public administration must become a much 
more broadly based discipline, resting not on a narrowly 
defined knowledge of techniques and processes, but rather 
extending to the varying historical, sociological, economic 
and other conditioning factors that give public administration 
its peculiar stamp in each country (Dahl, 1947,p.11.),
Furthermore, comparative public administration studies can be
seen as having a political application for the improvement and extension
of the machinery of government in a particular country. That is,
public servants are interested in the way in which foreign countries
deal with the structure and content of administration and with
administrative reform. Foreign experience can contribute some
ideas to solve the administrative problems of one's country. Politics
has changed from an almost static preservation of carefully balanced
positions to the interplay of dynamic drives of unpredictable forces.
Hence our concern has turned away from a merely descriptive analysis
of formal, legalistic, and constitutional forms to a prime
consideration of the processes of decision-making and political dynamics
especially administrative reform. Thus we stand to make an
invaluable gain in a comparative study of local government reform
in Nigeria and Britain.
Local government in Nigeria and Britain, for instance, are 
providers of services. They are also democratic agencies for the 
ordering of local priorities and the implementation of local demands. 
Both are essential mechanisms for relieving overloaded central 
government of some of the many services it is expected to provide.
They help to legitimise decisions made at central level. Furthermore, 
they are massive spenders; in Britain, for example, between 1962 
and 1974, local government expenditure rose from 9.2 per cent to
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12.4 per cent of the gross domestic product. In Nigeria, local 
government authorities spend 7 per cent of the nationally derived 
public revenue. Lastly, they are recruiting agencies for the 
local political elites.
Local government systems in both countries also share a number 
of problems. They are faced with erosion of autonomy; increasing 
State intervention, and the growth of national planning objectives 
and agencies. Another major problem of both systems concerns 
efficiency. Finally, they share the problem of democracy at the 
local level, that is,representativity of the local elites, and 
participation.
Both systems have their differences which are rooted in the 
social environment, in the historical traditions and conventions 
which underpin each system, in the political and economic setting, 
and in the institutional arrangements of each country. Despite these 
differences and similarities, both countries have been obsessed with 
the need to reform local government.
THE THEORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 
Introduction
Administrative reform is a universal thing, and in contrast to 
'change*, it is man-made and deliberate. Goodenough rightly 
observed that "as long as humanity lasts, men will be reformers... 
endeavouring to change others in order to maintain or create desired 
situations for themselves, or to change themselves in order to 
accommodate to unyielding circumstances or to realise a new dream"
(1963,p.15 ). Politicians, civil servants and scholars of public
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administration have always expressed their concern about the 
inadequate adaptation of the machinery of government to societal 
and political needs. Administrative reform, which is the panacea 
to this 'inadequate adaptation', may take the form of a piecemeal 
reorganization within an arm of the administrative machinery, 
designed to adjust the relationships between a bureaucracy and 
other elements in a society or within the bureaucracy itself, or 
a large-scale overhaul Of the system in-toto. As administrative 
systems change slowly and in a conservatively incremental manner, 
natural response and adaptation are inadequate in meeting the 
challenge of development. Something faster and more radical is 
needed, namely, organized programmes of administrative reform.
But the term, 'administrative reform', has been much used 
and abused. Writers on administrative reform have failed to
reach a consensus on its definition and on a theoretical framework 
under which it can be studied and analysed. It is still at a 
pre-paradi^matic stage "marked by a plethora of competing schools, 
a polyglot of languages, and accordingly, a confusion of logics. 
There is neither a common research tradition nor the necessary 
consensus for a common field of inquiry. Each of the competing 
schools questions the others, adventurism is rampant, and commonly 
accepted standards of control do not exist" (Landau, 1966,p.39).
And recently, questions have been asked as to the adequacy and 
appropriateness of the term 'administrative reform' itself and 
suggestions have been oféered to substitute it by using a more 
comprehensive term like 'reorganization of the machinery of 
government' which is "a consciously induced and directed change in
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the machinery of government" (Leemans, 1976,p,8),
The study of administrative reform, like other social science
subjects, is handicapped by what Leemans calls 'a jungle of
concepts and terminology':
Not only do students in the same field have difficulty in 
communicating with each other, but laymen cannot understand 
the reservations academics have about each other's work 
and they are puzzled by the different uses of the same 
term in referring to vaguely related phenomena. The lack 
of a universally shared and standardized vocabulary is 
common to all social sciences, with the same consequence - 
namely that semantic confusion leads to errors of a 
theoretical and explanatory nature (Ca i'd en.,.. 1970, pp.43-4).
The dissatisfaction and frustrations that have developed over
the years about the use of the term 'administrative reform' can
be attributed to several factors. One of the rhetorics that is
often heard in any reform effort is the 'rationality concept':
that administrative reform is intended to improve upon the existing
situation by aiming to create a good administration which clearly
/
has a normative element. Contrary to these pions wishes, 
what actually happens in many real situations is entirely a 
different thing. Many reformers have no other purpose than to 
strengthen the position of certain power holders, and reform actors 
are strongly inspired by influence and power motives (Leemans,
1976, p.8). The traditional use of the term has left an 
impression that a clear-cut distinction can be made between 
changes in the bureaucracy and those in the organization of the 
political executive organs. As one writer aptly says, "it may well 
be that administrative reform has lost its grip on the imagination 
of the political scientists because it has ignored the conceptual
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problems involved in adapting static models of administrative 
perfection to dynamic political reality" (Montgomery, 1969,p.427),
A good number of the so-called administrative reforms have implied 
considerable changes in the structure and processes of political 
executive organs and in their relationship with the administrative 
machinery (Leemans, 1976, p.7). It has been observed that changes 
in power structures within and among political executive organs induce 
changes in the administrative machinery, many of which are inspired 
by purely political considerations (Groves, 1976, pp.99-113).
Recent discussions show considerable awareness of the need to 
view administrative reform as a sub-system of a wider societal 
system which includes a political sub-system. Administrative reform 
is part of societal reform, and the interactions between and among 
the administrative and political sub-systems are crucial and to 
a large extent determine the setting up of objectives, strategies, 
and probabilities of the success of the implementation of the 
administrative reform proposals. Part II of Leeman's 
The Management of Change in Government is a catalogue of case studies 
about administrative reform, and the experiences of some developing 
countries point to a dilemma which has not been adequately treated 
(see Moharir, 1976, pp.238-51; Hadisumarto and Siegel, 1976, pp.252-71; 
Castro, 1976, pp.185-212; Brewar-Carias, 1976,pp.213-237). On 
the one hand, there is a growing need to undertake comprehensive 
reform programmes to keep in pace with complex social, economic and 
political situations which most developing countries must cope with 
in order to survive let alone prosper. On the other hand, 
comprehensive reforms have been found to be extremely difficult to
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implement.
Another factor which has obstructed the formulation of a 
theoretical framework with universal usage is the place of 
contextuality in the success or failure of any reform. Developing 
countries differ vastly among themselves regarding their administrative 
systems (that is, nature, composition, and capability), political 
systems (that is, absolute monarchy, military rule, dictatorship, 
one-party rule, multi-party democratic system), economic conditions 
(that is, stages of economic development), and cultural heritage.
These wide-ranging differences, and, consequently, the futile 
attempts to develop an all-embracing and universal strategy to study 
administrative systems and reforms have been widely recognised.
Lawrence and Lorsch (1969,p.88) conclude that an optimal change 
model for a particular case should be "conditional on the task to be 
done, the environmental conditions to be handled, and.the 
characteristics of the individual contributors involved"(emphasis mine).
In fact Basil and Cook opine that a "categorization of 
environmental states is a prerequisite to developing strategies for 
change" (1974, p.205). Dror hypothesizes that "the preferable 
mix of administrative reform strategies is in the main a function of 
the concrete circumstances of each particular reform" (1976,p.127).
Cohen emphasizes the uniqueness of each situation, which results in 
the demand by each to use its own approach suited to the particular 
situation at hand and builds strategic models on the basis of 
three variables; task, organizational form, and personal 
characteristics (1976, pp.165-181). Esman (1972), in his 
authoritative analysis of administrative reform in Malaysia, agrees 
with the view that each situation requires its own strategy.
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The simple fact, however, that there seems to be no strategies 
of universal applicability does not exclude the design of strategic 
model for the management of induced change in government which have 
some degree of validity for similar reform situations and objects. 
Cohen (1976, pp.165-181), Lee (1976, pp.114-125), and Lawrence 
and Lorsch (1969, p.89) provide typologies which suggest that a 
broad model of reform strategy can be designed to study divergent 
types of reform situations.
What is Administrative Reform?
We stated at the beginning that there has been no corpus 
of systematic theory either about the )cind of administrative changes 
which should be engineered or about the methods by which they should 
be implemented. Thus administrative reform, as a term, has been 
defined differently by different writers depending on their focus of 
attention. Thinking on administrative reform can be traced during 
the post-war years when systematic efforts were made to export 
technical help and know-how to the developing countries from the 
developed ones especially the United States in order to strengthen 
the administrative capabilities of the former, but intellectual 
discussion did not become very important until the sixties. In 
spite of the growing attention in recent years, administrative reform 
still remains conceptually deficient and elusive. This can be 
attributed partially to the inability of the people writing on it to 
differentiate the term from other related terms. The theorists, 
in order to look creative, spend a lot of time trying to disprove 
other theorists, while devoting little time to producing fine 
academic theories. Moreover the mass of 'bad' theories threatens
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the recognition of 'good' theories, Landau (1965,pp.7-0) warns
that metaphorical schemes
can neither be justified nor invalidated and they remain outside 
the scientific domain quite impregnable to the tests of 
experience. Such transfers not only cluster our vocabularies 
but they are pregnant sources of myth....
He further warns against "the mixing of models which not only
obscures imagery and confuses meaning but....frequently leads to
contradictory results" and may lead to nonsense results as well as
erroneous conclusions.
Furthermore, Caiden says that the over-abundance of theories is
due to pride and independence. "Independence creates a random
approach to common problems, with a resulting reluctance to follow
somebody else's definitions and usages. The semantic confusion
produces a mass of terminologies that pass as new theories" (Caiden,
1970, p.3.).
It is evident that the term 'administrative reform' has acquired 
widespread usage and recognition in the literature pertaining to 
government and public administration. The rationality concept 
or moral purpose of administrative reform has been emphasized. Thus 
the term has been applied to all improvements in administration:
(a) to general administrative overhauls in difficult situations,
(b) to specific remedies for 'maladministration', (c) to any 
suggestion for better government, and (d) even to the intentions
of self-styled administrative reformers (see, for example, Finan and 
Dean,1957, pp.437-452; Siegel, 1966, pp.45-55; Singh, 1955, 
pp.224-239; Martin, 1965). For instance, Montgomery defines 
administrative reform as "a political process designed to adjust the
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relationship between a bureaucracy and other elements in a 
society, or within the bureaucracy itself....both the purposes of 
reforms and the evils addressed vary with their political 
circumstances" (Montgomery, 1967, p.l.). Caiden defines it as 
"the artificial inducement of administrative transformation against 
resistance" (Caiden, 1970, p.8). According to him, administrative 
reform contains three interrelated properties: (a) moral purpose,
which emphasizes the importance and necessity of improving the 
status quo by removing alleged faults; (b) artificial transformation 
which points to a radical departure from existing arrangements and 
policies. 'It is a form of creative destruction in that an old order 
is broken down to pave the way for a new order'; and (c) administrative 
resistance, that is, when opposition is assumed (Caiden, 1970, 
pp.66-7).
Caiden (1970, pp.57-8, 65-7) also distinguishes administrative 
reform from administrative change by saying that the latter is a 
self-adjusting organizational response to fluctuating conditions while 
the need for the former arises from the latter because of the 
malfunctioning of the natural processes of administrative change.
Dror says that administrative reform is "directed change of 
the main features of an administrative system" (1976,p.127). This 
definition gives the term an objective reference and an ordinal scale 
of measurement. His two principal attributes of reform are goal 
orientation (directed, conscious) and the comprehensiveness of change, 
so that reform can be considered in terms of its scope (number of 
administrative components affected) and the rate of change (time 
required to bring about the desired changes). To Hahn-Been Lee,
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administrative reform is a complex process in which many factors 
interact and affect one,another and whose results can be found over 
a considerable period of time (Lee, 1970, pp.77-89), Lee broadens 
his ideas about administrative reform and proceeds to show its link 
with innovation by declaring that administrative reform involves 
new values and modes of behaviour to accommodate new ideas within 
an organizational context. This is what Leemans (1976,p.8) 
calls its latent apostolic nature. Administrative reform is therefore 
considered normative as it calls for improvement upon the existing 
order. "And there is little question that national development is the 
primary goal of many developing countries"(emphasis mine) (Lee,1976,p.114).
Administrative reform is generally used to describe activities 
which actually go far beyond its salient meaning. It is conceived 
as directed action. Administrative reform is defined here as 
those efforts which call for or lead to major changes in the 
bureaucratic system of a country intended to transform the existing >
and established practices, structures and behaviours within it.
To a number of scholars, the terms administrative development 
and administrative reorganization are synonymous with administrative 
reform. This is not surprising as reorganization literally means 
organizing some things differently from what was the case in the past. 
Reform has literal origins in the giving of new and different form to 
something, and translating those terms in organization vocabulary 
signifies new organizational structure. As Mosher notes.
Reform has a strong normative connotation. Reorganization 
though somewhat restricted and precise in its definition, has 
come to acquire nearly the same meaning in the American culture, 
both in its descriptive and in its normative senses(Mosher,1965,p.129)
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Reorganization, therefore, is conscious, planned, intended, deliberate
attempt to change the existing state of the system (Mosher,1967,p.497).
Khan defines administrative development as the growing
capability of the administrative system to cope continuously with
difficulties created by social change toward the goal of achieving
socio-economic and political progress (Khan, 1975, p.149). To
Riggs (1971, pp.25-6), administrative development reflects the
capacity of administrative systems to make choices and to exercise
discretion to bring about environmental changes by deliberate programmes
and self-conscious decisions.
The objective of any reform effort and administrative development
programme is to bring a change in the present state of the
administrative system which will enhance its capacity to undertake
and perform complex functions as they emerge. In a nutshell,
it is agreed that it is through administrative reform that we can
achieve greater administrative development:
First, reform proposals challenge bureaucratic inertia and 
reactionary administrators and although defence mechanisms 
may temporarily suppress chcinge, things can never quite be 
the same and peace tokens have to be made if the situation 
is to be kept in hand. Second, reform programmes attract 
enterprising administrative talent and provide valuable 
experience for a new generation of administrative aspirants.
Third, reformers promote badly needed administrative 
modernization which is likely to set off a chain reaction 
in functional reforms as changes in techniques, skills, and 
attributes in specialized field seem more attainable than 
possibly the harder changes to carry through in administration. 
Fourth, constructive progressive forces find openings for 
their respective creative talent in empirical problem­
solving, particularly the kind presented in administrative 
reform. Fifth, any effort to transform administrative 
systems is to be commended in the face of official indifference, 
technical ignorance, political intransigence and public 
apathy (Caiden, 1973,p.343).
For our purposes in this thesis, we define administrative reform 
as those efforts which call for or lead to major changes in the
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bureaucratie system of a country intended to transform the 
existing and established practices, structures and behaviours 
within it. This definition helps us to distinguish the post-war
'tinkering changes' from the major reforms of 1974 and 1976 in 
Britain and Nigeria respectively.
Administrative Reform as a Process
Administrative reform is a continuous activity, a process, 
and we shall therefore study it in its sequential trend. Any study 
of administrative reform must begin with the understanding of the 
awareness of the need for reform and conclude with a discussion of the 
problems relating to the implementation of such efforts, that is, 














Figure 1.1: Source : Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969,p.89
Several advantages can be noted if administrative reform is 
considered a process. Reform is a process which carries with it
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wider implications than the content of the reform. In other
words, behavioural aspects are emphasized along with the structural 
ones to make a study of any administrative reform more exhaustive. 
Cohen emphasizes the role of the reformer in the process approach.
In reform, the medium is the message:
(a) the way the reformer goes about making changes is at least as 
important as the specific changes recommended;
(b) if a reformer wants to create more responsible, responsive 
and initiating civil servants, the reformer himself must begin 
immediately to behave that way. A splendid example of the 
physician healing himself - risk-taking and innovation beginning 
with the reformer right from the start of the reform movement;
(c) since reform is a process, the relationship between reformer 
and target becomes a central issue, not only for the initial 
structuring of the relationship, but also for the way in which the 
reformer goes about studying the problem, gathering information, 
coming to conclusions and making recommendations. The reformer 
must not only arrive at good answers, but must work in a way that 
is consistent with the desired changes (Cohen, 1976, pp.172-3). A 
process-oriented approach takes into account and gives high priority 
to the human variable in the reform. At the same time, it demands 
that reformers must be more knowledgeable, concerned and involved
to bring about the relevant changes.
Caiden disagrees with the notion that process approach is most 
suitable to study administrative reform. Instead, he opts for a 
systems approach because he believes that "reform of any administrative
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system should begin with an analysis of the system rather than an 
analysis of the reform process" (Caiden, 1973a, p.27). Caiden 
thinks that the process approach is too narrow in its scope and in 
the end is uncJole to consider sources and dynamics of administrative 
behaviour within the context of an administrative system. Contrary 
to Caiden's thinking, it can be argued that the process approach is 
comprehensive in its scope and does include and focus on the 
interaction between and among individuals and organizations and 
thereby throws light on the dynamics of administrative behaviour.
Goodenough identifies six major stages in the process of 
administrative reform:
(a) INSPIRATION, the initial reformulation of the new social order, 
which usually comes to some individual in a flash of insight into 
social and moral problems;
(b) COMMUNICATION, whereby the visionary reveals his ideas to others 
and seeks their co-operation;
(c) ORGANIZATION of converts, through which the prophet reaches 
a wider audience;
(d) ADAPTATION TO RESISTANCE, wherein "even mild disapproval or lack 
of enthusiasm is likely to be interpreted as evidence of hostility 
toward the movement and its aims";
(e) ENACTING a programme, in which concrete steps are taken systematically 
to alter the conditions of life, and to forge a new order; and
(f) ROUTINIZATION, when the programme and its results are successful 
and the new pattern of living becomes routine (Goodenough,1963,p.286).
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Mosher (1965,pp.142-6), following Goodenough, identifies 
six sequential steps also:
(a) INCREASE OF TENSION, when within the administration, dissatisfaction 
and frustration intensify;
(b) SPARK, when some particular event ignite the already charged 
atmosphere;
(c) REORGANIZATION STUDIES carried out by investigatory groups about 
what should be done;
(d) THE REACHING OF DECISION, 'the consultation, negotiating, and 
decision phase', which may coincide with the previous stage
or await feasibility studies;
(e) FEASIBILITY STUDIES, which consists of translating recommendations 
into practical administrative techniques and planning implementation; 
and
(f) IMPLEMENTATION.
For our purpose here, the six major sequential steps in 
administrative reform identified by Goodenough and Mosher will be 
combined and reduced to four broad phases:
(a) Awareness of need or diagnosis;
(b) Formulation of goals and objectives. Strategy and Tactics or 
Planning Action;
(c) Implementation of reforms or Implementing Action; and
(d) Evaluation.
Each of these steps is characterized by the need for top-level decisions 
and adequate resources for its fulfilment. The initial decision to 
make a global diagnosis is not enough. For this diagnosis to serve as 
the basis for a programme of action, it must be followed by a further 
decision fixing priorities on the basis of the needs considered most
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urgent by the reformers. In some cases, this decision will permit 
the instrumentation of the infrastructure for reform mechanisms, 
but new and specific decisions are required in order to implement the 
recommendations formulated by such mechanisms,  ̂ Each step changes 
the preceding situation, and constitutes definite progress that 
calls in turn for new decisions. What is called for is actually 
a chain of decisions as in Figures 1.2 and 1.3
Figure 1.2
AWARENESS OF NEED
EVALUATION FORMULATION OF GOALS
AND STRATEGY
IMPLEMENTATION
AWARENESS OF THE NEED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
According to Lawrence and Lorsch, a diagnosis should indicate 
the symptoms which have to be translated into a "coherent picture 
on the basis of which action can be planned and carried out with a 
reasonable assurance that objectives will be achieved" (Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1969, p.85). Thus administrative reform is needed where 
change is insufficient to keep an administration abreast of development, 
and performance gaps appear - that is, "a significant discrepancy 
exists between what it is doing and what it 'ought' to be doing"



































reform are the following;
(a) The take-over of power through revolution or otherwise, by 
political groups who differ strongly from those previously in office;
(b) (Semi-) revolutionary developments inspired by violent 
dissatisfaction with the operations of the machinery of government 
including the bureaucracy;
(c) Grave developments in the environment such as war (or threat
of war), economic depression, sharp demands which have strong political 
support (for example, for the autonomy of parts of the country);
(d) The need for drastic cuts in government expenditure;
(e) 'Maladministration' which does not clearly affect the relationship 
with the environment but is perceived as excessive annoyance by groups 
within the government (Leemans, 1976, pp.16-17). Thus, the 
awareness of administrative reform arises when the components of an 
administrative system become maladjusted.
Combination of a number of different and identifiable factors 
over a period of time will push for major structural and behavioural 
changes to rectify the defects in the existing administrative system. 
These are:
Growth in the size of the clientele served; changes in problems and 
needs and, therefore, in organizational programmes and responsibilities; 
changing philosophy as to the proper responsibilities of governments; 
(result of) new equipment and advancing knowledge; changing and 
usually rising qualifications of personnel (that is, increasing need 
for specialists); basic policy changes at top level forces change 
(Mosher, 1967, pp.494-96).
This phase (Diagnosis)not only calls for an analysis and diagnosis
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of the administrative situation but also the selection and 
indication by authorities of administrative reform of priorities 
within this framework; and the determination of means (normative 
instruments and bodies responsible for orientation, co-ordination, 
execution and evaluation of reforms) and measures (policies, programme 
and projects) with which to achieve the chosen objectives.
FORMULATION OF OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
Although administrative reform is universal, it is conditioned 
by a number of variables; specific local needs, availability 
of different resources, historic traditions and indigenous political 
culture. Before we can say that a reform is a success or 
otherwise, it is therefore necessary not only to consider these 
variables, but also we must clarify the aggregate goals of the 
administrative reform. When the awareness for reform is clearly 
felt and understood, the logical step that follows is to decide what 
needs to be done and how that can be accomplished. No reform 
process can be complete without a clear perception of the role of 
goals and strategies within it. There is a clear consensus among 
practitioners and academicians that desired goals for any administrative 
reform must be set as clearly and as early as possible. It is 
essential in order to determine the appropriate strategies. Also, 
without specification of goals, it will not be possible to determine 
the extent of success or failure of the reform.
Dror (1976, pp.129-130) mentions six paramount goal clusters that 
inform reforms ;
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,(a) Traditional 'administrative efficiency' in the sense of saving 
money through form simplification, procedure change, duplication 
reduction and through similar organization and methods approaches;
(b) changing a particular main component of the administrative 
system so as to meet some ideal image. This again includes a large 
variety of main goals such as: introduction of a merit civil service,* 
introduction of a planning-programming-budgetting system; moving 
towards automated data processing and integrated data and information 
banks;
(c) reduction of perceived weaknesses, such as corruption, favouritism, 
political spoils etc;
(d) adjusting the administrative system to advancing over-riding 
societal objectives, such as accelerated modernization;
(e) changing the division of labour (functions) between the 
administrative system and the political system. For instance, either 
in the direction of reducing the power of the senior civil service and 
making it a more obedient servant of the political process or increasing 
the professional autonomy of the administrative system and strengthening 
its influence on policy;
(f) changing the relations between the administrative system and the 
population or selected population segments. For instance, through 
relocation of decision centres ('centralization versus decentralization'), 
'democratization' in the sense of participation, and 'democratization'
in the sense of making the personnel composition more reflective of 
various population segments. Of course administrative reform can 
be for purely political motives, such as making administration serve 
as a scapegoat, gaining support through distributing spoils.
Dror rightly says that administrative reform is a multi-goal- 
oriented endeavour which necessitates categorization of objectives.
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Objectives can be divided into external and internal categories.
This typology has the advantage of indicating the nature of the reform 
suggested. Dror, following the same line of thinking, distinguishes 
between the two principal categories: (a) "intra-administration
directed goals which are primarily concerned with improving the 
administration, and (b) objectives dealing with the societal roles 
of the administrative system and its interrelation with other components 
of the policymaking system and even of society as a whole" (Dror,1976, 
p.130). Goal clusters, a,b,and c above are examples of goals which 
are intra-administration directed, while d,e and f are examples of 
administrative reform goals dealing with the societal roles of the 
administrative system, and with changing policies and programmes.
In many circumstances, internal and external goals remain closely 
interrelated and pose problems to efforts which intend to differentiate 
between them (see, for example, Mosher,1967,p.497). The former are 
usually set as means towards the greater attainment of external goals, 
that is, to realise certain societal situations or relationships, or 
to increase and improve outputs. External goals have been specified 
in general terms in administrative reform programmes in many countries. 
These mostly concern the overhauling of the administrative system to 
accelerate wide-ranging social and economic development. At the same 
time, political realities must be taken into consideration in setting 
objectives. Internal objectives have been associated with the 
attainment of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within an 
organizational context. Reduction of unnecessary governmental 
expenditure on trivial administrative activities has been another 
objective of administrative reform. All these are intended to bring 
about significant improvements in administrative systems.
Experience has shown that there is a lot of difference between 
formal or official goals and informal and individual goals of particular
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reformers which sometimes may be not only dissimilar but contradictory. 
Commenting on the Philippine experiences in administrative reform,
Dr.Josef Abueva charges that undeclared goals of reformers were personal 
advancement, empire-building, and elimination of rivals (Abueva,1970, 
pp.45-47). Caiden therefore draws some conclusions from the range of 
objectives and goals: (a) Reform objectives are not necessarily objective
and reform proposals are not necessarily subjective;
(b) complex radical reforms need more time and instruction to implement 
than simpler incremental reforms;
(c) initial steps in reform implementation are judged more critically 
than later stages, once expectations and promises seem to be in the 
process of realisation;
(d) reforms are more likely to be accepted (1) if they are tailored to 
local circumstances, implemented through existing institutions, and 
invite local participation (emphasis mine); (2) if existing institutions 
and practices are not condemned out of hand, that is, if attention is 
given to extolling the virtues of reform rather than the defects of the 
unreformed; and (3) if they are based on critical rather than uncritical 
nonoperationalism;
(è) it is easier to draft proposals and plans than to execute them.
The wider the range of reform sources the more likely that the proposals 
will not coincide (Caiden, 1970,pp.142-3).
Strategy
According to the United Nations Report, "the frequency with which 
administrative reform efforts had failed in the past demonstrated the 
difficulty of making them effective without good reform strategies and 
the importance of devising appropriate strategies to carry them out"
(United Nations, 1973, Vol.1,p.13). Strategy is one of those
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elements In the process of administrative reform whose significance
is well recognized, but at the same time little effort has been made
until recently to circumscribe it (see Chin and Benne, 1969,pp.32-59).
This problem is complicated by the 'elusiveness' of the concept, because
different reformers use different strategies. No two persons have
similar thoughts, experience, knowledge and values about what strategy
to employ for administrative reform. Though they examine identical
social phenomenon, they view it differently:
People will define the meaning of a situation differently, they 
will come up with different evaluations, they will derive or 
impute different norms and certainly they will feel about the 
situation in many, many different ways and intensities 
(Meadows, 1963, p.87).
The rejection of the validity of a universal strategy for the 
management of administrative reform is also emphasized by Leemans.
"The place and role of the machineries and their sub-systems in the 
politico-administrative system and in society at large, their internal 
structures and relationships, their political and administrative cultures 
and patterns of behaviour, vary too much to allow a strategy with 
universal applicability" (Leemans,1976, p.46). Similarly, Lawrence 
and Lorsch suggest that the desired reform model for a certain case 
should be conditional on the task to be done, the environmental conditions 
to be handled, and the characteristics of the individual contributors 
involved (1969,p.88). Dror hypothesises that "the preferable mix of
administrative reform strategies is in the main a function of the concrete 
circumstances of each particular reform" (Dror,1976,p.127).
The rejection of universal strategies should not stop us from 
designing strategic models for the management of administrative reform 
which have some degree of validity for similar reform situations and 
objects. Thus, Dror is one of the first scholars to undertake a 
thorough study of strategy in the context of administrative reform and
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to provide a conceptual framework for further elaboration and
clarification. He defines it as 'mega-policies' which lays down "the
framework of guidelines and the boundaries of policy space within which
operational and detailed policies are to be established and decisions
are to be made" (Dror, 1976,p.126). Strategy implies defining the
goal boundaries of a desired or intended activity, as opposed to
'tactics' which refer to details of policy programmes (Leemans,1976,
p.42; see also, Mosher,1967,p.502).
In conformity with our definition, strategies in the context of
local government reform must therefore deal with issues such as :
overall goals of administrative reforms; the boundaries of 
administrative reforms; preference in respect of time, risk, 
acceptability; choice between more incremental or more 
innovative reform; preference for more balanced versus more 
shock directed reforms; relevant assumptions on the future; 
theoretic (trait or explicit) assumptions on which the reform 
is based; resources available for the administrative reform; 
and the range of feasible reform instruments (Dror,1976,p.126).
Strategies have also been viewed from a sequential, logical angle
which presupposes careful consideration of several factors which sometimes
must be carried out simultaneously. These are as follows:
(a) Research and analysis of the current situation;
(b) analysis and discussion leading to general consensus on needs and goals;
(c) forecasting of the future setting of public administration, 
including the political, economic and social environment, and the 
probable availability of resources to administration, as well as to 
its reform;
(d) development of alternative plans of administrative reform; and 
analysis of their costs and benefits, including social costs and benefits;
(e) decision to proceed on best feasible plan;
(f) implementation;
(g) continuing feedback on consequences and modification of plan as 
indicated (Grosnick and Mosher,1973,pp.11-13.).
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In conclusion, we can say that the 'best' strategy for 
administrative reform is determined contextually, dependent on and 
dictated by the reform objectives, the 'human dimensions', and the 
special environment obtaining in a particular country; and the three 
most essential elements of strategy are: (a) determining the desired 
(provisional) situations and possible alternatives or variants;
(b) determining the means by which this situation should be achieved; 
and (c) fixing the time dimension, that is, the period within which the 
desired situation should be realised (Leemans,1976,p.46).
IMPLEMENTATION
Caiden (1976,p.142) calls the implementation stage the achilles 
heel of administrative reform because most reforms fail at this stage. 
Experiences of India and Pakistan are good examples (Moharir,1976, 
pp.238-51; Gorvine,1966). As all reforms entail not only structural 
changes but also changes in mental and moral attitudes, people normalfy 
try to resist their implementation because they "prefer the familiar 
to the unknown,...the tried to the untried, fact to mystery,the actual 
to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the convenient to the 
perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss" (Oakeshott,1962,p.l72). 
Moreover, any given organization which is internally integrated resists 
being changed and discourages changes in its context. "Survival is... 
the motif of any organization and stability is the sine qua non of 
organizational survival" (LePiere, 1954, p.329).
The age-old advice generally given to the reformer is to keep in 
mind the interests of politicians and various affected interests within 
the administrative system so as to obtain the support of these people 
to facilitate the implementation and success of the reforms. The 
blessing of political authorities and cooperation of civil servants
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(those who perceive real or imaginary threats that they will be 
adversely affected by the reform) are invaluable to overcome the 
greatest hurdles to the success of any reform effort. The difficult 
position of the reformer in the context of reform implementation is 
obvious :
The reformers remain outsiders to the situation they are trying 
to improve. They have no power, position, status to influence 
those who can change things or they have no access to people who 
do have influence, or they have no impact on people who have to 
be convinced. Even highly prestigious bodies invested with the 
task of reform discover that nobody else really has any intention 
of doing anything about their proposals and they are being used to 
bury a burning issue, not for remedial action. When reformers 
do something worthwhile to propose and action is intended, they find 
that administrative systems are extremely conservative, no matter 
what the recognised value of their suggestion (Caiden,1976,p.142).
The high attrition rate in the implementation of major administrative
reforms has been considered as one of the most complex and frustrating
problems faced by the scholars in the area. In response to the
situation, two things have happened. On the one hand, deliberate
attempts have been made to identify and analyse those factors and
situations which prevent the implementation of reforms. On the other
hand, strategies have been developed to facilitate the process of
implementation. As we said earlier on, the choice of strategies
depends on a host of factors, such as the formulated goals, the extent
of reform to be initiated, the nature of existing transformations within
society, and the intentions of the reformers - to carry out reform with
or without general consensus, with or without the use of force, and
through existing channels or otherwise.
Using case studies drawn from many countries in the continents
of Africa, Asia and Latin America, Caiden gives a list of factors and
situations which must not only be understood but avoided as these result
in the failure of major administrative reforms; A bad beginning;
imitation, not innovation; incorrect diagnosis; hidden intentions;
indecisive approach; faulty planning; unduly restrictive techniques and
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instrumentalities; inability to command resources; absence of 
feedback; no monitoring; evaluation ignored; and goal displacement 
(Caiden,1976,pp.145-164).
Lee is one of those few who have tried time and again to 
come up with a strategy which will increase the probability of success 
of any reform effort. He considers the degree of implementation as a 
function of the social environment,the political structure, the reform 
agents, the reform agency, and the reform strategy (Lee,1970,pp.77-89).
He also posits two reform implementation strategies; (a) the comprehensive, 
and (b) the selective. A comprehensive strategy can be implemented if 
the leadership of reform agents and the internal structure of the reform 
agency are strong and if the social environment and political structure 
are favourable. A selective strategy can be implemented if either;
(1) the leadership is strong but the situation is unfavourable, or
(2) the situation is favourable but the leadership is weak. It follows, 
then, if the leadership is weak and, at the same time, the situation is 
unfavourable, no strategy can be expected to be effective. In Lee's 
matrix, time and leadership are two crucial variables which deserve wider 
attention.
Lee (1976,pp.114-125) attempts to relate the types of reforms and 
the kinds of existing bureaucracies. He argues on the basis of the 
experience of many countries that programmatic reforms have better 
probabilities of success as these admirably suit the needs of closed 
bureaucracies which can be found in most of the developing countries.
In other words, to enhance the possibilities of implementation, 
reformers must have a clear understanding of the nature, type, and 
objective of reform as well as the stage of bureaucratic development, 
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Bhutan! goes farther than Lee and asserts that the creation of a 
conducive environment for the facilitation of the process of reform 
implementation presupposes the creation, sustenance and spread of 
appropriate attitudes in men who matter most - men who occupy positions 
in the administrative hierarchy from where the consequences of good or 
bad leadership emerge and permeate the entire structure (Bhutan!,1966, 
pp.612-17). Bhutan! suggests some ways by which reforms can be 
implemented with speed and effectiveness. These are: (a) implementors
must get involved in the process as early as practicable; (b) an adequate 
agency for follow-up action must be established; (c) the urge to 
improve must come from within (whether from an individual or from the 
organization where reform is introduced) to have lasting improvements; 
and (d) extreme care must be taken in the choice and training of 
personnel meant to undertake the implementation of reforms.
Backoff (1974,pp.85^94), through the use of an innovative framework, 
employs the characteristics of administrative reform to predict the 
prospect of success in implementing major administrative reforms.
The characteristics are: scope, magnitude of change, sequence of change,
goals or objectives, reform instrument or means, and evaluation criteria. 
It is hypothesized that the greater the comprehensiveness, complexity, 
and magnitude of changes, the lesser the probability of implementation
44
as there will be more resistance-organized or institutionalised,
Caiden (1970,pp.144-156) suggests four methods of implementation;
(a) Reforms imposed through political revolution: Political changes
are likely to induce sweeping administrative reforms especially among 
the upper reaches of the administration (politicians and administrators) 
during a radical transformation of the power elite, as, for instance,
a violent revolution or a military take-over, particularly if the new 
elite is ideologically motivated and inclined to totalitarianism;
(b) reforms introduced to remedy organizational rigidity: The 
principal instrument of contemporary administration is the bureaucracy, 
whose institutionalised behaviour pattern embodied in legal codes may 
have a life of its own independent of the people who staff it. This 
rigidity leads to stresses and strains which in turn lead to internal 
demands for administrative reforms. Flexibility can be introduced 
internally. First, administrators are constantly reshuffled. No one 
is permitted to remain in the same job long enough to stamp his 
personality on the organization. New men are tried all the time. Second, 
more emphasis is placed on research and projection. Third, steps are 
taken to prevent excessive rigidity (and of course excessive flexibility)
in structure and regulations. Fourth, initiative, creativity, 
suggestions, and innovations are encouraged by example, and by incentives 
and promotional schemes. Fifth, boredom is combatted through job 
turnover, rotation, and joint ownership schemes. Sixth, greater 
responsiveness is promoted by public relations, consumer research, and 
complaint units;
(c) reforms through the legal system: One of the most obvious ways of 
getting somebody else to do what one wants them to do is to have a law 
passed. The law, in fact, is becoming an increasingly important method 
for implementing administrative reforms ;
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(d) reforms through changes in attitude: Lasting reforms cannot depend
on the superiority of power or the coercion of non-believers. Ultimately
those who resist reforms have to be won over in spirit as well as body.
Their attitudes must change or be changed. To change people's
behaviour, "it is necessary to change also their thinking and their
attitudes, to anticipate and to seek out anxieties, to talk difficulties
out in a kind of mental therapy" (Dimock,1959,p.239). Participation
unfreezes attitudes, encourages positive responses, permits more
balanced interactions, and reduces resistance.
The writings of Cohen, Caiden, Backoff, Lee and others, have
greatly helped to clarify and operationalise the complexities that
are found in the process of implementation, yet sizeable gaps differentiate
pious assumptions from the happenings in real world in the study of
administrative reform. Sometimes the gap is too great to distinguish
between the ideal and the real, which eventually seriously dampens
the prospect of implementation of reforms.
Caiden crystallises the assumptions generally made, consciously
or unconsciously:
First, that the government has recognised the need to improve 
its performance and is determined to do something effective; 
second that the government has appointed acknowledged experts 
to identify the weakest points and to concentrate on those 
remedies likely to have the widest application; third, that the 
experts with government backing are able to conduct full inquiries 
and publicise their efforts, whether in temporary ad hoc 
commissions or more lasting institutional arrangements; and fourth, 
that the experts are capable of doing a competent job (Caiden, 
1976,p.l44).
In practice, things do not exactly follow the idealistic routine.
Many governments only pay lip-service to reforms and have no real desire 
to see major reforms take place but would like to talk about it because 
of political gains involved. The reform bodies are mostly manned by 
incompetent people. Serious efforts are seldom made to maintain a 
balance between politicians, bureaucrats, academicians, and .other
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outside experts when members are chosen. This uneven composition 
results in recommendations which are impractical and difficult to 
implement. Bureaucratic attitudes have not changed, which prompts 
the perpetuation of negative and hostile attitudes towards any mention 
of change. Changes are always feared and frowned upon. Reformers 
have to be extremely fortuitous to expect co-operation from 
bureaucrats under these circumstances. And cooperation of 
bureaucrats is necessary to study the situation and eventually to make 
recommendations for change. Sometimes reformers not qualified 
to perform the job that they undertake.
But it may be assumed that the above mentioned gap between the 
ideal and the real can be narrowed considerably and the task of 
implementation will be smoother if the government gives serious 
attention to three types of actions: First, a welldefined and bold
policy, a firm decision on the part of political leadership in power 
to carry out the reforms accepted by it. Second, there is the need 
for adequate institutional arrangements and safeguards for 
implementation of reforms. Third, there is an operational plan to 
push ahead with the implementation of the accepted reforms.
EVALUATION
Unless administrative reforms are evaluated, the process is 
incomplete. Administrative reforms cannot be understood nor evaluated 
apart from the objectives that they endeavour to achieve. Yet to 
take the reformers at their word is unscientific, certainly distorting.
They should be judged by their deeds alone. Their contribution may be 
quite marginal. "Their egotistical stance may detract from the 
'hewers of wood and drawers of water' who work unobtrusively in the 
background, yet have a greater impact on the course of events than fleeting 
reforms" (Caiden, 1970, pp.159-160). Moreover, the reformers might
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probably have seen only a part of the whole or they might have 
misunderstood the situation completely. Furthermore, reformers *"'
often declare romantic objectives like democracy and efficiency to 
veil their undeclared intentions such as more power to the central 
government; reform may be an overt strategy designed to place the 
control of government in particular hands - a strategy that is seen as 
necessary and possible by certain groups at particular points in time when 
they feel that they are not winning, and cannot win, within the 
established rules of the governmental game.
Attempts to evaluate administrative reform involve serious 
methodological problems. Caiden (1970,pp.157-158) catalogues a 
number of these problems. First, reform is not » an end in itself.
Should its success be measured by its contribution to the ultimate 
objectives of administrative performance? Even if reforms improve end 
performance, what if the end products do not contribute to social 
efficiency or the public interest? Second, what constitutes success 
in reform? Is it the full realization or achievement of the reformers' 
original objectives? Is it any improvement on the status quo, 
irrespective of costs? Third, how much of the success can be attributed 
to the reformers, directly and indirectly? How much is due to factors 
beyond their control? Is the success merely on paper or have the 
reformers established built-in desires to ensure continuation? Fourth, 
is it possible to allow for differences between declared and real aims, 
between positive and negative aims? Fifth, what time limit should 
be allowed if results are not immediately forthcoming? What about 
delayed reactions and cumulative effects? How long do the seeds of 
reform take to grow and ripen? Sixth, how can charisma be measured 
when the reformer has personally won over his opponents through patience, 
cheerfulness, tact, and laconism? Finally, could the reform effort 
have been used more profitably in other directions? What were the
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better alternatives and were they considered? Could more have been 
achieved at very little extra cost if the reformers had not stopped 
where they did?
Rarely does the nature of the evidence allow researchers to 
attempt answers to these methodological problems. Such factors as 
motivation, morale, and subconscious feelings are beyond recall soon 
after the event. Rarely do reformers keep a full diary of events.
In search of greater accuracy, researchers must be prepared to enter 
areas in which revelations are harmful and persistent inquiry is 
discouraged. But to stop short at this point is to court bias and 
contradiction. To evaluate only part of the evidence is hardly 
satisfactory or satisfying.
Furthermore, appraisal is not the exclusive right of reformers 
and reformed. Reformers may not be representative of the society or the 
situation. They are likely to be 'outsiders', elite aspirants, highly 
educated, politically sensitive, probably holding influential positions 
or closely connected with power holders. Their expectations are likely 
to be higher than most. Even if their aspirations are not met, the
results may be pleasing nonetheless to different groups - elite, 
administrative conservatives, reformed, clientele - for different reasons. 
The final judgement, therefore, should be with the ordinary men and 
women whom the entire administrative apparatus is designed to serve. 
Unfortunately evaluation of this kind is the most neglected aspect 
in reform implementation. Given articulate public opinion, 
administrative secrecy, autocratic institutions and sporadic, isolated 
and uncoordinated efforts to improve performance, there is hardly 
any strong movement in favour of administrative reform in any country, 
and people who would like to see better administration do not know 
what practical steps to take to make their demands felt.
But there is a brighter side. The achievements of reformers are
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observeLble, and it is possible to compare the end results with 
the original aims. Productivity and the general level of services 
can be measured, as most organizations endeavour to ascertain their 
performance according to known criteria (though these may not be the 
most accurate or reliable of guides). Costs and expenditures are 
usually readily available. On the basis of these and other known 
facts, researchers are endeavouring to measure organizational efficiency, 
social costs, the efficacy of decision-making, the quality of policy- 
planning, morale, job satisfaction, organizational loyalty, centralization, 
specialization, and so forth. It is also not difficult to discover 
whether vice, corruption, and waste have been eliminated and whether 
behavioural patterns have changed. The records and working papers 
of reformers and of organizations responsible for surveys of 
administration are mostly available. The accumulation of this 
material should in time provide solutions to methodological problems. 
Nevertheless, evaluation depends largely on its purposes - the questions 
in which the evaluator is most interested, such as contribution to 
development, increase in local skills, improvement in social welfare, 
higher levels of satisfaction, greater dynamism (or self-sustained 
growth), and rate of circulation of new ideas. The results will differ 
correspondingly.
CONCLUSION
We have said that we will study administrative reform as a process 
because the sequential trend will enable us to look into both behavioural 
and structural aspects of administrative reform. The structural 
aspect will be invaluable in our analysis of the administrative system, 
while the behavioural will elucidate the human variable in the reform 
process. The relationship between reformer and target becomes a 
central issue, not only for the initial structuring of the relationship.
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but also for the way in which the reformer goes about studying the 
problem, gathering information, coming to conclusions and making 
recommendations. He must not only arrive at good answers but must 
work in a way that is consistent with the desired changes. In other 
words, to study administrative reform as a process also includes studying 
it as a 'system' because we can see the interaction between and among 
individuals and organizations and thereby of the dynamics of 
administrative behaviour.
We will therefore study local government reforms in Nigeria and 
Britain in the light of the aforementioned sequential steps: Diagnosis,
Objectives and Strategy,Implementation,and'Evaluation. To do this, we
will test the various hypotheses of reform in the light of local 
government reform efforts in both countries, and of course try to 
formulate our own hypotheses and make recommendations.
In his analysis of the diagnostic stage. Downs concludes that 
administrative reform becomes necessary when change is insufficient 
to keep an administration abreast of development, and performance gaps 
appear, that is, "a significant discrepancy exists between what it is 
doing and what it 'ought' to be doing" (Downs, 1967,p.191). Of course
the maladjustment of the components of an administrative system becomes 
acute and recognisable when a political group who differs strongly from 
those previously in office take over power. Thus a diagnosis of the 
administrative system becomes necessary when it is thought to be 
inefficient and ineffective; when it cannot meet current demands or 
when the impact of growth takes it by surprise. Other factors that 
necessitate administrative reform are said to include growth in the 
type and size of the clientele served; changes in problems and needs, 
and, therefore, in organizational programmes as to the proper 
responsibilities of governments; (result of) new equipment and
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advancing knowledge; and changing and usually rising qualifications 
of personnel (that is, increasing need for specialists). Thus, was 
local government reform necessary in Nigeria and Britain because 
unchanging social values could no longer be realised through an outdated 
administrative system? Or had values changed so that reform was 
needed? That is, was administrative reform necessary because the 
administration could not keep abreast of development?
The determination of necessary answers to these hypothetical 
questions about the need for reform will lead us to the next stage of 
administrative reform: formulation of goals and strategies. We had
referred to Dror's categorization of goal clusters: intra­
administration directed goals such as the attainment of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness within an organizational context, reduction 
of corruption and favouritism, introduction of a merit civil service 
and introduction of a planning-programming-^budgetting system. His 
second category deals with external objectives which mostly concern the 
overhauling of the administrative system to accelerate wide-ranging 
social and economic development. Again, the questions we will address 
ourselves to are: What are the objectives of the 1976 (Britain,1974)
local government reforms? Are the reform objectives given by Mosher, 
Caiden, Dror and others equally applicable to a developing country 
(Nigeria) as well as a developed country (Britain)?
Scholars of administrative reform agree that for a reform process 
to be successful, appropriate strategies are invaluable. Unfortunately 
there is no universal strategy for administrative reform because every 
reform must relate to the socio-economic, political and cultural 
environment of the country. How valid is the assertion that there 
can be no reform strategy with universal applicability? Since 
the formulation of an appropriate strategy depends also on the goals
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of the reform, and since the reform goals of Britain and Nigeria 
differ only in a few cases such as the need for national stability in 
Nigeria, can we therefore have similar strategy? To what extent has 
Nigeria tried to forge its own strategy?
The implementation stage is normally referred to as the achilles 
heel of administrative reform because most reform efforts collapse 
at this stage. Did the pre-1976 (pre-1974,Britain) local government 
reforms in Nigeria fail because the power or will to carry out the 
reforms were absent on the part of the political leaders? How true 
is Lee's hypothesis that time and leadership are two crucial variables 
in reform implementation? And is it true that the greater the 
comprehensiveness,complexity, and magnitude of changes' the lesser the 
probability of implementation?
The last stage, evaluation, is very important in administrative 
reform. Unless administrative reforms are evaluated, the process 
is not complete. But how objective can an evaluation of a reform be? 
Must we base our evaluation on the reformer's goal or the people's 
feelings and attitudes? That is, whose definition of 'success' should 
we accept? Do the end products of the reforms contribute to the 
stated goals such as democracy, efficiency, national stability and 
economic development? Did the reformers stick to the reform objectives?
The hypotheses we have posed for ourselves will be tested in the 
main body of the thesis. Our analysis will concentrate on the post-war 
local government reforms but especially the 1974 and 1976 reforms in 
Britain and Nigeria respectively. And our observation will lead us 
to formulate our own hypothesis for local government reform and local 
development in Nigeria.
In order to understand the changing structure of local government 
in Nigeria and Britain, and the origins of their ailments and criticisms.
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it is pertinent to give a brief historical description of local 
government in both countries. Then we will examine the major social, 
economic and political changes that have affected the structures 
before the recent reforms, and finally the process of local government 
reorganization since the Second World War will be considered.
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CHAPTER TWO
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE; NIGERIA AND BRITAIN 
INTRODUCTION
The mastery of any field of political science 
involves some knowledge of institutional 
history (Munro, 1913,p.1).
In order to understand how local government in Nigeria and 
Britain came to be as it was at the time of the 1976 and 1974 reforms 
respectively, and especially the origins of their defects and criticisms, 
it is essential to go into a brief historical perspective of both countries.
NIGERIA
We shall endeavour to examine the local government system, including 
Indirect Rule, in Nigeria prior to independence in 1960. However, we 
will need a brief survey of the administrative machinery in Nigeria before 
the advent of the British. This will throw some light on the working, 
and our understanding of Indirect Rule and the pre-independence structure 
of local government.
Nigeria was not a single country before the advent of the British, 
but she was made up of numerous independent states of differing area and 
population, some of them under powerful Emirs and Obas (as in the northern 
and western parts of the country respectively), and some very small 
states with representative governments such as those of the eastern Nigeria, 
the Delta area and the so-called 'Middle Belt'.
The large states in the north and west were centred around the Obas 
and the Emirs who were powerful rulers with vassals in the distant rural 
areas of their kingdom. These vassals or representatives had to pay 
tribute and regular taxes to the ruler. In the north, the Emir ruled 
with a few advisers and usually his district representatives were his
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friends, relations or sons. They were answerable to him and held 
office at the pleasure of the autocratic Emir.
Whereas the southern part of Nigeria has had contact with various 
European peoples, northern Nigeria had been more or less a 'terra 
incognita' to the various European peoples until the turn of the present 
century. Hitherto, the emirates of northern Nigeria had had most,
if not all, of their connections with North Africa and the old Sudanese
Kingdoms.
The administrative structure in the north was hierarchical in character 
with the Emir or Chief at the top, counselled, and assisted by his 
traditional councillors such as the Waziri (vizier), Madaki, the commander- 
in-chief of the armed forces, and various such others who resided in the 
emirate headquarters with the Emir. The emirate was divided into
territorial fiefs and to each fief a District Head was appointed who was
responsible to the Emir for the administration of the area. As the chief 
representative of the Emir, he was primarily responsible for the maintenance 
of law and order, collection of taxes and served as 'eyes and ears' of the 
Emir in the area. The districts were further divided into smaller 
units called villages and still into smaller units called hamlets. The 
Village and the Hamlet Heads were responsible to the District Head and 
they were delegated with responsibility of tax collection in their areas 
of jurisdiction and also the maintenance of law and order.
In addition to the Emir's court which represented the highest court 
of appeal in the emirate, there was in each district a local Muslim judge 
well trained in Muslim law. Recruitment into the ruling group was purely 
on personal basis, nobility, nepotism and favouritism, except for the 
Muslim judges who were more often than not appointed on merit.
In western Nigeria, the Oba was a constitutional monarch who ruled 
with the advice of his chiefs and these chiefs represented different
56
quarters of his domain. An Oba owed his obaship to his chiefs who 
could remove him if they lost confidence in him. It was "an oligarchy 
which responded to public opinion which had a great respect for constitutional 
authority but could revolt if driven too far by any oppressive acts of the 
authority" (Orewa, 1966,p.1).
In eastern Nigeria, the village rather than the clan was the common 
unit of government, and the existence of powerful rulers such as the Obi 
of Onitsha, was due to the influence from Benin. What at first appears 
to be rigid conventions in Ibo culture invariably turn out to be the 
ritual framework within which debate and questioning was carried on. ^
The revenue collected by the central government was not used to 
provide services for the local areas. The provision of roads, building 
of town halls, even the policing of the area against night marauders, were 
all provided by the local people at the village level. The concept of 
age grade (see chapter 9) was fully utilized, the young ones provided 
communal labour such as in building roads while the elders settled petty 
disputes, leaving serious ones to the Oba's or Emir's court.
PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION OF INDIRECT RULE
The British government did not make any systematic attempt to 
administer Nigeria until 1903 when Lugard subjugated northern Nigeria, 
and introduced initially to that part of the country and later to the 
rest of Nigeria a philosophy of public administration popularly known as 
indirect rule. This philosophy is "the system by which the tutelary 
power recognizes existing African societies and assists them to adopt 
themselves to the functions of local government" (Hailey,1957,p.155).
The existing African societies referred to were the 'native authorities' 
and they were to be guided in the formidable task of adaptation to the 
functions of local government (certainly not the traditional functions
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by implication) by British administrators.
Harold Laski argued that the British administrative service did not 
welcome innovation, and was positively hostile to the idea of civil 
liberty. African criticism of British rule was regarded as sedition 
(Laski, 1938,p.546). The criticism was sometimes linked with the
important question of the irresponsible nature of colonial rule, due to the 
fact that neither the British parliament nor the British electorate showed 
any continuous interest in African affairs. In spite of the theory 
of trusteeship, "in (Nigeria), Europeans are masters and Africans 
servcints. The vast majority of Europeans in Africa believe that 
relationship to be an integral part of the natural order of human society" 
(Leys,1931,p.102). Leys argued that this lack of administrative 
responsibility, which would have been a reality in a democratic self- 
governing community, had led to a denial of ordinary rights and liberties 
to Africans.
It was argued by supporters of Leninist theories of imperialism that 
indirect rule was simply a device for keeping Africans in a position from 
which they could be readily exploited. Other critics of the imperial 
policy believed that the system had its origins in racist beliefs which 
held Africans incapable of governing through any institutions other 
than their own 'inferior' ones. A close analysis of various theories 
advocating indirect rule suggests that its supporters did in fact believe 
in the unique quality of British political life, the institutions of which 
could not be transferred successfully to other people. According to the 
myth which had grown up about the exploits of the British imperial 
administration, the people of the colonies were governed much better 
than they could hope to govern themselves, by men who belonged to the 
elite of a society which had long accepted the responsibility for 
governing less fortunate or inferior people (Zimmern,1934,pp.102-3). All
58
indirect rule arguments envisaged only very gradual change, the 
prevention of political disruption which might lead to social chaos, 
and a future which would take care of itself. By their emphasis on 
the danger of rapid social change, they bolstered indirect rule theories.
The Northern Region and Indirect Rule
The Fulani Empire collapsed under the modern weaponry of Lugard in 
1903. Lugard then installed British residents at the main towns in 
the north. Lugard was impressed with the efficiency of the Emirs as
rulers. He therefore reappointed them as administrators of their 
peoples, only restricting them from slave dealing and other inhuman practices, 
from the establishment of armed forces, and from feudal rights over land.
As Campbell puts it, ''the Muslim theocratic states possessed an admirable 
administrative pattern upon which to build an effective local government 
structure. They had an organized form of taxation; they possessed a 
separate judiciary of professional judges and the kingdom was divided 
into administrative sub-areas, each under the control of an 
appointed executive* ( 1965,p. 115; see also,Kirk-Greene, 1965).
It is important that Lugard did agree to retain the Fulani system even on 
an experimental basis. In his anxiety to utilize the wonderful
intelligence of the 'born rulers' and to solicit their cooperation,
Lugard allowed, however, even when he allegedly insisted on good government 
and justice, the Fulani system to remain as a permanent basis of British 
colonial administration in northern Nigeria. His insistence on good 
government and justice, whatever these mean because of the different 
cultural orientations of the Fulani islamic government and the British 
western ideas of government and justice, brought into the indirect rule 
picture what I consider to be the kingpin of the system, namely the 
British administrative officer who was to assist and guide the Fulani Emirs
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^nd chiefs along the road to good government and justice.
Lugard and subsequent colonial administrators decided to maintain
the Fulani system for personal and logistic reasons which were more
important than the anxiety to utilize the wonderful intelligence of the
'born rulers'. As Cowan observed:
Lugard used Indirect Rule primarily as a matter of political 
necessity and not of theory since his administrative staff at 
the beginning totalled eleven officers for the entire area.
Indeed, even as late as 1921 there were only one political 
officer for every 80,000 inhabitants in the Northern provinces.
Neither the finances nor the personnel were available for 
direct administration (Cowan,1958,pp.12-13).
One is therefore tempted from the foregoing that the indirect rule 
system of administration, already used in India and Fiji, was a child of 
expediency, a makeshift policy ennobled from being just an expedient 
in times of financial hardship and lack of staff to a complete philosophy 
of government for Britain's colonial peoples. The traditional 
organization could only have been assisted and guided to adapt itself to 
the modem functions of local government by orienting its essential 
ingredients towards modern development. On the contrary, in their 
anxiety (I would add ,of necessity) to ensure optimum utilization of the 
traditional organization for the purposes of indirect rule, Lugard and his 
successors frantically attempted to preserve these ingredients - the Emir 
and the chief, the Native Treasury, and the Native Courts - in cold storage. 
And in fact, in the case of the chief the colonial administration introduced 
a new phenomenon hitherto unheard of in the literature of indigenous 
African administration, the title of 'sole chief' (abolished in 1952) without 
reference obviously to any council with whom a chief was always traditionally 
known to have been associated. The colonial administration did not stop at 
the introduction of this new phenomenon alone. In the words of Lugard,
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the essential feature of the system is that the native chiefs 
are constituted 'as an integral part of the machinery of the 
administration'. There are not two sets of rulers - British 
and native working either separately or in co-operation, but a 
single Government in which the native chiefs have well-defined 
duties and an acknowledged status equally with British officials 
(Lugard, 1965-fp. 203).
The consideration of the Emir as part and parcel of the colonial 
government had the following implications: (a) it had the tendency of 
isolating the chief from hif traditional environment and making him solely 
responsible to the colonial government for decisions taken affecting his 
people; (b) one would tend to infer that since the chiefs were dependent 
largely upon the administration in retaining their posts they acquiesced in 
whatever proposal was presented to them by the latter without ascertaining 
the wishes and interests of their people; (c) it would be impossible to 
supervise them if they were part and parcel of the single Government; 
and (d) it represented the strengthening of their position vis-a-vis 
the people which meant weakening the traditional brakes upon the chiefs. 
Henceforth, the Emir was to have a weak traditional council in a 20th 
century setting. This weak position of the council was further 
exacerbated by the declared policy of the colonial administration to bar 
the western educated elite which was the product of the social and 
economic changes of the war and post-war periods from participating in 
the political and administrative life of northern Nigeria. Since 
members of this group were drawn largely from the 'commoner class' they 
were usually barred from political office under the traditional authority 
system in which royal birth and nepotism were the primary criteria for 
selection. This had dual significance for the failure of local 
government: not only was there a loss of potential talent, but there
was also created a group which had a high degree of political awareness 
but was alienated from participation in legitimate political activity.
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The position and the indispensability of the Resident in carrying 
out the government policy can hardly be overemphasized. He was the 
backbone of the system, with the Emir just an arrow in his bow, and his 
duty was to act as a sympathetic adviser and counsellor to the native 
chiefs. It was a major responsibility, and a titanic task on his side 
to educate the Emirs and «direct them in their respective administrative 
duties. Beneath the Resident was the District Officer who supervised and 
assisted the native rulers and ciistrict headmen. He had full responsibility 
to arrange for the carrying out of all departmental work of the government.
He heard appeals from native courts especially in cases relating to land 
dispute.
Southern Nigeria and Indirect Rule
While Lugard busily engaged himself in the reconstruction of the north 
under indirect rule, the west remained, enjoying no definite measure 
of administrative control. The extent of jurisdiction exercised over 
the inhabitants by the government was vague. Various states remained 
independent under one treaty or the other with the British Government. 
Residents were, however, posted to these states, but they possessed and 
exercised powers no less than those of consulates. Local administration 
remained entirely the business of the indigenous authorities guided 
and advised by the District Officer or Commissioner. Judicial system 
which then appealed to them as the sole machinery of administration received 
particular attention. There were three grades of courts, the Supreme 
Court whose jurisdiction was extended to the Western Provinces in 1900,
Native Council, and Native Court. The Native Council exercised, 
primarily, judicial functions, having the District Commissioner at the 
head of other members nominated by the High Commissioner. The Native 
Council had also power to make rules relating to modification of native
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law, regulation and promotion of trade, and generally to maintain peace.
The court system never seemed to have proved an effective system of 
administration. The Native Council for instance could not be properly
Icalled 'native* since the court was nominated by the District Commissioner.
The local officers of administration relied on the little powers vested on 
them in respect of the Native Council. On various occasions they were at 
sea to discern the policy of the government, or the extent of its 
executive powers. The Egbas, for instance, presented an anomalous position, 
where the government was carried out in the name of the Alake, who was himself 
illiterate, by an able and educated native.
The position of the south-eastern part of Nigeria was in fact unique.
The measure of authority exercised by the government during this period, 
and even up to the time of amalgamation of the Northern and Southern 
Provinces was insignificantly infinitesimal. The coastal strips of 
this region, especially Bonny and Calabar^had early contacts with the 
Europeans, but purely on commercial grounds. In order, at this time, 
to overcome the hazards that beset the British traders, the Home Government 
merely appointed a consul for the Bights of Benin and Biafra. The 
consul dealt with commercial cases, though in cases concerning the natives, 
they acted in full collaboration with the native chiefs. By 1872, the 
consul and court of equity received legal recognition. After the 
provinces had come properly to the grip of British Government, the same 
court system was retained. Thus in 1906 a Native Council Ordinance 
provided for the establishment of Native Council or courts, with other 
minor subordinate courts. The jurisdiction of the native council was 
exactly as it was in the Western Provinces. The court became an 
executive arm of the government. The idea of warranting chiefs to 
attend the court sprang up.
The native court could hardly prove an effective administrative
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organization; the native members had no real powers in the court, they 
were mere puppets. The court far from being the Commissioner's court 
was dominated by the court clerk who exploited the situation by lording it 
over illiterate warrant chiefs. Maintenance of justice became the 
hallmark of administration. Primary needs of the society were played 
down. The District Commissioner was most of the time preoccupied with 
other functions, that delegation was inevitably often made to the corrupt 
court clerks.
It would therefore appear that the success or otherwise of indirect 
rule very much depended upon the leadership qualities of the administrative 
officers - setting goals, clarifying objectives, etc. Unfortunately, 
however, not all 'political officers' were development oriented. The 
first phase of indirect rule from 1900-1925 saw some of the most influential 
officers develop a philosophy of indirect rule which was inimical to 
development. Brian Smith (1967,pp.32-33) noted the example of Charles 
Temple, one of the most distinguished Residents of the first decade of 
indirect rule. Temple believed that the duty of the British administrative
officer was to preserve the social structure and cultures of indigenous 
societies from disrupting effects of contact with an alien civilization.
The practical implications of this are not far to seek. Development 
plays a very secondary role to the business of creating local 
administration which might have existed under ideal conditions prior to 
British suzerainty. It should be observed at once that the tendency
to 'preserve' the emirates in the cold storage was not only an attempt 
to back-pedal them which was antithetical to development, but also 
myopic which represented lack of managerial vision. It ought to have 
been clear, though not to Temple, that the effect of this would be to 
reinforce the suffocating blanket of tradition; that to the extent that 
the British had occupied northern Nigeria at all, it would have been
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impossible for him and others of his ilk, to steer the tide of contact 
with an alien civilization with all its disrupting effects; and that the 
attempt to insulate the emirates from 'anything new' would operate towards 
their stagnation.
One can therefore conclude, with some justification, that the role 
of the administrative officer was in general negative, insisting upon the 
preservation of the Native Authorities in very near their original form 
which was antidotal to development. Thus the failure of the upper 
management to set goals, clarify objectives, develop procedures, plan, 
schedule and project itself into the future is very visible. Like an 
observer at a burial procession, one could visualize the dramatis personae 
moving in a long calvacade like 'processionary caterpillars', one 
processionary leading and the other following - each with his eyes half 
closed and his head snugly fitted against the rear extremity of his 
predecessor. "They mistake activity for accomplishment. They meant 
well but got no place" (Randal,1967,p.4.). Needless to add that it 
is a situation which smacks of managerial incompetence. Bearing in 
mind that development is not a natural process, and requires powerful and 
resourceful change agents, this transparent managerial incompetence became 
profoundly convulsing.
Amalgamation and the extension of Indirect Rule to the Western and Eastern 
Provinces
The amalgamation of the Northern and Southern provinces of Nigeria 
in 1914 had far-reaching consequences on the development of the system 
of native administration in Western and Eastern Nigeria. It led to an 
attempt to apply the well-tried, ill-defined formula of indirect rule, 
as developed in the Northern provinces, to the southern half of the country. 
The official reason for the decision to apply indirect rule to the south
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was that it was necessary to apply a uniform policy of local government 
throughout the whole of the newly created country (Lugard,1920,para 16),
But apart from administrative convenience, the amalgamation was 
economically viable especially in the face of economic stagnation of the 
north. The north had depended largely on grants-in-aid which the 
Imperial Parliament could ill afford. Thus to boost the north, it had 
to be merged with the prosperous south.
The amalgamation, however, did not sufficiently extend administration 
to the villages which had all along been ignored. Rather the court 
system was the main organ of administration in these villages. Courts 
were reorganized but it did not take Lugard long to realise that success 
in the northern administration was not founded on efficient courts, but 
depended on a good taxation system and well established treasuries. ‘
He was convinced that without reasonable financial backing any administration 
was doomed to fail. A major obstacle, however, existed in this area with 
respect to tax collection. Apart from payment of tributes and tithes 
to their chiefs or Obas, the Yorubas had known no system of taxation.
The introduction of direct taxation in 1916 was greeted with vehement 
resentment and disturbances in Isayin and Abeokuta. The announcement 
by the government in 1927 of its intention to introduce direct taxation 
was greeted with the most sullen acquiescence in certain districts, and the 
worst experience was the 'Aba Riot' which was the direct outcome of 
unfounded rumours and suspicion that women were going to be taxed.
The Aba Riot was a turning point in the history of native 
administration for it was only after it that intensive investigations 
and research were conducted on the lines of knowing what the native 
institutions in the South-Eastern Provinces were with a view to using 
them as units of local government. It had been found necessary to 
accommodate the atomic units in the South-East cind Middle Belt Provinces.
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Donald Cameron who took over as the Governor came fully determined 
to make indirect rule look more attractive than before. To him the 
allegiance of a people to a tribal head freely given and without external 
cause is the essence of * true indirect rule. It was paramount in
his mind to see that the greatest aims to be pursued at all costs were those 
of building on the existing organization and ideas of the people; of 
leaving it to the people themselves assisted by sympathetic advisers to 
device and develop their own local institutions in accordance with their 
own standards of modern civilization and of resisting the temptation to play 
the part of 'King makers' or constitution makers. Thus Cameron 
insisted that village units in the Middle Belt and the South-Eastern 
Provinces should retain their identities as judicial and executive bodies. 
Where, however, a more powerful and vigorous authority existed and was 
surrounded by smaller units numerically and financially weak and barely 
able to maintain themselves, and provided these units exhibited a 
disposition favourable to amalgamation it was highly desirable to encourage 
them to group themselves with their most powerful neighbour. He took 
care to identify various types of native authority such as chiefs-in-council, 
council of elders, and stressed strongly the need to preserve the 
essentially democratic character of indigenous institutions and thereby 
abolished the autocratic ideas of indirect rule. He changed emphasis 
in the method of preserving the indigenous institutions as mere 'museum 
pieces' to directing their evolution towards representative organs of 
democratic local government. He found that it was not easy to
democratize the northern emirates radically, and he therefore preferred 
a gradual process. The native authorities were not to be accepted 
solely because they were traditional, but merely because they were 
acceptable to their people. He brought a change of emphasis from the
rule by the chiefs to the rule by the chiefs and council. Native authority
67
was just an Instrument through which advancement could be made in the 
social, economic welfare of the local people, and was not to be regarded 
perpetually as upholders of law and order (Cameron,1934).
Decline of Indirect Rule and the Need for Reform
Right from its introduction, indirect rule had not only been subject 
to vehement opposition, but had also provoked a lot of adverse criticisms 
both from within and from without the country, and even the most articulate 
critiques were among those who served in the administration itself. Just 
as Lord Lugard had his followers through the 1920s and 1930s, so also 
did a person like Lord Hailey have his precursors amongst many of the 
commentators on the theory and practice of indirect rule. Criticisms 
of this method of government began even before Lugard's The Dual Mandate 
was published in 1922. Probably the earliest really trenchant criticism 
came from a district officer in Nigeria, Fitzpatrick, who argued that the 
system of indirect rule replaced the comparatively more desirable system 
of 'autocracy, tempered by assassination' (Fitzpatrick,1924,p.619).
The protection of the autocratic rulers by British bayonets created a 
feudal system which was inefficient, expensive and corrupt. In his view 
the administration had been needlessly duplicated and, so far as the 
native administration was concerned, the population tended to divide into 
those on the pay-roll and those paying taxes. In order to put an end 
to this corruption, with which he believed the British were identified, 
he advocated an increased European administrative staff, with African 
additions where possible, to undertake all administrative services.
Another criticism in the same vein came from Lord Raglan who categorised 
all chiefs as tyrants or weaklings so that "the administration is placed 
in the dilemma of having either continually to upset the decisions of 
the chiefs or else to connive at injustice"(Raglan,1923,p.579).
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Fitzpatrick and Lord Raglan were critical of the operation of 
indirect rule, especially the strengthened position of the Emir and 
their (Emirs') enhanced prestige at the expense of older indigenous 
institutions. We have said that the aim of indirect rule was to preserve 
indigenous institutions which, the British administration believed, had 
seme value for Africans as a good basis for administrative take off.
In Nigeria, it seemed that some indigenous institutions had been ignored, 
while others had been preserved and made more resistant to change.
Criticisms of indirect rule became more frequent after 1930 due to 
socio-economic and political changes in Britain and Nigeria (see chapters 
3 and 4). These criticisms were centred around the two questions of whether 
or not the system did preserve African institutions, and whether such 
institutions could be made the basis for gradual political development.
Many critics suggested that old institutions were not really being preserved 
at all. Old sources of political legitimacy had been destroyed 
inevitably, the more democratic aspects of Nigerian societies undermined, 
and Nigerian aristocracies entrenched in positions from which they could 
now be removed only by the British administration. One critic pointed 
to the danger of indirect rule bolstering the power of oppressive and 
incompetent chiefs (Leys,1931,p.70) while Rattray thought that the people 
themselves were likely to become estranged within the system because it had 
produced centralized Nigerian autocracies "disregarding the bases of former 
African constitutions and states which were essentially decentralized and 
democratic" (Rattray, 1934,p.22). Was it not the case, the critics asked, 
that African chiefs had become the tools of the British, and were often 
so regarded by their own people, especially the educated ones?
In so far as the institutions could be said to have survived they 
were increasingly anachronistic. The critics believed that political 
systems should reflect economic and social realities, which meant that
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there should be a chance for participation in politics for the increasingly
large number of Nigerians who lived outside the tribal milieu. This
fundamental criticism shaded into a second one which was to the effect
that people learn about politics by being active in politics. Under the
system of indirect rule, important groups were denied a chance to
participate, while the role of the traditional elite was seriously restricted
and distorted by the imposition of an alien super-structure.
There were thus three main criticisms of indirect rule. It was an
inefficient and corrupt method of governing alien people; it was a
vehicle of reaction and not progress; it had the effect of submerging
democratic elements in tribal society under an authoritarian framework.
These criticisms were commonly connected with whether or not the system
was likely to impede «or enhemce the development of institutions through
which Nigerians would eventually govern themselves. It is clear that
Lord Hailey doubted the wisdom of maintaining indirect rule for this reason.
It was also true, said the critics, that educated Nigerians themselves
were critical of indirect rule and regarded this method of administration
as an imperialist device for preventing development, or as an indication
that the British regarded them as inferior people who could not be expected
to operate in their superior western institutions. Leonard Barnes, for
example, argued that Africans rightly understood that local institutions
and traditions were preserved
less from any sense that these things may be intrinsically 
worthy of preservation and development than in a profound 
conviction of their inferiority to British counterparts 
and therefore to their suitability to backward people 
(Barnes,1935,p.284).
The system of indirect rule could be interpreted therefore as a
Machiavellian design to keep the Nigerian in his place, and a means of
actually preventing development. The educated Nigerian was being
turned against the British by "the not wholly unjust doubts about the
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honesty of our intentions" (Macmillan,1934,p.137).
Some of the criticisms of indirect rule imputed to large groups 
of Europeeuis, involved in colonial politics, a kind of sinister design 
to defraud the African. Certainly the intention to exploit Africa for 
European benefit found expression in the theory of the dual mandate.
Cotterell went farther, suggesting that Africans were regarded as the 
guinea pig savage of brave new world whom "the anthropologist would like 
nothing better than to see pinned-down in a kind of mental cold storage, 
preserving for perennial future study the paradox of arrested development" 
(Cotterell,1934,p.454).
A criss-cross strand of argument runs through Sir Donald Cameron's 
egotistic evangelical mission: "we are using their own indigenous institutions
in order to promote higher standards of civilization amongst them. This 
is the most vital principle in my conception" (Cameron,1937,p.9). The 
belief that existing institutions made the best basis for change was a 
Burkean notion. It was part of the British conservative tradition that 
change should always be introduced slowly, retaining what was valuable in the 
existing institutions of society; this conservatism bedevilled local 
government in Britain.
The 'indirect rulers' knew, and perhaps felt a sense of guilt, about 
the damage done to African societies in the past. The missionaries, 
an integral part of the administration, tried to suppress those aspects of 
African social system (e.g. age grade) most clearly anathema to Christian 
beliefs as interpreted through western culture. There existed a conflict 
between a b e l i e f  In the advantages of progress as manifested in the 
application of scientific discoveries to the solution of human problems 
and a recognition of the loss of a sense of security which the individual 
tends to suffer in a mass society. As we have mentioned earlier, the 
attempt was to exacerbate the gulf that existed between 'us' and 'them'.
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demonstrated in the British attempt to define where, when and what he 
could participate in. Admittedly the aim of the British Government was 
to grant independence when it felt that Nigerians were 'mature'. But how 
could they mature in cold storage, when the Imperial Government had failed 
to undertake a programme of mass education; when it had failed to provide 
adequate resources to attack disease and poverty; when it had allowed 
British nationals to exploit Nigerian resources without encouraging 
genuine economic growth and development? Above all, it had failed to 
provide experience in government which would have made the transfer of 
power to Nigerians and the practice of democracy a success. All these 
failures, to use Professor James O'Connell's words, led to the inevitability 
of instability in Nigeria and to the demise in which local government found 
itself. "They saw instability ahead for newly created states in which 
existed extremes in educational standards and in which ethnic loyalties 
had been encouraged, under the system of indirect rule, at the expense of 
national loyalties" (Crocker 1936,p.215).
The Labour Monthly epitomized the suffering of Africans:
In the colonies millions of coloured people are denied the vote; 
they are not consulted about the administration nor about the 
management of their lives...Government is carried on by ordinance; 
there is no freedom of speech nor of the press; trade union and 
political organization is either illegal or functions under the 
daily threat of a persecution for 'sedition'. The peasantry are 
driven by heavy taxes from their land to work in British owned mines... 
and, as workers they are paid a few shillings a month and are forced 
to live in foul conditions, so that the British capitalist may earn 
his profits (Labour Monthly, 1939,pp.757-8).
It was a serious defect of indirect rule that it was not democratic.
The initial mistake was that the indigenous institutions of government 
which had existed as democratic and decentralized were ignored, especially 
in the South-Eastern Provinces and the Middle Belt, where the atomized 
units of government seemed to present some difficulty in discerning any 
power or authority which could be utilized for local government purposes.
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but indeed it was in these societies that one could find the gems, 
the very essence of everything upon which indirect rule should have been 
built. The Aba Riot was a great lesson. The importance of villages 
was later realised. Something approaching democracy was introduced after 
autocracy had been entrenched. Training in democracy should normally 
have been expected to precede its introduction to ensure that democracy 
is firmly rooted and maintained. In almost all over Nigeria democracy 
implied that the affairs of the state rested not in the hands of a few, 
but was the concern of the whole people. It was unforeseeable to think 
of democracy as the same thing as a rule by a 'sole native authority'.
To the educated people this was no democracy, nor was it near to it.
It was undemocratic to allow the Governor or the Resident the right to 
recognize or depose. a chief. It was true that the people were later 
allowed to recommend a chief of their own choosing, but the ultimate 
power to recognize and depose him rested in the Governor, a situation quite 
strange to the people. By their own tradition, the people had their 
own way of removing reactionary chiefs (Johnson,1921,pp.70-71). Democracy, 
therefore, was lacking in Nigeria, and as Dr.Miller very well put it, 
"Nigeria was ruled administratively on the principle that was the 
very antithesis to that of democracy"(Miller,1947,p.29.)
Another damaging attack on indirect rule was the idea of segregating 
the educated classes from the illiterate masses, a policy introduced 
by Lord Lugard. This was implicit in his plan for educational systems 
in the Northern Provinces. Worse still was the policy of excluding 
the educated natives from the native authorities, and from the 
administrative service on the general belief that no native was suited for 
such responsibility as that of the administrative officer, rather they 
could continue to serve as clerks (Coleman,1958,p.163). Another 
principle of native administration which received a stinging attack
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was the educational policy, especially that of the north. It
was forcefully argued that education was not moving as fast as would be
expected.
Thus, the colonial government was an undemocratic institution 
designed to maintain British authority. Decisions were improsed from 
above. In practice, this meant that the political officers wanted 
someone to whom they could give orders and who could be held responsible 
for carrying them out. Indirect rule, which formed the philosophical 
basis of British rule incorporated the indigenous political structure 
and thereby provided the cheapest means by which this authority could be 
preserved. However, indirect rule only worked where the traditional 
political institutions were authoritarian. These problems - lack of 
democracy, nepotism, corruption, inefficiency and ineffectiveness - 
remained basically unsolved at the time of the 1976 reform (see chapter 
5) despite the changes of the early fifties (see chapters 3 and 4).
BRITAIN
At the beginning of this chapter we stated the reasons for going 
into an historical analysis of both countries. To these might be 
added the fact that this historical background affords us the opportunity 
to analyse the extent of change brought adDOut by the 1976 and 1974 
reforms in Nigeria and Britain respectively.
Mediaeval and Tudor Period
We have said that no system of local government is devised in a 
vacuum. It cannot be separated from social, economic, and political 
conditions that form its environment. Local government in Britain arose 
from men tackling problems as they developed - such problems as the 
maintenance of law and order, the relief of the poor, and the building
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and repair of highways. Richards (1978,p.11) has described how 
the three traditional units of local government in England and Wales 
have been the county, the parish and the borough, each possessing a 
considerable degree of independence. The three traditional units 
came into existence during the Middle Ages when the country was still 
predominantly agricultural with a widely scattered population. Each 
county was administered by a county court presided over by the Sheriff 
appointed by the Crown. The counties were divided into 700 hundreds 
each administered by a hundred court. At a lower level of the rung 
came the township which constituted a rudimentary police authority and 
each of which was represented at the hundred court by its Reeve and four 
men. Within the townships were the parishes, or areas of administration 
round the churches although the parish later acquired non-ecclesiastical 
functions.
The system of local government based upon the sheriff and the county, 
hundred and parishes fell into disuse, and in the first instance, most 
of the duties were undertaken by Justices of the Peace appointed by the 
Crown on their circuits around the country. The Justices maintained 
law and order. New social and economic problems accompanied the 
growth of industry, particularly the woolen industry, in the 16th century. 
The enclosure (fencing-in) of common fields resulted in many unemployed 
serfs who urgently needed relief, and the dissolution of the monasteries 
by Henry VIII ended an important form of charity for the poor. The 
declining social conscience of the larger landlords led to the neglect 
of highways and footpaths at a time when increased commerce produced the 
need for a better system of road maintenance.
To meet these demands local government was reorganised on the 
basis of the parish with Justices of the Peace undertaking a co-ordinating
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and controlling role. A considerable body of new legislation followed. 
By the Statute of Highways 1553, each parish had to appoint two surveyors 
responsible for the repair of roads in the parish, and the inhabitants 
were required to devote four days' labour a year to the maintenance work. 
Wealthier persons could pay a highway rate in lieu of work, and this money 
was used to pay the poor working on the roads. The administrative 
duties of the parish were greatly increased by the Poor Relief Act 1601. 
Each parish had to appoint an overseer who recovered a rate from local 
inhabitants for the purchase of materials on which the poor could work.
It seldom proved practicable to provide the work and it was largely 
replaced by the distribution of relief financed by a parish rate. Hence 
each parish carried out its duties through four categories of unpaid 
officer-overseer of the poor, surveyor, constable and churchwarden 
(Richards, 1978,p.13).
The Eighteenth Century
The control of the Justices of the Peace by the central administration 
came to an end after the Revolution of 1688. Quarter sessions operated 
as the principal link between central and local administration. The 
members of this body met at least four times a year for judicial business. 
It was natural that they should discuss county affairs. The duties of 
the Justices were few in comparison to modern standards, but the growth 
of the new industrial towns created new social problems. In short, the 
rise of industrialism made the old system of government chaotic and 
out of date.
Among the influences which contributed to the need to reform local 
government were:
(a) The movement to fence-in common land in order to secure agricultural 
improvements led to many farm workers being driven from the land. They
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flocked into the towns to seek employment and placed a strain on such 
local government services as existed;
(b) many parish vestries safeguarded the interests of privileged 
groups and paid no attention to the interests of the community. And 
most town councils neglected their public duties and failed to promote 
municipal interests. The public officers themselves were corrupt and 
inefficient;
(c) there was a tremendous increase in the rate of industrial development 
from about 1750. The increase was mainly brought about by the harnessing 
of steam to provide power for machines. This power was worth supplying 
only to many large machines, and this meant that they had to be brought 
together in factories. The old system of domestic production declined, 
and more and more people went to work in factories. Towns grew up around 
the factories, and the resultant problems led to demands for the extension 
of local government services and for a more efficient local government 
structure;
(d) the transformation of the country from an agricultural society to an 
industrial one created problems with which local government could not cope, 
such as sanitation, water supply, public health all of which called for 
expert knowledge and large resources;
(e) the Parish Overseers of the Poor were unable to handle the problems of 
the parishes where manufacturing' interests had created new centres of 
population;
(f) the problem of poverty, easy to manage when applicants for relief were 
few, became more difficult as enclosure and industrial change swept the 
country;
(g) the Industrial Revolution raised the standard of living and lowered 
the death rate. The rapid increase in population which followed gave
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rise to serious administrative problems (Stones,1968,pp.5-6).
To remedy these problems, various ad hoc authorities were established 
to provide specific services. Local Acts created improvement 
commissioners to undertake such duties as paving, lighting, street-cleaning 
and general improvements, financed through rates. Other local Acts empowered 
the establishment of corporations to take over poor relief functions from 
the unpaid 'parochial' overseers. In like manner turnpike trustees were 
charged with the maintenance of existing main roads and the provision 
of new ones, and were authorised to levy tolls on road users (Hart 
and Garner,1973,p.24).
The Nineteenth Century
The system of local government had to be reformed again during the 
early part of the 19th century because of sweeping demographic, social 
and economic changes that had taken place. These reforms led to 
a system of parishes, counties, boroughs and ad hoc bodies.
In 1832 there were over 15,000 parishes, each being a distinctive unit 
of local administration but varying considerably in area, population, and 
the number and method of appointment of officials (Smellie,1946,p.l2).
The parishes in towns and cities exercised important functions in common 
with rural parishes. It was the right of all inhabitants to have a say 
in parish business and to perform, in turn, parish duties. "In practice 
arrangements for the administration of the parish reflected its economic 
and social order, and open parish vestries were often a small oligarchy 
of intimate neighbours presided over^the clergyman or senior churchwarden 
and dominated by neighbouring Justices of the Peace (Seeley,1978,p.3).
In general, the system worked well, particularly in settled rural 
communities. In the new industrial towns people did not know one 
another and community spirit was weak. The close or select vestries
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which became established lent themselves to corrupt practices by 
consisting of a restricted number of people (10 to 24) serving for life 
and filling vacancies by co-option. Parish duties were heavy and 
dirty, and many people were willing to pay to get out of doing them.
This led to the rise of local 'bosses' who controlled all the civic offices, 
The first changes in the legal constitution of the parishes were made 
by the Sturge Bourne Acts of 1818 and 1819. These Acts introduced a 
property qualification and plural votes (up to a maximum of six votes 
for highly rated properties). A minority of about 3,000 parishes 
adopted these arrangements and they tended to become combinations of 
tradesmen bound together by local interests (Smellie,1946,pp.15-16).
The Hobhouse Act 1831 introduced another sweeping change whereby 
every ratepayer, male or female, secured a single 'parochial' vote.
It also provided for annual elections and vote by ballot, but restricted 
the choice of electors to people with such a high rating qualification 
that most were excluded.
The duties of the Justices of the Peace increased considerably 
although there were only 5,000 in 1832 compared with 3,000 in 1689, 
and the Justices struggled under the load of numerous statutes. The 
office became specialised and required such expert knowledge that few 
people were qualified to accept it, and of those who were qualified to 
do the job, few cared to take it on. The new industrial towns were 
not pleasant enough to attract the landed gentry, from whom Justices were 
usually recruited. The position was therefore occupied by someone who 
was inefficient and corrupt.
About 200 municipal corporations were outside the jurisdiction of the 
Justices of the Peace. They tended to safeguard the interests of
traders and craftsmen and usually failed to provide sound administration. 
They were inefficient because:
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(a) Councils often felt that they had no responsibility for social 
problems. The members of the council confined their activities to the 
administration of corporate property;
(b) members of the corporations (when they were not manufacturers 
themselves) considered that the industrialists should meet the needs of 
the workers whom they had brought into the towns for their own profit;
(c) even where the council was willing to act, it was not always easy for 
it to acquire the power to do so;
(d) often a town had extended beyond its ancient boundaries; its powers 
to provide services ended at its legal boundaries.
An ad hoc authority is one which is created for a special purpose and 
which exercises only one function. The inadequacies of the traditional 
local government system had resulted in the setting up of various ad hoc 
bodies. About 200 local Acts had been passed to establish incorporated 
guardians of the poor, while over 1,100 turnpike trusts had been formed 
of which the more important ones appointed permanent paid officers and 
experimented with different road profiles and surfaces. Improvement 
Commissioners were extending their activities from roads, street-lighting 
and police to water and gas supplies and provision of fire engines.
Although the enthusiasm of some of the new authorities diminished and 
they were not all incorruptible, nevertheless they provided services 
which the traditional activities could not supply, and were in fact the 
beginnings of modern local government at a time when the county and 
borough systems were becoming increasingly ineffective (Richards,1978,p.16).
Thus, at the beginning of the 19th century, the traditional structure 
of local government which had served the country for centuries, was 
crumbling in the face of rapid socio-economic changes. The system 
which had been adequate in an agricultural society with few social problems 
was inadequfifti when confronted by the pressing social needs of a society
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which was becoming increasingly industrial. The early 19th century 
reform was in response to social and economic changes which made the 
system of local government obsolete and created problems.
Nineteenth Century Socio-Economic Change
Mention has already been made of the fact that local government cannot 
be separated from the social, economic, and political conditions in which 
it exists and operates. The 19th century saw dramatic changes in 
the structure of local government in England in response to environmental 
changes. During the early 19th century the following factors were among 
those which affected the growth of local government and the need for its 
reform:
(a) The growth of industry: The development of steam-driven machinery killed 
home industry, since the new source of power was worth supplying only
to many machines in factories. The factories needed many workers, who 
were housed in towns. The concentrated new urban developments of
the Industrial Revolution created an urgent need for improved local 
government services of all kinds.
(b) The growth of trade-union activities: The change in industry 
from domestic (taking place in the home) to factory production brought 
together large numbers of workers, who became organized and began to feel 
that they had power. As they grew and became stronger they added their 
weight to the demand for local government to improve living conditions 
and provide amenities.
(c) The French Revolution: The ruling classes were shocked by what had
happened in France, and felt that the same thing could occur here unless
the working classes were kept down. Strong measures, such as the
Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800, tried to prevent the rise of working-class
organizations which could press for reform. These Acts forbade any
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United action by masters or workmen to raise or lower wages or to 
increase or diminish the hours or quality of work. During the 
Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) there was no great demand for reform because 
there was prosperity. "The slump in the years following the end of the
Wars and the repeal of the Combination Acts in 1824 increased the demand 
for reforms" (Stones,1968,p.11).
(d) The rise of political parties: Until the 19th century political
parties tended to be loose associations of people with the same attitude 
to the questions of the day. The arrangement was very flexible. By
the 19th century the country was more definitely in two political camps, 
both representative of the middle class. The Conservative Party reflected 
the views of the landed gentry, who favoured the established system of rural 
local government. The Liberal Party was that of the industrialists, who 
wanted to see reform in the towns. The tussle between the two elements 
helped to determine the form which local government was to take.
(e) 'Laissez-faire' and Utilitarianism: One of the most important principles 
to which men subscribed during the 19th century was that of 'laissez-faire' - 
a belief in a free competitive economy and a strong conviction that it was 
wrong for a government to interfere with the actions of individuals.
This idea was taken a stage further by Jeremy Bentham (j.*748-1832), who said 
that the value of any governmental or individual action could be tested 
by seeing whether it resulted in the greatest good for the greatest number 
of people. He applied his idea to a study of the local government 
system and concluded that local government could be improved by electing 
the local authorities in accordance with a standard procedure, by giving 
them greatly increased powers and functions, and by auditing their accounts. 
These two concepts and a more enlightened social conscience led to more 
demands for local government reforms.
(f) The Reform Act,1932: Before 1832 Parliament was composed of two
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members from each county and each borough regardless of size and 
population. In the counties those persons were allowed to vote
who held the freehold of land worth more than forty shillings a year 
(Stones,1968,p.12).
The Reform Act 1832 extended the vote to the middle classes and this 
resulted in a Liberal Government dedicated to further reform. The first 
statute affecting local government was the Poor Law Amendment Act 183^ 
which established very strong central control through the Poor Law 
Commissioners. Some 700 unions (groupings of parishes) replaced the
15,000 parishes for the administration of poor relief, based on convenient 
administrative areas, under elected Boards of Guardians of the Poor, who 
appointed salaried officials.
In 1833 the Government set up a Royal Commission to inquire into the 
state of the municipal corporations in England and Wales. The 
corporations were in need of reform because they were corrupt, inefficient 
and strongly biased in religion and politics, and, therefore, in their 
administration of charitable trusts. The Commission's report led to the
passing of the Municipal Corporations Act 1835, which laid the foundations 
for the present-day system of local self-government, with elected councils 
which were unconnected with the administration of justice. There were 
however serious limitations as a large proportion of the inhabitants could 
not vote and the powers of the new councils were confined to the 
management of corporate property, control of police and making of bye-laws, 
although these powers were extended by subsequent statutes. The Act 
was applied to 178 of the 246 boroughs, but London and 67 very small 
boroughs were not included.
Richards (1978,p.17) describes the remarkable difference of approach 
between the last two Acts. Poor Law reform was based on strong central 
control, uniform arrangements, rationalisation of areas and the ad hoc
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principle. The Municipal Corporations Act 1835 gave authority to 
local representatives subject to a minimum of central control, maintained 
existing areas and created organizations which could each administer a 
wide range of services.
Public health was the next service which demanded attention.
Using statistics collected by the new local registry offices, Edwin 
Chadwick, Secretary to the Poor Law Commissioners, produced a report 
showing that there was a connection between the amount of sickness and 
the amount of poor relief which was paid. By the middle of the 19th 
century, about half the population lived in towns and by 1880 the proportion 
had increased to over two-thirds (Smellie,1946,p.77). Of fifty large 
towns in England and Wales in 1845, scarcely one had a good drainage 
system and only six a really pure water supply. Living conditions were 
filthy and squalid, with a consequent danger of cholera and the plague 
(Stones,1968,p.16).
Chadwick argued that the amount spent on poor relief could be reduced 
if sickness were prevented. The Public Health Act 1848 authorised the 
establishment of a General Board of Health overseeing local boards of 
health, charged with the duty of providing water supply and drainage either 
where the inhabitants requested it or where the death rate exceeded 23 
per 1,000. Municipal corporations assumed these responsibilities for their 
areas. The General Board of Health was abolished in 1858 but the 670
established local boards of health remained.
By the middle of the century the turnpike trusts were encountering 
problems with road maintenance. It had become evident that a parish was 
too small an area for road maintenance and in 1862 the county justices 
were given powers to create unions of parishes as highway districts.
These proved unpopular and many villages opted out of highway districts 
by adopting the Public Health Act 1848 and the Local Government Act 1858,
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and forming their own local board of health, which entitled them to 
separate highway powers. The Local Government Act 1863 blocked this 
loophole by stipulating that only parishes with a population of at least
3,000 could apply for local board of health status. However, many 
villages obtained this status by 1863 and some remained as urban districts 
until 1974. Some of the highway districts were never established 
and others ceased to function, resulting in responsibility for roads 
reverting to the parishes (Richards ,1978,p.19).
The Second Reform Act 1867 gave the vote to urban workers but it was 
not until 1884 that this was extended to rural workers. A more enlightened 
Parliament recognised the confusion, variation and overlap of local 
government bodies and functions. This was glaring in the administration 
of public health, where powers were vested in the vestry, guardians of the 
poor, local boards of health, borough councils and improvement commissioners. 
The Royal Sanitary Commission which reported in 1871 found "a chaotic 
system which made efficient local government impossible" (Stones,1968, 
pp.17-18). In 1871 the Local Government Board was established with 
poor law, public health and registration of births and deaths functions.
The first compulsory Public Health Act in 1875 revised and rationalised 
public health law and introduced a simplified pattern of urban and rural 
sanitary authorities, although the general structure of local government 
administration was still confusing and cumbersome (Seeley,1978,p.6).
For example, the urban sanitary authorities were highway authorities but 
not poor law authorities, while in rural areas the poor law authorities 
had sanitary functions and often highway responsibilities.
In 1870 Gladstone's Liberal Government gave the parish the 
responsibility to provide a school where it had not already been provided 
by the church or other voluntary agency. School attendance beccune
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compulsory in 1876 and free in 1891 (Richards,1978,p.19),
Meanwhile London had been excluded from the operation of Municipal 
Corporation's Act 1835 and was probably the worst governed area in the 
country. The capital had expanded substantially outside the one square 
mile occupied by the City of London, and the corporation showed little 
interest in the adjoining areas. Many important services were 
administered by the Metropolitan Board of Works established in 1855, 
based on a system of indirect election through district boards. The 
Metropolitan Board acquired further wide-ranging powers over time, some 
of which it is claimed were administered corruptly.
Structural Reforms; 1880-1944
By 1880, the local government system was in chaos, ripe for reform. 
Seeley described the position in 1885 as "a chaos of areas, a chaos of 
franchises, a chaos of authorities, and a chaos of rates" (1978,p.6).
The range of sizes of borough was enormous - from half a million population 
in Liverpool to a few hundred in Shaftsbury (Smellie,1946,p.47). There 
were over a dozen different kinds of rates and even elections were held 
at different times, in different ways and on different franchises. It
became evident that the creation of numerous ad hoc bodies was not 
conducive to maximum efficiency and that a simple system of general local 
authorities offered distinct advantages.
The system needed reform also because important changes in suffrage 
had taken place. The 1867 Reform Act had extended the vote to the new 
industrial working class, whilst the 1884 Act gave the vote to the 
agricultural working class. These changes in the political environment, 
themselves reflections of further social, economic and physical 
environmental changes, were to lead to further reforms in the structure 
of English local government. This second period of reform was
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essentially one of 'consolidation* and established a structure of local 
government which, outside London, was to remain largely unchanged until 
1974.
The essential piece's of legislation in this period were the Acts of 
1888, 1894 and 1929. As a result of the first two, the structure of local 
government was unitary or single tier in the larger towns, and two or 
even three tier in the rest of the country.
The Local Government Act 1888 established the county councils, with 
a similar framework to the boroughs, consisting of councillors elected by 
the ratepayers and aldermen elected by the councillors. In the counties 
the administrative powers of the Justices of the Peace were transferred 
to elected county councils. The original proposals had been that all
the country should be governed by county councils, who would act as a 
link between government departments and the smaller local authorities within 
the counties. However, many of the larger boroughs were unwilling to be 
swallowed up by counties, whose councils would be motivated by rural 
interests. These large boroughs were able to bring pressure to bear on 
the Government, and the Act, when passed, excluded from control by the 
counties all the municipal boroughs which had a population of more than
50,000 and four others (Chester, Worcester,Burton-on-Trent, and 
Canterbury) which had a population of less than 50,000. The authorities 
which were excluded from control by the counties were known as county 
boroughs - single-tier authorities with the powers and duties of both 
counties and boroughs for their areas.
The 1888 Act was a major step towards the concept of sub-legislatures 
and provision was incorporated for decentralisation from Parliament to 
county but this was never implemented. The Act also attempted to establish 
basic principles for providing monetary aid to local authorities, by 
isolating central aid to local government from other forms of national
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expenditure and thereby restricting central supervision of local administration. 
The majority of specific grants were replaced by a single combined grant 
to be paid from a separate local taxation account, funded from forty 
per cent of the product bf certain national taxes (assigned revenues).
The system was later discontinued as the assigned revenues did not increase 
at the same rate as local authority expenditure and successive governments 
were not prepared to increase the range or proportion of revenues paid to 
the local taxation account. This was the beginning of a continuing 
controversy on the relative desirability of general grants as opposed to 
grants for specific purposes (Richards,1978,pp.21-22).
The next stage was the rationalisation of the second-tier authorities.
At the time of the passing of the Local Government Act 1888^there had 
been some support for proposals to make more orderly the system of local 
government in county districts. The Local Government Act 1894 went a 
step further in reorganizing and simplifying the system of local government.
The Act provided that urban sanitary authorities (usually these were the 
areas of local boards of health constituted under the Public Health Acts 
1848-74) should be called urban district councils and their districts, 
urban districts. It also established new rural district councils, to
which were transferred the duties and powers of the rural sanitary 
authority in the district. Both types of council were to be elected.
The Local Government Act 1899 overhauled local government 
administration in London by replacing numerous district boards and vestries 
by 28 metropolitan borough councils. It was believed that the boroughs
would act as a counterweight to the London County Council as they were 
given responsibility for public health, housing, rating, libraries and 
recreational services. As Richards (1978,p.22) says, it was not 
foreseen at the time that most new duties would be assigned to the county 
council , thus accentuating the imbalance.
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The pattern of local government structure thus established was 
to remain for over half a century - until 1963‘in London and 1974 in 
the remainder of England and Wales, and this is illustrated in Figure 2,1* 
FIGURE 2.1;
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE; ENGLAND AND WALES 1899-1974 





















Yet the system did reflect the political, social and economic 
realities of the late 19th century. At that time, it was still 
meaningful to distinguish between town and country, and it was created 
before it was possible to foresee the many stresses and strains that 
20th century strains would bring; the 1888 local government system 
was created before the invention of the motor car; the introduction of 
universal suffrage in Britain (1928), and the creation of the welfare 
state and the rise of a social democratic party essentially concerned 
with representing (at least organised) working-class interests.
Some of the rapid changes which overtook the new local government 
system shortly after its introduction and before its main revisions in 1929
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can be seen from the following data. The population of England 
and Wales was increasing at a considerable rate, rising from 26 million 
in 1881 to 38 million in 1921 - an increase of 46 per cent in 40 years. 
This increase was not distributed evenly throughout the country and was 
concentrated primarily in the towns which extended into the surrounding 
countryside. These developments undermined local authority boundaries 
and caused conflict between urban and rural authorities, as the majority 
of rural district councils and county councils were opposed to town 
boundary extensions and the conferment of county borough status. Between 
1889 and 1925 there were 109 extensions of county borough areas and an 
increase in the number of county boroughs from 61 to 82, involving a 
combined loss to the counties of 350,000 acres, 3 million population and 
£14*2 million in rateable value (Seeley,1978,p. 11).
Furthermore, the movement of population from the rural to urban areas 
continued, as the urban percentage of the population rose from 57 per cent 
in 1891 to 67 per cent in 1921. Unknown at the time of the 1888 Act, 
there were over a million road vehicles licensed by 1930. Also unknown 
in 1888 was the Labour Party: by 1929 it was in its second period of
office, and its concern with social welfare was beginning to make itself 
felt, perhaps more strongly in the housing and planning fields.
The 1929 Act contained a number of important provisions, of which one 
was the abolition of the only remaining ad hoc authority - the Guardians of 
the Poor. Their functions (poor law, registration and hospital 
service) were transferred to the county councils and county borough 
councils. Another aim was to improve the condition of roads in county 
areas to keep pace with the increasing number of vehicles by transferring 
the highway powers of rural districts to the county councils. Towns with 
a population exceeding 20,000 could claim highway powers over county 
roads within their boundaries and all urban authorities retained
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responsibility for minor or unclassified roads. Rural districts and 
towns with less than 20,000 population could be given delegated powers 
over county roads in their areas but this did not operate very 
satisfactorily and diminished over time. Richards (1978,p.30) thinks 
that there is a strong case for confining highway activities to the larger 
authorities with the necessary technical expertise and resources.
The Act also recognised the need for regional planning over wide areas 
than thase of individual local authority units. It empowered county councils 
to act jointly with other authorities in the preparation or adoption of 
town planning schemes.
However, the reforms of 1929 were initiated not so much by the need 
to cope with the aforementioned changes as by a crisis in another area, 
namely,the finance of local government. The 1888 Act had attempted a 
separation between local and national finance, but the ever-increasing 
scope of local government activity in the 20th century ensured that 
such a separation could not be achieved (Jones,1969a, pp.165-82). Central 
government found it necessary to give ever-increasing grants to finance 
the new services, whilst on the other hand, local authorities found that 
taxes (rates) provided an ever-diminishing part of the revenue they 
required. Financial reforms were required for three reasons; to 
meet part of the cost of the new and expanding services provided by local 
government; to enable the centre to supervise services expected to reach 
a certain minimum standard everywhere; and to correct inequalities in 
the burden of local taxes between different individuals and areas. To a 
certain extent, it was felt at the time that all these goals could be 
achieved by replacing the many individual grants in aid by a block grant, 
and by the exclusion of agricultural and industrial land from local taxes, 
steps taken to ameliorate the problems of the Depression of the late 20s 
and 30s. As a result of the 1929 Act, however, the new grants generally
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increased the already apparent tendency for the central departments to 
exercise a general control over the work of local government.
Between 1929 and 1974, there were numerous Acts which, together with 
government committees, bgundary commissioners and even Royal Commissions, 
attempted to ensure that the structure of local government could continue 
both to cope with the problems with which it was faced, as well as providing 
the various services required and demanded of it. Examples of 
important legislation which increased the scope of local government activity 
include the 1944 Education Act, the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, 
as well as many Housing Acts. Local government has also lost some 
functions to central government. Some - such as the Poor Law (1934-47), 
most civil airports (1945), electricity (1947), gas (1948) and more recently 
water (1974) - have been transferred to public corporations. Others -such 
as trunk roads (1936 and 1946), hospitals (1947), and most remaining local 
health services (1974) - have been transferred to central government.
The administration of these last has not been transferred to centrally 
located Whitehall departments or to their inspectorates. New local 
agencies with sane discretion have been appointed - in these cases the 
divisional road engineers, the road construction units and the regional 
hospital boards.
Moreover, numerous bodies have been appointed which it has recently 
become common to call QUANGOS, quasi-autonomous, non-governmental 
organisations. Many of them are also local - from some of the oldest, 
such as employment exchanges, through to consumers' committees and 
advisory committees of all kinds - and some such as the area health 
authorities have several members nominated by local authorities.
All these legislations and changes took place without a fundamental 
review and change in the organizational and areal basis of local government 
until 1974. As Goldsmith correctly says.
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what has happened to English local government since 1888 
is that it has become delocalised. In other words, a 
number of changes have posed problems for the structure of 
local self-government laid down by the 1888 Act, causing 
adaptations which have fundamentally shifted the emphasis 
away from democratic criteria and the locality, towards 
efficiency ones and the centre. These changes have been 
both national and local, as well as reflecting political, 
social and economic changes in the country (Goldsmith,1979,p.15).
It is an examination of these changes that we now turn, for an




DIAGNOSIS; SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING THE NEED 
FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM
INTRODUCTION
The careful student of history must seek the explanation of 
the forms and changes of political institutions in the social 
and economic forces that determine them (Turner,1920,p.243),
We have said that the awareness of administrative reform arises
with the realization that the present organizational set-up is unable
to meet its obligations adequately; when a particular administrative
system cannot keep in pace with development and fails to make necessary
adjustments to socio-economic and political changes over a period
of time. As a result, its components become maladjusted. We also
identified a number of factors which will push for major structural
reforms to rectify the defects in the existing administrative system.
These factors include the following; growth in size and type of the
clientele served such as substantial increase in population and
urbanization; changes in problems, needs and demands of the people,
(result of) new technology, new equipment and advancing knowledge;
changing and usually rising qualifications of personnel and basic
policy changes at top level. We shall be dealing with all these
factors under two broad headings - SOCIO-ECONOMIC, and POLITICAL changes.
These changes which were taking place while the structure of local
government remained relatively stable, led to indreased load (functions
and responsibilities) on local government without a corresponding increase
in capacity (performance), and therefore the defects and criticisms
which were levied on local government in Nigeria and Britain (see
Chapter 5).
First of all, we will formulate here a conceptual framework which 
will enable us to interpret the changing structure of society, generating 
demands for new structures of local government in both countries. This
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framework will go a long way to help in answering our question:
Was reform necessary because the administration could not keep abreast 
of development? Our perspective is shaped by the systems analytic 
perspective associated Vith David Easton (1965), which provides a useful 
theoretical framework with which to interpret the background to local 
government reform. We will now be in a position to define local 
government as a system which resides in and responds to socio-economic 
and political changes. Thus, the changing structure of local government 
can be seen as a series of 'system responses' to environmental changes, 
responses which are partly regime changes (e.g. the spread of partisan 
local government); partly authority changes (e.g. the advent of the 
military in Nigerian politics or the rise of public persons as local 
political leaders); and partly system changes (e.g. reform in 
orgniaation and function).
But, as we shall see, local government reform cannot be simply 
interpreted as responses to the forces of socio-economic and political 
changes, for to do so is to ignore the role of the reformer, Dahl's 
homo politicus (Dahl,1961,pp.223-8). The actions of the reformers
will be determined by their perception of their environment and 
environmental changes.
Thus, the problems of 'administrative systems' and 'administrative 
reform' will be approached within the framework of General Systems 
Theory, at a macro-analytical level which recognises that:
(a) policy formation is as much a key factor in determining the output 
of public policy - represented by bureaucratic performance - as is 
policy execution; and
(b) (local government) bureaucracy is a sub-system of the larger society, 
and the ability of the bureaucratic system to pursue its goals - that
is, its capacity - is determined by two factors: its external links with
95
the environment and its internal orientation. What we want to 
demonstrate is that national goals, viewed either in terms of their 
stationary condition at a fixed point of time or in terms of their 
dynamic elements, represent the load on the bureaucratic system, and 
that the capacity of the bureaucratic system to support its load is 
determined by the links it maintains with the external environment as 
well as by its internal basic environment or orientation. The need 
to reform the local government systems in Nigeria and Britain arose 
because the load (input) has multiplied due to socio-economic and 
political changes while the capacity (output) has not kept abreast of 
these changes.
Societies the world over are caught in a situation that demands 
wholesale changes in their organizational structures and social dynamics 
in order to deal with the new complex technological, economic, and political 
relationships. The reform of local government (Nigeria: 1976;
England and Wales: 1974) became necessary because previous reform 
attempts since 1945 were not successful. That is not to say that it 
was only after 1945 that reformers and critics of local government in both 
countries started feeling the discrepancy between the ideal and reality, 
that is, that local administration was not keeping abreast of developments. 
Criticisms of local government and the need for reform go much farther 
back. But the demand for reform, which culminated in the 1976 and 1974 
reforms in Nigeria and Britain respectively, became more articulate and 
enunciative after the Second World War and especially in the sixties.
We shall therefore concentrate on post-war reform efforts. ■
In order to adequately analyse the 'defects' of local government in 
Nigeria and Britain, we need to catch the dynamics of social, political / 
and economic changes that have occurred in both countries. There are
differences between the two countries and they (the differences)
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are rooted in the social environment, in the historical traditions 
and conventions which underpin each system, in the peoples, in the 
political and economic setting, and in the institutional arrangements 
of each country. It *is on the variety, complexity and intensity of 
these differences and changes that our analysis of the formulation of 
reform objectives and other subsequent observations and assertions 
will depend. But first we will give a brief catalogue of the ailments 
and pressures confronting local government in both countries; we will 
deal with them in much greater detail in chapter 5.
Despite the huge gap in development between Nigeria and Britain, 
and the aforementioned differences (see chapter 1), it is interesting 
that both of them should have so many problems in common; and both 
of them were obsessed with the need to reform local government. Both 
countries felt that the local government system was not working well; 
that it was undemocratic, which is argued to be related to the low level 
of voting in local elections. It is also said that they were 
undemocratic because of the lack of control by the locally elected 
representatives over the bureaucracy. Elected officials themselves 
are aaid to be drawn disproportionately from better educated middle-class 
men or, in Nigeria's case, from illiterates. It was also asserted that 
they were undemocratic because of the degree of internal democracy within 
the local authorities, their insensitivity to local demands and their 
institutional responses to the challenge of participation.
Both systems of local government have been put under severe 
pressure because of sweeping demographical changes, population mobility - 
rapid movement from rural to urban areas in Nigeria and Britain 
(urbanization), and in Britain's case, suburbanization, that is, 
the city spread and decaying city centres. Added to these is the 
growing awareness that large industrial and commercial centres can no
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longer be planned or serviced in isolation from the surrounding rural 
or semi-rural areas and vice-versa.
Another major problem which local government in both countries 
faced was the erosion of their autonomy. Increasing State intervention, 
the need for national planning agencies, and the secular egalitarian 
trend involving the demand for minimum standards in performance, were some 
of the pressures pushing in a centralist direction. Certainly central 
control is real, and is manifested in the plethora of circulars and 
advice that flood the offices of local authorities. Central control 
can be in many guises - political, administrative, legislative, technical 
and financial. It is the financial which is often resented, since local 
government dependence is more than evident; two-thirds of British local 
government fund expenditure come from central government in the form of 
grants. This is even higher in Nigeria, with the Federal and State 
Governments providing about four-fifths of local government expenditure.
Finally, both local government systems faced growing problems about 
their efficiency - and at two levels: both in their relations with the
centre and within local government structures, real problems of 
duplication and co-ordination have emerged. Added to these is the ^
point of corruption and nepotism in the Nigerian system. Moreover, 
small local authorities are said to be too weak in financial resources 
and trained personnel to provide proper services and adequate 
administration. Only in a few cases can they establish or maintain 
such costly institutions as hospitals and secondary schools unaided.
As we said earlier, we shall deal with these problems in greater details 
later.
However, although local authorities in both countries have certain 
problems in common, their causes of, and conditions for reform differ 
in many respects. Modernizing, secularizing and (sub) urbanizing 
trends have long been noticeable in Britain. Increased social
98
mobility, coinciding with technical progress, mechanization and 
rapidly improving communications, has considerably enlarged the scale 
of almost every aspect of human life. During the last few decades, 
in particular, social and economic development has accelerated in pace.
Metropolitan areas with their highly fragmented structures have
A /understandably long been a matter of concern, but the raison d'etre >
of the small districts in rural areas was moreover being increasingly 
contested. More recently, growing recognition of the need for 
physical, economic and even comprehensive planning has given new 
dimensions to the local government issue in Britain. Planning 
stresses the necessity for progressive and integrated policy making and 
large-scale territorial frameworks for government and administration 
suitable for carrying out this task. The reduction in the number of 
local authorities (from about, 1500 to about 400) is indicative of
current thought in this respect.
On the other hand, Nigeria, at the threshold of a new era, has
undergone an even more tumultuous process. Not only did she demonstrate
a natural inclination by breaking with the colonial system of
administration, but she has also introduced ' new structures, as a 
result of changed socio-economic and especially political conditions. 
Moreover, the new orientation towards social and economic development 
has placed many new tasks on the shoulders of local government; this 
has been further aggravated by the frequent lack of any well-organized 
indigenous private sector in the economic and social field, and therefore 
the panacea, reform.
In Nigeria, scale-enlargement has not been the primary cause to 
stimulate local government reform, although it has been a secondary 
factor, notably in western Nigeria. Efforts in this direction have 
placed major emphasis on the political reliability of the system for
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enhanced national unity and stability, and on the contribution it 
can make to social and economic development, and on increased popular 
participation in public decision-making and action.
In concluding thi^ introduction we can say that a local government 
system, particularly when it has developed gradually and is more or less 
the outcome of natural growth, does not function autonomously within 
the national system of government and the national community. A system 
is sometimes rooted in the distant past, like the British, but even if 
it is created by the government as a bold act of innovation, like the 
Nigerian system, it is subsequently moulded and re-shaped by the society 
in which it operates, influenced by numerous forces which condition its 
nature, operation and form. In the terminology of the modern social 
sciences, local government is a system that functions together with other 
systems within a larger system, and all these systems interact on each 
other.
Local government machineries in Britain and Nigeria lagged behind 
socio-economic and political changes; systems of local government and 
administration, in particuLar, became obsolete and thus unsuited to 
modern conditions and present and future needs. The point we are making 
is that the 'defects' of the British and the Nigerian local government 
systems, and therefore the needs for their reform, were a product of the 
social, economic and political changes which both countries witnessed.
These changes stretched the local government structure beyond what it 
could take, thus the discrepancy between LOAD (functions and responsibilities 
or input) and CAPACITY (performance or output), and this created problems 
for local government administration.
\
In order, therefore, to fully comprehend the criticisms levied 
on local government in both countries, it is necessary first of all to 
discuss the changes which have occurred in the society. Thus, we shall
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try to conceptualize the interplay of forces between load and capacity 
vis-a-vis the criticisms that were levied on local government. As 
we have said above, local government does not exist in a vacuum but 
that it is a sub-systemr of a larger society and to which it must respond. 
Therefore, any changes in the society will rebound on local government. 
We will classify the societal changes which a local government must 
respond to as: SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE
Little is still known of the pre-twentieth century social and 
economic life of Nigeria. We do know, however, that the Hausa /Fulani 
peoples engaged in extensive trading activities across the Sahara Desert 
for hundreds of years; and that Kano was one of the few major 
trans-Saharan trade centres. On the other hand, the peoples of the 
south, particularly the Ibos and Yorubas, traded with Europe for more 
than two centuries, participating at first in the slave trade, and after 
its abolition, in the trade in palm produce. There is also evidence 
that despite the difficulties imposed by dense vegetation and difficult 
terrain, especially in the south, there existed internal trade.
Exchange, division of labour and even the use of a monetary standard were 
well established in many parts of the country. Food and other 
subsistence items were produced simply: the hoe was the most significant
instrument of cultivation and beasts of burden and head porterage were 
the means of transportation.
The appearance of European trading firms in the 19th century, and 
missionaries sowing new ideas and bringing education, and later an 
externally imposed government began to produce important structural 
change in the economy of Nigeria. Most important of all was the 
offering by traders of rewards for the sale of particular crops which
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were in demand abroad - principally palm oil and palm kernels, and 
later cocoa, rubber, and groundnuts. Though there were no European 
plantations, production being done by peasant farmers on tiny parcels 
of land, the new incentives offered by the Europeans led to increased 
agricultural production for export. In the 20th century new cash 
crops such as cotton, rubber, cocoa and groundnuts brought more and 
more peasants into contact with the world market and with outside ideas. 
This contact helped in awakening a nationalist spirit, including the 
demand for democratic local government as we shall see later. Thus, the 
system of local government through native authorities remained relatively 
static for almost half a century until the early fifties, while the 
following changes were taking place in the society:
(a) the monetization of the economy and the linking of the economy with 
the world market;
(b) the introduction of new agricultural commodities such as cocoa, and 
the valorization of existing ones such as palm produce. The money made 
from these crops afforded farmers some leisure and some of the farmers 
could now devote more of their attention to local government affairs;
(c) the introduction of medicine and new drugs which lowered the death 
rate and consequently led to a population explosion and urbanization;
(d) the introduction of Western education and the training of medium- 
level personnel especially of white-collar clerical workers;
(e) the introduction of new technology such as the construction of a 
rudimentary albeit important railway network between 1895 and 1927, and 
the introduction of motor cars which inevitably meant that roads must 
be built and maintained; and
(f) the establishment of a few new towns to facilitate closer spatial 
integration of the economy.
All these changes, which we discuss in some detail below, and especially
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improved transportation, led to quicker dissemination of ideas, and 
the changes had a serious impact on the structure of local administration 
in later life.
The pre-1974 British local government structure on the other hand, 
was still based essentially on the Acts of 1888 and 1894 whose major 
premise was that town and country were separate and required a separate 
structure to deal with the differing problems they faced. Since then, 
the process of continuing urbanization and industrialization has made 
that separation meaningless as the process of increasing social and 
economic inter-dependence overwhelmed the existing local boundaries.
New technology, such as the introduction of motor vehicles, added to the 
functions of local government since, for example, they had to provide 
and maintain roads. Improved educational facilities led to increased 
better qualified personnel some of whom chose to work with local 
authorities. Despite governmental attempts at containing urban England, 
nothing could stop the process of suburbanization and the flight of 
industry out of the city. We can gain an insight into the scale of 
these changes using the following indicators: 
increase in Population
In 1871 the population of England and Wales was about twenty-three 
million. It had risen to thirty-two million in 1901, forty million 
in 1931, forty-six million in 1961 and reaching sixty million in the early 
1970s. Nigeria also experienced a tremendous increase in her 
population which was nineteen million in 1931 but rose to thirty million 
in 1953 and by 1975 there were over seventy million Nigerians. The 
expansion of population in Nigeria and Britain was not distributed 
evenly throughout the countries. In fact, the vital factor in the 
population explosion has been the increase in the urban proportions of 
the population, particularly in towns between 50,000 and 200,000 people.
In 1901 there were 61 of these towns, housing 22 per cent of the
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population of England and Wales. By 1961 there were 162 of such 
towns and they housed 38 per cent of the population. 77 per cent of 
the population now live in such urban towns, as against 57 per cent in 
1891 and 67 per cent in 1921. 40 per cent of the population live in
the six major metropolitan areas, though this proportion is declining 
as people continue to leave the major cities.
Urbanization in Nigeria, on the other hand, was given a strong 
stimulus by the British conquest of the country. The wage employment 
offered by the government and by commercial firms tended to be 
concentrated in particular spots. Centres of administration requiring 
Nigerian employees were needed for the effective political control of 
the country and about them were clustered what few modern amenities 
there were. At the same time with the growth of the export and import 
trade, centres for collection of produce and distribution of imported 
merchandise were set up at key ports and at strategic points on the 
main transportation routes. With the railway came the further need 
for concentration of services and fueling facilities. Thus to the 
already existing urban centres, the importance of some of which increased 
immensely, there were added new ones - Kaduna, Jos, Port Harcourt, Emugu, 
Gusau, Onitsha and Aba, to mention a few. In these towns were 
concentrated the schools, the sanitary systems, the hospitals, and 
sometimes electric power. To the attractions offered to rural dwellers 
in the forms of wage employment prospects or small-scale business 
opportunities there was added that of enjoyment of these other amenities 
and services. Nigerians were attracted by the 'gleam' and they flowed 
freely into the urban centres without recruitment, compulsion, or 
assistance (see Table 3.1); the cities thus grew in the same way as 
export production - through local responses to economic (and other) 
incentives. What evidence there is points to tremendous increased
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urbanization. There were about 0.8 million people living in urban 
towns of 50,000 or more in 1921. The figure rose to 1.4 millions 
in 1931. Despite this 5.8 per cent rate of growth, 'urban' population^ 
thus defined, was by this time still only 7 per cent of the estimated 
total. According to the 1952-54 census, this figure had risen to 
11 per cent and has more than doubled by 1975.
TABLE 3.1
POPULATION OF PRINCIPAL URBAN CENTRES IN NIGERIA.
TOWNS 1911 1921 1931 1953 1975’
Ibadan 175,000 238,094 387,133 459,196 847,000
Lagos 73,766 99,690 126,108 267,407 060,848
Ogbomosho 80,000 84,860 86,744 139,535 432,000
Oyo 45,432 46,356 48,733 72,133 152,000
Benin City n.a. n.a. n.a. 53,753 136,000
Iwo 60,000 53,588 57,191 100,006 214,000
Ilorin 36,342 38,668 47,412 48,999 282,000
Kano n.a. 49,938 97,031 130,173 399,000
Zaria n.a. 25,000 28,000 53,974 224,000
Kaduna n.a. 5,428 10,628 38,794 202,000
Jos n.a, 2,000 2,476 38,527 90,402
Enugu n.a. 3,170 12,959 62,764 187,000
Aba n.a. 2,327 12,958 57,787 177,000
Port Harcourt n.a. 7,185 15,201 71,632 242,000
Calabar n.a. 15,438 16,958 46,705 176,000
Maiduguri n.a. 16,274 24,359 54,646 189,000
Onitsha n.a. 10,319 18,084 76,921 220,000
Ede 26,577 48,360 52,392 44,808 182,000
Note: n.a. = Exact number hot known.
Sources : Coleman,1958, p.74; and *1975 figures, 
Africa South of the Sahara, 1979,p.748.
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Population increase and mobility have led to certain problems for 
local government. The urban areas, and particularly the larger towns, 
needed room in which to accommodate their increasing numbers; the 
rural areas, alarmed at the departure of local taxpayers opposed 
any extension of the urban boundaries and the consequent declining 
revenues. In Britain, they were opposed to the creation of new county 
boroughs which had the same effects, since it removed the areas of 
authorities promoted to that status from the jurisdiction of the county 
authority. In short, the conflict between taum and country - between 
county borough council and county council - arose because areas of local 
government did not adequately change to meet the conditions created by 
drifts of industry and population. Furthermore, owner occupation in 
England and Wales reached over 50 per cent in the early 1970s, whilst 
the supply of privately rented accommodation had dwindled to some 15 per 
cent: as a consequence, the rental market is supplied by municipal
housing, with over a third of the total housing stock falling into this 
category.
Urbanization and industrialization in Nigeria also involved continuous 
differentiation in the institutional structure of the society, as well 
as changes in the social, econcanic and psychological commitments of 
people. In order words, considerable social mobility led to calls 
for changes in local government structure to meet the demands of the 
increasing clientele. Social mobility also diminished the cleavage 
between the town and its surrounding rural areas. This further made
nonsense of the structure of local government. And in the realm 
of politics, increasing urbanization effected a new political role for 
the urban worker and the expanding middle class. Thus, as
modernization progresses, popular political involvement tends to be
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enhanced and traditional political loyalties eroded. Concomitant 
with this, different interest groups arise, or are aroused, and the 
growing mass of enfranchised citizens will increasingly leave their 
imprint on the political process. The implications of social 
mobilization for political development are understandably far-reaching, 
because a change in the quality of politics occurs by virtue of changes 
in the range of the human needs which impinge upon the political process. 
The transformation of social needs on a large scale - particularly in 
areas such as housing, employment, social security, municipal services, 
medical care, and so forth - creates impossible demands on local 
governments whose administrative and resource capacities have not 
adapted or kept pace with growing and divergent needs of a modernizing 
population. Thus, rural-urban drift brought with it changes (social, 
political and economic) and problems. Greater mobility of the 
population and the weakening of the extended family linkages brought 
new demands upon the local authorities to assist the individual who fell 
into need. The tempo and character of the changes created situations 
and attitudes that have predisposed many Nigerians to nationalist 
activity and increased demands from the government after independence.
The cities and towns became not only melting pots, but the breeding 
and training grounds, as well as the arenas, of Nigerian nationalism; and 
later for the demand for a democratic and efficient local government to 
cater for their needs.
Advances in Medicine
The increase in population of both countries was due, in great 
part, to a check upon the death rate by the advances made in medicine. 
From the beginning of the 18th century (Nigeria: 20th century) , the 
medical profession had moved, at an accelerating pace, out of the
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darkness of superstition into the light of science. A connection 
had been established between dirt and disease, and some attention was 
given to providing clean water, sewers, drainage, and to removing 
offensive trades and nuisances.
Later, in the 19th century Britain, it was thought likely that 
every individual was a possible menace to public health, since he could 
harbour germs on his body, in his clothing, and in his home. Every 
person came to be regarded as a possible spreader of diseases who, if 
not supervised and treated, could affect the whole nation. Local 
authorities came to pay more attention to personal health services in 
accordance with minimum scientific standards under greater central 
supervision.
Since the Second World War there have been significant improvements 
in environmental sanitation, the inspection of the food supply, maternity 
and child welfare, the supervision of midwives, the treatment of 
infectious diseases, and modern medical aids have been increasingly 
introduced in Nigeria too. These, such as the introduction of 
quinine to cure malaria, have had effects on the death rate emd hence 
on the population growth rate (see Table 3.2). The population explosion 
means in effect that the local government authorities have had to 
provide and maintain dispensaries, maternity centres, housing,social 
security and amenities for the masses. As a consequence they became 
important sources of employment. The local authorities did not respond 
adequately to these changes and responsibilities and because they 
lacked the necessary funds and trained personnel, they became 
inefficient and ineffective.
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TABLE 3.2: BIRTH AND DEATH RATE IN NIGERIA
PER THOUSAND





Note: *These figures represent the rate of infant mortality 
in Lagos, but they are representative.
Sources: Africa South of the Sahara, UN, 1979; Census of Nigeria, 
1931,VoL 1.appendix 1,pp.125-30; Dr.J.G.S.Turner, "Notes 
on the Medical History of Lagos", Vols,11 & VI, Lagos,1933
Expansion of Educational Facilities
Before 1870, the provision of education in Britain had been in the 
hands of various voluntary bodies, assisted by State grants. The 
Education Act 1870 authorised local school boards (ad hoc bodies) to 
provide schools where voluntary provision was not adequate.
The Education Act 1902 abolished the school boards and transferred 
their powers to county councils and county borough councils. The 
larger non-county borough councils and urban district councils were 
to be the authorities for elementary education only. This new and 
costly service was operated only by the largest local government units.
The provision of higher education was restricted to county councils and 
county borough councils, since smaller authorities could neither provide 
such a service nor make adequate use of it.
In Nigeria, perhaps the most significant inheritance from the colonial 
masters was the introduction of Western education, usually by 
missionaries. Schools were built in many areas which had hitherto 
seen nothing like that, although their influence remained concentrated.
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of course, upon the main centres of administration. The shift 
of emphasis to education in the government expenditure after 1951 
had a very significant socio-economic and political impact on the 
society. Not only did the provision of educational facilities add 
to the burden of local government and therefore its ineffectiveness, 
but education per se changed the type and quality of local government 
clientele and inevitably the demands of the clientele.
In the Western Region, primary education became free in 1955 
and the number of admissions expanded rapidly in most of the others.
Openings for secondary schools also increased rapidly whilst the number 
of university entrants was substantially higher. From less than a 
million students in institutions of various kinds in 1950, the figure 
rose to over three million within fifteen years. This tremendous 
expansion of education facilities in Nigeria has continued, with 
education receiving the highest priority in the Federal Government budget 
estimates since 1978. We shall see in the next sub-section how 
education siphoned the already inadequate resources of local government 
in Nigeria. Table 3.3 tells all the story of the rapid change in education 
since 1938.
TABLE 3.3: EXPANSION OF EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES IN NIGERIA
NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED
YEAR SECONDARY EDUCATION TECHNICAL/VOCATIONAL UNIVERSITY
1938 5,400 60
1950 21,400 1,300 300
1955 39,500 2,600 900
1960 135,400 4,700 2,700
1971 343,313 15,590 14,371
1973 448,904 22,588 23,173
1975-80 1,555,180 117,686 53,000
Sources; UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1967; 
Legum, 1977,p.674.
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In Britain all education other than university education has 
been a local authority responsibility since 1902, and the division 
as between secondary and primary was at one time between the county 
and county borough coundils on the one hand and certain district 
councils on the other. This ceased with the Education Act 1944, 
in the belief that it is wrong educationally and administratively for 
responsibility for a child's education to be split half way through his 
school career. In contrast, in Nigeria where education is the overriding 
interest of all classes of the community, the native authorities of 
colonial days and the local authorities that succeeded them have shown 
their eagerness to build primary schools and their willingness to make 
sacrifices to do so. Thus there has emerged the administrative 
pattern of divided responsibility that had been discredited in the 
British Act of 1944 - the local authority primary school and the 
government secondary.
The expansion of education (and enfranchisement) in Nigeria and 
Britain led, as we shall expand later, to increased political awareness 
and participation, to increased qualified specialist personnel working 
with the local authorities (though less so in Nigeria) and also to 
increased demands for institutional reforms both at the national and 
local levels. As Wraith puts it, "it is part of a natural process 
that as education and prosperity become more widespread people demand, 
and are capable of exercising, an increasing share of responsibility 
in administering local affairs..." (1972,p.21).
Increased Local Government Functions
It is not possible to lay down any precise responsibility between 
central and local government, because there is no infallible test 
of principle by which to determine what particular duties should be 
assigned to either of them. There is no class of duties which, from
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the purely constitutional point of view, it will be improper to 
entrust to local authorities. But in the course of history, 
responsibilities have been distributed between central and local 
administrations in an almost infinite variety of ways. Regards 
have always, however, been had to the fact that the society is not 
static, but in a state of flux. Changes are bound to occur and 
emphases are bound also to be different at different stages of 
development. It suffices, therefore, without reference to theory, 
to accept the fact that there are certain functions which, it is either 
essential or desirable for the government to perform, and that there 
are certain functions which are essentially suited for performance 
by the local authorities.
We must remember that Britain pioneered the agricultural and the 
industrial revolutions and they created for her unprecedented social 
problems, especially of destitution and disease. The central government 
itself had no machinery for tackling these problems. 'Local government', 
as it then existed, was equally incapable of solving them. Outside
the boroughs (which were in any case concerned with local trade and 
prosperity and were extremely corrupt) local government meant the 
'justices of the peace', whose main job was judicial and whose 
administrative functions were rudimentary. Of course, someone had 
to solve the social problems and the policy of the 19th century 
governments was to give responsibility to locally elected bodies to 
deal with poverty, provide basic necessities in the streets, deal with 
problems of sanitation and public health and later with public 
education (Pearce, 1980, pp.14-15).
In contrast, when comparable modern problems began to arise in the 
20th century in Nigeria, Government was paternal and all-powerful and 
its local agents, the district officers, were supposed to solve every
112
problem that came along. State control, which would have been 
regarded in Britain at the time as unacceptable, was accepted in 
colonial government as normal. To get a true British-Nigerian 
comparison it is therefore necessary to stand history on its head.
The result, in Nigeria, of superimposing the British kind of local 
government on what already existed was simply too much government; 
there was not enough for everyone to do, especially with the limited 
resources available, so that having created local government it was 
necessary to invent a purpose for it. In fact, the real purpose, in 
the minds of the British, had been political education, as a preparation 
for self-government, and in the minds of the Nigerian politicians the 
diminution of the power of the chiefs.
The point we are making is that such functions as the building and 
maintenance of roads, public works, schools, dispensaries, housing, 
transport, traffic and amenities, which usually should be reserved for 
local government were performed by the field agencies of the central 
government. This means that the central government was very powerful 
and influential since it imposed the apparatus of modernization from 
above upon people who took very little active part in it. These 
field agencies which were "essential when things had to be done for 
people, came to be something of an obstacle when the time came for 
things to be done ^  people. In other words it is now difficult 
for local communities, coming into the picture after fifty years of 
departmental government, to find their feet, since the knowledge, 
the skill, the equipment and the money are so largely concentrated in 
central government hands" (Wraith,1972,p.44). The result has been 
that administrative, professional and technical competence have been 
unduly concentrated in the central government service, at the expense 
of local government, and this made local government, even with their
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limited functions, ineffective and inefficient.
Before the reform of 1974 in Britain, one could define the functions 
of local government as follows: the environmental, the protective
and the social. This analysis has now become obsolete. Contemporary 
problems of the 'environment' such as communication have become 
primarily national. The protective services included the police whose 
staffing and administration now largely ignore local government 
administrative boundaries; and one of the most important of the social 
services, hospitals, was taken away from local government about 30 years 
ago. We shall return to this point - the loss of functions- shortly.
In Nigeria much of this was meaningless because, as we said earlier 
on, most of these functions were performed by the central government. 
Apart from law and order, only public sanitation could be said to be 
the responsibility of local communities. The unromantic subjects 
of refuse, sewage, drains, public cleansing, pure water, and pest and 
disease control have been the foundation of local government everywhere. 
Almost everything else is a matter of argument, so far as its 
administrative setting is concerned. We should now, however, go into 
some details about the growth of local government functions.
One matter in which local authorities in Nigeria have differed from 
the British, and more closely resembled the French, is in their general 
responsibility for law and order. They have, of course, specific 
powers to deal with natural nuisances such as fires and man-made 
nuisances such as brothels, gambling, begging, hawking and noise. But 
there has always been in addition a general duty laid upon all local 
authorities, which cannot be listed as a specific function or defined 
with any precision; that is the duty generally to assist in maintaining 
law and good government. This duty has grown increasingly important 
today. The law lays it down that local authorities shall not only
114
perform the duties imposed on them by the law, but must generally 
maintain order in their areas. In this respect it is the duty of the 
local authorities to interpose for the purpose of preventing, and to the 
best of their ability pfevent, the commission of any offence by anybody 
within the area of the council.
In view of the great stress laid on the importance of this duty, the 
law contained provisions permitting the councils to maintain their 
own local police force and prisons. The importance laid on the 
maintenance of law and order can probably be attributed to local 
government's inheritance of some of the roles played by traditional 
authorities in the past, when no other government agency possessed the 
necessary information and organization at the local level. The provision 
for local authorities to maintain law and order was described as the
/Native Authority's main raison d'etre and obligation to the Regional 
Government and to the community it serves (Campbell, 1963). The 
added burden of maintaining a police force and prisons was necessary 
in view of the fact that the 'native authority' was almost synonymous 
with the 'native court'.
One other, if not the most important duty performed by the local 
authorities, is the provision of medical and health facilities. Here, 
the responsibility was shared between the councils and the central 
government. Local authorities played and still play a prominent part 
in the sanitation of their areas. This 'welfare' category of functions 
became vast as new services were added, and the tasks of health inspectors 
increased. They include the inspection of houses, and abatement of 
nuisance; inspection of animals or meat for the purposes of determining 
whether they are fit for human consumption; inspection of buildings with 
a view to detecting whether they are dilapidated or ill-ventilated in 
such a way as to constitute danger to the lives of the inhabitants.
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They vaccinate people against smallpox or cholera and carry out routine 
inspection of bakeries, waterworks, eating houses etc. to see that 
they are constantly maintained in a perfect sanitary condition.
Education later became an important function of local government, 
as we mentioned before. Local authorities were enpowered to build, 
equip and maintain schools. Most of the primary schools in the 
Eastern Region prior to independence were owned and managed by voluntary 
agencies and missions, but they relied on the councils for a proportion 
of their recurrent costs. In the north, native authorities contributed 
immensely to building and maintaining schools. The Northern Regional 
Government on its part appreciated this great task and encouraged the 
native authorities to improve the existing educational facilities by 
giving them capital grants towards meeting the costs, and by making 
a recurrent grant for the payment of teachers' salaries in grant-aided 
schools. The native authorities also ran a number of secondary schools.
Another function which became devolved on local government was the 
provision of a public works. This department, usually with an engineer 
as the head, was responsible for the building and repair of roads and 
bridges which were under the council's jurisdiction. A number of the 
wealthy local authorities provided public utilities, such as street 
lights. The provision and improvement of markets, ab^atoirs, motor 
parks, were all among the important functions of local government.
It must be mentioned also that the councils were empowered to take 
part in trade or ccxnmerce. Wealthy councils like Lagos City Council 
and Enugu Urban County Council operated public passengers' transport, 
but these in themselves were poorly organized and ineffective. In the 
Northern Region, the Government established the Native Authorities 
Housing Corporation in 1963 to stimulate business interest of the native 
authorities.
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Although the responsibilities of local government remained in the 
established realms of sanitation, minor works, law and order and 
primary education, increasingly the view came to be held that rural local 
government is meaningless unless it is assisting in economic development - 
creating wealth which in the more distant future may yield the tax 
revenue from which social services can ultimately be financed. In 
Nigeria there is some confusion as to what constitutes 'development*.
Often the word is construed to mean anything that was not there before, 
irrespective of whether it is revenue-earning or a liability on existing 
revenues. Unfortunately the most popular forms of development - schools 
and health centres - are a heavy recurrent liability especially in view 
of the pitifully inadequate human and financial resources, and produce
no immediate return; their return lies in the improved health and
/education of the next generation. Markets and abpatoirs are other 
popular projects which pay their way as public utilities but cannot be 
said to add to wealth. The kind of developments which are most likely 
to produce returns in a near future are unforunately the least popular - 
investment in improved agriculture, fisheries, drainage and irrigation, 
and village industry (Wraith,1972,pp.38-9).
This contrasts with Britain where the idea of economic development as 
an aim of local government is alien. Agricultural or industrial, it is 
largely in the sphere of competitive private enterprise. The State 
may play a regulatory role or may be responsible for a number of 
nationalised industries, which are either natural monopolies or public 
utilities. But local authorities play no direct role at all. The 
most that could be said about local authorities in Britain is that they 
may sometimes provide the basic opportunities, such as land for factories 
or river frontage for docks and wharves, and the public services to 
support them; but actual development is not their affair. Their
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business is to collect rates and with the help of central government 
to provide public works, transport, markets and a wide range of 
amenities and social services.
We have mentioned the losses and gains made by local government in 
Britain between 1888 and 1974 (see Chapter 2). During this period there 
was a radical extension in the range and quality of the services 
provided by local authorities. Following the Education Act of 1902, a 
spate of social legislation, such as the Town and Country Planning Act 
of 1947, has required local authorities to provide a wide array of personal 
and environmental services, far beyond the limited protective and public 
health functions of the late 19th century, and has greatly widened the 
functional role of local government units. An unprecedented scientific, 
technical and communications revolution, the evolution of the concept of 
a Welfare State, and the need for the provision of national standards, 
have formed the background to these changes, providing the tools and a 
philosophy for local government's assumption of increased responsibility 
for the welfare of the population.
Changing social conditions, such as those outlined above, rendered the 
local government areas which were suitable for performing given functions 
unsuitable for their task when functions grew in scope and when new 
duties were made necessary by advances in living standards. There was 
no significant attempt to adapt areas to the requirements of the services 
which had been allocated to them, resulting in varying standards of 
service from authorities whose resources were too slender to fulfil their 
responsibilities. Local government structure therefore became 
'ossified and anachronistic'.
There were economic changes as well. In chapter 2 we mentioned 
the change from an agricultural economy to an industrial one, and the 
problems and consequences of the change. Thus agriculture which was
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the main source of employment at the time of the 1888 Act, declined 
seriously in later years and accelerated the movement of population 
from the country to the towns. This mobility, as we have noted, brought 
problems to local government.
Another example of the economic and functional change is the way 
motor industry and especially the heavy industries, have moved away from 
the centre of the city - Ford is at Dagenham and Halewood, and British 
Leyland at Longbridge and Leyland. The development of the car and ■ 
the subsequent spread of car ownership has meant that long-distance 
commuting (up to 30 miles each way) is relatively common around most 
cities outside London, whilst the development of suburban rail and 
underground services around the latter has meant commuting journeys of 
up to 50 miles and more. This has given rise to what Pahl (1968,p.263) 
has called 'a dispersed city' around London : in twenty years, between
1951 and 1971 the outer metropolitan area of London has grown from 
3,500,000 to 5,300,000.
One of the most important consequences of the growth of the dispersed 
city has been the impact on the old core cities, which generally have 
lost population and jobs. For example, Liverpool lost almost a 
quarter of its population between 1951 and 1971, many of them the younger 
and more slcilled members. The much higher proportions of the semi­
skilled and unskilled, of the elderly and of those who, for whatever 
reasons, are unable to leave the inner city, mean that the old core 
cities face a much higher demand for services, but also have a lower 
tax base on which to finance such services.
There has, however, been a missing factor in our argument, namely 
the size and population of the local authorities to whom it is proposed 
to delegate, for it is meaningless to discuss the functions of local 
authorities without also discussing the areas within which those
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functions are to be discharged. The two are quite inseparable, 
and they present us with the central dilemma of local government in 
Nigeria and Britain, namely that there is always a conflict between 
efficiency, which generally tends to point to large units, and local 
democracy, which always tends to point to small ones. Let us now briefly 
unravel this complexity.
The size, and more particularly the population of a local authority 
determines its revenue; this in turn will determine its capability; 
moreover some of the functions of local authorities (e.g. sewerage and 
sewage disposal) can be efficiently and economically administered over 
a small area, whereas others, such as electricity, require a large one; 
as a further complication, some of those which need only a small area may 
come to need a larger one, as technical efficiency grows; consequently 
the administering authority may have to combine with others, in 
order to become bigger, or alternatively lose the administration of such 
functions altogether and allow them to be performed by a larger authority, 
such as the central government or a quasi-autonomous organization. A 
related problem is that some functions which can be discharged 
satisfactorily over a small area (e.g. a town) nevertheless need highly 
qualified staff, which a small authority cannot afford.
Thus, not only has local government in Britain and Nigeria been 
criticized for failing to respond adequately to socio-economic changes 
around them, but they have been found inefficient because of their size. 
Functions were devolved haphazardly, paying little attention to the 
sizes of local authorities, and therefore to their financial and personnel 
capability. We shall return to these points when we come to deal with 
the 'defects* of local government in Nigeria and Britain (see chapter 5 )•
We have said that the tremendous increase in the functions of local 
government led to criticisms and calls for reform since they could not
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adjust adequately to meet these changes. But the other side of the 
coin is the loss of functions which relates to one of the criticisms 
of local government, namely that it was undemocratic. A local government 
is a semi-independent political body whose powers may in general be given 
or taken away at any time by legislators. Furthermore the functions of 
local government in both countries are generally defined in the law, 
that is, a local authority may do nothing unless it has been specifically 
authorized by the legislature. With all these changes which we have 
said occurred in the society. Governments came to doubt the capacity 
and capability of local authorities to provide vital services, and this 
has led to central intervention in many matters which would be 
considered of purely local interest in Nigeria and Britain. other 
arguments for taking away local government functions include: the
need for uniform and acceptable standards of services, the need for 
large, specialized and technical operation, and the need for high level 
management. Thus local government in Britain have lost the following 
functions: Poor Law (1934-7), most civil airports (1945), electricity
(1947), gas (1948), water (1974), trunk roads (1936 and 1946) and 
hospitals (1947). Local governments are said to have lost their 
autonomy not only because of the loss of these functions, but also 
because of the amount of central supervision, and their huge dependence 
on central government finance. Again, we shall treat these things in 
detail when we ccane to discuss the 'defects' of local government.
Population.explosion, population mobility and the weakening of the 
extended family linkages, the impact of urbanization and the universal 
cash economy, industrialization and the technological revolution, the 
evolution of the concept of a Welfare State, and the need for acceptable 
standards of services increased the responsibility of local government.
An array of functions have, in short, been devolved on local government 
far beyond the limited protective and public health functions of post-war
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years without a corresponding increase in their technical, financial, 
professional and administrative competence.
The Growth of Communications
In Britain the size of local government units was influenced by the 
ease with which man could travel on foot or horse. In Nigeria the 
same is true of the area of jurisdiction of an Emir/Oba or his 
plenipotentiary. With the development of the internal combu^on engine 
the conception of locality has changed. Technological advances such as 
the development of the aeroplane and telephone have 'shrunk' Nigeria and 
Britain and made things much easier. There were no vehicles in Britain 
by the time of the 1888 Act. By 1930 Britain had over a million motor 
vehicles and this figure rose to 12 million by 1970.
The colonial government contributed in no small way to the development 
of communications facilities in Nigeria. It started the railway line 
by 1898 and by 1932 had reached a total mileage of 2,100. It 
constructed harbours in Lagos and Port Harcourt and built roads. In 
1914 Nigeria had 2,000 miles of roads over which motors could pass; by 
1926 this total approximated 6,000 miles. By 1951 the mileage was 28,000 
and by 1962 it jumped to 45,000. The number of licensed commerical 
vehicles rose from 7,300 in 1950 to 18,000 at the beginning of 1958, 
and the increase in the number of private cars during the same period 
was from 7,000 to 24,000. This figure jumped to over 85,000 in 1972.
The number of telephone instruments installed in the county also increased 
rapidly from 10,500 in 1951 to 49,000 in 1962 whilst the total wire-miles 
rose from 38,000 to 182,000 over the same period. Tables 3.4 to 3.7 
graphically portray the tremendous growth in communications in Nigeria.
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TABLE 3.4: MERCHANT SHIPPING FLEET
DISPLACEMENT 
(gross tons) 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
110,000 121,000 142,000 182,000 336,000
Source: Africa South of the Sahara,1979,p.758. 
TABLE 3.5: MOTOR VEHICLES IN USE
1969 1970 1971 1972
Private cars, taxis etc. 42,778 42,425 60,000 85,000
Commercial vehicles r 25,626 27,086 39,000 48,000
Motor cycles 29,559 : 29,730 40,000 58,000
Tractors 478 459 800 1,200
Trailers 1,644 1,499 2,000 3,000'
Special purpose vehicles 182 396 420 500
TOTAL 100,267 101,694 142,220 195,700
Note: 1969 figures exclude the 3 Eastern States;
1970 figures exclude the Northern and East-Central States;
1971 and 1972 figures are estimates for the whole country.
Source : Africa South of the Sahara, 1979, p.748
TABLE 3.6: INTERNATIONAL SEA-BORNE SHIPPING
1972 1975
VESSELS ENTERED '000 NET REG.TONS 8,824 n.a.
GOODS LOADED '000 METRIC TONS 87,588 100,100
CRUDE PETROLEUM n.a. 98,719
GOODS UNLOADED* ♦ • • II • • If . . . .  II . . .  . 4,727 4,800
* Including transhippment
Source: Africa South of the Sahara, 1979,p.758
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TABLE 3.7: CIVIL AVIATION (SCHEDULED SERVICES *000)
NIGERIAN REGISTERED AIRLINES 1973 1974 1975 1976
KILOMETRES FLOWN 9,100 9,400 9,500 10,200
PASSENGERS CARRIED 300 325 450 485
PASSENGER - KILOMETRE 334,000 355,000 430,000 470,000
FREIGHT TON-KILOMETRE 7,400 7,400 6,800 7,300
TOTAL TON- KILOMETRE 38,000 41,000 49,000 51,000'
Source: Africa South of the Sahara, 1979, p.758
The effect of the growth of communications in Nigeria is that it led 
to an increased trading radius of each producer and each village and 
thereby a quicker dissemination of ideas such as the demand for democratic 
local government, and these communications changes had serious impact on 
the structure of local administration in Nigeria. Increased demands 
from the ever-increasing Clientele led to problems, such as the provision 
and maintenance of roads, dispensaries, housing, drainage and so forth , 
for local government. In a more direct way, the growth of communications 
had another effect on the structure of local government: it is possible
for the local government official of today to know the extremities of his 
local government far more intimately than, for example, the rural district 
official of 1920 knew his district. The influence of communications 
on the system and structure of local government is so significant that 
Wraith asserts that "it is communications that are really the important 
geographical factor in local administraction; they determine whether 
centralization is possible, irrespective of whether governments want 
it." (1972, p.32.)
Furthermore, improved transport has meant that smaller authorities have 
lost more and more functions to the larger ones and that large local 
authorities had to transfer major services to central government 
authorities or quasi-govemmental organizations. Thus local government
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structure and boundaries created by the colonial masters and only 
slightly changed by their Nigerian successors, and the Victorian 
local government boundaries in Britain became obsolete and irrelevant 
because of large change^ in population distribution, including the rapid 
growth of the conurbations, improved transport facilities and the 
development and widespread use of motor vehicles, technological 
developments generally and the demand for more and improved services.
We must add as an aside, however, that although all-weather roads and 
above all the aeroplane have diminished distance, Nigerian communications 
by road, rail and telephone are still indifferent by international 
standards, and this fact must continue to affect local government for many 
years to come. In the main it should tend to enhance its importance, 
since as a general principle the worse the communications in any given 
area the greater the need for decentralization through devolution. 
Furthermoere, we are aware that there were local government changes in 
the early fifties in Nigeria but these were nothing but changes of name 
since there were complicated political motives behind them - destroying 
indirect rule through the chiefs (the hall-mark of colonialism), creating 
local machinery for national political parties, placating local interests 
and handing out patronage. We will deal with these things when we 
ccme to consider the political changes that occurred (see chapter 4) 
but suffice it to say that the changes in the fifties were not systems 
responses to environmental changes neither were they for efficiency reasons. 
The fact is that the local governments became less efficient and corrupt, 
and there was nothing to show that even the most rudimentary services 
were rendered.
The somewhat detailed analysis of socio-economic changes in Nigeria 
and Britain is necessary if we must see how the changes have affected 
the political situations. But that is just half the truth as we shall
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later see. Political changes too have led to socio-economic changes. 
Changes in one aspect, therefore, have organic relationship with changes 
in other aspects. For instance, urbanization and education led to 
increased political awafeness and consequently political changes; 
also, independence heralded Nigerianization and indigenization of the 
economy and these led to enormous socio-economic changes, changes which 
forced the central government to devolve more functions on local 
government as the former had to face other more serious functions such as 
foreign affairs.
We did say earlier that local government is an organism which must be 
affected by changes around it. In Nigeria we have deliberately painted 
a rosy picture of socio-economic changes. Yet, in whatever form 
development takes, it engenders its own problems. In the case of 
Nigeria, socio-economic changes led to regional inequalities, local 
government inefficiency and consequently accusations of tribalism, 
nepotism, corruption and bribery. In their classic study of 
Corruption in Developing Countries, Wraith and Simpkins concluded that 
"local government in the Southern Regions of Nigeria has reached the 
point of being a conspiracy against the public, so riddled is it with 
bribery, nepotism, politics and corruption" (1963,p.19). The majority 
of school leavers were drifting into the towns and fast becoming a solid 
unemployable community there, to provide the fodder for the political 
thuggery and lawlessness which appeared an increasingly commonplace 
feature of Nigerian political life.
In short, the seemingly rosy socio-economic development is nothing but 
hallucinating gleam. The common man did not benefit much. In 
fact, we will note that there was little in terms of socio-economic 
changes in the period 1960-1970 because of political wranglings. The 
politicians who fired the aspirations of the masses betrayed them. They 
gerrymandered the structure of local government and even with-held
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the grants of some local authorities. The goods were not delivered, 
the masses became alienated and disenchanted and these plunged the 
country into chaos which consequently led to political changes - the 
creation of states and the eventual reform of local government.
Yet the dynamic aspect of these changes had not affected the basic 
structure of local government before the reforms of 1974 in England and 
Wales and 1976 in Nigeria. Local government structural and organizational 
changes were not commensurate with the rate of socio-economic changes.
Thus what happened was that increased socio-economic activities 
multiplied the load (functions and responsibilities) on local government 
without a corresponding increase in its capacity. The net result was 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness. In short, there was a great deal of 
underspending and weak administration, resulting in considerable under­
fulfilment and structural distortion. All these have led critics 
and reformers to describe local government as being anachronistic, 
undemocratic and inefficient (see chapter 5).
Some Implications of Socio-Economic Changes for Local Government
In whatever country it occurs, socio-economic changes bring with them 
an expansion of the politically relevant strata of the population. These 
politically relevant strata are a broader group than the elite: they
include all those persons who must be taken into account in politics. 
Dockworkers, farmers and trade union members in Nigeria and Britain are 
not necessarily members of the elites of these countries, but they are 
quite likely to count for something in their political life. In 
Nigeria, as in other developing countries, the political process usually 
does not include the mass of isolated, subsistence-farming, tradition-bound 
and politically apathetic villagers, but it does include increasingly 
the growing members of town and city dwellers, cash-crop farmers.
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wage ea.mers, those who use the mass media, literates in town and 
country. The growth in the numbers (and types) of these clientele 
produces mounting pressures for the reform of political practices and 
institutions such as local government.
Socio-economic changes also bring about a change in the quality of 
local politics, by changing the range of human needs that impinge upon 
local (government) political process. As people are uprooted from 
their physical and intellectual isolation in their immediate localities, 
from their old habits and traditions, and often from their old patterns 
of occupation and places of residence, they experience drastic changes 
in their needs. They may now come to need provisions for housing and 
employment, for social security against illness and old age, for medical 
care against health hazards of their crowded urban dwellings and places 
of work and the risk of accidents with unfamiliar machinery. They may 
need succour against the risk of cyclical or seasonal unemployment, against 
oppressive charges of rent or interest, and against sharp fluctuations in 
the prices of the main commodities which they must sell or buy. They 
need instruction for themselves and education for their children. They 
need, in short, a wide range and large amount of new local government 
services. But local government will not be able to perform these functions 
effectively and efficiently unless it is reformed.
These needs ordinarily cannot be met by traditional types of local 
government inherited from a precommercial and pre-industrial age.
Neither could these needs be met by a local government system designed 
in the 19th century such as in Britain. The answer to satisfy these needs 
can be found in local government reform.
So also, the growing need for new and old local government services 
usually implies persistent political pressures for an increased scope of 
government and a greater relative size of the government sector in the 
national economy. In other words, a greater scope of governmental
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services euid functions requires ordinarily an increase in the 
capabilities of local government. Usually it requires an increase 
in the numbers and training of local ogovernment personnel, an increase 
in local government offices and departments, and a significant improvement 
in administrative organization and efficiency. A rapid process of 
socio-economic change thus tends to generate major pressures for 
political and administrative reform.
Similar to its impact on local government, socio-economic changes tend 
to generate also pressures for a more general transformation of the 
political elite. It tends to generate pressures for a broadening and 
partial transformation of elite functions, of elite recruitment, and of 
elite communications. On all these counts, the old elites of traditional 
chiefs and emirs, village headmen and local notables are likely to prove 
ever more inadequate; and political leadership may tend to shift to the 
new political elite of party or quasi-party organizations, formal or informal, 
legal or illegal, but always led by the new 'marginal men' who have been 
exposed more or less thoroughly to the impact of modern education and 
urban life.
The increasing numbers of the mobilised population, and the greater 
scope and urgency of their needs for political decisions (at least at the 
local level) and governmental services, tend to translate themselves, 
albeit with a time lag, into increased political participation. This 
may express itself informally through greater nuntoers of people taking 
part in crowds and riots, in meetings and demonstrations, in strikes and 
uprisings, or, less dramatically, as members of a growing audience for 
political communications, written or by radio and television, or 
finally as members of a growing host of organizations. While many of 
these organizations are ostensibly non-political, such as improvement 
societies, study circles, agricultural and commercial associations and 
the like, they nevertheless tend to acquire a political tinge, particularly
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in a country like Nigeria which lacks more open outlets for political  ̂
activities such as those available in Britain. But even where there 
are established political peurties and elections, as in Britain, a 
network of seemingly nonpolitical or marginally political organization 
serves an important political function by providing a dependable social 
setting for the individuals who have been partly or wholly uprooted 
or alientated from their traditional communities. Such organizations 
may serve at the same time as marshalling grounds for the entry of 
these persons into political life.
Where people have the right to vote, the effects of socio-economic change 
are likely to be reflected in the electoral statistics. This process 
finds its expression both through a tendency towards a higher voting 
participation of those already enfranchised and through an extension of 
the franchise itself to additional groups of the population. Often 
the increase in participation amongst those who already have the right 
to vote precedes the enfranchisement of new classes of voters.
Another effect of socio-economic changes is the shift of emphasis 
away from the parochialism of the traditional culture to a preoccupation 
with the supralocal but far less than world-wide unit of territorial, 
and eventually national state. Experiences in some of the developing 
countries including Nigeria suggest a more rapid rise of attention 
devoted to local affairs and national topics than of that given to 
international affairs.
The expansion of cash crops in Nigeria following the advent of 
the British, and especially before independence, points to another 
side effect of socio-economic changes in the society: social mobilisation
and economic development tend to substantially increase the share of 
the international trade sector in the national economy. Thus, in the 
course of British development, the proportion of total foreign trade rose
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from an average of 20 per cent in 1830-40 to about 60 per cent in 
1870-79.
The problem of the ratio of the sector of internationally oriented 
economic activities relative to total national income - and thus 
indirectly the problem of the political power potential of internationally 
exposed or involved interest groups vis-a-vis the rest of the ccanmunity - 
leads us to the problem of the size of states and of the scale of effective 
political communities, which in turn relates to local government. As 
we have seen the process of socio-economic changes generates strong 
pressures towards increasing the capabilities of government, by increasing 
the volume and range of demands made upon the government and 
administration, and by widening the scope of politics and membership of 
the politically relevant strata. The same process increases the frequency 
and the critical importance of direct communications between government 
and governed. It thus necessarily increases the importance of the 
language, the media, and the channels through which these communications 
are carried on. The panacea, again, lies with reforming local 
government institutions.
Other things assumed equal, the stage of rapid socio-economic changes 
may be expected, therefore, to promote the consolidation of states 
whose peoples already share the same language, culture and major social 
institutions such as Britain; while the Scime process may tend to strain 
or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into 
several groups with different languages or cultures, such as Nigeria.
In the last analysis, however, the problem of the scale of states 
(and also of local governments), goes beyond the effects of language, 
culture, or institutions, important as all these are. In the period 
of rapid socio-economic changes, the acceptable scale of a political 
unit will tend to depend eventually upon its performance. If a government
131
falls to meet the Increasing burdens put on it by the process of 
socio-economic transformation, that is if capacity falls short of 
the load, a growing proportion of the population is likely to become 
alienated and disaffected from the local government. It is this failure 
that led local government in Nigeria and Britain to being labelled as 
inefficient and ineffective, and that the solution to the problems 
lies in reforming them. At the national level, the problems of Ireland 
to Britain and of Biafra to Nigeria may serve as exajnples. If a 
government proves persistently incapable and unresponsive it may be 
forced out of power by, say, the military* As we shall see in the case 
of Nigeria, the intervention of the military was to affect local government 
in no small way.
All these implications, and their relationships with the politics of 
Nigeria and Britain will be discussed in the next chapter.' We shall also 
examine the political changes which took place in both countries and the 
effect of socio-economic changes on political changes and vice-versa since 
the latter are usually preceded or accompanied by a rise in several 
of the usual indicators of the former.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DIAGNOSIS; POLITICAL CHANGES AND THE CHANGING SYSTEM 
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
INTRODUCTION
Administrative reform is a political process designed to 
adjust the relationships between a bureaucracy and other 
elements in a society, or within the bureaucracy itself 
(Montgomery,1967,p.1).
A country's decentralization system can be considered a sub-system 
of its political system. Political factors are consequently of major 
importance in determining the local government system and/or its 
reorganization. After all local government draws its legal and 
constitutional authority from the Government. Moreover, the fact that 
national unity is frequently one of the principal objectives of the 
decentralization policy indicates the highly political nature of the 
decision on the system to be introduced. The less stable the political 
situation, the greater will be the significance given to political 
considerations. Nigeria, as we shall see later, therefore attached 
decisive weight to political factors in reorganizing local government.
These political factors may be of twofold origin: political ideology
and political expediency. The ideology underlying a country's 
political system has great influence on the structure and functioning 
of its system of local government and administration. The government 
will develop a system in accordance with the basic ideological principles 
which it has adopted, and which are therefore likely to be reflected in 
local institutions and their relationship with the central government. 
Britain has thus developed a more or less advanced system of local 
representative institutions in accordance with her interpretation of 
democracy which is frequently marked by a considerable, although declining, 
degree of local autonomy. Nigeria, in comparison, has opted for a
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Western model of democracy with considerable degree of central control 
over local authorities (see below and chapter 8).
Although the system thus tends to acquire its overall orientation 
from the political ideology, political expediency is equally or sometimes 
even more important; the probability of attaining the desired structure 
depends primarily on the degree to which it is permitted by political 
conditions. In fact, therefore, the structure of power within a 
country, the existence, nature and strength of groups supporting or 
opposing the government, all exercise strong influence, if not on the 
design and reform of the local government system, then at least on its mode 
of operation. If such opposing centres of power are likely to affect the 
government's authority and even its existence, as the regional governments 
did before 1966 in Nigeria, it will be reluctant to design a framework of 
local government which may reinforce or encourage the oppositional forces, 
or which, on the other hand, may antagonize them to the point of revolt or 
seccession. Such problems evidently determine the local government 
policy in a country like Nigeria with diverse, territorially cohesive 
ethnic groups.
Thus, following Wildavsky (1966,p.306), we can slightly expatiate 
the aforementioned political factors to become (a) 'Policy politics' which 
deals with the question of which policy will be adopted; (b) 'Partisan 
politics' which concerns the matter of which party will win a given contest, 
such as a debate or an election; (c) 'System politics' which deals with 
the issue of what structures and procedures are instituted in order to 
produce decisions; and (d) 'Patronage politics' which relates to the 
distribution of individual (or group) assignments to posts within the 
decision making system. We will look into all these and especially their 
effect on local government.
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POLITICAL CHANGE
In Nigeria and Britain, political changes and decisions have often 
led to changes in the structure and functions of local government. In 
most cases, political changes heralded in social and economic change.
That is not to say that socio-economic developments have not had a great 
impact on political changes. But in the field of local government, 
political reforms and decisions have affected the functions and structure 
of local government more than social and economic changes. In chapter 2 
we mentioned a number of political changes in Britain which led to local v 
government structural and functional reforms in the 19th century. These • 
include the French Revolution, the growth of trade union activities, the 
rise of political parties, the widening of the franchise, "laissez-faire" 
and various Acts of Parliament. There have always been close links 
between democracy in Parliament and in local government because if 
democracy is to work effectively, it must operate at all levels. Parliamentary 
reform in 1832 was logically followed by municipal reform in 1835.
The extension of the franchise in 1884 was followed by the establishment 
of representative government in the counties through the Local Government 
Act of 1888 (Pearce, 1980,p.9).
Three important changes have occurred in the nature of local politics 
in the 20th century. First, there has been the extension of formal 
party politics into local government. Second, as in Nigeria, the rise 
of party in local government has produced an associated change, namely, 
in the nature of political leadership. The third and in some way most 
significant change in twentieth-century British local government has been 
the emergence of the professional officer as an important factor in local 
politics. Nigeria, too, in the 20th century has seen a number of political 
movements and changes which have considerably affected local government.
Amongst these are: the rise of nationalism, the democrati.ZLQtion of the
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political system and the granting of political power (including 
independence) to Nigerians, the extension of formal politics into local 
government, and the coming of the military into politics. We shall 
expand on these in a moraeht and consider them in terms of those which are 
essentially local in nature and those which operate in a national context.
We have dealt with the introduction and abolition of indirect rule 
in Nigeria. Whatever its shortcomings, the system reflected the 
political, social and economic realities of the early 20th century Nigeria. 
Things started changing rapidly in the years between the War and independence 
in 1960. The Nigerian constitution was amended four times : in 1946,
1951, 1953 and 1957. These national political changes were transmitted 
to the local level. Thus, traditional native authority was replaced 
by the local government system. The change was quicker in the east and 
west than in the north where the system of administration through native 
authorities was less firmly rooted. But even then attempts were being 
made in the north to make the native authorities more democratic and responsive 
to public opinion. Thus in 1952 the Northern House of Assembly passed 
amendments to the Native Authority Ordinance which had the effect of 
abolishing the status of sole authority hitherto enjoyed by a considerable 
number of Emirs. They were obliged to accept advisory councils, though '
they were not bound to accept adviee“given by the councils. The 1954 
Native Authority Law incorporated this amendment, authorized the Governor 
to prescribe the inclusion of a certain proportion of elected members of 
Native Authority Councils, and in the case of lesser chiefs obliged the 
chief to abide by the majority decision of his council. Later, further 
legislation gradually introduced the elective principle into the 
traditional authorities.
One of the first steps taken by Chief Awolowo's Action Group 
Government when it took office in the then Western Region in 1952
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was to reform the machinery of local government. The Local Government 
Law of 1953 provided for one -, two - or three-tier local government at 
the divisional, district, or local council level based on the principles 
of English local government. It stipulated that not more than one 
quarter of the members of the councils could be traditional members 
and that the powers of intervention previously exercised by the Resident 
of a province were to be transferred to newly created inspectors of local 
government (usually the former Residents). Usually traditional chiefs 
acted as presidents of local councils in western Nigeria.
In the Eastern Region the demand for elected local councils was 
inspired by a genuine distrust of the native authorities, widely thought 
to have been created by the British, and by the demand for self-government. 
Because the east lacked a system of traditional native authority comparable 
with the north or west, the power of the British administrative officer was 
inevitably greater, and as the independence movement gained strength, the 
system became increasingly unpopular. It was reviewed in 1947 and the 
Local Government Ordinance of 1950 provided for the creation of elected 
county councils, urban and rural district councils and local councils. The 
councils were made directly responsible to the regional government and 
administrative officers were no longer responsible for taking executive 
action in the provision of local government services. In the east, as in 
the west, Residents' posts were abolished in 1956/7.
Two other political developments had significant effects on the structure 
of local government in the former Eastern Region. First, in order to 
clear the way for a regional systan of personal income-tax introduced 
under the 1956 Finance Law, the Government decided to abrogate direct 
tax and rates levied on a personal basis which hitherto had been the 
main source of revenue to the local authorities. Although the Eastern 
Regional Government agreed to distribute to the authorities £1.9 million
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of the £2,5 million it expected to collect through the new income tax 
in the first year, the measure was criticized on grounds of the local 
authorities* loss of local fiscal autonomy. Second, the Jones 
Commission, appointed in 1956 to inquire into the position, status, and 
influence of chiefs and natural rulers in the region and to make recommendations 
reported in that year that throughout the region there was a feeling that 
local councils had moved too far in the direction of popular representation 
through election and that there was an almost universal desire to see 
traditional heads presiding in every council.
THE FRANCHISE
Another political change which affected the nature of local government 
(e.g. election results, the extent of local taxation, calibre of councillors 
and efficiency, party politics in local government and therefore local 
democracy, etc.) in Britain, as it did in Nigeria, was the broadening of 
the franchise. According to Keith-Lucas and Richards (1978,pp.18-20), by 
1900 the franchise for all forms of local authority was basically the same - 
the occupier of rateable property. Unmarried women with the necessary 
qualifications were admitted in 1869 and married women in 1882. It was 
not until 1918 that a male voter's wife was admitted as such to the 
register. And it was not until the Sex Disqualification Removal Act of 
1919 that women were allowed election as council members. Paupers too 
had been excluded from the franchise. They had traditionally been 
disfranchised from all parliamentary and local elections as,in effect, a 
separate and inferior estate of the realm. The People Act 1918 allowed 
paupers to vote in local government elections; but the Local Government 
Act 1933 prevented them from service on any local authority. It was not 
until the National Assistance Act 1949 when the concept of pauperism was 
eradicated that the poor could exercise their full rights of citizenship.
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The franchise, however, was still based on the conception that it was 
the ratepayer who should control the local authority - a doctrine that 
led inevitably to a great emphasis on economy by councillors who saw 
themselves as essentially trustees of the rate fund. Long after the 
property qualifications had been abolished for voting for Parliament, the 
local government vote was denied to all except the occupier of rateable 
property and his wife (or her husband) and this restriction was not 
removed until the Representation of the People Act 1945. The Act, in 
making provision for the resumption of local government elections after the 
War, provided that all parliamentary electors should also have the local 
government vote. The abolition of this restriction added some eight million 
voters to the register and at last the right to vote in local elections 
came to be based on the person rather than on the occupation of property.
It was a significant change, which implied also a change in the attitude 
to local councils - no longer primarily trustees of the rate fund.
Thus, the widening of the franchise has some implication for the 
reorganization of local government which in turn "is so central to the 
political world of organized power for particular advantage, that it must 
have implications for the continuing societal struggle to control government" 
(Dearlove,1979,p.l3). Rae (1971) details the political significance of 
the qualifications for the franchise and the political importance of 
qualifications for elected office. For example, the Audit (Local 
Authorities) Act, 1927, disqualified any person surcharged for more than 
£500 for five years from membership of any local authority. "The Labour 
Party saw that the main purpose was to exclude the Socialist members 
from the local authorities in East London" (Keith-Lucas,1952,p.179) .
In my view, a political perspective on universal suffrage has to 
recognize its implication for the access of different interests to local 
government, éind therefore for the likely direction of public policy.
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Another political implication of the extension of the franchise for
the nature of local government and its reform is the coming into local
politics of professionals and small businessmen. "The franchise was
extended lower and lower down the social scale, until it practically
embraced the whole community, and gave the working classes a potential
control over municipal as well as Parliamentary elections" (Redlich,
1903,Vol.1,p.278). The 'crowding out of the gentlemen' and their
replacement by professionals and businessmen led to the call for a
reorganization of local government because of the allegedly dwindling
calibre of councillors (see chapter 8 for our view on this point). In
other words, local government was said to be inefficient and ineffective
because the social leaders and landowners assumed less of a role on local
councils than was once the case in the golden era of local government.
It is as the working class have moved into local government, 
aided and abetted by the rise of the Labour Party, that so 
many councillors have been judged as of 'illiterate speech and 
low social standing' and as of inadequate and declining 
calibre (Dearlove, 1979,p.15).
We must add, however, that the idea that the working class have taken
over as councillors is erroneous. This was a bourgeois fear that did
not materialise in reality. Councillors are still predominantly middle
class, though professionals, managers and small businessmen, rather than
landowners and manufacturers.
In Nigeria, too, as socio-economic changes took place (see chapter 3),
it became mandatory for public men to work on local councils, replacing *
the traditional rulers and their plenipotentiaries, usually friends and
relatives. Table 4.1 depicts the gradual but effective abandonment
of traditional members for elected members, usually professionals and
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Apart from these implications of political reforms for the 
calibre of councillors, Cornford (1963,p.37) points out another: the
widening of the suffrage class became the most significant single factor 
in deciding political allegiance (see also, Rubinstein,1977,p.124).
The arrival of professionals through the British Labour Party did a lot to 
"push businessmen off the council" (Morris and Newton, 1970,p.122).
In Wolverhampton, "the growth of labour representation on the council is 
due largely to the extension of the franchise" (Jones,1969a,p.58).
In London in the 1880s and 1890s the Labour Party became 'a new political 
force, supported by an extended trade unionism, and capable of winning 
elections for either liberals or socialists'. In the 1919 local 
elections Labour secured control of half the Metropolitan Borough 
Councils, and by 1934 had captured the London County Council (Thompson, 
1967, pp.110,286). A wide suffrage, combined with single member 
constituencies, also helped to give the party structure the shape we know 
today; indeed, to the modern debate about representation and electoral 
systems party is central.
By implication^^ the extension of the franchise led to the detection 
of another 'defect' in the system of local government, namely^participation 
and the erosion of local democracy. We have argued how universal suffrage 
brought party politics, allegedly led by the Labour Party, into local 
government. It is argued, therefore, that the intrusion of party politics 
into local government discourages the right sort of people from putting 
their names forward, and encourages the selection of candidates solely on 
the basis of their record of party loyalty and service. On the council 
itself, it is claimed, the existence of party groups stifles free 
discussion and renders council debates meaningless since all decisions are 
effectively taken at private group meetings. Finally, it is alleged
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that doctrinaire party policies are liable to be adopted regardless of 
individual local circumstances and flying in the face of technical advice 
from officers (see. Committee on the Management of Local Government,
1967,Vol.1,pp.109-111; Warren,1952,p.187; Grant,1971,1972). The
survey findings of the Royal Institute of Public Administration graphically 
portrays the intensity of party politics in local government. Of 31
county councils which responded to the questionnaire as many as 27 
formally recognized party group leaders, and 29 had groups which met before 
full council. The aggregated figures indicate that 75 per cent of 
English and Welsh local authorities had formally recognized leaders and 
86 per cent of party groups caucus met privately before council meetings.
Taking all these developments into consideration, we can say that the 
20th century Nigeria, like the 19th and 20th centuries Britain, saw growing 
acceptance of the contention that as the common man prospered, so he would 
acquire the leisure time and the desire to turn his attention to responsible 
consideration of the affairs of state. As socio-economic changes were
taking place, it became necessary to make some political changes and thus the 
various barriers to participation by the common man were removed. Hereditary 
and proprietary political institutions were gradually stripped of their 
powers while the powers of institutions of the elected representatives of 
the people were gradually enhanced.
NATIONALISM AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR
One of the political movements in Nigeria without a direct 
equivalent in Britain was nationalism. The movement which led to the
gradual abandonment of indirect rule in favour of local government as the 
precursor of self-government and independence is traceable to social, 
economic and political factors. The failure of indirect rule in
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eastern Nigeria left a continuing shock in its trail, despite the efforts 
of Sir Donald Cameron to ameliorate conditions. Whatever faith in the 
system might have still lingered was dealt an even greater blow by the 
Second World War. War served as an activating agent of political 
consciousness sweeping through the colonial world. It brought home to 
the Nigerian leaders a realization of the unworkability and inadequacy 
of indirect administration, a realization that its centrifugal pull worked 
against central representative government. The country soon found itself 
in the throes of problems connected with taxation, Africanization of the 
Government service, and education.
Nigerian socio-economic growth and nationalism have followed closely 
parallel courses and derived reciprocal impetus one from the other, both 
being a part of an awakening and a search for a new place in the world 
for the Nigerian. Nigerian nationalism was the end product of three 
major developments or conditions. The first was the 'social mobilization', 
to use Karl Deutsch's phrase, of substantial numbers of Nigerians as a 
result of a policy of determined Europeanization by Christian missionaries, 
a literacy curriculum, and the growth of a population of urban workers 
worried by psychological and economic insecurity. Of special importance 
was the introduction of schools, the development of cash crops and local 
economy, the growth of communications, and the introduction of information 
media such as newspapers.
The second was the accumulation Of "conscious economic grievances 
among the mobilizaed groups, derived from the presence and the practices of 
large-scale European enterprise and what was believed to be government 
indifference regarding economic development" (Coleman,1958,p.410). The 
people's hopes were raised by steady economic growth, only to be dashed due 
to the Second World War. The war led to vast expansions in governmental 
powers in Nigeria and Britain in order to deal with the miseries wrought
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by the massive economic crisis. The expansions assumed various forms, 
some radically socialist in nature, some only mildly reformist of the 
capitalist system; but all had one feature in common - a large complex 
bureaucracy at the expense of local government. Of course large complex 
governmental bureaucracy dampened the understanding of the people about what 
actions were being taken by officers of government in the name of the people. 
We shall return to this point in a moment.
The third and most important reason was the emergence of a Western- 
educated minority who worked in the government or firms and who felt the 
frustration of colonial rule most. This educated minority wanted "the form 
of freedom that is not merely self-determination and self-realization, but 
rather the determination and realization of goals which enhance, protect 
and unite life** (Marcuse,1973,p.51). By 1945, changes were beginning to *
be felt because the number of educated Nigerians had been on the increase. 
Different associations were formed, and most of which were launched solely 
to attack and demand the abolition of indirect rule. The antipathy of 
these men towards the indirect rule system and native administration had 
become more pronounced. In fact, the Nigerian Youth Movement, the 
precursor of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.) .
demanded a "complete abolition of the Indirect Rule system. Native 
administration should be a f o m  of local government, and it is for that 
reason that we will encourage and support it" (see, Awolowo,1947,p.57.).
As we shall expatiate later, the introduction of party politics in 
Nigeria was to have a great effect on local government because the parties 
(N.C.N.C., Action Group and Northern Peoples Congress) not only won power 
at the regional level in the east, west and north respectively, but they 
reformed local administration namely, from the unrepresentative native 
authority system to democratic local government. The politicization of 
local government in Nigeria, as in Britain, produced an associated change.
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namely in the nature of political leadership. Traditional rulers were 
swept aside for educated public persons.
The Second World War had a great impact on local government in Britain 
too. The war destroyed very large numbers of houses in London and a number 
of other cities and towns. In all, 280,000 houses were destroyed,
250,000 made inhabitable, and 250,000 seriously damaged. Local government 
was given the task to rehabilitate returning soldiers and others. Churchill 
demanded 'work, food and homes' and the councils had to take immediate action 
to ameliorate the physical and social problems attendant on the war. Local 
government functions, as well as its estimation increased in the eyes of the 
people and the political parties. 180, 000 prefabricated metal houses were 
erected and councils helped to get house-building started again.
The huge social and physical problems which bedeviled the country led 
to a plethora of reports from commissions and committees. The most 
important of these was the Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and Allied 
Services, which laid the foundation for the pattern of the 'welfare state'.
Out of this report and the subsequent discussions emerged a series of 
statutes scxne of which changed the pattern of local government functions.
First came the National Insurance Act, 1946, the National Insurance (Industrial 
Injuries) Act,1946 and the National Health Service Act,1946. It was 
this last measure which made most difference to the role of the local 
authorities and started the ball rolling for the erosion of local government 
functions. On the one hand it took away from them all the hospitals, 
maternity hemes, sanatoria and mental hospitals. On the other hand, 
though, it expanded the lesser functions of local authorities in such fields 
as ambulances, prevention of sickness and after-care, and midwifery.
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CENTRALIZATION
Another major post-war political change in Nigeria and Britain is 
centralization. The following were the pressures pushing in a 
centralist direction and therefore eroding the autonomy of local government 
in both countries:
(a) Socio-economic changes) the importance of the work of local authorities 
in the public sector of the national economy and the resultant need to 
ensure that local authority expenditure is consistent with the Government's 
general economic policy;
(b) the high proportion of local authority income by way of Government grant 
and Parliament's wish to exercise some supervision over the spending of this 
money: two-thirds of British local government fund expenditure come
frcxn central government in the form of grants. This is even higher in 
Nigeria, with the Federal and State Governments providing about four-fifth 
of local government expenditure;
(c) the national importance of much of the work of local authorities, the 
need for national planning agencies, and the secular egalitarian trend 
involving the demand for minimum standards in performance. This demand for 
minimum standards of provision cannot be over-emphasized in Nigeria. In 
fact, the centralization of some local government functions was due to the 
doubt cast on the capability (financial and personnèl) of local authorities 
to provide some essential amenities, such as secondary school education, 
courts, prisons and the police;
(d) the need to protect taxpayers against possible financial mismanagement by 
local authorities, by means of Government loan sanction and audit;
(e) the desirability of protecting local authority staff against arbitrary 
dismissal;
(f) the need to provide suitable machinery for the settlement of disputes 
between the local authority and individuals, particularly with regard to
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alleged maladministration through local commissioners; and
(g) the most important political change in Nigeria which led to large-scale 
centralization was the coming of the military into politics with their 
emphasis on discipline, national integration and unity. Their justification 
for their own entry into politics is to end politics, after a turbulent 
political period, and they began by outlawing the most vigorous and 
conspicuous of the pre-military political institutions, including local 
government. Such institutions were branded as divisive and opposed to 
national unity. Functional, political and administrative powers therefore 
became centralised under the military.
Centralisation is related to at least three of the 'defects' of local 
government perceived by reformers: that most local authorities are
inefficient because they are too small and the panacea is therefore 
centralisation; and that local government is undemocratic because of the 
various forms of control - administrative, legislative, financial, political 
and technical - exercised by the central government (see chapter 5).
We will deal here with the most important and most conspicuous form of 
centralisation - the transfer of functions from local to central government 
and quasi-autonomous organizations.
The Second World War ineviteibly had its impact on local government in 
Nigeria and Britain. Although the rate of central control increased 
considerably after 1945 due to political tensions and economic difficulties, 
centralisation of local government functions in Britain date much further 
back (see Robson,1966,p.13). Local government functional losses are 
regarded by critics as reducing the power of the authorities and their 
estimation in the eyes of the electorate. As Professor Robson put it,
"there can be no doubt whatever that the transfer of services from locally 
elected councils to centrally appointed boards signifies a loss of 
democratic control over those services" (1952,p.350; see also. Royal
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Commission on Local Government in Greater London,1960,paras.227,707;
•Money,1973,p.319).
The origin of central-local tension can be summarized thus: some
services are national, but administrative efficiency requires that they 
be performed locally (Foster et al,1980,p.48). Despite these tensions,
local government continued to enjoy a lot of prestige and respect until the 
beginning of this century. Its functions included the provision and 
maintenance of streets, roads, police, prisons and local courts. Local 
government was in-charge of the provision of poor relief, education, gas, water 
sewerage, and later electricity and buses (Robson,1966,pgl3-32).
However, social and economic changes (see chapter 3) had made the 
provisions of the 1888 Act obsolete. Beliefs and values had changed. 
Centralisation was not only a response to these changed and changing socio­
economic situations, but it was also a matter of political expedience.
Foster et al (1980,pp.45-63; see also Robson,1966,pp.13-32) catalogue 
local government functional losses. Some, - such as the Poor Law 
(1934-47), most civil airports (1945), electricity (1947), gas (1948) 
and more recently water (1974) - have been transferred to public corporations. 
Others - such as trunk roads (1936 and 1946), hospitals (1947), and most 
remaining local health services (1974) - have been transferred to central 
government.
Local government in Nigeria also witnessed a great deal of 
centralisation to the point where people regarded them as 'mere agents' 
first, of the Regional Governments and then of the State Governments 
(Wraith,1972,p.67). Prior to 1976 there had been a steady encroachment on 
the preserves of local government which the reforms were designed to reverse.
In the west the loss of traditional functions was in top gear in 1968 when 
aspects of primary and secondary education were assigned to the State. A 
state water corporation was established to take over water supply from local
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government. Police and prisons were transferred to the federal level 
in 1969. In 1970 forest reserves, "from which many councils derived 
considerable income" (Oyediran,1974,p.552), were taken over by the 
State Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. This centralisation 
happened to coincide with an improvement in the qualifications of 
councillors and led one observer to predict that "frustrations will increase 
as the local leadership realises that it is called upon to do little more 
than administer motor parks and cemeteries...an enfeebled local government 
can hardly be expected to develop community interest and support for 
facilities and services which are wholly state responsibilities" 
(Oyediran,1974,p.552).
In the east the Local Government Law, 1960 (Part X) gave the minister 
for local government extensive powers with the result that he virtually 
controlled local government services. The functions of councils at 
the divisional level, under the reorganisation of the late sixties and 
early seventies known as 'development administration', were mainly advisory.
In the north, the position of the native authorities was weakened by 
the Provincial Administration Law of 1962 which provided for the 
appointment of a provincial commissioner, of ministerial rank, to represent 
the Government in each province. These politicians took over the functions 
formerly exercised by the Residents and therefore control from the centre 
became more tight and this left the native authorities with little freedom. 
And it was in the north that the most marked centralisation took place 
after the military coup of 1966. Previously the provision of services 
directly to the public was left largely in the hands of the native 
authorities (N.A.s). The regional government provided services whose
scale required resources beyond the capacity of the N.A.s. There was a 
presumption in favour of local government, albeit of a traditional kind.
The system was also flexible with services such as water supply being
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allocated between regional and local government according to the resources 
of particular N.A.s. Only a minority of authorities were in a position to 
run hospitals or welfare services, and there were wide disparities in 
the level of provision in other services between the wealthier and poorer 
emirates. Nevertheless, "the general tendency was for services rendered
directly to the public to be regarded as native authority responsibilities 
until these became so complicated or expensive that Government had to take
over" (Adedeji and Rowland,1972,p.304),
The native courts, police forces and prisons were centralised largely 
for political reasons, though with significant financial consequences for 
local government in the form of between 7.8 and 11.1 per cent of total 
recurrent expenditure in 1967-8. Great confusion was caused by leaving 
in operation a statute which vested the power to maintain law and order 
in local government (Summerhayes,1969,p.219? Nemetz,1971). Then in 
1970 most functions relating to agriculture, animal health, co-operatives 
and roads were taken over by the states, partly because they were already 
under the technical direction of ministry staff and partly because the 
states wanted even more control. The fiscal position of the federal and 
state governments was also superior to that of local government 
(Nemetz,1971,pp.5-6). The regional and state governments had preferred 
to take over services rather than strengthen local finances. Indeed the 
weak fiscal position of local government was brought about by taxation 
changes imposed by the centre and then used as the rationale for
centralisation. Local government emerged from these changes with what one
observer regarded as 'trivial* functions, and the presumption about the 
location of responsibility for local services swung significantly in favour 
of the state government (Yahaya,1975,p.27). Thus in almost all the states 
in the federation, the pre-1976 local government reforms saw a shift of 
powers, manpower and financial resources from the local authorities to the
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state ministries and public corporations.
The reasons given for centralizing local government functions were 
similar to those used in Britain (see Foster et al,1980,pp.49-63). Apart 
from those given above, the first argument which we are going to advance 
for the transfer of functions from local government is what we call political 
expediency. The political temperature is higher in Nigeria than in Britain,
largely because Nigeria has not yet achieved the state of nationhood. That 
is to say that she is often in danger of internal dissension and has yet 
to achieve natural unity, which accounts for the coups and counter-coups, 
and even a civil war. In a situation like Nigeria, therefore, the central
government felt that national unity must be their overriding aim and therefore 
they guarded against anything divisive; and there is no doubt that local 
government has often been misunderstood, or misrepresented, as local self- 
government , or the creation of small tribal states which could threaten 
national unity. In Britain, politics in local government is usually 
contained within reasonable limits, and while political clashes can be 
sharp on particular issues, it is accepted that much municipal work is 
a-political. In Nigeria, on the other hand, politics in local government
can be explosive, and the central government naturally take this into 
account as a hazard to security. Moreover, the leaders, given the 
fragile basis of their legitimacy, are afraid of decentralizing power 
to local levels because of the fear that pockets of resistance would build 
up around local autonomous centres.
Another reason adduced for centralising local government functions 
is that local administration must be geared to development, and if this 
is taking place within the framework of a national development plan it is 
not easy for the planners to allow very wide margins of local discretion.
By contrast, local government in Britain has very little to do with 
economic development, which is the province of private enterprise or
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public corporation. Local authorities are concerned with services, 
and their role in development is at most the ancillary one of providing 
the environment which will attract others to develop.
Other reasons advanced for transferring local government functions to 
central government include: staff shortage at the local level; widespread
corruption and nepotism; lack of confidence in the capability of local 
government; too many local authorities were regarded as being too small 
to attract the necessary staff, to generate adequate revenue, and to be 
effective and efficient. Another ostensible reason for these changes was 
the desire to improve services many of which were considered to be 
ineffective, inefficient and corrupt. But just as important a motivation 
appears to have been the self-serving desire for bureaucratic growth of the 
various state ministries.
We can say, therefore, that the regional governments failed to maintain 
in the sixties the interest they had in local government in the fifties. 
Political, financial and other pressures had a profound impact on the 
structures, staff, services, and finances of locàl government. The 
regional governments, especially the west and east, devoted more effort in 
developing ministry bureaucracy - each with its own field administration - 
than in promoting local government. While the regional budgets increased 
dramatically, the local ones did not; the total amount expended in the 
mid-sixties was actually less than in the final years of the fifties. And 
in the west especially, the elected councils gave way to nominated ones 
in 1963 - concomitant with the political crises.
The latter half of the sixties was marked by several events which had 
a profound impact on local government, as we shall see later. First, 
the coup of 1966 suspended representative (including local representative) 
government. Secondly, the outbreak of the civil war in 1967 suspended 
local government in the east and diverted attention from the improvement
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of local government in other areas of the country. Thirdly, the
transformation of the four regions into twelve states (then 19 in 1976),
which were formally created in 1967 but commenced operationally in 1968,
has led to major changes in local government. The series of tax riots
in 1968 and 1969 in the western state underscored the importance throughout
the federation of being responsive to the needs of the local areas. The
loss of police and prisons functions to federal agencies and of other
functions to state agencies principally in 1968 was an indication of the lack
of confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the local institutions.
By 1969, local government throughout Nigeria was in a state of crisis.
Or as one journal puts it editorially,
the institutions of Nigerian local government have failed to enhance 
their capacity,to involve the public, to respond to local needs, 
or to administer effectively and responsibly the various local public 
services. In fact, they have declined. The hopes which 
accompanied the reforms of the early fifties have been dashed 
on the disappointments of the sixties (Quarterly Journal of 
Administration, April 1969,pp.169-170).
Thus, the effect of the military take-over on local government 
proves our hypothesis that local government is an organism which must 
respond to environmental and political changes. Furthermore, the 
large-scale overhaul which local government faced under the military 
corrobrates what we have said earlier: that major administrative reforms
are usually direct outcomes of very serious crisis conditions faced by a 
government, such as the take-over of power, through revolution or otherwise, 
by political groups who differ strongly from those previously in office.
Thus, it is clear that all democratic states have experienced a 
rapid growth of governmental functions in recent years, and that much of 
this growth has occurred centrally. But while local operations have 
everywhere declined in relative importance, they have grown substantially 
in absolute terms (see chapter 8). The public demands resulting from 
industrialization and urban living have forced local authorities to extend
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or adjust traditional services and to provide a wide range of new 
services. Yet everywhere the growth of 'big democracy' has been 
accompanied by a sharp concentration of administrative space. As a 
consequence, the spatial requirements of public administration have tended 
to change much more rapidly than politically determined boundaries and 
there has resulted an institutional chaos of intergovernmental, ad hoc, 
and special-purpose agencies which tended to destroy the foundations of 
local self-government in Britain and Nigeria. In these complex and 
rapidly changing relations, local authorities in both countries have 
experienced a gradual erosion of their former independence, and have been 
subject increasingly to severe financial dislocation.
Looking at the importance attached to local government before say 1946 
in Britain and 1960 in Nigeria, and the great decline they faced thereafter 
and up to the time of the reforms in the seventies, one cannot but agree 
with Professor Langrod that "local government has within itself, inevitably, 
the seed of its own death once the process of democratization is accomplished; 
democracy in action will claim, then, sooner or later, but inevitably a 
breakaway from the fundamental idea of local government and will demand 
administrative centralization" (1953,p.29). Local government was given 
so many vital functions, local government had become so important that the 
political parties had come to regard it as a possible repository of 
their power. It is this vital role that local government came to play in 
Nigeria and Britain that led the political parties to intervene in local 
government, because a great deal of political influence was derived from 
control of local councils. In other words, political parties became 
involved in local councils because they derived much of their local 
influence from the membership of them. The pioneers of local party 
organization always realised the importance of municipal elections as 
barometrès indicating the state of national opinion and as reliable training
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grounds for party workers. It is to the politicization of local '
government that we now turn.
PARTY POLITICS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
We do not attempt to survey the whole field of party politics in 
local government, but its impact on local government in Britain and Nigeria, 
party politics being one of the things that have 'happened' to local 
government and therefore made the provisions of the 1888 Act irrelevant.
There has been little formal study of the workings of party in local 
government and much of the discussion that does take place is still 
largely concerned with whether or not party in local government is desirable. 
Buxton noted that "the role of the party groups in the actual running of 
the council (has)...been almost as little studied as their relations with 
the outside parties" (1973,p.85). The Royal Commission on Local Government 
in Greater London left out the intrusion of partisan politics in local 
government because they did "not conceive it as any part of our duty to have 
regard to considerations of party politics" (1960,p.65). Yet it is
necessary to study the impact of partisan politics on local government 
because it relates to local policy formation and execution, the 
day-to-day work of local authority, the result of local elections, the calibre 
of councillors and the discussion of local democracy. In Nigeria 
especially, they dominated local government, and in large measure contributed 
to its failure, and the consequent need for reform.
In Britain, the existence of organized political groups on local 
councils is no recent phenomenon. As Bulpitt puts it, "the search for 
a golden age (in the 19th and early 20th centuries) when politics and parties 
played no part whatsoever in local government is quite futile; conflict has 
always existed, and parties were always present" (1967,p.5; see also.
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Brand,1974,pp.133-4), Hadfield and MacColl (1948,p.90) point out that
the influence of political parties had increased and was increasing in local 
government. Indeed, parties had came to be seen as the "indispensable 
element in the conversion of local councils into responsible governments" 
(Dunsire,1956,p.87).
A coherent urban political programme attached to a permanent political 
organization, however, did not emerge until the last decades of the 19th 
century. The foundation of the Birmingham Liberal Association in 1865 
and its adherence to 4 programme of municipal reform laid the foundation for 
Joseph Chamberlain's successful capture of the City Council and the School 
Board in 1873, and things were never going to be the same agàin in local 
government (Briggs, 1968,p.193). The emergency of municipal Socialist 
ideas in the 1890s in the Labour movement gave added impetus to the growth 
of a programmatic local government politics (Gyford,1976,p.60). Labour 
therefore, extended partisan politics in local government especially after 
the Second World War, but it did not introduce party politics into local 
government (Young,1975,p.29).
Representative local government in Nigeria, on the other hand, was 
a child born out of party politics, and therefore, inevitably, born 
into partisan politics. The first local government laws in 1950-54 
were passed in a state of political urgency and euphoria. "Complicated 
political motives were behind them - destroying indirect rule through 
the chiefs (the hall-mark of colonialism), creating local machinery for 
national political parties, placating local interests and handing out 
patronage" (Wraith, 1972,p.53). It is significant that national leaders, 
later to become Presidents, Prime Ministers and Opposition Leaders, all 
took the ministerial portfolio of local government in the early days of power, 
In this atmosphere practical realities were thrown overboard, and functions
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and powers were given to local authorities which they had no hope of 
using. Thus, local authorities in Nigeria were created for political 
and prestige reasons, and as Professor Dudley (1968) said in his study of 
party politics in northern Nigeria, the Northern Peoples Congress relied 
primarily not on its own efforts in organization but on the numerous staff 
of the native administrations, which provided the party with continuous and 
direct access to the area and people under their jurisdiction. It was 
therefore the desire to ensure conformity, the determination to break, 
particularly, Tiv opposition, a group known for their individualism, that 
led to the riot of 1960 and again 1964.
Some of the arguments advanced in defence of parties at the local level 
can also be used to show their impact on local government. The battle of 
parties on the local authority is not a mere charade; their conflict 
represents a genuine disagreement as to what councils should do, how they 
should do it, and whose interests and values should be advanced. Moreover, 
with formal powers dispersed amongst the various committees and sometimes 
delegated to chairmen, and with individual councillors able to sink their own 
responsibility in the wider corporate responsibility of the council as a 
whole, "party organization in council has the great merit of identifying 
responsibility for policy and action" (Committee on the Management of 
Local Government, 1967,Vol.5, p.398). Party can thus impact a sense of 
direction and purpose to the disparate activities of the various committees 
and departments, and can provide the officers with some form of guidance 
as to what proposals are likely to meet with acceptance. In short party 
provides a common frame of political reference for the officers, and a 
common source of information, inspiration and allegiance for the councillors, 
thereby unifying an otherwise fragmented pattern of government. In addition 
to all these and in contrast to what is available in Britain, political 
parties in Nigeria were not divided from each other by social and economic
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policies and beliefs, but by personalities and ethnic rivalries which 
contributed greatly to the failure of local government.
Conversely, a party with a majority in the council which is reminded 
of its responsibility by an effective opposition, the local press, and its 
own internal discipline provides a local government with strong and effective 
organization.
Outside the council itself parties are also important as a means of
organizing local elections and mobilizing the vote, and in particular as
a mechanism of recruitment into the ranks of councillors. In the absence
of parties in local elections the consequences may be those experienced in
the United States:
In most situations in which parties have been abolished in municipal 
elections, the conservative forces of the community have won most 
elections. In the absence of a party based on the lower strata  ̂
which could define issues that appeal to their interests and bring 
them to the polls....the voting portion of the electorate in 
such elections is disproportionately composed of the more privileged... 
(Lipset,1964,Vol.l,p.lxi; see also,Adrian, 1952).
The role of the parties in ensuring the widest use of the electoral
process is crucial. In Britain, more than half of the seats in Parliament
were uncontested before the emergence of national parties (Lloyd,1965).
The same problem has already been mentioned in the local context, where the
evidence suggests that "competition for seats is strongest in urban areas
and appears to bear a relationship to the presence of party organizations"
(Committee on the Management of Local Government,1967,Vol.5,p.48) . With
larger authorities and larger electoral areas the importance of party as
a means of enabling individuals to wage a local campaign seems likely to
increase rather than to decrease. This is particularly true for working-class
candidates, for whom parties are in any case the chief avenue of recruitment
to the council chamber.
Beyond their periodic function of recruiting candidates and organizing
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election campaigns, parties also serve to some degree to aggregate the 
various interests within the community. The close links, personal and 
organizational, between the parties and differing local social and economic 
groups, enable the parties to receive and absorb the demands of such groups 
and to carry them into the policy making process. This may help to account 
for the comparatively modest degree of independent pressure group activity 
at the local level in Britain compared with the United States.
Political parties then represent genuine divergencies of view, they 
give coherence to the work of local authorities, they function as a means 
of political recruitment and election organization, and they represent the 
demands and interests of differing social groups both organized and unorganized.
The rise of the Labour Party brought with it three vital changes; it 
was associated with speedy transaction of business in short council meetings, 
with little attempt by the full council to alter committee recommendations, 
with few items being referred back for further consideration and with few 
questions put to committee chairmen. In addition. Labour councils were 
much more prone to limit the autonomy of officers and to involve the 
councillors in questions of detail (Boaden, 1971a, p.422). Secondly, the 
Labour Party widened the spectrum of local debate, because it emphasized 
the provision of services than the other parties - such as housing and social 
services (Boaden, 1971b,p.112). In other words. Labour widened the
scope of local government, as a result of which it was to acquire many new 
functions, such as town and country planning, which would previously not 
have been seen as legitimately within the purview of local authorities 
(Goldsmith,1979,p.17). Thirdly, the Labour Party emphasized the importance 
of campaign programmes, introduced pre-council caucus meetings, and a sense 
of party discipline. As Bulpitt (1967) has shown there is little uniformity 
in party politics in English local government, which run from rigid one-party 
systems to loose multi-party ones. Nevertheless, one of the consequences
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of these Labour-associated changes was to force similar changes on the 
Liberal and Conservative parties both of which now have their own caucus 
meetings, fight local elections on a programmatic party basis with candidates 
who have some party connection and who are likely to support the party line.
The impact of party politics on local government in Nigeria prior to the
military coup of 1966 was almost completely negative. Party differences
impeded council work and brought the whole system of local government to a
standstill. There was indiscipline, corruption, indolence, nepotism,
gross excesses in party patronage, and generally, party politics lowered the
morale of the staff of local government. A staff of local government risked ,
dismissal if he belonged or was seen to belong to the opposition party.
Party militants were used as administrative personnel, and party and
administrative structures brought together. In Nigeria the council often
became the constituency party organization.
Centralization, which became the order of the day, was largely
motivated by intense partisan politics designed to satisfy only the
ruling party in a given region. In 1963, a well-known political commentator,
Theo Ola said that "the greatest single enemy of local government system
in Nigeria has been party politics" (DaiJÿTimes, January 26,1963). Similarly,
the acting secretary of Ibadan City Council, S.T.Fafim, argued that
the existing local government was conceived without allowing for 
complications of party politics and the use that can be made of 
local government councils by national political parties. It was 
introduced at the time when the politicians were keen on exercising 
newly acquired powers; but today it appears the wheel has turned 
full circle (1963,pp.7-8).
Another important convention or political expediency which was ignored 
in Nigeria but which is widely, though not universally, observed in Britain 
is the distribution of offices. In a borough, for instance, it is 
customary either for the mayor to come from the majority party and the 
deputy mayor from the minority one, or for the two parties to hold the office
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in turn; this symbolizes the fact that the mayor is the chief representative 
citizen and is to that extent above politics. Similarly, it is customary 
either to share the chairmanships of committees between the parties 
(see Table 4.2), or to arrange that the chairman comes from one party and 
the vice-chairman from another; it is also customary to spread the 
membership of the committees proportionately between the parties.
The contrast in Nigeria is sharp. Not only does the winning party 
take all the chairmanships, but unless restrained they will appoint only party 
members to committees. This situation was carried to an aÜDSurd stage 
that the then Western Regional Government became compelled to include a 
section in its local government law enabling the Minister to use powers 
of direction if it appeared to him 'that the minority parties are not 
adequately represented on a committee of the council'; otherwise they might 
well have been excluded altogether (Wraith,1972,p.89) . The power of the
majority party used to pervade every aspect of a council's life and work, 
even to the extent of compelling the council's employees to join the party 
under threat of dismissal.
TABLE 4.2:
PATRONAGE DISTRIBUTION IN TWO COUNCILS IN BRITAIN; 1955-60
MANCHESTER ROCHDALE
Committee Chairmanships NP & M NP
Committee Places P P
Alderman P P
Mayoralty P P
Outside Board and Committee Places P NP
NP = Non-party-political (seniority usually basis of distribution) 
P = proportional to party representation 
M = majority party takes all.
Source: Bulpitt,1967,p.122
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The above problems took on an added force given the Nigerian 
socio-political conditions of ethnicity and conflict between the 
traditional and modern seats of authority. However, a special problem 
arose in areas or regions where the party controlling the regional 
government was different from the ruling party at the local level.
Several forms of pressure were used by such a party at the regional level 
to break such an opposition. This was the situation in the then Northern
and Western Regions of Nigeria where you had pockets of opposition, such 
as the Tiv example given earlier, to the ruling parties at the regional 
levels.
In both the Northern and Western Regions especially, all kinds of 
political victimization and oppression were used to elicit conformity 
with the ruling party. Of course, you had the Native and Customary «
Courts, the prisons and the Native Authority Police who were charged with 
such a responsibility. Generally, local councils that refused to conform 
had their grants withheld or in the final resort faced dissolution. Things 
had gone so bad that Akindolire asserted that "the present mess in local 
government emanates from over-politicizing of our local authorities"
(1963,p.3), and McGrath (1969,p.189) concluded that the council was 
anything but the democratic local institution it was formerly meant to be.
Like in Nigeria, the politicization of local government in Britain 
has led to a change in the nature of political leadership (Lee,1963;
Jones,1969a). 'The fit and proper social leaders' who dominated town and 
country government in the 19th century have been cast off and their place 
has been taken by public or party persons, people whose position in the 
political or social hierarchy of the community depends ultimately on their 
political skills and particularly on their party status and label rather 
than hereditary or proprietary reasons. Table 4.3 graphically portrays 
the scale of the change from local councils composed of traditional rulers
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and their plenipotentiaries to local government dominated by public 
persons.
TABLE 4.3:' PERCENTAGE OF COUNCILLORS BY MAJOR OCCUPATION:
THREE WESTERN NIGERIA COUNCILS,1959-1963.
IFE IWO OGBOMOSO TOTAL
Farmer 27.3 20 15 24.1
Produce Buyer 23.9 12 - 18.1
Trader 12.5 20 20 15.0
Teacher 6.8 16 10 9.0
Carpenter 4.7 4 15 6.0
Tailor 4.7 4 25 7.5
Public Letter Writer 3.4 4 - 3.0
Lawyer 3.4 - - 2.2
Store Keeper 3.4 - - 2.2
Timber Contractor 2.3 4 - 2.2
Butcher 4 - 1.5
Black Smith - - .7
Goldsmith 8 5 3.0
Bricklayer - - .7"
Painter - - .7
Herbalist - .7
Truck Driver - .7
Nurse - - 5 .7
Washerman - - 5 .7
Insurance Broker - 4 - .7
TOTAL 100 lOO 100 100
Source : Oyediran,1973,p.459.
The rise of the party man has led to a change in the way formal 
political leaders perceive the changes, issues and policies with which 
they deal. As Dearlove (1973,pp.206-26) has shown,the ideology of the 
local councillor is an important determinant of the kinds of policies he 
will favour or the way in which he perceives problems. The emergence of 
party candidates has meant that party ideology has tended to become much 
more important as a determinant of policies: Labour councils, for instance,
will not sell council houses, and Conservative councils are not enthusiastic 
about building new ones.
In Nigeria, however, the failure of local government during the first 
republic could be traced directly to the absence of ideology and the
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calibre of the politicized councillors. Their calibre was low 
if measured in terms of their educational qualifications (see Table 4.4) , 
professional and political experience and their level of probity. Most 
of them were corrupt, inefficient and inexperienced in the affairs of 
government. They dabbled in routine matters of administration such as the 
award of contracts and staffing matters.
TABLE 4.4; PERCENTAGE OF COUNCILLORS BY EDUCATION; THREE WESTERN 
NIGERIA COUNCILS, 1952-63
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL IFE IWO OGBOMOSO TOTAL
N.136N.86 N.25 N.20
None 19.8 24.0 35.0 22.9
Adult Education 16.3 4.0 10.0 13.0
Primary 47.7 56.0 40.0 48.0
High School 5.8 8.0 5.0 6.1
Teacher Training 2.2 8.0 10.0 4.6
University 8.1 - - ' ■ 5.4
100TOTAL 99.9 100 100
Source: Oyediran, 1973,p.457,
All of these set of changes, which we categorized earlier as being
of essentially a local nature, are local only in their impact. The
changes themselves have contributed considerably to what might be
called the 'delocalisation' of local government : it is in this sense
that they are inter-dependent with the national changes. As Goldsmith
points out, the strong partisan nature of local politics clearly has a
national dimension, which is clearly seen by electors:
Now more than ever, local electors use local elections as a 
means of passing judgement on the performance of parties at 
Westminster and in Whitehall, and national politicians use 
local election results as indicators of likely general/national 
election outcomes (1979,p.17).
In the same vein, the fact that local political leaders are likely * 
to be party men means that they will use their position to implement the
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local dimensions of their party's national policies: the amount
of money spent on education and the sale or non-sale of council houses 
are good examples. Many local leaders may be prominent within the ranks 
of the national party, even if they have no ambitions to rise further up 
the political ladder. In this way, national and local politics become 
entwined, and local politics become delocalised.
PROFESSIONALISM ' _
Another significant political change which is less prominent in Nigeria 
but which has affected English local government in the 20th century is 
the rise of the professional officer. The social and economic changes 
which we enumerated (see chapter 3) meant that local government has expanded 
its scope and therefore needed expert advice to tackle these complex 
problems. The late 1960s brought both an emphasis on efficiency and 
management in public administration, and the emergence of new demands for 
local democracy, participation , community power and professional 
autonomy (Hill,1970). Given the doubtful strength of local electoral 
accountability, the extent to which local government develops more democratic 
and responsive processes depends considerably on the role played by local 
administrators (Sharpe,1967; see also Gregory,1969,pp.31-47). Perhaps the 
most important development affecting the professionals' role is the growth 
of procedures for corporate decision making. Inei.period of greater 
restraint on public expenditure, the crucial decisions may be those on overall 
social priorities. Examples of expert hands are seen in such occupations 
as planner, social worker and housing manager. In education, the 1944 
Education Act provided the impetus for major post-war development, and 
also made it a statutory obligation on every local education authority to 
appoint a permanent education officer. In his article, Brian Neve points
out the professional, co-ordinating and brokerage role of the Chief
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Education Officer:
several case studies of local decision making in the post-war 
period have isolated the CEO as the main source of innovation 
over a period of time or pointed to the likely connection between 
the arrival of a new CEO and, for example, the creation of new 
advisory posts, an acceleration of local need, or a new move on 
comprehensive reorganization. A study of Reading shows the 
CEO as the source of all innovation, while another describes a 
new CEO in Birkenhead successfully revitalizing a dormant 
education service (Neve,1977,p.293).
In short, the CEO is seen as a catalyst, an expert among experts.
The result, as people like Lee (1974,) Dennis (1972) and 
Davies (1972) have shown, is that these professionals have risen to 
positions of enormous influence, if not dominance, in the local decision­
making arena. Their position is one which many councillors find it
\
difficult to challenge. They can be more or less aware of national 
developments and reports, and use these to extract initial commitments 
to policies which may have a significant long-term impact, and in the past 
many of them have done much to foster a bi-partisan consensus on decision 
making. Neve (1977,p.293) again cites the example of a study of the 
prolonged comprehensive reorganization process in Manchester (1953-67) 
with the CEO playing a mediating role between two implacable bodies: 
a Labour Education Committee strongly committed to reform and greimmar school 
teachers determined to resist it. In such circumstances the education 
officer has 'professional' loyalties both to the teachers and to his own 
judgement of the educational welfare of the children (present and 
future), while also having a 'democratic' loyalty to his committee. Thus 
even when the policy initiative comes from the party group or from prominent 
councillors, the chief officer may play a key role in co-ordinating the 
process in reconciling opposing interests and in determining the form 
of the policy outcome.
Furthermore, the rise of the professional official with his ties 
with a national professional institution has delocalised local government.
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Thus the Society of Chief Executives protested when Rother District 
Council dismissed its Chief Executive. The professional institutes are 
often very important influences on the form and content of legislation 
and its implementation: «planning provides a good example with the 1968 
Town and Country Planning Act. These national associations, such as 
the Association of County Councils and the Association of Municipal 
Corporations, have tremendous influence on all legislation affecting the 
work of local authorities. In their own way, these 'national*
representatives of local authority interests have all contributed to the 
delocalisation of local government in Britain.
CONCLUSION
Having analysed the changes which occurred in the society while the 
structure of local government was relatively stable, the answers to the 
questions which we set ourselves at the beginning are starting to emerge:
Was reform needed because unchanging social values could no longer be 
realised through an outdated administrative system? Or had values changed, 
so that reform was needed? Well, if we take the socio-economic and
political changes that occurred into consideration, it is not surprising 
that so much criticism was levied on local government in England and Wales. 
Instead for local government to be reformed as these changes were occurring, 
what happened was an extensive preservation of existing status and 
privilege at each successive stage in the growth of the structure. 
Furthermore, new tasks have had to be devolved upon local authorities 
in a makeshift haphazard manner. Moreover, there was no sufficiently 
responsive machinery for the adaptation of the structure to changing 
conditions. By the 1960s, however, the socio-economic and political 
changes outlined above had created sufficient pressure and criticism to bring 




DIAGNOSIS: THE DEFECTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
INTRODUCTION
The increase in population and the requirements of the time 
has outgrown the capacity of local machinery created for more 
limited objects (Wright and Hobhouse, 1884,p.iv).
In chapter 1 we said that a diagnosis should indicate the symptoms 
which have to be translated into a coherent picture on the basis of which 
action can be planned and carried out with a reasonable assurance that 
objectives will be achieved. Critics believed that the existing local 
government administrations in Nigeria and Britain had failed to meet the 
demands put on them. The impact of growth took them by surprise and 
they could not keep up with the times. The pattern of settlement was 
always well ahead of the pattern of organization. Clearly the human 
geography, pattern of life, functions of local authorities, and nature 
of local administration had changed so drastically that the need for new 
institutions became inevitable.
The British system of local government created by the Act of 1888 
was working so well that the President of the Local Government Board 
declared to the House of Commons in 1893 that "no man can point to a 
single instance in which our municipal system has broken down" (cited in 
Dearlove,1979,p.21). This tribute was attested to at the beginning 
of this century by Dr.Josef Redlich who pointed to "the marvellous increase 
in the efficiency of local government and the equally marvelous growth 
in its functions" (1903, Vol.2,p.408). He also praised the flourishing 
system of democratic local government noting how "the gradual substitution 
of a democratic for a privileged franchise has not done away with the 
governing classes.. .democracy was not found to have deprived the upper 
classes of political leadership" (1903,Vol.1,pp.215-16, 278).
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The socio-economic and political changes detailed in chapters 3 
and 4 made redundant this happy late Victorian golden age of democracy, 
efficiency, autonomy from central control and high calibre councillors.
The local government system in the 20th century and especially after the 
Second World War came under heavy criticism. Critics have described the 
system as inefficient, subject to massive and increasing central control 
and therefore it was undemocratic, and dominated by councillors and 
officers of declining calibre. Buxton concluded that "local government 
was not capable of providing an efficient service" (1973,p.54; see also, 
Richards, 1978, p.33).
So terribly bad did critics believe things had gone that Richard 
Crossman, Minister of Housing and Local Government, denounced the system 
as archaic and regressive (1975, p.440). Municipal administration was 
regarded as inefficient, ineffective and unbusinesslike, and Brodrick 
(1875,p.27) was driven to the conclusion that the 19th century reorganization 
on which the pre-1974 structure was modelled, was based on 'unscientific 
legislation'. A lot of people, including politicians, local government
officers, academics and critics became disturbed at the manifest inability 
of local authorities to cope with the major problems facing them (Robson, 
1966,p.122).
Small wonder that the representatives of the London County Council 
in giving evidence before the Ullswater Commission on London Government, 
complained bitterly of the unsatisfactory nature of the local government 
area; a structure which they declared was entirely unsuitable to the modern 
requirements of local government, particularly in regard to such services 
as education, electricity, housing, transport and the regulation of 
wholesale markets (Robson, 1931,p.41).
All these views were aggregated in the official words of the Royal 
Commission on Local Government in England, and the Labour Government's
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White Paper on the Reform of Local Government in England;
unless local government is organized to meet the needs of the 
future, and in particular is organized in units large enough to 
match the technical and administrative requirements of the 
services which it administers, its powers must diminish, and with
it the power of local democracy Radical change is overdue.
And only if such change occurs, and local government is organized 
in strong units with power to take major decisions, will present 
trends toward centralization be reversed, and local democracy secure 
its place as a major part of our democratic system (1970,paras.
10, 97; see also. Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater 
London,1960,paras.227,707,; Money, 1973,p.319).
In Nigeria too, commentators praised the inherent qualities of the
pre-independence system of local government and its capacity for the
conduct of affairs (Hailey,1957,p.460). Azikwe's N.C.N.C. saw local ^
government as a way of extending "democratic principles and advancing the
interests of the people of Nigeria and the Cameroons....(and as a)
suitable means for the purpose of imparting political education to the
people of Nigeria" (see, Arikpo,1967,p.61). This was orchestrated in the
fifties by Awolowo, the leader of the Action Group, who glowingly
enlogized the local government system:
Local government is the foundation on which the massive and the 
magnificent super-structure of state, regional or central government 
is erected. Indeed, it is the most efficient agency by means of 
which the regional or state government minister can respond to the 
basic needs, welfare, and general well-being of the citizens 
(Western Nigeria House of Assembly Debates,1952,pp.96-7).
Thus according to Brian Smith, local government in Nigeria came to be seen
as "playing an important role in achieving the developing world's prime
objectives: securing the maximum returns from material and human resources,
and raising the standards of living" (1967,p.28). In another article, he was
so convinced of the efficiency of local government in the provision of
essential services in the Northern Region that he asserted that even if
the regional government collapsed, the local governments were capable of
running vital services in the region (Smith,1967,p.40; see also. Wraith,
1972,p.200).
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The post-war dreams of an efficient and democratic local government
evaporated in the sixties. Local authorities in Nigeria, like their
British counterparts, were said to be inefficient because their sizes
were too small to generate adequate revenue and attract the right quality
of staff and councillors. They were also believed to be over-politicized,
corrupt, undemocratic and stagnant (West Africa, 1971,p.214). Things had
degenerated so much that critics came to the conclusion that
the institutions of Nigerian local government have failed to enhance 
their capacity, to involve the public, to respond to local needs, 
or to administer effectively and responsibly the various local 
public services. In fact, they have declined. Nigerian local 
governments today are deprived of their representative institutions, 
are being shorn of their functions, and are declining in manpower 
and fiscal resources. The hopes which accompanied the reforms 
of the early fifties have been dashed on the disappointments of the 
sixties (Quarterly Journal of Administration, April 1969,pp.169-170).
A tremendous similarty exists, therefore, between Nigeria and Britain
with respect to the whole language of discourse about local government,
its problems, its reorganization and prospects. This is not surprising
since most of the advocates of reorganization in Nigeria not only studied in
Britain, but are also very attentive to developments in the latter country
and have often tried to transplant facets of British local government to
Nigeria. Moreover, political scientists in Britain, like their counterparts
all over the world, have come to appreciate the essence of comparative studies,
and this has led some of them into research about local government in Nigeria.
In both countries, therefore, there has been a lot of writing about the
need for efficiency and the virtues of local self-government, and advocates
of reorganization have long been concerned with the calibre of their
elected representatives and with the implications of this for services
and expenditure. Furthermore, in both countries there has been anxiety
about the inefficiency caused by the presence of too many too small
authorities, and fragmentation in the overall system and within individual




Several attempts were made before the seventies to reform local 
government in both countries. The belief that the functioning of 
local government was highly unsatisfactory led to a plethora of committees 
and commissions set up to inquire into different aspects of local government, 
such as the Maud and Mallaby Committees on people in local government, the 
Allen Committee on the impact of rates, the Local Government Commissions on 
areas and authorities in England and Wales, the Herbert Commission on Local 
Government in Greater London, and then the Royal Commission on Local 
Government in England. In Nigeria, too, abortive attempts were made in 
the early sixties and between 1968 and 1971 through committees of inquiry 
such as the Benue/Plateau State Reform Panel, Kano State Committee for 
Local Government Reform, and Kwara State Advisory Committee for Local 
Government Reform, to reorganize the system of local government. These 
attempts, however, led to further centralization and the consequent weakening 
of local administration.
We have said that the defects analysed by the Royal Commission 
(1966-69) and the Federal Government in its Guidelines for Local Government 
Reform (1976) were nothing new but were mere compilations of criticisms 
which had become bitter since the Second World War in Britain and especially 
in the sixties in both countries. The Commission was unanimous in the 
view that 'local government in England needed a new structure and a new 
map'. It was 'in a sense a random growth' which had 'not been planned
systematically in the light of what it has to do and the social and 
geographical conditions of each place'. The Commission diagnosed the 
following basic defects in the structure at that time:
(a) The division of town and country, what the Commission called "the 
most fatal defect in the present system" (para.85). The 'present' structure
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failed to recognize the inter-dependence of town and country which increased 
with the growth in personal mobility. "People from the countryside 
came into the towns for shopping, entertainment, higher education and 
many professional services; people who work in towns increasingly live 
out in the country and commute ; people who live in the towns increasingly 
go out to the country for recreation" (para.86).
(b) the division of responsibility between counties and county 
boroughs had built up a legacy of boundary ambitions and fears, and 
created a division of interest between the two types of authority.
According to the Commission, "the fragmentation of England into 79 county 
boroughs and 45 counties, each with its own independent authority concerned 
with its own interests, has made the proper planning of development and 
transportation impossible" (para.87);
(c) there was a division of responsibility within the counties themselves; 
county councils were frustrated in the exercise of their power by county 
districts' responsibility for related functions. And within any county 
the pattern of responsibility was uneven, the larger county districts had 
more powers than the smaller in certain aspects. This defect is more 
clearly set out in the findings of the Seebohm Committee on Local Government 
and Allied Personal Social Services (1968,paras.676 and 681);
(d) the inadequate size of many local authorities measured in terms of 
population, area , or financial resources, led to lack of highly qualified 
manpower and technical equipment;
(i) the relationship between local authorities and the public was 
unsatisfactory. Here the Commission drew mainly upon studies previously 
carried out for the Committee on the Management of Local Government (1967); 
(f) the relationship between central and local government was simply 
'wrong' (para.lOO). In the Commission's view central government should
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settle priorities for services of national importance, establish minimum 
standards, broadly determine the allocation of resources, establish 
priorities, operate checks on costs and quality and resolve inter-authority 
and citizen-authority disputes (Royal Commission on Local Government in 
England, 1969, Vol.1,pp.25-32).
Although there was no official thesis on the defects of local government 
in Nigeria comparable to the Royal Commission's report, critics nevertheless 
diagnosed similar malaise to those above. These defects were:
(a) Confusion arising as to the proper status, functions and the best 
organizational framework of the local government,; that is, whether the 
local government system was a rival government to the regional/state 
government claiming the loyalty and duties of the people or whether it 
should be based on the principles of decentralization or déconcentration 
of powers;
(b) inefficiency, ineffectiveness and waste arising from the poor supporting 
facilities such as staff, funds and equipment at the disposal of the local 
government;
(c) corruption and malpractices arising from the lack of identification and 
moral involvement with the local government system as an instrument of 
development at the local level;
(d) partisanship arising from the election and/or appointment of local 
government representatives on political party/tribal lines. This led to 
the tendency of successful candidates trying to 'recover' their expenditure 
on election through corrupt practices; and the ruling party withholding 
the grants of local government belonging to the opposition. Furthermore, 
partisanship was alleged to have led to further centralization and therefore 
the charge that councillors were unresponsive to their electorate;
(e) too many too small authorities which made it impossible to generate
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necessary fund with which to employ qualified staff and execute projects.
Thus, the councillors and local government workers were said to be men
of poor quality who were inefficient. And because they were inefficient
and ineffective, many of their functions and powers were transferred
to the Government or corporations.
These defects were summarized by the Chief of Staff Supreme
Headquarters, Brigadier Yar'Adua:
Local governments have, over the years, suffered from the continuous 
whittling down of their powers. The State Governments have 
continued to encroach upon what would normally have been the 
exclusive preserves of Local Government. Lack of adequate funds 
and appropriate institutions had continued to make Local Government 
ineffective and ineffectual. Moreover the staffing arrangements 
to ensure a virile local government system had been inadequate.
Excessive politicking had made even modest progress impossible. 
Consequently, there has been a divorce between the people and 
government institutions at their most basic levels (Guidelines,
1976,foreword).
For the sake of our analysis here, we will reduce the defects 
identified by the Reddiffe-Maud Commission and the Federal Government to 
four broad ones. First, there were too many too small authorities, 
lacking the areas, population and resources to provide the specialized 
staff, equipment and institutions needed by increasingly technical and 
complex services, and catchment areas were too small to provide the necessary 
standards of service to the growing numbers of minority groups needing 
public help. In northern Nigeria, however, it was felt that the native 
authorities were too big and therefore remote, undemocratic and 
'ungovernable',
Secondly, the existing areas of local government did not fit the facts 
of social life. The obsolete division of town and country took no 
account of their interdependency and in particular the division between 
county boroughs and counties 'builds into the system a division of interest 
where, in fact, there is a common interest'. In Nigeria, this problem 
was exacerbated not only by the indifference of the colonial masters to
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urban development which was carried over to the post-independence era, 
but also the establishment of Government Residential Areas for the colonial 
administrators and their Nigerian successors, effectively segregates the 
'country' areas from the chaotic township* Indeed, this fragmentation 
was said to be the fatal defect of local government. Suburbs were not 
governed by the towns from which they had emerged; conurbations, each 
now a single economic and social unit, were splintered into a variety of 
authorities, and urban districts were divorced from the rural districts 
whose core they composed. This administrative fragmentation was said 
to have damaged the provision of services to areas whose problems needed 
to be tacWed comprehensively (Royal Commission on Local Government in 
England,1969, Vol.1,paras.85-88).
Thirdly, it was believed that this fragmentation meant that the 
citizens did not feel that local government units reflected anything 
meaningful in their daily lives. Local government areas did not 
correspond to what they regarded as communities. And so they grew 
apathetic (Jones, 1973,p.155). And thus critics believed the division of 
local authorities into tiers (outside county boroughs) confused the electorate 
and led to their lack of interest in the activities of the authorities.
This ignorance was not thought to be a sound basis for democracy.
Fourthly, the division of local government into competing authorities, 
unable to combine in a common front, and their inadequate areas (except 
in northern Nigeria), meant that the central government was increasing 
its control, and was likely to remove more functions from unreformed local 
government, leaving it with îew important activities and increasingly 
unattractive to cdale people, either officials or members, to serve. This 
relates to the calibre of councillors and the local government staff.
The low calibre of course meant that the authorities were ineffective and 
inefficient. These problems were said to be compounded by party politics
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(see chapter 4) and corruption, especially in Nigeria, In Nigeria, 
the system was manipulated for party advantage. Its financial and 
professional viability was undermined as local government units were 
created to suit the electoral needs of political parties and as offices 
were filled as political rewards. By 1965 every council set up in 
1952 had been suspended. Important local government functions were 
transferred to ad hoc bodies.
We shall now expand the critique of the existing system to see how the 
institutions of local government "have failed to enhance their capacity, to 
involve the public, to respond to local needs, or to administer effectively 
and responsibly the various local public services" (Quarterly Journal of 
Administration, April 1969,p.170).
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
The boundary problem formed the mediety of local government defects 
while other problems as those pertaining to democracy, efficiency, 
central control and councillor calibre were spokes in the hub. For 
instance, the Redcliffe-Maud Commission considered the division of 
responsibility in the counties between the county and district authorities 
a great weakness in view of the need for a common rational approach to 
problems of planning and the integration of personal social services.
Both the Nigerian Government's Guidelines and the reports of the Redcliffe- 
Maud Commission found the size of most local authorities inadequate for 
their responsibilities. They considered the relationship between local 
authorities and the public unsatisfactory, largely because the public found 
the system too complex and difficult to understand. A more comprehensible 
system would, they believed, result in more accessibility, interest, 
awareness, and involvement. Or as the Guidelines put it, reorganization 
will lead to a system which will not only "stimulate democratic self-government
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and encourage initiative and leadership potential" but it will also bring 
about success through 'community responsiveness* and participation*
(1976,foreword). Furthermore, they found the relationship between 
central and local government unsatisfactory because of the great 
heterogeneity of local authorities. Better mutual understanding and a 
clearer division of function and responsibility would be possible only 
if local authorities were fewer and stronger in resources and in their 
capacity to deal with community problems.
This intimate relationship is not only between the 'hub* and the 
'spokes' but also among the 'spokes' themselves and which we are only 
separating for academic purposes. The inter-relationship among the 
defects can be demonstrated by the fact that central control is said to 
have increased because of local government inefficiency and ineffectiveness 
which in turn is a consequence of the poor calibre of the staff and 
councillors.
It was commonly believed that the structure of English local government, 
established at the end of the last century, was antiquated (Robson, 1966; 
Griffith,1966; Mackintosh,1968; Richards,1978; Pearce,1980). These 
critics believed that the symptoms of decay were the result of obsolete 
municipal structure which was quite unsuited for the tasks it was designed 
to perform. Thus the major problem of local government was identified 
as that of the boundary because they were felt to be inconsistent with 
modern needs and social necessities (Robson,1931,p.30).
To critics, local government in Nigeria before the 1976 reform were  ̂
a medley of authorities lacking correspondence between their sizes and the 
financial and personnel resources required to provide and maintain services 
(Wraith,1972; Post,1968; Orewa,1968; Nemetz,1971; Adedeji and Rowland,
1972). They agreed that structural problems were at the centre of local 
government defects. Post (1968,p.102) argued that the local authorities
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were corrupt, and inefficient because their sizes were too small to 
attract qualified personnel. Adejuyigbe concurs, saying that "the small 
sizes of the councils had important effects on their finances" and of 
course on their achievement (1972,p.403). Wraith takes his argument 
further and asserts that not only were they too small to be effective, 
but the 'tier' system was too complicated for a society that was largely 
illiterate:
...the system had no relevance to traditional forms, and that in 
particular the requirement that one local authority should collect 
the tax only to part with most of it to another, upon whom they 
might only look with favour, aroused deep suspicion and resentment 
(Wraith,1972,p.63).
\Intense partisan politics in local government added to the boundary problem 
as politicians gerrymandered the councils for their political ends. In 
1969, a journal's editorial comment said that local government in Nigeria 
would remain inefficient unless they "have sufficient size. It must be 
sufficiently large - in area, in population, and hence in potential fiscal 
and leadership resources - to develop programmes, employ competent 
administrative and professional staff, and to manage the variety of local 
services expected of a modern local government" (Quarterly Journal of 
Administration, April 1969,p.170).
The Pfë-Reform Structure
The pattern of local government in England and Wales was established 
by the Local Government Acts of 1888 and 1894. In the county boroughs 
a single authority was responsible for local services within the area.
In the counties there was a two-tier system. Responsibility for some 
services was given to the county council, and other services were entrusted 
to county districts - non-county boroughs, urban districts, and rural 
districts. In rural districts certain functions were performed by 
parish councils or parish meetings. The Local Government Board (and later
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the Minister of Health) was empowered, subject to Parliamentary confirmation, 
to confer county borough status on non-county boroughs and to extend the 
boundaries of county boroughs. The subsequent creation of new county 
boroughs and the enlargement of the original ones involved a considerable 
transfer of population, territory, and financial resources from 
administrative counties to county boroughs.
As of 1972 the local authorities in England and Wales comprised:
58 County Councils 
82 County Borough Councils 
276 Non-county Borough Councils
A total of 1,298 
District Councils548 Urban District Councils 
474 Rural District Councils 
About 7,500 Parish Councils 
About 3,400 Parish Meetings 
This did not include Greater London, which had the Greater London Council,
32 London Borough Councils and the City Corporation.
The disparity in population of each type of local authority is 
very glaring if we classify them according to population as in Table 5.1
The differences in population among the areas of the same constitutional 
class were almost grotesque. The counties ranged from Lancashire with 
more than two and a quarter million, to Rutland with less than thirty 
thousand. The West Riding of Yorkshire had 1,696,220 inhabitants, as 
against Westmorland with 66,950. The Welsh counties varied from 
Glamorganshire with more than 750,000 to Randnorshire with less than 20,000. 
Even if we omit the extreme, there were large differences of population in 
the middle ranges.
This disparity was not limited to counties alone. For example, 
the county boroughs of Birmingham had a population of well over a million.
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TABLE 5.1: POPULATION^ NUMBER AND TYPE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES
IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1964.
POPULATION NUMBER
1,000,000+ 4 County Councils 
1 County Borough Council
500,000 to 
1,000,000
14 County Councils 




15 London Borough Councils 
17 County Councils 




17 "London Borough Councils 
14 County Councils 
33 County Borough Councils
1 Non-County Borough Council
2 Urban District Councils 




5 County Councils 
34 County Borough Councils 
45 Non-County Borough Councils 
17 Urban District Councils 




3 County Councils 
1 County Borough Council 
94 Non-County Borough Councils 
130 Urban District Councils 




1 County Council 
53 Non-County Borough Councils 
162 Urban District Councils 




38 Non-County Borough Councils 
129 Urban District Councils 




44 Non-County Borough Councils 
104 Urban District Councils 
39 Rural District Councils
Below 1,OOO 1 Non-County Borough Council 4 Urban District Councils
Source : Registrar-General's Population Estimates for mid-1964.
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Liverpool nearly 750,000, while Canterbury had slightly over 30,000,
Dudley below 65,000 and Gloucester 70,000. The non-county boroughs ranged 
from towns like Swindon, Cambridge and Poole, all approaching the hundred 
thousand mark, or Rhondda which just exceeded it, to tiny pockets like 
Bishops Castle in Shropshire or Eye in Suffolk with less than 2,000 inhabitants, 
The urban districts ranged from Basildon with a population of 103,000 to 
to Saxmundham with only 1,500.
Similar anomalies also occurred in their territorial size, with a large 
county covering about 1,649,401 acres as against the Holland Division of 
Lincolnshire with 267,847 acres. Among the non-county boroughs,
Keighley had an acreage of 23,640 as against 157 acres for Woodstock. These 
same territorial anomalies permeated into the rural and urban districts, as 
we can see in Table 5.2.
TABLE 5.2; SIZE,NUMBER AND TYPE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES; 1965*
TERRITORIAL SIZE NUMBER AND TYPE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES
Below 1,0O0 Acres 11 Non-County Borough Councils
40 Urban District Councils
1,000 to 43 Non-County Borough Councils
1,999 Acres 87 Urban District Councils
2,000 1 County Borough Council
to 43 Non-County Borough Councils
2,999 acres 80 Urban District Councils
2 Rural District Councils
3,000 11 County Borough Councils
to 73 Non-County Borough Councils
4,999 Acres 143 Urban District Councils
2 Rural District Councils
5,000 41 County Borough Councils
to 83 Non-County Borough Councils
9,999 Acres 128 Urban District Councils
5 Rural District Councils
10,000 13 County Borough Councils
to 10 Non-County Borough Councils
14,999 Acres 23 Urban District Councils
5 Rural District Councils
15,000 7 County Borough Councils
to 5 Non-County Borough Councils
19,000 Acres 21 Urban District Councils
9 Rural District Councils
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Table 5.2: continued.




6 County Borough Councils 
5 Non-County Borough Councils 
4 Urban District Councils 
38 Rural District Councils
Over 30,000 Acres 3 County Borough Councils 
2 Urban District Councils 
405 Rural District Councils
* ExcltdLng county councils and GLC area. 
Source : Municipal Yearbook, 1965.
Although one is not advocating for uniformity of size and population 
among the local authorities in each category, but the disproportionate 
sizes were too pronounced. Critics like Maddick (1963,p.115), Richards 
(1973,p.34) and Robson (1972,Vol.Ip.74) believe that each category must have 
a minimum and maximum size if they must perform their duties efficiently and 
effectively. The implications of these disproportionate sizes and
populations were that inefficiency and duplication became the order of the 
day. Also, it would have been impossible, for instance, for Birmingham 
with over a million people and Gloucester (70,000) to have proportionate 
and comparable financial resources such as rateable facilities. These 
ranges in sizes and population led critics to believe that a number of local 
authorities were too small to perform with tolerable efficiency and economy 
the functions devolved on them. The Labour Party asserted that "there
are too many local authorities, the majority of which are too small....
too many authorities lack the population and rate revenue necessary to 
provide essential services" (1942,pp.5-6; see also, Sharpe, 1965,p.11;
Reddiffe-Maud and Wood,1974,pp.24-31). Robson agrees and argues that 
"just as the technique of industrial and commercial administration now
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requires far larger units of authority than formerly, so does the 
technique of efficient municipal administration now demand more extensive 
units of local government" (1931,p.125). The Local Government Boundary 
Commission argued that "a single large unit should be able to achieve 
economies in terms of manpower and money more easily than several smaller 
ones" (1947,para.24). The Royal Commission on Local Government in 
England (1966-69) did not doubt the wisdom of one of its predecessors since 
they also considered it "clear that larger authorities offer advantages of 
specialization in staff and institutions" (1969,Vol.1,p.59).
The alleged inefficiency however has greater root in the changes 
which occurred in the society, than in the structure itself. This assertion 
is made up of three ingredients. First, the socio-economic and political 
changes that have taken place in the 20th century Britain have been 
enormous (see chapters 3 and 4). Second, "as the services run by local 
authorities have increased in number and importance, (so) the problem of 
securing a high level of modern efficiency has also increased" (Jackson,
1963,p.207). Third, in the face of these two changes the overall 
structure of local government has remained unchanged in its essentials.
In other words things have not so much gone wrong with local government; 
it is more the case that local government has just failed to adapt to 'new 
problems' and 'new duties' (Local Government in England and Wales During 
the Period of Rfeconstructionyl945,p.3). In effect, a stable governmental 
structure has been described as inefficient in the face of social and 
economic change. Governmental authority has remained 'fragmented' while 
the growing conurbations enjoy an economic and social integration. 
'Lilliputian organizations' were seen as no longer up to the task of 
managing the technical means of satisfying the everyday needs of those 
who lived in the great cities (Green,1959,p.17). The answer to our 
hypothetical question is unfolding now; Was reform necessary because
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changing social values could no longer be realised through an outdated 
administrative system? The much talked about values can be reduced to 
'democracy' and 'efficiency'. And as we have demonstrated, the changes 
are enormous. New methods of transport which arose from the introduction 
of the petrol engine set up an overflow of population from the towns, 
resulting in an an enormous expansion of their suburbs. A large number 
of people now work in one area and live in another. These people have to 
be provided with many services by the city in which they work, but most of 
them pay rates only to the council of the area in which they live.
This artificial division between country and town not only became 
blurred and unrealistic but was also a constant source of rivalry between 
the authorities. One of such local conflicts was between the counties 
and county boroughs over proposàls by the former to bring within their 
boundaries the 'overspill* areas into which their populations had moved 
out, a course resisted by the county councils because it meant a loss of 
prestige, catchment area and rateable value to them. Because of these 
and other problems, the areas and populations of local authorities remained 
small and they were therefore deemed inefficient (see,Simon,1926,p.216).
Convinced, therefore, that small areas can never have the necessary 
resources to perform satisfactorily, commentators started praising the 
efficiency of larger areas. Griffith (1966) believes that the arguments 
in favour of larger local authorities are many, various and strong and the 
Royal Commission on Local Government in England (1966-69) received a number 
of evidences calling for larger areas because, as one of them points out, 
"small-scale operations in refuse disposal are uneconomic and inconvenient 
in various ways" and, more generally, they argued on, "a small authority is 
less likely to possess modern plant, equipment or specialist appliances.... 
(has) less room for new developments in services....(and) little margin for 
unexpected contingencies" (Written Evidence of the Ministry of Housing and
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Local Government, Research Study 10,1969,pp.38,51). Robson also
believed that "one of the most cogent reasons for requiring larger.... 
units of local administration is that the present muddle produces a 
strong tendency to centralization" (1931,p.60).
In a word, the Reddiffe-Maud Commission subscribed to the 'doctrine of 
the minimum size for an efficient authority'. It is interesting to know
that the Minister who appointed the Commission "had no doubt that an 
impartial body would support his contention that larger units were needed" 
(Morton,1970,p.17), and the Commission itself in considering " proposals 
for a new structure started from the basis that most existing units are too 
small for the provision of the main services" (1969, Vol. 1,p.42) .
Local government structure was even more chaotic in Nigeria 
(Fadahunsi,1977). The coming of regional self-government in the early 
fifties provided an impetus to the interest in local government structure 
and administration in each of the three regions. In the south, the native
authorities were replaced (in the east, as a result of the Local Government 
Ordinance of 1950; in the west, following the Local Government Law of 
1952) by English-style county or divisional, district and local councils.
The governing bodies were wholly elected in the Eastern Region and three- 
quarters elected, and one quarter titled members in the Western Region.
The district and local councils were not subordinate, but co-ordinate with 
the larger (divisional and county) jurisdictions within whose boundaries 
many, but not all, were located. In the north, the Native Authority Law 
of 1954 replaced the sole chief with the chief-in-council, but the 
traditional districts and village groups/villages remained as subordinate 
administrative organs of the native authority.
Thus, prior to the 1976 reform, there was no uniformity of structure 
among the local governments in Nigeria. Every region (later state) 
established and operated its system of local government. Not only did
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critics believe that the structure was ill-defined and chaotic, but 
they also believed that the local authorities except in the north, were 
too small in area and population to be efficient. To them, it was impossible 
to survey the facts of local government without becoming convinced that 
there was a great multitude of minor authorities covering areas so inadequate, 
possessing such small populations and with so limited financial resources 
that with the best will in the world, they had neither the capacity nor 
the means to exercise in a satisfactory manner the powers conferred on 
them. Wraith (1972) believes that the main characteristics of local 
government in Nigeria was the utter lack of symmetry or system under which 
it was carried on. Fadahunsi,Orewa, Wraith and a host of other critics 
concluded that local government in Nigeria consisted of numerous Lilliputian 
authorities "sans population, sans money, sans knowledge, often sans 
staff" (Robson,1931,p.45) and almost sans existence.
Local government structure problem in Nigeria was compounded by 
illiteracy and politics. "The ordinary man tends to see local government 
in terms of local feuds, traditional rivalries, and distrust of 
neighbouring towns or communities with whom he is unwilling to share his 
own resources, and whom he suspects of getting more than their fair share 
of benefits; not only does he not want his council to combine with others - 
he would like it to become still smaller; and the politicans often back him 
up" (Wraith, 1972,p.63%.
Thus the argument about the size of local authorities in Nigeria, as 
in Britain, can be reduced to three spheres. First, small authorities 
are seen as unable to secure the services of councillors and officers of 
high calibre. Orewa provides evidence to support his claim that none of 
the small authorities in Bendel State was "able to employ a qualified 
technical officer to supervise the construction and maintenance of its roads
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and bridges" (1968,p.231). Second, small authorities are seen as 
unable to secure the benefits that are alleged to derive from economies of 
scale. Orewa concludes that "the per capita expenditure on administration 
and law and order were on the average lower in larger councils than in the 
smaller councils" (1968,p.224). Third, and related to the second one, 
small authorities cannot secure the benefits of specialization and 
division of labour whereby competent specialists are employed for particular 
tasks, as it is difficult to justify the employment of the range of 
necessary specialists unless the case load is large (Wraith,1972,p.84).
The scale of the local authorities activities varied greatly from place to 
place and it was in the north that their influence was greatest. Before 
the reorganization into states, local authorities varied in size of 
population between 2,000 and three million, and their ordinary revenues 
from £10,000 to over £2 millionv The large authorities such as Kano,
Sokoto and Katsina made their own. provision for public sérvices - 
electricity, water etc - and had full responsibility for the policing of 
their area and maintaining their prisons. Kano Native Authority, for 
instance, spent over £2 million a year and employed over 5,000 salaried 
personnel, and supported a modern hospital with over 300 beds. The 
native authorities acted as the agents of the regional government in 
implementing regional welfare and works programmes in their localities.
To execute these programmes, some of the richer authorities employed their 
own expatriate staff. In fact it used to be said with some truth that 
before the reorganization into states that if̂  the central government 
collapsed in the north, the native authorities would carry on the 
administration of the region, whereas if the native authorities collapsed 
there would be complete disaster (Hicks,1961,pp.180-181; Smith,1967,p.40).
Things were different in the other two regions where the system of 
native authorities had been taken over by the introduction of local
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government institutions on the English model. These local government 
authorities, however, were neither as large nor regarded as efficient as 
the great emirates of the north. In 1953-4, for exeunple, the total 
ordinary expenditure of all the local treasuries in the Western Region 
was under £2 million, the largest being Ibadan with £278,484, and the amount 
in the east was even less. Many of the local authorities in the south 
used to spend about £2,000 and hardly employed anybody outside their small 
office staff.
In a nutshell, the population and resources of the local authorities 
were regarded as too small to allow them to be effective except within a 
very narrow range, consisting mainly of minor roads and small dispensaries. 
Thus by 1958, there were 132 'tiny' local authorities in the Western Region. 
These were made up of 14 Divisional Councils, 9 All-purpose District 
Councils, 58 Districts and 51 Local Councils (Western State of Nigeria, 
1971,p.10), Critics therefore believed that the pre-1976 reform attempts 
were not done on the grounds of logic or equity. They were not inspired 
by any general principles except for political gains. Yet as we said in 
chapter 1 (see also chapter 8), administrative reform should be both a 
political and a management process; and for administrative reform to be 
meaningful, therefore, it must allow for both its political and managerial 
elements. In Nigeria, only the political aspect was emphasized. The 
councils were created to give "a measure of local independence to groups 
of villages" (Western State of Nigeria,1971,p.4) and to allow the 
politicians to win elections. The same process of fragmentation took place 
in the east and by 1960 there were 107 local authorities.
Adejuyigbe (1972) believes that the small size of the councils had 
important effects on their finance, efficiency, democracy and councillor/ 
officer calibre. He asserts that many of them could not raise enough 
revenue to pay their staff. They were unable to engage people to
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perform many of the functions expected of them. To back up his 
assertion he gives the example of Ifetedo Local Council in Ife Division 
which was unable to engage labourers for road works during the 1970/71 
financial year. "Some of the provisional authorities in Akoko were unable 
to provide funds for drugs in their dispensaries in certain years - in 
1967/70 Akoko East Provisional Authority could only provide £8 for drugs 
for use in its dispensaries" (Adejuyigbe,1972,p.403). This was a classical 
example, highly representative of local government in Nigeria, especially 
in the west and east. Even in the north where local authorities were 
usually larger, richer and believed to be more efficient, my native 
authority, Yagba, had only £110 in its treasury in 1965. <
Furthermore, local government units did not reflect anything meaningful 
in the daily lives of the citizens because they did not fit the facts of 
social life. What the citizens regarded as communities did not correspond
to the areas of local authorities. This is believed to be responsible for
their apathy (Wraith,1972). Moreover, the majority of the electorate, 
who at any rate are illiterates, were confused by the 'tier' system of 
local government. The Western Region, for instance, had the Local Council 
which was generally not a rating authority; it was usually associated with 
a larger council which collected the rates. The rating authority then 
paid an annual grant to the local council to meet its expenses. But local
council taxpayers were not willing to pay taxes to outsiders.
All the problems of local government remained unsolved despite the 
declared intention of the Military Government in 1966 to reform the system.
A year after the creation of twelve states in 1967, the promised reform was
launched and by 1970 the Federal Military Government's proposals were
implemented. The result was the familiar pattern of non-uniformity in 
local government. In 1972 the Western State (now Ogun,Ondo and Oyo states) 
reformed its own local government system by adopting a modified version of
191
the American city-manager plan, introducing a one-tier system, removing 
the traditional rulers from local government affairs, and directing that 
40 per cent of local revenue raised annually should be used for local 
development efforts. In Bendel State (formerly Midwest), local governments 
were abolished in 1974 when the state government promulgated the Development 
Administration Edict. This edict introduced a two-tier structure of 
Development Councils and Development Committees in what it called the 
'development administration system' (Government of the Midwest State of 
Nigeria, 1974). The new system resulted in the déconcentration of state 
ministries to the field and the appointment of a civil servant (Resident) 
as the head of the entire government operation in each administration 
division. Members of the development councils and development committees 
were selected by the state government.
In 1972 the East Central State (now Imo and Anambra states) introduced 
a two-tier préfectoral system tailored on the French model. Under what it 
called 'divisional administration', direct control of the system by the state 
cabinet and the military governor was exercised through state-appointed 
divisional officers. In the South Eastern State (now Cross River state), 
the new system of field administration was directly controlled by the Ministry 
of Development Administration, while only advisory and tax collecting roles 
were assigned to the traditional authorities. In Rivers state, the 
government also centralised the functions of local administration under the 
state ministry.
In the northern states*, the local government reform of 1972 replaced 
the extant native authorities by local government authorities, and 
reorganized the native authority system by establishing in their place 
'Administrative' or 'Development Areas' which were mutually independent but 
directly related to the local government authority and the State Governments. 
The roles of the state bureaucracies were increased while the position and
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powers of the emir in local government was watered down. These reform 
attempts failed because they were done primarily for political reasons.
They led to increased centralization of local government powers and 
functions (see chapter 4).
Thus by 1976 there was still a huge disparity in population, area, 
and revenue of local authorities as presented in Table 5.3. Ther disparity 
in population was pronounced. In Kano State, for example, they ranged 
from Kano with a population of 4,747,065 to Gumel with a little more than 
a quarter of a million. In the North-Eastern State, Bornu Local Government 
had 1,971,870 inhabitants, as against Jama'are with 6,000. In the 
North-Western State they varied from Sokoto Local Government with more than 
3 million people to Lapai with just 100,000. In the Western State the 
differences were equally grotesque. They varied from Ogbomosho Local 
Government with 343,279 to Ilara with 1,113 inhabitants (Western State of 
Nigeria,1972,p.87).
Similar anomalies also occurred in their territorial size. In 
Kwara State for example, Ilorin Local Government covered an area of 2,110 
square miles as against Oyun with 258 square miles. In the North-Western 
State, Sokoto had a square mileage of 25,608 as against Lapai with just 
2,587 square miles. In the North-Eastern State, they ranged from over 
32,000 square miles (Bornu) to just about 150 sc[uare miles (Jama'are) .
And in the Western State they ranged from Oyo Local Government with 7,927 
square miles to Epe Local Government with only 466 square miles.
The implications of these disproportionate sizes and populations were 
that inefficiency and duplication became rampant. Also, it would have 
been impossible, for instance, for Katsina with over two and a quarter 
million people and Birnin Gwari (29,798) to have proportionate and comparable 
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million taxpayers, Birnin Gwari had only 97, and the total recurrent revenue 
of the former was 77 times more than that of the latter. Kano Local 
Authority had a total recurrent revenue of N3,091,560 while Gumel could 
only muster N228,660. In the North-Eastern State the local authorities' 
revenues ranged from Bornu with N3,246,120 to Jama'are with N51,514. Prior 
to the 1976 reform, therefore, variation in the expenditure and development 
potential of local authorities remained as wide as when Dr.B.C.Smith first 
noted that:
While Bornu and Kano Native Authorities plan to develop medical 
services by capital expenditure amounting to £139,000 and £141,695 
respectively for the period 1962-1968, Jama'are and Kamaübu plan 
expenditures of £1,000 and £100. Other extremes include 
£54,708 (Kano) and £200 (Lafiagi) on agriculture, and £358,052 
(Kano) and £500 (Jama'are) on communications (1967,p.39).
Thus many local authorities were regarded as too restricted geographically 
and administratively to be fully effective. "The majority of the councils 
have no plans, staff or funds to reseal the Provincial and District roads 
which were tarred for them by the Government in the first instance** (Orewa,
1963,pp.12-13). Adejuyigbe concludes that "the economic inviability of 
the councils makes them unable to attract qualified staff or ensure them the 
security of tenure necessary for progressive administration" (1972,p.405).
The Government's official Guidelines concur with these critics and 
declare that "lack of adequate funds and appropriate institutions had 
continued to make local government ineffective and ineffectual" (1976^foreword).
THE TOWN AND COUNTRY CRISIS
Another diagnosis of critics and the Reddiffe-Maud Commission is 
that there was a 'fatal' division between town and country, established 
by the 1888 and 1894 Acts. This division is said to be artificial, 
certainly against the new age symbolised by the motor car, which leads to 
"the huge tidal wave of population which sweeps in and out of many large
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cities every morning and evening" (Robson,1931,p.97). This division 
of town and country is believed by Robson and a host of other critics to 
be too fertile a ground for conflict for the health of local government.
And the Royal Commission (1966-69) agrees that "local government areas 
no longer correspond to the pattern of life and work in England. Population 
has long since over-run many of the old boundaries" (1969,Vol.1,para.85).
This discintion, it is argued, should be abolished and town and country 'il 
linked in entities like the proposed city regions. "The opposition of 
county councils to the efforts of non-county boroughs to obtain county 
borough status, and the attempts of existing county boroughs to enlarge 
their boundaries, constitutes the forms in which this conflict between town 
and country has usually been manifested during recent decades" (Robson,
1931,p.76; for an illustration, see maps 12-15 in the folder accompanying 
Volume 111 of the Royal Commission's Report,1969). The effect of this 
division was that no single authority was responsible for thinking about 
the totality of related services and their adequacy, about the community 
as a whole. Thus counties and county districts were not regarded as
proper units of self-government, but as providers of services.
Half-hearted piecemeal attempts were made to solve the town-country 
problem and the chaotic relationship between counties and county boroughs 
on the one hand, and the county councils and the county districts on the other. 
The Local Government (County Boroughs and Adjustments) Act 1926 raised 
the qualifying population level from 50,000 as provided for in the 1888 Act 
to 75,000 and provided that the status could only be granted by Local 
Private Act. The Local Government Act 1958 further raised the qualifying
level to 100,000 and placed a ban on the promotion of Local Private Acts for 
15 years. Under this Act, however, a comprehensive review of the
status and areas of all local authorities was set in train through the
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agency of a Local Government Commission.
Hart (1966) believes, like Robson (1966) and Warren • (1963) that 
reform was urgently needed to resolve the problem between town and 
country; between the conurbations and the regions. The conflict between 
town and country further reduced efficiency, they claim, because petty 
jealousy hindered vital policy making. The problem of who to decide 
what and who to do what alwaysrbecame an excuse to do nothing.
The Conurbations and the Regions
Because of the alleged untidy planning and structure. Sir William Hart 
believed that the conurbations are "the aggregations of urban development 
which have spread without the benefit of planning to guide their growth"
(1966,p.128). He believed that a number of areas, such as Greater London,
have growth mainly from one centre, "spreading in concentric rings with 
untidy fingers of development stretching further along the main lines of 
communication" (1966,p.128). The result, he said, was a jumble of local
authority areas with accidentally interlocking boundaries dividing authorities 
of differing status, powers and resources which led to public uncertainty and 
confusion (Hart,1966,p.129).
Attempts to solve these problems through joint committees produced 
little result. Joint boards were established to administer some services, 
especially those like sewage and sewerage disposal, where the physical 
necessities of geography take little heed of local authority boundaries.
Joint police authorities were also constituted in some cases; often 
arrangements ./were made for one authority to provide a service, such as 
the supply of water, in the area of its neighbours. Yet when all this 
had been done, the conurbations remained from a critical point of view, 
'untidy', 'inconvenient' and 'inefficient' when compared with what might
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be the case.
A clear example is the first post-war step towards reorganization of 
local government when the Government set up a Local Government Boundary 
Commission. After two years' experience, particularly as related to
the conurbations, the Commission concluded that their powers were inadequate. 
They could only consider the alteration of areas and of the existence and 
status of individual local authorities; they could not make recommendations 
affecting the distribution of functions among local authorities. They could 
not propose the creation of a new unit of local authority or the 
modification of the group of functions which any recognised unit exercised. 
Thus because the government was not ready to grant the Commission extra 
powers, it was wound up in 1949.
After this Commission came a flurry of other commissions. The 1958 
Local Government Act set up two commissions, one for England and the other 
for Wales. Greater London had been excluded from the scope of the
Local Government Boundary Commission, but in 1957 the Royal Commission on 
Local Government in Greater London 1957-60 (the Herbert Commission) was 
appointed "to examine the present system and working of local government in 
the Greater London area; to recommend whether, any, and if so what, changes 
in the local government structure and the distribution of local authority 
functions in the area, or in any part of it, would better secure effective 
and convenient local government" (1960,p.1). The Report of the Commission
was largely accepted and implemented in the 1963 Local Government Act.
The problem of town-country dichotomy was very serious in Nigeria also. 
Improved medical faciltiies and better standards of living consequent 
upon socio-economic eind political changes lowered the rate of mortality, and 
led to a population explosion. The shift from agriculture to industry and 
commerce, and the availability of amenities and opportunities (hospitals, 
schools, colleges, pipe borne water, jobs, electricity etc.) led to the
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movement of Nigerians from the rural areas to the towns and thus 
accelerated urbanization. Not only was the urban area the abode of 
modernist Nigerians and the centre for their modernizing activities, it 
had come to assume a determinate and decisive role on Nigerian social, 
economic and political life, dictating the pace of social progress and 
infusing the cultural mien with an ever more complex and intricate pattern.
The cities, especially the administrative and commercial centres such as 
Kano, Kaduna, Ibadan, Enugu and Lagos, 'burst' their traditional boundaries 
and created spatial, physical and administrative problems. The confusing 
and illogical separation of town and country spread to other towns, especially 
state capitals, with the creation of 12 states in 1967 (19 states,1976).
Kano city, for example, had a population of 131,OCX) in 1953. This 
rose to 415,000 in 1967 and by 1975 Kano was a city of 600,000, giving it an 
estimated annual growth of 8.9 per cent. Kano is a sprawling, spacious 
place, comprising the ancient city, modern 'township' ('Sabon Gari') 
and commercial centre, international airport, seat of Kano State Ck>vernment 
and subsidiary townships. Like other Nigerian towns, population explosion 
and urbanization led to serious problems such as traffic congestion, breakdown 
of public services and shortage of housing in Kano. So far as local 
administration was concerned, it was a tangle of authorities with the city 
separated administratively from its suburbs despite their social and 
economic interdependence. The local authorities consisted of the old and 
powerful Kano Native Authority which was renamed the Local Government Authority 
in 1968, its subordinate authority for the Old City, the Waje Town Council, 
an administrative officer in charge of the modern commercial part of the 
city and many ad hoc authorities. An attempt was made in 1962 to 
reorganize the tangle of local authorities into a more rational kind of 
organization. This attempt led to the establishment of a Kano Greater
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Planning Authority, which was replaced in 1969 by the Metropolitan 
Planning and Development Board which assumed planning powers for the 
whole of Greater Kano.
Kaduna, the old Capital Territory of the Northern Region and since 
1967 a state capital, is the fastest growing city in Nigeria, with an 
estimated annual growth of 11.2 per cent. As Kaduna Capital Territory 
and a modern town, it had the advantage of more spacious and far-sighted 
planning: that is, the Territory covered a 5-mile radius from the city 
centre. In 1975 Kaduna was a city of 202,000 people. Despite the
far-sighted planning, Kaduna had become, in the severities, an 'ungovernable' 
city because of the high rate of urban growth (Wraith,1972,p.144). It had 
'burst out' of its 5-mile radius yet the suburb was administratively 
distinct from the city in spite of their social and economic interdependence, 
Uncontrolled growth, slums, pollution, congestion, and the breakdown of 
public services through over-strain had become as acute in Kaduna as 
anywhere else in the country (Wraith,1972,p.144). A sign of hope for
Kaduna, however, was the 50-year development plan which was approved in 
principle in 1970 and which effectively took off after 1976.
Ibadan is second to Lagos as the worst example in Nigeria of 
'megalopolis' - the city running riot with no one able to control it.
Its problems are comparable to those of any other town in Nigeria: rural
exodus, migrant unemployment, industrialization, lack of modern sewerage, 
lack of housing and planning, urban crime and poverty in the face of weak 
financial resources, limited administrative capability and inadequate 
infrastructure. These problems, like in other Nigerian cities, are 
aggravated by maladministration, malfeasance and corruption. Ibadan 
used to be the capital of the Western Region, and since 1967 a state 
capital. It was always firmly linked sociologically and economically
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with the fanning areas round about it, but this interdependence was ignored
in the local administrative set up. The population of Ibadan increased
considerably and this led to enormous expansion which created problems since
the town and the countryside were separated administratively,
Lagos, as we have said, is the worst example of a megalopolis in Nigeria.
It is one of the fastest growing cities of the world. The 1963 census gave
Lagos a population of 665,000 within the formal city boundaries, but
these had little relation to the real built-up area and it was calculated
that another 425,000 ought to have been added to give the population of the
continuous conurbation (Wraith,1972,p.140). By 1975, Lagos was estimated
to have a population of about a million and a half, and population within the
city limit was growing at about 8 per cent per annum while the urbanizing
areas beyond it was 20 per cent. A critic has this to say of Lagos :
Growth had been unplanned and largely unforeseen and has gathered 
such momentum that it is impossible to halt or reverse it, and 
there seems no reason why by the end of the century the built-up
area should not stretch ten miles inland The penalty that the
public has to pay is constant failure of water and electricity, 
chaotic traffic, inadequate public transport, and tiring and 
expensive journeys to work (Wraith,1972,p.141).
The problems of local administration in Lagos, as was the case in England
and Wales before the reforms of 1974 (London: 1963), derived from structures
designed to meet the needs of simpler days, and which became largely
obsolete. Furthermore, most Nigerian cities and towns were built or
developed by the colonial masters for their own interests, and these bear
no reality to present day Nigeria (Allen,1972,p.17). The Lagos Town
(now City) Council is a body of long standing, but until the 1960s it was
in essence a sanitary, public health and markets authority only; it then
acquired other responsibilities, notably a bus service purchased from
private enterprise and the administration of primary education. More
recently still its social welfare and works programmes have greatly increased.
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and its budget in 1975 was about £5*2 million, four times what it was in 
1965. Nevertheless it could not possibly undertake responsibility for 
providing the major public services or solving the major planning problems 
of the city. For many years the Ministry of Lagos Affairs of the Federal 
Government was responsible for the major roads and streets and the vital 
water supply, and has now been succeeded by the Lagos State Government; the 
Ports Authority is responsible for the city's most important undertaking; 
electricity is supplied by the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA); 
and the statutory corporation known as the Lagos Executive Development 
Board (LEDB), has been responsible for the huge undertaking of clearing the 
worst of the slums, replanning the city centre and creating new housing 
estates on the outskirts.
There were, therefore, five different 'agencies', all within the same 
geographical area, performing functions best suited to the different kinds 
of work and to the resources which each could muster. Unfortunately the 
division of labour between them, and their various areas of jurisdiction, 
have not kept pace with changing circumstances. Here is the familiar 
pattern of a growing city (from 300,000 in 1955 to 1,500,000 in 1975) 
pushing its tentacles into the area of neighbouring authorities, so that the 
time came when the statutory boundary had no relation to the real boundary 
and claims were made to extend it at the expense of its neighbours. Until 
the time of the civil war, progress towards a more rational organization 
was made difficult by the fact that the whole of Lagos outside the city 
boundary was within the former Western Region, which raised political, 
administrative and financial problems of great complexity (Jones and 
Keith-Lucas,1963). As long ago as 1964 a United Nations team had proposed 
that the artificial separation of the city (Federal Government) from the 
built-up area outside (Western Regional Government) should be terminated, and
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that a Greater Lagos Metropolitan Authority should operate over the 
whole conurbation in the manner of the LEDB, and that the then Lagos Town 
Council should act as a second-tier authority, also over the whole area 
(Koenigsberger et al,1964). The creation of Lagos State reduced some of 
the problems but not the multiplicity of authorities over the whole area.
The Federal Ministry of Lagos Affairs is now superseded by two state ministries 
Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs for general purposes and Works 
and Planning for planning purposes, located at Ikeja, and the jurisdiction 
of the City Council and the LEDB remain unchanged. Outside the city 
boundary - in the territory taken over from the Western Region - urban 
planning is the responsibility of the Ikeja Planning Authority and there 
were before the 1976 reform, four 'divisional' local authorities for general 
purposes - Ikeja, Badagry, Epe and Ikorodu, all of which are so near the 
metropolis that they have become urbanized.
In Nigeria and Britain we have the universal problem of the growing 
city and its hinterland. The city boundary is always slow to catch up 
with the real area of the city, which has led in some parts of the world 
to the growth of what is usually called the 'City Region' - a ring thrown 
round the city sufficiently widely to anticipate future problems of urban 
growth and to solve them by a single authority, or at least a co-ordinated 
set of agencies. Before the 1974 and 1976 reforms in Britain and Nigeria 
respectively, local government areas no longer corresponded to the pattern 
of life and work. Population had long since over-run many of the old 
boundaries. The local government structure did not correspond to the 
realities of life because it failed to recognise the social and economic 
interdependence of town and country.
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The Race for County Borough Status
The structure of local government in Britain included two different 
types of local administration: single-tier all-purpose authorities in the
county boroughs and two-tier arrangements in the administrative counties, with 
a special variety of two-tier government in London. This is in contrast 
to what obtained in Nigeria where there were no all-purpose local authorities 
in the midst of a two-tier system. At the turn of the century, when local 
government services in Britain were far less fully developed and when 
attention chiefly concentrated on the environmental problems of the urban 
areas, the two systems of local administration existed side by side without 
difficulty. But services expanded and county functions became more
important; at the same time there was a steady stream of applications to 
establish new county boroughs or to extend existing ones and, inevitably, 
there was friction and rivalry between the counties and the county boroughs. 
Furthermore, the separate development of local government in the towns, 
largely because of public health and other problems there, had resulted in 
a divergence between the powers possessed by urban authorities as agàinst ' 
those in rural areas - a divergence which was in due course to demand 
modification in times of greater mobility and more unified standards.
A number of critics, including George Jones (1963,pp.173-87;
1964,pp.277-90) advanced a number of reasons most important of which is the 
shift of population, to justify their call for enlarged county boroughs 
which would remove the 'unrealistic' division of town and country and lessen 
the rivalry between the counties and the county boroughs. In the report 
on the West Midlands Special Review Area, the Local Government Commission's 
Report says.
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The county boroughs, representing the main urban centres, 
are losing population to the peripheral areas, where more lônd 
is available for building and people can get a house with a garden. 
Among the population which is lost in this way are the younger 
feimilies, because these need accommodation with more space for 
children, and, more generally, the higher income groups. As 
a result, the county boroughs....are beginning to lose variety 
in the social and economic make-up of their populations (1961,p.19).
This view was orchestrated by the SSRC Bristol Conference Working Group on
the Royal Commission (1969). Their research shows that the distribution
of population, the pattern of industrial and other employment, have
changed greatly.
Another reason advanced for the extension of county boroughs was the 
natural increase, that is, the excess of births over deaths, which is said 
to be much greater than was forecast 30 years ago. Moreover, there is an 
increase in the number of families wishing to have their own separate 
homes. From these causes, and from the universal desire for more 
spacious living, comes an increasing movement out from the older and 
more congested areas of towns to their fringes and to places well beyond.
The net result, it is believed, is that the resident population of many 
county boroughs and large municipal boroughs is either falling, or is 
rising by far less than their natural increase, while the resident population 
of fringe areas is rising by much more than their natural increase. Jones 
(1963), Simon (1938,pp.399-405), and Hennock (1973,p.323) believed that 
these movements would lead to chaos because some people are living in a 
local government area while paying rates to another. They also believed 
that the movement from the centre of the towns would lead to 'decay', 
and create class consciousness because only the rich can afford to live 
in the quieter and more beautiful suburb.
These critics adduced reasons for the outward movement : growing
affluence in the society; the bus, motor car and telephone; in many 
big towns a point of time has been reached when a great deal of densely
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developed housing built in the mid-19th century, is now so worn out that 
it is having to be replace, and municipal rehousing, commonly at lower 
densities and with consequent overspill, has become a big and immediate 
pressing task; and that council housing has produced an exodus because 
the number of displaced people cannot be all resettled due to roads, spacing 
for play, schools etc. Thus they came to the conclusion that a county 
borough in circumstances such as we have described was going to find itself 
in a more and more serious position if its boundaries remained unchanged, 
and that this must often outweigh the 'genuine factors' on the other 
side, such as the wishes of the inhabitants in the fringe area and the vigour 
of local government activity there.
Thus, it is said that the relationship between a town and its rural 
surroundings transcends purely social and economic inter-relationship.
Towns provide a great many services, as the Royal Commission (1969,Vol.1,p.26) 
notes, for people in the suburb, such as shopping, hospitals, dental treatment, 
insurance, accountancy, further and higher education, recreation, 
entertainment and a host of other things. But it is not a one-way traffic: 
the countryside provides the city-dwellers with opportunities for recreation 
and certain types of employment.
As we have said before, there were attempts before the Royal Commission 
(1966-69) to reform the structure of local government in Britain and resolve 
the town and country crisis, and especially the county - county borough 
conflict. The 1958 Local Government Act, a product of a concordat between 
the Government and local authority associations, is a good example. The 
scope of the Commission was very restrictive. The 1956 White Paper said 
that there was "no convincing case for radically reshaping the existing form ■ 
of local government in England and Wales. What is needed is to overhaul 
it and make such improvements as are necessary to bring it up to date"
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(Local Government; Areas and Status of Local Authorities in England 
and Wales,1956), Thus the Local Government Act 1958 delineated five 
conurbations - Tyneside, West Yorkshire, South-East Lancashire, Merseyside 
and the West Midlands - outside Greater London and labelled them 'special 
review areas' and the remainder of England and the whole of Wales as 'general 
review areas'. The Commission could propose changes in the boundaries
of the counties and county boroughs and/or abolish or create new ones, but 
it did not have the power to review functions. In the special review areas
it could propose changes in the county districts, including abolishing or 
creating them or promote them. The Commission was also empowered to 
propose a 'continous county', that is a county with no county boroughs 
within its boundaries. Likewise, it could propose the allocation of 
functions between the continuous county and the county districts within its 
boundaries.
The scope of the Commission was further restricted by the way it was 
asked to carry out its enquiry procedures. As Sharpe noted, "the Act 
clearly limits the scope of the Commission and the regulations however 
admirably democratic in intent, have made matters worse by enforcing it, as 
their reports amply testify, to devote much time and energy to the negative 
job of answering the objections of existing local authorities rather than 
the rigorous examination of the positive merits of reform" (1965,pp.21-22).
And as Richards concludes,"the morass of procedure for dealing with objectors 
strangled any impetus in (the Commission's) work" (1978,p.37). The final 
stroke that broke the Commission's backbone was inflicted by the Minister 
of Housing and Local Government, Richard Crossman, a radical reformer 
who felt that
the whole structure of local government is out of date, that our 
county borough and county councils as at present organized are 
archaic institutions whose size and structure make them increasingly 
ill-adapted to fulfilling the immensely important functions with 
which they are charged. The greatest obstacle, in fact, which prevents 
efficient councils from retaining public confidence is the obsolete
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constitutional framework within which they had to operate 
(1965,p.658).
In a nutshell, like the ill-fated Local Government Boundary Commission, 
the Local Government Commission (1958-65) could not achieve much because 
of the aforementioned cumbersome procedures. By 1966, the Commission 
was dissolved and replaced by the Royal Commission (1966-69). Before 
the 1974 reform, therefore, there were incremental changes but no 
significant structural reform. The boundaries remained largely as they 
were at the beginning of this century. Considerable transfer of functions 
took place from smaller to larger geographical units in the existing local 
government structure, and from local government to the central Government 
and ad hoc bodies. Central control over local government expanded and 
tightened, and was accompanied by immeasureibly enlarged assistance from 
central funds. Moreover the allocation of functions to local authority 
had been piecemeal. Nobody seemed to examine the total effect on the 
system of population explosion, population mobility, urbanization and 
functional distribution, with the consequence that a number of local 
authorities had duties which they were ill-equipped to perform; and they 
lacked the scope and resources necessary to attract adequately trained 
staff and provide services at present day standards.
LOCAL COUNCILS, COUNCILLOR CALIBRE AND THE ELECTORATE
The concern to increase efficiency in local government in Nigeria and 
Britain is related to the concern to raise councillor calibre. As we said 
at the beginning of this chapter, critics believe that the poor calibre 
of councillors was closely related to the 'defective' structure of local 
government and therefore to inefficiency which led to the electorates' 
apathy towards the business of local authorities. As Dearlove (1979,p.15) 
says, part of the case for reorganizing local government boundaries and
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creating larger local authorities has been grounded in an appreciation
that this could have the effect of increasing the likelihood that urban local
authorities would have councils composed of businessmen and professionals.
This view is shared by the Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater
London which felt that
there does seem to be some relationship between the size and scope 
of the authority and the capacity of the councillors and 
officials attracted....a certain minimum size and scope of 
authority seems to be needed to attract councillors and officers 
of the right calibre (1960,p.63).
The Working Group on Local Authority Management Structures agreed "that
streamlining the structure and management processes will result in more
of these potential candidates (professionals and businessmenlbeing
willing to play an active part in local government" (1972,p.30).
In Britain, anxiety about councillor calibre is nothing new. It is
a product of the socio-economic and political changes that took place
in the 19th and early 20th centuries, such as population explosion, mobility,
the Labour Party, the industrial revolution, franchisement, etc. (see
chapters 3 and 4). These changes led to a change in class composition of
local councils by 'crowding out' manufacturers and landowners and bringing
in professionals and small businessmen. Hennock notes that as early as
the middle of the 19th century "the personnel of town councils repeatedly
attracted critical comment. It seemed to many observers that there had
been a change for the worst since 1835" (1973,p.312). Hennock goes on
to point out that by the 1850s there was a "decline in the number of
substantial men" - "a decline in the representation of the social and
economic elite" - and a rise in the representation of retailers: " really
small businessmen In terms of business ability and of local standing the
council had reached a nadir by the second half of the 1880s" (1973,pp.179-96,
225-6). Lee details the experience of Cheshire where
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county government by country gentlemen..,.was transformed between 
1840 and 1880....by the introduction of businessmen and industrialists
into the county magistracy The landed gentry were displaced from
their monopoly of local politics by new social leaders who
made their wealth out of the expansion of urban industry (1963,pp.4-5,79).
By the end of the Second World War, however, "the county society of social
leaders was replaced by a community of public persons and the county
council gradually became a body of elected representatives each of
whom was dependent for his position not on his social standing but on his
experience in public service" (Lee,1963,pp.212-13).
At the beginning of this century, Ostrogorski noted a "decline in the
intellectual, and to some extent, moral standards of the personnel of the
town councils" (1902,Vol.1,p.49), and Lowell had "no doubt that the average
standing of the councillors had gone down" (1908,Vol.2,p.199). In Bath,
businessmen formed almost half of the council in 1938 but by 1962 they made
up barely one-fifth of the total council (Green,1968). And critics believe
that the "traditional leadership....from the higher occupational status
groups" is being challenged by the leaders of the non-traditional workers through
the trade-union and Labour movements" (Stacey,1960,pp.36-7). In 1960, Dame
Evelyn Sharp, Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local
Government told the Annual Conference of the Association of Municipal
Corporations :
I do not think that enough really able people are interested today 
in taking part in local government. I do not think that enough 
people from business, from industry, from agriculture and the 
professions are going into it....Most people engaged or interested 
in local government agree....that the calibre of local government 
is not equal all round to its responsibilities.
This belief was translated into official action when The Committee on the
Management of Local Government was appointed to "consider in the light of
modem conditions how local government might best continue to attract and
retain people (both elected representatives and political officers) of the
calibre necessary to ensure its maximum effectiveness",and much of the
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evidence to the Royal Commissions on Local Government in England and 
Scotland considered "it is a view widely held that the standards of 
elected representatives is not as high as it might or should be", and that 
something should be done to improve matters (Royal Commission on Local 
Government in Scotland,1969,Written Evidence 9,p.6 ).
The problem of poor calibre among the councillors and officers of local 
government was so real in Nigeria that one cannot over-emphasize it.
Critics believe that representative local government started off with 
councillors and officers of low calibre. We should note, however, that 
before representative local government was introduced, ' local government' 
was in the hands of 'noble traditional councillors' who.were plenipotentiaries 
of the Obas or Emirs (see chapter 2). Thus, like in Britain, socio­
economic and political changes in Nigeria forced out the powerful aristocrats 
after the Second World War and brought in petit-bourgeoisie (see Table 4.1). 
These elected councillors were regarded as intellectually and morally 
delinquent. The majority of them did not have secondary education (see 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4). In his study of three councils in Western Nigeria, 
Oyediran (1973,pp.457-8) discovered that almost one quarter of the 
councillors had no formal education whatsoever, and nearly one half 
(48 per cent) attended primary school only. 10.7 per cent had more than
primary education and only 5.3 per cent had university education. As
Humes put it, "the calibre of the (councillors) has been generally low; 
too few qualified and motivated men were available for office and thus too
many of the incumbents were illiterate, unemployed and corrupt"
(1970,p.99). Wraith believes that most councillors were driven into 
local politics "solely for what they could extort through bribery and 
corruption, and of the rest, few really understood their role, but 
interfered with their officials and dabbled in administration" (1972,p.76).
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Critics found the quality and performance of councillors and officers
deeply disappointing:
Generally speaking, men who stand for local councils are not 
successful or established men; many of them have no definable 
occupation, and regard their council membership as a way of 
supplementing, if not actually earning, a living. A high 
proportion are neither intelligent nor honest, and it is these 
who deter more reputable citizens from standing for local councils.
Above all, local councils have virtually become appendages of the 
political parties and the first qualification for a councillor 
was to be a political 'activist'. The dishonesty of councils 
has come to be taken for granted, a fact which can be stated openly 
since it is the subject of so many official reports. No one 
seriously questions the fact that the chief purpose of many - indeed 
most - councillors was to enrich themselves by percentages on 
contracts, bribes for favours and corrupt practice in general; or 
that nepotism, the giving of jobs, market stalls or contracts to 
relatives was common practice (Wraith, 1972,pp.81-2).
The inefficiency and ineffectiveness of councillors and officers
reinforced each other. There were no incentives for the officers.
Until recently all local governments administered their own personnel
services; the unified services in the West and Mid-West (Bendel State)
covered less than 2 per cent of the top posts. The salaries were low,
the security inadequate, the promotion prospects limited, and the respect
and responsibility insufficient to attract and retain sufficiently qualified
personnel. The regional/state governments did not do enough to improve
the status of local government officers; and politiciems undermined what
little responsibility they tried to exercise. Patronage, nepotism and
jobbery were therefore rampant (Smith and Owojaiye,1981,p. 222.). *
Furthermore, their inefficiency was exacerbated by the blurred
distinction between the legislative function of the councillor and the
executive function of the staff. The principal officers of a British
local authority are men of high professional standing; as a broad
generalization they are probably better educated, better qualified and better
paid than many of the councillors whose servants they technically are.
Councillors for their part are men and women busy with their own affairs.
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to whom local government is voluntary public service, and who think 
too highly of the ability of their officials to dominate them. This 
contrasts with Nigeria where the principal officers of local authorities 
are few in number, their professional qualifications are very low, and they 
are not highly paid. And as we have seen, the councillors were not people
of high attainments. The relationship between the councillors and the
officers was one of master-servant relationship» The use of committees 
abetted the intensity of councillor interest in administrative matters such 
as staffing and contracts; as a result administrative matters were mistreated, 
professional staff were misused and abused, and the council was diverted 
from its more important policy and planning considerations. This is 
authenticated by the Public Service Review Commission (Udoji Commission):
"Both the portfolio councillor and the multi-committee systems often lead to 
interference by council members in the purely day-to-day administrative issues 
of local government. This leads to continual frustration of officials,
inefficiency and corruption" (1974,p.122).
A number of reasons can be advanced for the 'poor quality' of staff 
and councillors in Nigeria. First, local government was relatively young 
and did not command much loyalty; men who were completely honest in their 
dealings with family, clan and tribe were often corrupt as councillors.
Second, only a limited number of educated people were available; the 
majority of the educated ones went into national politics or to professions 
and businesses. Third, and as a consequence of the second, the majority 
of people who engaged in rural local government were necessarily illiterates, 
and it was not easy for men of higher calibre to work alongside them.
Fourth, the council areas were small in population and revenue, and the 
volume and importance of the business each was able to handle was such that men 
of standing were not interested in it. Fifth, as we have said, the councils 
were so deeply embroiled in politics that busy people with businesses or
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professions of their own could not be bothered with them.
To summarize, one of the most severe shortcomings of local government 
was the lack of administrative and development planning caused by the 
paucity of top leadership posts. The most obvious deficiency was the 
lack of a post which would provide overall administrative leadership and 
plan for future development. There was no administrative post with 
clear-cut authority to direct and co-ordinate the department heads and 
with the salary and security to attract men with the education, experience 
and the expertise necessary to do the job competently and to secure the 
confidence of the politicians, the public and the state bureaucracy, and to 
stand firm against political interference in administrative matters. Nor 
were there enough professionally qualified men to head the local government 
departments on a full-time basis. A jurisdiction which could not afford 
such qualified personnel could not justify its independent existence.
All these views were aggregated in the Guidelines: "the staffing arrangements
to ensure a virile local government system had been inadequate. Excessive 
politicking had made even modest progress impossible. Consequently, there 
has been a divorce between the people and government institutions at their 
most basic levels" (1976, foreword).
Local Authorities and the public
As quoted above, the Federal Government believed that there was 'a divorce 
between the people and government institutions', and the Royal Commission 
(1969,Vol.1,pp.28-9) concluded that the relationship between local 
authorities and the public was not satisfactory. The Committee on the 
Management of Local Government found that there was both ignorance of and 
indifference to local government on the part of the public.
A number of reasons were adduced for this apathy. First and most 
important, was the issue Of councillor calibre. The electorate felt that
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they were inefficient and ineffective, and in Nigeria'/ case, corrupt.
"Local government is, at present, apt to be irrelevant to people's 
problems, and often cannot solve them even though it has the responsibility 
for doing so" (Royal Commission on Local Government in England,1969,
Vol.1,p.29). Second, the apathy to local government was largely due to the
defects in the existing structure which we have outlined. Third, the apathy 
of the electors was also said to be due to a trivial knowledge of local 
government or lack of interest in it. Surveys conducted for the Royal 
Commission (1966-69), like those of the Maud Committee (1964-67), revealed 
that only one out of four electors could spontaneously mention a single function 
provided by their council. "Between a quarter and a third thought that 
county "boroughs provided hospitals and electricity, and almost one in five 
that the clerk of the council was elected" (Redcliffe-Maud and Wood,
1974,p.62). Many more had never met their councillor nor could name
him (Hampton,1970,pp.135-7). Fourth, the publicity needed to generate 
interest was also said to be inadequate since most of the councillors 
could not devote full-time to council work. Among the alleged deterrents 
to potential councillors used to be the amount of time which council work 
involved, more so that they were unpaid.
Before the 1972 Act, it was believed that people were dissatisfied 
with the traditional method of public participation in local government.
It was suggested that too many decisions were initiated by the local 
authority or its agent before they were passed to the public. "There will 
have been consultations and discussions between departments of the local 
authority before the subject is put to a committee, but seldom will an 
attempt have been made to consult directly the people chiefly affected - 
parents and schoolchildren, for example, by a proposed reorganization 
of schools, or residents in an area proposed for redevelopment" (Redcliffe- 
Maud and Wood,1974,pp.70-71). Furthermore, it was said that the councils
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had inadequate devices for getting the necessary feedback of local views 
on the running of services. These views led the Royal Commission to conclude 
that "the system itself is hard enough for most people to understand"
(1969,Vol.1,para.99), and the National and Local Government Officers 
Association confessed that the institution was "comfJex, obscure, pettifogging 
and dull" (Committee on the Management of Local Government,1967,Vol.1,p.68).
Again, attempts were made prior to the 1974 and 1976 local government 
reforms in Britain and Nigeria respectively, to solve the problem of public 
apathy in local government affairs. Although the Maud and the Mallaby 
Committees were not directly concerned with the problem of public apathy, 
both reports, published in 1967, believed that public apathy was a by-product 
of the defects of local government such as the structural/functional 
deficiencies, an excess of central control, an excessive number of committees 
and sub-cômmittees ̂  too much fragmentation of work between separate 
departments, lack of calibre of some elected members and officers and other 
internal organizational matters. The Maud Committee's Report even concluded 
that the country was not getting full value in terms of human happiness for 
the time spent and for the increasing capital expenditure standing in 
1967 at E3,000 million per annum (9 per cent of the gross national product).
The various reforms carried out in Nigeria between 1968 and 1971, and 
which attempted, in part, to solve the problem of public apathy in local 
government, were mere window-dressing. The reforms once again brought to the 
fore the chiefs and other traditional elements. Furthermore, local officers 
were replaced by Government civil servants which further increased 
centralization. Thus, patronization, powerlessness, poverty, corruption, 
parochialism, poorly conceived politics, pussillanimous policy-making 
institutions, patronage-ridden personnel services and a paucity of administrative 
and development planning due to a lack of professional administrative posts -
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these and a host of other problems plagued local government institutions 
in Nigeria and increased public apathy prior to the 1976 reform. And 
the malaise that underlined these problems was the unwillingness of the 
regional/state governments to make investment required to develop responsive 
and responsible local government.
CENTRAL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
Central control or lack of democracy, is the last but by no means the 
least important defect diagnosed by critics and the reformers. The power 
exercised by central government departments over the affairs of local 
authorities is extensive. It is deemed necessary to ensure a high 
national standard of service which otherwise might vary greatly from one 
authority to another. Any restraint must to some extent limit local 
autonomy, but the degree of control and its many forms perturbed those who 
felt that local democratic participation in decisions which determine the 
conduct of local services was superseded by the remote dictates of a 
Government juggernaut. Whether the choice is as simple as that between 
local but democratic inefficiency and centralized competence, as is sometimes 
suggested, is highly debateable, but we have already seen how local authorities 
have lost functions to a number of governmental and ad hoc bodies 
(see chapter 4).
We will not go into detailed discussion of the various forms of control - 
legislative, judicial, financial, administrative, etc. - because they are 
not only outside the ambit of this sub-section but they are also well-known 
to any student of public administration (see, for example. Green 1959,p.156; 
Jackson,1970,pp.220-34; Robson,1966,p.67; Seeley,1978,pp.152-69;
Smith and Stanyer,1976,pp.113-29; Jones,1980; Richards,1978,pp.160-67).
We will be concentrating on the prevalence of the idea that central control
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had increased and that this was bad for local government (see below).
Traditional administration is seen as revolving around particular 
services, and local authorities are often seen as geared to "the local 
administration of a policy laid down in broad lines by the central 
government" (MacColl,1951,p.lO; see also. Green,1959,p.156; Robson,1966, 
p.67). Both these factors are said to encourage a situation in which local
authorities conceive of their role in very narrow terms as limited to the 
provision of separate services which are seen in isolation each from the 
other and from the problems and needs in the local community. A situation 
is describe^ in which the "central government is the determination of policy 
and principle. Local government is the application of those principles 
to the peculiarities of local fact" (Clarke,1969,p.1). Broadbent 
(1977,p.138) went further, considering that "the total picture does seem to 
support the idea of the local state as an agent of central government", 
indeed, there is the view that local authorities are just engaged in 
"managing a bundle of separate independent services" because they have 
"traditionally been considered as local agencies responsible for a collection 
of essentially separate services defined by statute and drawn together within 
the same organization for administrative and political convenience. Their 
role in short, was prescribed and restricted" (Redcliffe-Maud,1967,p.350; 
see also. Greenwood,Smith and Stewart,1971,p.5). This lop-sided central-
local relationship has been attributed to the central government's reliance, 
not only on its formal powers of intervention, but also on its ability to 
impose its will upon local authroities by means of informal persuasion, 
for the existence of extensive legal powers of control has had a 'cumulative' 
and 'psychological effect' where local authorities submit questions to the 
minister "over which he has no legal control" (Jennings,1947,p.258; 
see also, Dearlove,1973,pp.11-12).
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Critics advanced two reasons to account for the increase and extent 
of central control particularly since the Second World War, First, 
there is the belief that* local authorities depend too much on central 
finance and that he who pays the piper dictates the tune (Marshall,
1960,p.15; Robson,1966,p.149). Hepworth, rather more pointedly asserted 
that "the more finance is supplied by the central government from nationally 
raised taxes the less tends to be the discretion allowed to local government. 
Conversely, the greater the ability of local government to raise 
finance from its own sources then the less able the central government 
is to control local government" (1970,pp.14-15). Chester suggested 
that "it could be argued with strong support from the history of 
central-local relations that the giving of a grant enabled the central 
Government to 'purchase' many of the administrative powers it now possesses" 
(1951,p.48). These critics believed that the only panacea to this 
defect is reform which would enable local authorities to gain more financial 
independence and with this a supposed increase in decisional autonomy 
(Chester,1951,p.333; Committee on the Management of Local Government, 1967, 
Vol.1,p.XI; Royal Commission on Local Government in England,1969,Vol.1,p.31), 
Second, central control is believed to have increased because of "the 
prevailing desire for uniformity of public services" (Marshall,1960,p.15) , 
and the Royal Commission (1969,Vol.1,p.30) declared that the public demand 
for equality was also responsible for detailed control. All these 
critiques were substantiated by the Royal Commission which agreed that "local 
authorities are not given enough freedom to go their own way. In 
addition they are subject to a number of minor controls and requirements 
which detract from their ability to manage their own affairs and make their 
own decisions" (1969, Vol.1,p.30).
In Nigeria, critics expressed similar dismay about central-local 
relations. Before the first military coup of 1966 local governments (or
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native authorities) were closely controlled by the regions. All proposed 
by-laws had to be submitted for ministerial approval and the regional 
governments could compel an authority to make rules on any subject provided 
for in the local government laws. Rules or orders made by local 
authorities could be centrally revoked. Administrative controls were 
exercised through policy circulars, directives, regulations, instructions, 
routine consultations, and reporting. District officers attended council 
and committee meetings. Representatives of other central departments in 
the localities were involved in close supervision and inspection of local 
government activities, ensuring conformity to regional government policy.
Some council departments consisted largely of field officers of central 
ministries, making the local authority an extension of the ministry's 
field service. For example, the fomstry division of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Natural Resources in the old Western Region acted as the 
forestry department of a number of local authorities (Mittlebeeler,1971). 
Control of staffing arrangements was centralised and all financial decisions, 
including tax rates, level of surpluses and administrative expenditure, 
required central approval. Capital expenditure, embodied in development
plans, required central approval, even down to the selection of projects 
for execution. If an authority was considered sufficiently .viable
financially to service a loan for large projects the centre controlled its 
source, type and conditions. Loans had to be managed and accounted for
in accordance with ministerial directives. All local authority investments 
were subject to central clearance and the regional governments laid down 
procedures, conditions and regulations regarding the circumstances under 
which local authorities could lend money, including advances to staff.
As would be expected, central control was not relaxed under the 
military regime, least of all during the civil war. From his survey 
Mittlebeeler concluded that "In few countries with local government is
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there greater centralization. Much of this phenomenon of course can be 
traced to the critical period through which the country is passing, but even 
in the days when collegiate legislative bodies were functioning, central 
control was very much in evidence" (1971,p.206). Adedeji and Rowland 
concluded that the existence of budgetary controls "eloquentJ.y articulate 
the weak and dependent status of local authorities" (1972,p.227).
Extensive central controls over the internal administrative 
organization of local authorities were in existence. Before 1976, the 
appointment of senior officials, such as clerk to the council, treasurer 
and supervisor of works, required central approval. Conditions of service 
for local government service were regulated and salaries were determined 
by technical departments at the centre. The management of local authority 
staff was carried out in accordance with a common set of staff regulations 
for local authorities in each region. Financial procedures were closely
controlled by the memoranda issued by the central ministry (Campbell, 1963).
By 1972 it was estimated that "financial controls over local authorities in 
many states are now very detailed and, to an extent, go beyond controls 
exercised by central governments in most countries" (Adedeji and Rowland,
1972,p.221).
Staffing arrangements were also controlled by the Government. In the 
west a Local Government Service Board, appointed by the regional executive, 
was set up in 1957 to make appointments and promotions in the unified 
local government service for senior positions. This meant, according to one 
observer, "the total elimination of local community control over the staff 
that serve them" (Oyediran,1974a,p.550; see also, 0denigwe,1973,P.109).
Thus, though the local community paid the salaries, they had no power 
over recruitment or scale of remuneration. The L.G.S.B. was answerable to 
the central ministry not to local councils. Other officers also felt a
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a sense of commitment to the state government rather than their local 
council (Kolawole,1979,p,10; Adewumi,1973,p,52).
Apart from the two aforementioned reasons for increased central control 
which were (and still are) applicable to both countries, there are other 
reasons which were peculiar to Nigeria. The motives for central control 
varied from one part of the country to another. They were influenced by the 
experiences which different regions had of local government in the past.
In the north the institutions of local government, based as they were on the 
powerful traditional governments of the Hausa/Fulani emirates, were often seen 
as rivals to the centre. They were capable of acting in defiance of the 
old regional government (Yahaya,1975,p.24). They sometimes commanded 
greater loyalty from the masses. When the region was subdivided into states 
in 1967, leaving some emirates in an even more powerful position within the 
smaller territories covered by the new states, it was inevitable that local 
government had to be changed to underline its subordinate position. Elsewhere 
in Nigeria, the centre's preoccupation had been with corruption at the local 
level and partisan advantage in regional politics (Smith and Owojaiye,1981, 
p.221-2. ). Intervention by the centre had been extensive on both counts.
The modifications to the structure of the system introduced in the late 
sixties did not lessen local government's financial problems. Misappropriation 
of funds continued to provide the centre with opportunities to intervene in 
local management. The loss of qualified staff to other occupations 
persisted, further increasing local government's dependence on the centre in 
the planning and execution of local projects and services.
As we said earlier on, critics in both countries believed the 
excessive central control was bad because it undermined local democracy.
It was also widely believed that central control reduced the efficiency of 
local government since men of calibre were unwilling to serve in an 
institution which they regarded as no more than the Government's agents.
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This belief, it is alleged, also increased public apathy in local government 
affairs.
Whether these critics were correct in their diagnosis of local 
government defects or whether the alleged defects have been memoved 
by the 1974 and 1976 reforms in Britain and Nigeria respectively will 
be analysed in chapter 8. First of all, let us examine the objectives and 




REFORM OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES
INTRODUCTION
No suggestion for ‘reform is more common than 'what we need
is more coordination' (Pressman and Wildavsky,1973,p,133).
To ensure proper understanding of this chapter, we need to remind 
ourselves that reform is characterized by a value orientation that is 
different than merely recognizing the possibility that a new process 
or concept can be applied to a particular situation (innovation)•
In the administrative context the advocacy role is more important than 
the originating role. What we need stress here is the "effort to 
apply new ideas and combinations of ideas to an administrative system 
with a conscious view to improving the system for positive goals of 
national development " (Lee,1970,p.78). Hence, once local government 
defects have been diagnosed, analysed and understood, the logical step 
that follows is to decide what needs to be done (objectives) and how 
that can be accomplished (strategies). This stage is what Dror
(1976,p.126) refers to as 'mega-policies' which lay down the framework 
of guidelines and the boundaries of policy space within which operational 
and detailed policies are to be established and decisions are to be made. 
Though it is easy to complain, it is difficult to diagnose and to suggest 
remedies, steps that present intellectual challenge and require relevant 
knowledge and creative thought. Symptoms may be misinterpreted; 
facts may be taken in the wrong sequence; only part of the whole may 
be seen (Caiden,1970,p.l36).
Administrative reforms cannot be understood nor evaluated apart 
from the objectives that they endeavour to achieve. It is therefore 
of prime importance for any administrative reform that its objectives 
be properly set. Firstly, it is essential in order that the strategies
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and instruments may be determined. Secondly, it discourages 
'actors and sub-systems'from pursuing their own objectives under 
the pretext that these accord with those of the leaders or reformers. 
Thirdly, lack of concise objectives is dysfunctional to the operations 
of the organization in that it creates insecurity. Lastly, the 
degree to which the objectives are realised is a significant yardstick 
of the success or failure of the reform. Similarly, reorganizations 
are intended to accomplish purposes of one kind or another in addition 
to and beyond the modification of organizational structure, as exemplified 
in the local government reform in Britain and Nigeria where democracy 
and efficiency loomed large among the goals. This is another way of 
saying that reorganization is an intermediate objective toward something 
else. It is normally a means, not an end unto itself. (Though 
change 'for its own sake' sometimes contributes to the motivation for 
reorganization. Scale enlargement in southern Nigeria and Britain,
and scale reduction in northern Nigeria were means towards the 
achievement of greater efficiency and effectiveness. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that the means-ends relationship is by no means a 
one-way avenue or indeed an avenue at all. Ends modify means, and 
means modify ends. As we will see later, ends were changed in certain 
cases during the implementing of reorganization).
In chapter 1 we said that goals can be divided into external and 
internal categories: (a) intra-administration directed objectives which
are primarily concerned with improving the administration, such as 
efficiency, and (b) goals dealing with the societal roles of the 
administrative system, and with changing policies and programmes, such 
as development. This distinction is only for academic purposes
because the two are closely inter-related. Internal objectives are 
usually set as means towards the greater attainment of external
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objectives, for instance, to realise certain societal situations or 
relationships, or to increase and improve outputs. External objectives 
have been spelled out in many reform programmes, particularly in 
developing countries (Mosher,1967 pp.497-8). In Nigeria, for
example, social and economic development featured frequently as one of 
the prime objectives of local government reform. Another objective 
in Nigeria and Britain was the strengthening of democracy in local 
government and administration. Yet another reform goal which featured 
prominently in the reform of local government in Nigeria was the need 
for national integration and unity.
Internal goals may also be manifold. Traditionally, administrative 
reform has been equated with organizational efficiency, and often 
inspired by the necessity to reduce government expenditure. Some 
reforms, inspired by this objective, have nevertheless focused more 
generally on improvement of the administration. The 1974 reform in 
Britain emphasized efficiency, which was also an important consideration 
in the 1976 local government reform in Nigeria. However, efficiency 
often covers a wider area as exemplified by Mosher (1967,p.498) who 
emphasized effectiveness as a goal of reorganization.
Another major concept behind the reform of local government in 
Nigeria and Britain, but especially in the latter, is rationality, which 
in many respects is related to efficiency and effectiveness. For 
example, the introduction of new budget and planning methods (e.g.
PPBS or PAR) is intended to increase rationality in budgetary allocations 
and in policy making. We will later relate each of these objectives to 
the local government reform in Britain and Nigeria.
Leemans mentions changes in influence and power relations as an 
important motivation for administrative reform. "Such changes may 
concern the relationship between the bureaucracy and the political organs.
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The area of influence relations (sic) also includes trends to 
broaden participation in internal decision-making processes" (Leemans, 
1976,p.29). Dror (1976,pp.129-130) gdes a step further and
catalogues reform objectives a number of which are applicable to the 
local government reforms in Britain and Nigeria (see chapter 1).
The Royal Commission under Lord Reddiffe-Maud was established 
in 1966 " to consider the structure of local government in England, 
outside Greater London, in relation to its existing functions; and to 
make recommendations for authorities and boundaries, and for functions and 
their divisions, having regard to the size and character of the areas in 
which these can be most effectively exercised and the need to sustain 
a viable system of democracy" (Royal Commission on Local Government in 
England,1969,Vol.1,p.iii). The Federal Military Government was a
bit more explicit in setting out the objectives of the 1976 local 
government reform in the Guidelines and which were subsequently enacted 
in state edicts. These were:
(a) To make appropriate services and development activities responsive 
to local wishes and initiatives by devolving or delegating them to local 
representative bodies;
(b) to facilitate the exercise of democratic self-government close to the 
local levels of our society and to encourage initiative and leadership 
potential;
(c) to mobilise human and material resources through the involvement 
of members of the public in their local development; and
(d) to provide a two-way channel of communication between local 
communities and government (both State and Federal)^Guidelines for Local 
Government Reform,1976, p.i).
Thus both countries realise that administrative reform as a 
permanent and systematic effort should elicit an organic-adaptive response
227 .
from the public sector in every area and at every level of its work. 
Therefore its purposes, more specifically, include:
(a) increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of administrative units 
through improvement of 'their structures and working systems so as to 
ensure that available resources for fulfilling government functions are 
used to the greatest possible advantages;
(b) assigning responsibilities, as precisely as possible, to the 
institutions and officials in charge of the co-ordination and execution 
of goal action;
(c) simplifying, accelerating and decentralising the operative mechanisms 
of such entities, while expediting and simplifying procedures;
(d) making every effort to ensure that governmental personnel have 
the necessary ability and training to adequately perform their tasks 
by means of training and motivation programmes designed to stimulate 
conscientious, innovative, dynamic and responsible attitudes towards 
their work; and
(e) stressing the importance of co-ordination, collaboration, and teamwork 
as a government policy for ending insularity and lack of co-ordination.
Since administrative reform is not mechanical, but based on human 
values, it therefore calls for genuine decisions, support, readiness 
for participation and innovation, goodwill of the public and proper 
allocation of resources. And to be successful, the reform must make 
clear the direct benefits for the participants of the reform and the 
masses in general.
Administrative reform objectives, therefore, are oriented towards 
fulfilling specific demands of the public rather than towards mere 
"efficiency' or an abstract 'rationalization' of the government 
machinery. In the case of the 1976 reform in Nigeria it was hoped 
to make local government a third tier of government activity in the nation.
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which will govern effectively and democratically at the local level.
It was hoped that a reformed local government system would allow:
(a) the Head of State to achieve the most effective possible 
realization of his goals and programmes, especially those concerned 
with socio-economic and political development: "The reform of our
system of Local Government is not only important and desirable in itself, 
but it is a crucial element in the Political Programme of the Federal 
Military Government. Indeed, having disposed of the question of the 
creation of new States, the Local Government Reforms are the next 
important exercise in the process of building a sound foundation for the 
return of this country's administration to civil rule " (Guidelines,
1976, foreword );
(b) the Head of State to utilise his national programmes through an 
efficient, effective and democratic local government. He believed that 
for national economic development and political stability to be achieved, 
he must wake the people out of their lethargy and inertia, beginning from 
the grassroot - the local government. Thus he sought to promote local 
government human, material and financial resources through the added 
impulse which his programmes would give to co-ordination, participation 
and teamwork (Guidelines, 1976, foreword); and
(c) the citizens and society in general to enjoy constant improvement 
in the economic, social, political and cultural aspects of their daily 
lives, efficient attention in their dealings with the government and 
capability in the services they have the right to demand of government 
entities. "These reforms would mean nothing if they did not include the 
certainty that as from now, every stratum of Nigerian society would 
benefit from the continued prosperity of this country, through the 
availability of amenities, indeed necessities, such as electricity, 
adequate water supply, improved transportation, health facilities and
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so on" (Guidelines,1976, foreword).
To emphasize the commitment of the Murtala/Obasanjo regime to a virile 
democratic local government, the responsibilities to be performed by the 
new local governments, both concurrent and exclusively, were carefully 
spelt out (see Appendix 1).
In a nutshell, the goals of the 1974 local government reform in Britain 
and those of the 1976 reform in Nigeria will be crystallized into three 
main objectives: FUNCTIONS AND SIZE, DEMOCRACY, AND RATIONALITY OR
EFFICIENCY. In Nigeria, however, the objectives included national 
stability and socio-economic development.
FUNCTIONS AND SIZE
It would have been absurd to reform the structure of local government 
without relating it to functions and vice-versa. Thus the term of 
reference required the Royal Commission to consider the structure of 
local government in England, outside Greater London, in relation to its 
existing functions; and the Nigerian Government sought to achieve active 
participation of the people in local government by devolving vital 
functions to the councils (Guidelines,1976,p.1). The concept of 
rationality is also closely linked with functions for there would be no 
need to talk of efficiency or effectiveness if there are no functions to 
be performed. And the simple fact that local authorities have
functions means that they have to perform them well. These functions
are varied and are of immense scope, including responsibility for the 
police, for the fire services, for almost all education other than
university, for the health and welfare of mothers and infants, the old
and the sick, for children in need of care, for public health, for the 
physical environment and the use of land, for housing, for sports and 
recreation, for museums, art galleries and libraries, for highways, traffic
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and transport. The Commission sums up the functions of local 
government as "responsibility for the safety, health and well-being, 
both material and cultural, of people in different localities..." (Royal 
Commission on Local Government in England,1969,Vol.1,p.10),
The Federal Government felt that a reformed local government would 
generate "local initiative and response to local needs" (Guidelines,
1976,p.1). To achieve this aim, the Government devolved functions
(a) which require detailed local knowledge for efficient performance;
(b) in which success depends on community responsiveness and 
participation; and
(c) which are of a personal nature requiring provision close to where 
the individuals affected live, and in which significant use of discretion 
or understanding of individuals is needed (Guidelines,1976,p.1.).
The above definitions of the role of local government stress its primary 
responsibility for all aspects of community welfare within the 
geographical area of its jurisdiction.
In chapters 4 and 5 we catalogued critics' displeasure with the loss of 
functions by local government either to the central government or to 
ad hoc bodies of the central government. These criticisms which also 
border on the central - local relations, especially the need for local 
democracy, became a gospel word for writers, the Redcliffe-Maud Commission 
and the Federal Government of Nigeria. The Royal Commission (1966-69) 
and the Federal Government therefore aimed at righting wrongs by stemming 
the erosion of local government functions hoping thereby to strengthen their 
democratic base. The Nigerian Government said that devolving adequate 
functions to local government would ensure active and democratic 
participation of the people (Guidelines,1976,p.1), and the Conservative 
government argued in 1971 that
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a vigorous local democracy means that authorities must be given 
real functions - with powers of decision and the ability to take 
action without being subjected to excessive regulation by central 
government through financial or other controls,,.above all else a 
genuine local democracy implies that decisions should be taken - and 
should be seen to be taken - as locally as possible (Local Government in 
England; Government Proposals for Reorganization,1971,p.1).
We must note in passing, however, that most of the critics of local
government functional losses have not taken time to take stock of local
government gains especially in Britain (see chapter 8).
Both the Royal Commission and the Federal Government believed that 
structural reorganization was a prelude to functional effectiveness. They 
noted that some services were being provided jointly by two or more 
authorities. There were duplications, overlapping, wastage and confusion. 
Redcliffe-Maud and Wood observed that residents of Stalybridge had area 
offices in Dunkinfield for education, in Stalybridge for health, in 
Wilmslow for children, and in Stockport for planning, while for welfare 
there was no administration at area level (1974,p.30). As we saw in 
chapters 4 and 5, the situation in Nigeria was not better than the one 
described above.
To offset these structural defects and the consequent functional 
inefficiency, the Nigerian Government proposed that a population of
150,000 (The Royal CommissiCn proposed 250,000) was the minimum necessary 
for effective discharge of local functions; because only an authority 
of this size would "have at its disposal the range and calibre of staff, 
and the technical and financial resources necessary for effective provision 
of education, housing and the personal services" (Royal Commission on 
Local Government in England,1969,Vol.1, para.257). Furthermore, the 
Federal Government's Guidelines say that "in order to achieve sufficiently 
large scales of operations to be able to perform all the types of funtions 
reasonably economically, whilst remaining sufficiently local, local 
governments should, as far as possible, serve total populations of between
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150,000 and 800,000" (1976,p.3.).
Another solution, and which is closely linked to the idea of 
population, is that authorities should be large enough to be responsible 
for, say, land-use planning and transportation, and at the same time act 
as housing authorities. Just as there are different views about structure, 
so there are about the right size of authority. The fact is, again, that 
there is no one size which is uniquely right, while all others are wrong.
The Royal Commission, like the Federal Government, therefore proposed a 
population size which would solve the country-town dichotomy, thus creating 
a local government in its simplest, most understandable and potentially 
most efficient form; an area embracing town and country and a population 
of at least some 250,000 (Nigeria: 150,000-800,000) (Guidelines,1976,p.4.).
It was claimed that any authority smaller than these figures "cannot offer 
attractive career prospects for well-qualified staff and they have financial 
disadvantages" (Guidelines,1976,p.4.).
Thus, the Federal Government and the Royal Commission believed that 
the areas of the new authorities must be large enough for planning.
Secondly, the proposed population range in each country would allow local 
government to attract the necessary skilled manpower and resources needed 
to provide services of the highest standard. Thirdly, wherever possible, 
each authority should be responsible for all the services in its area but 
at the same time it must not be so large as to be unresponsive to the 
wishes of the electors.
DEMOCRACY
There is a universal demand for further democratization and for 
opportunities for large-scale participation in political, or more generally, 
in public action. In a country like Nigeria, popular participation in 
economic and social development programmes is conceived essential for their
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effectiveness. In countries like Britain and America, with 
long-established and well entrenched democratic systems, increasing 
awareness of the limitations of representative government as an instrument 
for large-scale participation in political action has caused a search for 
new forms by which tô involve citizens, citizen groups and organizations 
in the making and implementation of policies (see chapter 9).
Of central importance in the debate about the structure of local 
government are the objectives 'democracy' and 'efficiency'. The 
overriding objective of the Royal Commission and the Federal Government 
was to make reforms which would enhance both the effectiveness of local 
government and 'sustain a viable system of local democracy'. The need 
for local democracy is also emphasized by Brain Smith because it is the 
base structure for "political education through participation. Local 
democracy, in theory, ensures the responsiveness of administration to the 
peculiar interests of local communities and protects the general health 
of democracy" (1976,p.31).
But as we indicated above, democracy goes beyond mere electioneering 
and the right to vote; it includes important concepts as accountability 
and control, responsiveness and the redress of grievance. According 
to Wood (1976,pp.22-5) democracy has at least four different meanings.
There is the representational meaning, emphasizing election and voting 
rights. It is this meaning that led the Royal Commission to propose 
single-member wards with a maximum of 10,000 constituents, and as a 
consequence, the Commission suggested a population of 1,000,000 as the 
maximum for a local authority. For the same reason the Federal Government 
proposed an upper limit of 800,000 people for any local authority.
Thus in Britain and Nigeria (especially northern Nigeria), the pre-reform 
structure was said to be 'undemocratic' because the authorities were too 
large and remote from the electorate, with the result that about half
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the seats at local elections were regularly filled without a contest.
The geographical meaning of 'democracy* emphasizes the importance 
of 'smallness', both in terms of physical accessibility and population 
which lead to a genuine Representation of local interests. The Commission 
demonstrated the importance it attaches to the geographical meaning of 
democracy by "running a 'Community Attitudes Survey' which sought information 
about the size of areas to which people felt most attached, and by mapping 
areas in terms of such factors as the journey to work, the circulation area 
of local newspapers, and bus routes" (Wood,1976,p.24.). Similarly, the 
Federal Government warned against 'large and sluggish bureaucracy' which 
is distant from the people. "If too large, even with small population, 
remoteness from some of the people arises" (Guidelines,1976,p.4.). Both 
the Federal Government and the Royal Commission believed that democratic 
control of services and accessibility call necessarily for a small 
functional unit. It is a basic requirement of effective local democracy 
that authorities should be in charge of areas within which they can 
provide efficient services. Furthermore, the reformers felt that the 
bigger the unit, the more doubtful it becomes whether the individual 
citizen can have a real sense of belonging to it (Royal Commission on 
Local Government in England,1969,Vol.1,p.72).
The third definition of democracy emphasizes the concept of 'responsible* 
government. Birch (1962) sub-classlfies this into two parts :
'Responsive' government is one which responds to public demands, and 
'accountable' government is government seeking judgement on its performance. 
Both definitions imply the cargo-cult concept (that goods will be 
delivered), that it is responsible for the provision of reasonably 
important public services. Here there is a clear link between the ideas
of 'democracy' and those of 'efficiency' or 'effectiveness'. A 
responsible local authority is one with clear choices to make about the
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nature of Its outputs: it is not one which is too small to be
entrusted with a reasonable range of functions by the Government.
Little wonder that the Royal Commission wanted local authorities which 
would "enable citizens arid their elected representatives to have a sense 
of common purpose" (1969,Vol.1,p.3.), and the Federal Government wanted 
local government to be "responsive to local wishes and initiative...and... 
provide a two-way channel of communication between local communities and 
government" (Guidelines,1976,p.1.). Wood concludes that "though the 
discussion about responsiveness and accountability frequently revolved 
around calls for 'participation', for local ombudsmen, for press and public 
access to meetings of council committees, beneath all this lies the clear 
implication that democracy and functional effectiveness are linked"
(1976,pp.24-5).
Fourthly, the concept of 'democracy' could refer to functional 
division between different tiers of government. For instance, the 
Conservative White Paper of 1971 stated that "a genuine local democracy 
implies that decisions should be taken as locally as possible" (Local 
Government in England: Government Proposals for Reorganization,1971,para.8)
Like the definition above, this also links democracy to efficiency.
The above definitions do not underrate the importance of elections; 
in fact they buttress its significance since elections are effective 
ways of emphasizing accountability and control. Councillors have to 
face re-election, and this is bound to influence their decisions on major 
policies. Thus election is effective in persuading councillors to 
anticipate the likely local reaction to alternative decisions. This 
anticipated reaction from the electorate suggests that councillors are 
responsive to local pressure. "Whenever a controversial matter requires 
decision a council will test the local climate of opinion before taking 
action and will have in mind the consequences of taking an unpopular line"
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(Redcliffe-Maud and Wood,1974,p.21,).
Before the 1974 reform, local complairts were handled by the 
councillors,With the exception of Bristol in the mid-1960s, there was 
no formal 'office of complaints'. The Royal Commission realised the 
difficult situation a councillor might face, say, when pressed by a 
local resident to pursue a complaint which is against a decision he has 
made. This and other reasons led the Commission to recommend the
creation of local ombudsmen, which it was hoped, would buttress the four 
ideas of democracy as defined above.
EFFICIENCY
We have already said that 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness' are 
closely related to 'rationality', and we shall discuss them as one of 
the objectives of local government reform in Britain and Nigeria. In 
both countries the expectations affecting the scale of public services are 
outstripping the capacity of the economy to provide resources with which 
to satisfy them, at any rate without restrictions on private consumption 
and investment which currently would be regarded as intolerable. It is 
in this context that one must place the movement to raise the efficiency 
of local administrative institutions and methods. Thus, since the public 
services have extended, and yet the constraints on increasing the 
resources devoted to them have become more compelling, the major 
reaction has been to call for administrative reform with the hope of 
improving the performance of local administrative agencies - improving 
input-output ratios. '
The search for efficiency in Nigeria and Britain is as old as the 
'identification' of the defects of local government. It was not 
surprising, therefore, that the Federal Government and the Royal Commission
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placed great emphasis on the need for effectiveness and efficiency.
The barage of administrative reforms that took place in Britain in 
the 1960s was largely influenced by the Plowden Report. Three other 
reports - Mallaby, Maud dnd Bains - greatly stimulated this quest 
for efficiency. It is interesting to note, by way of contrast, that
Nigeria did not have any committee or commission of incpiiry on local 
government management prior to the 1976 reform. We shall, however, be 
drawing on recommendations of the Federal Government in its search for 
efficiency in local government. The different approaches in the quest 
for efficiency which we shall be considering are: Manpower Management,
Co-ordination of Policy and Administration, and Management Techniques.
Manpower Management
The Royal Commission in its quest for efficiency leant heavily on the 
Mallaby and Maud Reports on personnel management. The best use of 
scarce manpower is a central part of efficient administration. Two main 
factors stand out. One is the argument, elucidated in the Mallaby 
Report, that skilled staff are in short supply and local authorities suffer 
harmful shortages. The other dominant factor is the view that new skills 
are rapidly being demanded as governmental services expand. To solve 
these problems, the Bains Report, like the Maud and Mallaby Reports, 
recommended that internal management needed change dependent on reform 
of the system through effective recruitment policy, beautiful career 
prospects, extensive training facilities, staff streamlining, use of 
specialist services and reduction in the number of local government 
committees and departments. Committees should relate to programme areas 
rather than the activities of different departments. More significantly, 
major instruments for corporate planning were necessary in every 
authority: a central policy and resources committee, a chief executive
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without departmental responsibilities, a management team of chief 
officers which he would lead, and a system of interdepartmental working 
groups implementing tasks in a general system of corporate planning and 
implementation (see Diagram 6.1). The setting up of a personnel 
function was also recommended. In short, it was recommended that "the 
traditional departmental attitude within much of local government must 
give way to a wider-ranging corporate outlook" (Working Group on Local 
Authority Management Structures,1972,p.6.).
In Nigeria, the Federal Government realised that one of the obstacles 
to past reform efforts was inadequate staffing. Or as the Guidelines 
put it, "the staffing arrangements to ensure a virile local government system 
had been inadequate" (1976,foreword). And in other to remedy this 
defect the Government recommended that the Ministry of Local Government 
should ensure "that the quality and quantity of staff available to local
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governments is such that they are able to discharge the functions and
provide the services for which they have been given responsibilities"
(Guidelines, 1976,p.11.). Improved personnel is necessary in view of
the huge number of functions and the large fund which local governments
are expected to shoulder. The Ministry of Local Government is also to
lay down the terms and conditions of service for local government staff
so as to bring them to par with the State Civil Service, and promote local
government training schemes at various levels for administrative, financial,
professional and technical staff in co-operation with training institutions
and other ministries (Guidelines,1976,pp.11-12.).
Each local government must have an Executive Secretary who will be
responsible for the administrative management of the local government as
a whole and should be the secretary to the local government council and
to the council's Finance and General Purposes Committee (see Diagram
6.2 and Appendix 11). To make the post attractive to candidates, the
secretary is placed on the same salary as a deputy permanent secretary.
The Guidelines recommend that each state, through its Local
Government Service Board, should set up a combined local government service
for the more highly trained cadres. And the Board
should be responsible for all employment, postings, discipline 
etc. of all members of the combined local government service, but 
should delegate internal postings within local governments and 
minor disciplinary matters to Establishment Committees of local 
governments subject to the right of appeal to the Local Government 
Service Board, which should also serve in an appellate capacity 
in respect of disciplinary matters concerning staff employed by 
local governments directly (Guidelines,1976,p.11).
Thus, it was felt in both countries that these internal changes required
a restructuring of the system of local government. After all, "if
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large areas are to be contemplated in order to provide for more 
efficient administration of some services than is at present possible 
within the local government field" (Hart,1965,p.7), then "the traditional 
departmental attitude within much of local government must give way to a 
wide-ranging corporate outlook" (Working Group on Local Authority Management 
Structures, 1972,p.6; see also. Royal Commission on Local Government in 
England,1969,Vol.1,pp.123-4; Stanyer,1970,pp.15-16).
Co-ordination of Policy and Administration
Another approach in the quest for efficiency centres on the twin 
problems of co-ordination and policy planning. Co-ordination has, 
traditionally, been carried out by the council itself, by horizontal 
senior committees such as finance, by the estimates and budgetary process, 
by party control, and by informal working groups of officers. But in 
recent years local authorities have felt the need to go further in their 
search for comprehensive administration, and have considered the advantages 
of a specific co-ordinating committee.
The Maud Report (1967) and the Federal Government's Guidelines 
criticized local government arrangements whereby members concerned 
themselves with details of day-to-day administration, much of which could 
be entrusted to officers. The Maud Report, drawing from the experiences 
of foreign countries and of local experiments at Newcastle and elsewhere, 
stressed firmly that the Clerk should be the undisputed head of the 
council's staff. The Guidelines similarly emphasized that the secretciry 
should be the head of all appointed personnel. The Maud Committee and 
the Federal Government produced detailed plans to ensure co-ordination 
of both administration and policy in local authorities, which involved a 
drastic reappraisal of the nature of committee work and the structure 
of local administration. The structure and functions of the Local
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Government Service Board recommended by the Federal Government were 
similar to Maud's Management Board which was rejected by local authorities. 
The onus to recruit, promote, transfer and train local government staff 
rest with the Board.
The significance of the Management Board for the existing committee 
organization would be;
(a) Committees should not be directing or controlling bodies nor should 
they be concerned with routine administration;
(b) no committee should have more than fifteen members (including co-opted 
members);
(c) committees should be deliberative and representative bodies;
(d) committees should take executive decisions only in exceptional 
circumstances when the management board requires them to do this - these 
fields of decision-taking should be strictly defined by the management 
board and it should be made clear that the committees issue instructions 
to the officers only on these matters; and
(e) the number of committees should be drastically reduced and similar 
or related services should be grouped and allocated to one committee 
(Committee on the Management of Local Government (Maud Report),1967,
Vol.1). Paragraph 168 states; " we believe that in an all-purpose 
authority it should be possible to reduce their number to about six", 
and suggests - Planning and development. Housing, Works - including 
highways and traffic. Education and culture. Health and welfare, and Public 
protection. Diagram 6.3 illustrates Bains alternative model for the 
committee structure of a non-metropolitan county.
In order to enhance local government efficiency, the Guidelines 
(1976,p.9) recommended that local authorities should avoid numerous
or large committees. The Government recommended that there should, in 
all cases, be two main Standing Committees ; Finance and General Purposes,
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and Education. Other standing committees should be kept to a 
minimum and should be restricted to manageable size (usually four).
The Guidelines require that members of all committees (except ex-officio 
members) including their chairmen should be elected by the council. So 
also every local authority is expected to have a chairman and not more than 
four supervisory councillors who will devote most of their time and 
energies to the affairs of local government. The Guidelines also 
recommended that councils should exercise 'political control' over the 
departments of their local government through supervisory councillors or 
through small committees (1976,p.9). Like the Maud Report, the Guidelines 
recommended that the roles of the committees would be to make recommendations 
to the management board (Service Board) on 'major objectives' and 'major 
strategies' for achieving those goals. They would review progress in 
the sphere of the particular service that concerned them, consider 
reactions of the public and deal with any matters referred to them by the
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board. Executive decisions would only be made in exceptional cases 
and when the board asked for this to be done; the implication being that 
delegated authority would normally rest with officers rather than 
committees. As the Guidelines put it, "members of departmental 
committees will not give directives to executive heads of departments 
directly, but if it concerns policy matters, such directives should come 
from the committee chairman as political heads of departments. The 
functions of committee chairmen thus envisaged are a departure from those 
of the familiar portfolio councillor with executive functions" (1976,p.9).
We should note, however, that all the recommendations contained in the 
Guidelines were more or less mandatory. There is little room for 
flexibility and criticism under a military regime. In Britain, on the 
other hand, a number of people attacked the Maud report, especially the idea 
of a management board (Greenwood, Norton, and Stewart,1969,pp.151-68;
Smith and Stanyer,1968,pp.239-279) .
Thus, generally it would appear that local authorities accept the 
Maud Report's diagnosis of the organizational problems which result from their 
committee structure, and also accept that greater internal co-ordination is 
required and could be achieved by allocating wide functions to a policy 
committee; but it is not accepted that reorganization should entail a 
radical change in the powers or functions of existing committees. The 
barage of criticisms levied on the management board proposal paved the 
way for the Bains Report. The Report of the Royal Commission left out 
the idea of a management board but its members were "firmly of the 
opinion that the new main authorities must have a central committee, board 
or body of some kind, by whatever name it may be called" (1969,Vol.1, 
para.486). Additionally, "the case is surely cast-iron for a central 
body to advise the council on its strategy and priorities, co-ordinate 
the policies and work of the service committees, and ensure that the best
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managerial methods are adopted In each department and in the work of the 
council as a whole" (1969,Vol.1,para.489), Each of the new authorities 
would therefore work out the form of central committee most suited to 
its requirements, and also the division of duties between the central 
committee and the service committees"which would continue to be at the 
heart of affairs...It is, however, a radical change from traditional 
practice that we seek. The central committee must be at the core of 
the administration; and the proliferation of committees must be ended" 
(1969,Vol.1,paras.493-5).
Management Techniques
We must point out at the beginning that all that we are going to 
discuss in this sub-section did not feature in the 1976 reform in Nigeria. 
"An approach to local government which centred on such grand concerns as 
democracy, efficiency and central control, hardly had time to notice 
matters so mundane as the actual working of particular local authorities. 
Local government was either pure administration, or a self-regulating 
democracy, and from these perspectives the management of local government 
could easily be assumed away as an irrelevant, taken-for-granted blur" 
(Dearlove,1979,p.ll3).
In Britain, corporate management-Management Services, employment of 
private consultants, LAMSAC, PPBS, Work Study, O & M, Operational research. 
Network Analysis, use of computers, and Cost-benefit Analysis - has been 
an important ingredient of recent local government reports, such as the 
Maud and the Bains reports, and has aroused great interest among members 
and officers alike. It Aims to provide a framework whereby the needs 
of a community are viewed comprehensively and the activities of the local 
authority are planned and executed in a unified way to satisfy those needs
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to the fullest extent possible within available resources. To achieve 
these aims necessitated considerable restructuring of the internal 
organization of local authorities in 1974.
NATIONAL STABILITY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Two 'external objectives' featured largely in the 1976 reform in 
Nigeria: national unity and stability and socio-economic development,
both of which cannot really be emphasized in the case of the 1974 reform 
in Britain.
National Unity and Stability
In the first place, this was expressed in the government's concern
with the political unity of Nigeria. The Federal Government wanted
a system of local government which would stimulate the consolidation and
reinforcement of national unity and the reduction of any centrifugal
forces that might be present.
The reform of our system of local government is not only important 
and desirable in itself, but it is a crucial element in the 
political programme of the Federal Military Government (emphasis 
mine). Having disposed of the question of the creation of new 
states, the Local Government Reforms are the next important 
exercise in the process of building a sound foundation for the 
return of this country's administration to civil rule (Guidelines, 
1976, foreword).
The Government was not only reluctant and unwilling to establish a 
local government system that might create power centres capable of 
competing with or effectively opposing the central government; it was 
determined to demarcate the boundaries of local units in such a way that 
existing power centres will be weakened or destroyed. Just as the 
establishment of regional bodies in Czechoslovakia during the 1950s was 
undoubtedly partly inspired by the Government's wish to combat federalist 
inclinations and to reinforce its grip on the whole country, so the
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creation of states in 1967 and the reorganization of local government 
in 1976 were structural efforts made to combat the disintegrating 
influence exercised by the former regions and provinces of Nigeria.
As the Guidelines put it, the implications of the reform "in fact mean 
that a fundamental change in the political structure of this country will 
be brought about" (1976, foreward).
Thus the government destroyed the existing regional governmental and 
administrative structures. This was necessary because Nigeria is a 
country of many peoples, each with their governmental structures developing 
into power centres which affected the authority of the central government 
and consequently endangered national unity.
Finally, the Federal Government introduced representative local 
government as a nation-building instrument. Meeting the people's 
desires to participate in governmental affairs, at least at the local level, 
was considered a useful device by which to reduce their resistance. It is 
interesting and ironical that it was the military, an undemocratic 
institution, that reorganized representative local government in Nigeria.
National unity was also interpreted as the nation-wide acceptance and 
implementation of central government policies, the integration of local 
policies in the national policy and adherence by local governments to the 
standards of services laid down in the centre. This problem is closely 
related to the more fundamental question of whether the function of local 
authorities is solely or primarily to foster local interests or to serve 
national interests at the local level. The objective of national unity, 
understood in this fashion, not only requires a certain structure of 
local government and a certain relationship between local and state 
government, but also necessitates the shaping of local government units 
whose size and managerial capacities can guarantee the level of achievement
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and service demanded by the centre. The Federal Government 
therefore recommended that local councils should have substantial 
control over local affairs, initiate and direct the provision of 
services, and "determine and implement projects so as to complement 
the activities of the State and Federal Governments..." (Guidelines,
1976,p.1), Furthermore, the Government was aware of the values,
strength and common interests inherent in the existing system by 
demanding that local government should, with such adjustments as may 
be appropriate, be coterminous with the existing Divisions, (Guidelines, 
1976,p.5.).
Socio-Economic Development
This objective coincides in certain respects with that of efficiency 
which, in the fulfilment of public tasks, is considered to contribute 
to the economic and social development of an area. In Nigeria, the 
efficient performance of public tasks at the local level is a prerequisite 
for successful realization of the national plan. In spite of the fact 
that development and efficiency are interdependent there are sufficient 
reasons why separate attention should be paid to the objective of social 
and economic development. Firstly, it needs more than just efficiency; 
it also requires the promotion of active popular participation as well as 
the integration of governmental activities for the various geographical 
areas and governmental tasks. Secondly, social and economic development 
is the primary objective of overall Nigerian government policy to such a 
degree that, if only for this reason, it deserves special mention. This 
concerted government policy for economic and social development is not 
confined to Nigeria alone, but to an increasing extent, in Britain,although 
as we pointed out in chapter 3, the role of local government in development 
is to provide the basic opportunities such as land for factories, rather
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than plunge into actual development.
Furthermore, the stress on local government as an instrument for 
development is closely associated with the reflection, wrongly or 
rightly, that small units will stimulate popular participation in 
developmental activities. This reflection is deeply rooted in the 1976 
reform objectives which were inter alia, to develop local leadership, to 
develop pride and unity in their areas and country, to bridge the gap 
between people and the administration, to bring the people's thought 
to bear on their problems, to initiate them in the art of self-help 
and collective action, and above all, to release their latent creative 
energies and to utilize the vast manpower potential in the country for 
its development. Some of these motives were also mentioned by the
Royal Commission (1966-69); in Britain, the cry for metropolitan 
government, encompassing a number of existing local units, springs from 
concern regarding the inability of the existing structure to provide 
the leadership, stimulus and integration necessary for economic expansion; 
moreover, central cities were often hampered in their economic growth by 
lack of territory, thus the call for the eradication of town - country 
dichotomy, which would enable municipalities to meet industrial and 
commercial expansion needs. Lastly, the tendency to construct large 
local authorities was also inspired by the wish to provide a governmental 
instrument and basis for economic development. In its evidence to the 
Royal Commission, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government advocated 
the city region concept not only because it "considered that the. city 
region as the...development unit (would be)able to formulate and execute 
its own policies", but also because it would be a prerequisite of 
effective future investment and economic development (Royal Commission 
on Local Government in England,1969,Vol.1, paras.112,115 and 120). The
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Commission itself was convinced that large units of local authority, 
such as provincial councils, "are required which can settle the broad 
economic, land use and investment framework for the planning and 
development policies of operational authorities" (1969,Vol.1,para 283). 
Little wonder that the Government pointed out in 1977 that "local authorities 
now need...to stimulate investment by the private sector, by firms and 
by individuals, in industry, in commerce and in housing" (Policy for the 
Inner Cities,1977,p.9).
An important issue, therefore, for the Nigerian government especially, 
was the type of local government structure and administration which would 
provide the most effective instrument for popular participation in 
developmental activities. As we said before, the recommended population 
range indicates the strong emphasis which was placed on participation in 
socio-economic development as an objective of the reform policy.
The type of participation envisaged is primarily concerned with the 
execution of decisions taken by local political and administrative 
authorities. It refers, therefore, to mass participation in
developmental works such as improvement of agriculture, building of roads 
and houses, provision of health facilities etc. rather than to the 
participation of a few people in policy and decision making. It is 
obvious, however, that the two types of participation cannot be fully 
separated; engaging people in developmental activities implies, in many 
cases, that they are also allocated a role in the taking of minor decisions.
As we shall try to prove in chapter 9, large-scale participation is 
closely related to community development, which stresses that people should 
actively and willingly partake in the execution of projects which have been 
decided upon by the people themselves, or the local council, or in 
exceptional cases, by the State Government field agencies. The relationship 
between local government and community development is frequently pointed
251
out; it is often claimed that the former should contribute considerably 
towards the latter, but in order to do so, the Federal Government believed 
that local government must have proper structure, powers and methods of 
operation (see sub-sections 'Functions and Size*, and 'Efficiency').
Awareness of the significance of local government in stimulating citizen 
participation in social and economic development was therefore central to the 
1976 reform. This is understandable in that the private sector is not 
only relatively weak in comparison to the private sector in Britain, but 
it also depends to a large extent on State capital. Unfortunately, the 
Guidelines and the State edicts were extremely vague on what role they 
expected local government to play in the development process, which should 
normally be the provision and maintenance of necessary infrastructure such 
as markets, council offices, roads, water supplies etc. (not industrial 
enterprises) to stimulate and support the private sector.
As we shall see in chapter 9, we will be resting our thesis on the belief 
that, if not done by dictatorial methods, rural manpower can only be 
mobilised for projects conceived and organised by the people as an expression 
of their own felt needs; the rural population is indifferent to 
innovations brought to them by central government agents whose ways of 
thought are unfamiliar. This is only one side of the coin, of course; 
undeniably, central government agents have frequently been prime movers 
in innovation and local development. Nevertheless, it is generally 
accepted that active participation in social and economic development 
can best be achieved within the framework of a small community. People 
are more willing to engage in development work for the benefit of a 
limited government unit whose decision making authorities they feel 
closely associated and trust, than they are to work for more remote 
authorities. Popular participation in development activities, it is 
believed, therefore calls for small-size units of local government - "if
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too large, even with small population, remoteness from some of the 
people arises" (Guidelines,1976,p.4.). But is there an optimum size; 
and is local government necessarily the primary unit for community 
development? In many cases, as we shall see in chapter 9, these 
activities could ideally be performed at the sub-communal level, the 
village or group of villages. In fact, the usefulness of the sub-communal 
unit as a catalyst for stimulating popular participation is a strong 
argument in favour of its establishment.
The empirical evidence we have discussed so far in this chapter does 
not support those who hypothesize that developing and developed countries 
cannot have identical local government reform objectives. We do accept 
that the emphasis placed on objectives varies from countries to countries 
but by and large the reform goals themselves can be very similar. These 
objectives, however, will falter and die if correct strategies are not 
designed to implement them.
STRATEGIES
In chapter 1 we said that local government reform strategies differ 
from country to country: "the preferable mix of administrative reform
strategies is in the main a function of the concrete circumstances of 
each particular reform" (Dror,1976,p.l27). The 1976 reform in Nigeria 
was initiated and executed by the military government, and like all military 
strategies, this was clothed in secrecy and it was quickly implemented 
with military precision. Thus, unlike in Britain, there was no room for 
serious research, debates, consultations, and legislative actions.
The assertion in the paragraph above, however, is not completely true. 
After all, what we have discussed in this thesis so far shows a lot of 
correspondence in their analyses of defects and the setting of objectives, 
steps that are very crucial in administrative reform strategies. In fact
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this goes to support our claim that environmental differences between 
countries should not stop us from constructing strategies with universal 
applicability, with each country just needing to adapt them to her 
environment. Thus, in Nigeria and Britain, there were debates, 
researches and consultations, although acceptedly more comprehensive in 
the latter country. The Guidelines (1976,foreword) speak of 'tentative 
discussions', 'small co-ordinative committees', and of 'exhaustive 
consultations' between the Sates and the Federal Government on the one hand, 
cind between the Federal Government and the traditional rulers on the other. 
This it not to deny, however, that there were marked differences in the 
strategies of Nigeria and Britain.
Firstly, unlike in Nigeria, Britain set up a Royal Commission with many 
local government experts on it. Britain decided to use a Royal Commission 
because they are regarded not only as agents of change but also as "the 
chief advisory bodies in the legislative and administrative process" 
and "their report is looked to as an exposition of the situation or problem" 
(Wheare,1955,pp.68-9). The debate they generate is regarded to be at 
least of equal importance to their investigative work and actual 
recommendations. Donnison concludes that commissions are a force to 
reckon with because "their work generated and focused a reforming impetus 
which would have been difficult to mobilise in other ways" (1968,p.558).
And local government reform is one of the delicate subjects where the 
Government feels that impetus frcan a royal commission would be better 
because with the councils, their associations and professional groups 
thinking first and foremost in terms of their interests and future role; 
with politicians weighing the political balance sheet; and with civil 
servants thinking very much in terms of administrative and legal 
feasibility, the Royal Commission provided the best chance for all and 
sundry to air their views. The Royal Commission therefore served a
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valuable purpose in maintaining a reform momentum and in creating a new 
agenda for public debate.
The Royal Commission's need for prolonged public debate and the 
necessary administrative‘and legislative procedures lead us to the 
second point - reform pace or timing. It took Nigeria less than two 
years to initiate and implement the 1976 local government reform as 
against almost a decade (1966-74) taken in Britain despite the two year 
period given by Crossman who evidently hated the procedure and demise of 
the earlier Local Government Commissions for England and Wales (1958-65). 
The drastically short period of time taken to reform the local government 
system in Nigeria was due to a number of reasons:
(a) The Murtala regime which came to power in 1975 had shown itself to
be a 'ruthless', highly disciplined one that was above petty politicking;
(b) that regime presented the local government reform as an urgent
objective because it was a crucial element in their political programme of 
returning the country to civil rule in 1979. This was very attractive 
to the people and helped to weaken pockets of resistance;
(c) the need for national unity, after the civil war, made it attractive 
and necessary to destroy the existing societal structure which endangered 
the Government's existence;
(d) the governmental and administrative machinery needed thorough 
re-structuring to turn it into an efficient and effective instrument for 
achieving the development objectives;
(e) the role of 'homo politicus' (see chapters 1 and 7) - Murtala's high 
standard of probity and his personal charisma lent him a lot of speed and 
weight in the reform efforts;
(f) since it was a military regime, there was no room for serious,
long-drawn debates and legislative procedures;
(g) Nigeria could drastically and quickly reform its local government
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since the system was fairly simple, very young (less than 25 years 
old as against the century-old system in Britain) and therefore easier 
to change. Damages caused by any f a i l u r e b e  consequently smaller, 
particularly in view of the possible gains to be derived from the reform;
(h) no local representative institutions could claim any long history 
and tradition of public service and consequently they felt less 
impelled to oppose reforms which might reduce their importance; and
(i) few vested interests- are aggregated in institutions such as associations 
of local authorities and groups of local politicians who, jealous of their 
position and that of their members, will resist major changes likely to have 
any unfavourable effect.
Britain, on ther other hand, had to settle for a gradual approach 
because:
(a) As a democratic country she had to give the electorate the opportunity 
to discuss and debate the object and subject of the reform. In other 
words, the government could not dictatorially impose the reform with one 
stroke of the pen;
(b) like all royal commissions, the Redcliffe-Maud Commission, by nature, 
had to proceed gradually in order to broaden the debate and this means 
having to deal with a wealth of materials, evidences etc. In all, some 
2,156 witnesses submitted written evidence to the Commission;
(c) gradual process enables adaptation of the local government structure 
to new needs and conditions, while allowing the people to adapt to
the new structure, without disrupting the continuity of the operations 
of local institutions;
(d) it minimizes resistance to reform since everybody would have had the 
opportunity to air his view;
(e) the existing system of local government which was almost a century 
old had become a stable, highly complex and differentiated administrative 
system which could not be hastily changed overnight without causing disruptions;
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(f) the decision making process is highly pluralistic. Innumerable 
individuals and organizations, whether connected to central government 
or not, were involved in the decision making process on the reform 
schemes ; and
(g) local representative institutions, whose considerable influence
was further strengthened by associations of local authorities and political 
parties, were an important source of resistance.
An important similarity in the 'time factor' is worth mentioning: 
the reforms in Nigeria and Britain were initiated and implemented by 
Governments which had newly come to office and which were therefore still 
popular with the public during this honeymoon period. Murtala came to 
power in 1975 after eight years of Gowon's rule which had become directionless, 
corrupt and irresponsible. In Britain, the Labour Party initiated the 
reform in 1966 and the Conservative Party implemented it at a time when 
they had newly come to office with a comfortable majority.
These differences in strategy, therefore, were inevitable because, 
as we have said, any government is conditioned in its choice regarding 
local government reform by the impact of environmental conditions on the 
structure and functions of local units. A government may prefer a 
particular strategy, but it must realise the difficulties that prevailing 
conditions will imply for effective implementation. If these conditions
are not taken into account when changing the local government structure, 
the reform is unlikely to be successful. Many countries have experienced 
setbacks in introducing a new system of local government because it was 
unsuitable to local conditions; others have had to deviate considerably 
from their original intentions. The danger has proven particularly 
acute when a system is transplanted from one country to another, such as 
the doomed British-inspired system enacted in Nigeria in the 1950s.
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Apart from the influence exercised by ecological conditions on 
the feasibility of reforming the system of local government, any local 
government reform will face active resistance as it alters the power 
structure of the community and thereby arouses groups or individuals 
who feel that their interests or power positions will be affected.
People in authority are particularly affected by such threats to prominence. 
In Britain, this refers to members of local government bodies: the
councillors, the mayors, the officers and the various local authority 
organizations, such as the AMC or the RDCA or more generally, NALGO. 
Generally, opposition to reform came from such quarters than from members 
of the general public. In Nigeria, strong resistance to local government 
reform came from local landlords, chiefs and especially emirs in 
northern Nigeria where the boundaries of the emirates co-incided with local 
government boundaries.
Local government reform has therefore become a complex and intricate 
process. The dissatisfaction regarding the existing systems in Nigeria 
and Britain, and the important role which local government plays in the 
process of political, social and economic development of Nigeria especially, 
prompted scholars, governments and associations of local authorities to 
use a more systematic approach to the problem. Before the 1974 and 
1976 reforms, both countries 'modernized' and adopted their local government 
systems haphazardly and piecemeal, usually by removing functions from local 
government. The last reforms, however, show laudable trend towards a 
more systematic and wholesale approach, implying greater efforts to set 
clear objectives to the decentralization policy as a basis on which to 
re-design the system.
In a nutshell, the tendency towards greater rationality in local 
government reform is striking. This is not only shown by more systematic 
efforts, but also by the declining influence of less rational considerations.
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such as identification with the social community, antagonism between 
urban and rural areas, between city and residential fringe municipalities.
This new trend was aptly expressed in the Liberal Party's evidence to 
the Redcliffe-Maud Commission: 'It is clear that a thorough rationalization
of local authorities is required'. The rational approach is also 
manifested by the search for quantifiable criteria such as functions, 
efficiency and planning, on which to determine size and boundaries of new 
units of local government and administration. Nevertheless, a government's
ability to give decisive weight to rational consideration depends largely 
on their acceptance by the people and influential interest groups. Value- 
judgements and group interests still play a considerable role in the 
feasibility of reform achievement. The need for a rational approach led
the Royal Commission and to some extent the Nigerian Government to ask 
for evidence, to carry out some research and to deduce principles upon 
which their recommendations were based.
Evidence and Consultations
The Reddiffe-Maud Commission commenced its work by sending a letter 
to every local authority requesting evidence within three months and an 
open invitation to the public was also made. In all, some 2,156 witnesses 
submitted written evidence. Of these 1269 were individual local authorities 
(including 594 parishes) and 536 were individual members of the public, 
such as academics and local government officers and councillors. The 
remaining 350 or so included national and local political, amenity, 
business, professional and ratepayer associations. Oral evidence was 
taken from only a dozen bodies - ministries, local authority associations 
and NALGO.
In Nigeria, evidence of witnesses were taken and consultations were 
carried out although not at a scale comparable to the Reddiffe-Maud
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Commission because of time factor. Indeed, the Federal Government 
asked each state to set up a Committee for Local Government Reform but 
this was after the Guidelines had been published and enacted as edicts by 
the states. The Federal Government had therefore previously diagnosed the 
defects of local government, set out the reform objectives, strategies and 
principles as contained in the Guidelines and had made up its mind as to 
the type of structure of local government it wanted. All that was left 
to the Committees to do was take evidence (mainly oral) from witnesses and 
make recommendations about possible new boundaries (see chapter 7). 
Unfortunately both the evidence of witnesses from the states and those 
allegedly collected by the Federal Government were never published.
Everything was shrouded in secrecy. Thus all that we know about the 
evidence and consultations was the little fed to us in the Guidelines.
According to the Guidelines (1976, foreword), tentative discussions 
on local government reforms started in 1975 through the establishment of 
a small co-ordinative committee. Each state was asked to make consultations 
and the reports of these were submitted to Lagos for information and 
co-ordination. Then the whole country was divided into zones and each 
zone was asked to prepare papers on local government reform and particularly 
on the definition and functions of local government, its financing, the 
role of traditional authorities within any proposed local government 
structure, the Local Government Service structure etc. The zonal reports 
were discussed at various conferences in Enugu, Kaduna and Ibadan. The 
final conference was held in Ibadan to co-ordinate the recommendations of 
all the committees plus all the observations made by local government 
practitioners, traditional rulers, local council administrators and other 
interested parties. The amalgam of this process, after collation, was 
again submitted to a joint meeting of National Council of States and the 
Supreme Military Council. The document which emerged from this joint
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meeting was submitted to a national conference of traditional rulers 
which was held in Lagos in July 1976.
The next step was that of a mass education campaign embarked upon 
by the traditional rulers. This writer was on the entourage of theI
Emir of Ilorin as he campaigned to solicit support for the reform effort 
throughout the former Ilorin Emirate. The campaign was not partisan; 
it was not to speak for or against candidates seeking election, but to 
get the people to support local government reform which would bring 
government nearer to them, and to get them to vote in the local elections. 
For instance, the Emir of Ilorin, like all the other traditional rulers, 
emphasized that the local government reform was to bring development to 
the local areas; and that the elections were not attempts to get the 
local people to pay more tax, but that they should vote so as to elect 
the person they thought most suitable as their councillor.
Research
The desire for a more rational approach is further evidenced by the 
emphasis on research. The Reddiffe-Maud Commission was not ready to 
base its recommendations only on the evidence of witnesses. Indeed, what 
they heard convinced them of the need for further research involving an 
appraisal of existing information and research and the setting-up of 
specific research projects. As we said earlier, local government reform 
is now based on scientific studies, particularly to the determination of 
optimal areas and boundaries of local government units. Britain 
undertook research on these matters and ascertained its necessity: "The
determination of the number and area of provisional authorities required 
for the proper organization of local government will necessitate careful 
and detailed studies", (Evidence of the Association of Municipal 
Corporations to the Royal Commission,1969,para.269 ). Even so, there is a
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widespread lack of research activities. A main weakness of Nigerian 
local government reform is the lack of systematic research and educational 
effort in relation to the structure and operations of local government.
There is little or no academic study of local government institutions and 
their role in the somewhat complicated federal structure.
Thus, serious research did not come into play in the Nigerian reform. 
The Government did not carry out any research, neither did they contract 
anybody to carry it out for them. Even in Britain, the limitations of 
general studies of local government as a whole or of aspects thereof are 
evident. Even though the Reddiffe-Maud Commission recognised the 
essence of research and in fact backed up their proposals by considerable 
research, they stated with regard to the relationship between the efficient 
operation of a certain function and the maximum and minimum size of local 
units: "...we simply do not know whether the time spent on research will 
produce enough hard facts about this problem...size cannot be statistically 
proved to have a very important effect on performance" (1969,Vol.1, para.219) 
This is all the more interesting because it has frequently been posited 
that research on size and boundaries of local units is easier to undertake 
and is more likely to produce useful results than on most other aspects of 
decentralization; many important variables, including intensity of social 
and economic relationships within an area, cost-benefit relationships of 
major public functions, popular interest in communal affairs, are at least 
quantifiable by approximation. Other issues, such as whether or not a 
new tier of government should be introduced, or of an optimal population 
of a local government, have hardly any objective measuring-rods, so that 
subjective or value-judgements or political expedience are likely to be 
decisive factors in policy-making. Research into the overall system of 
local government is even more problematic, although studies on environmental 
factors, for instance, may help reform efforts.
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Another limitation is the absence of sufficient and reliable data, 
the compilation of which is expensive and requires highly trained manpower. 
The ensuing doubt regarding the usefulness of research reduces 
governmental willingness to vote necessary funds. Trained researchers 
are very rare in Nigeria. It is interesting to note, however, that the 
Royal Commission was therefore more influenced by departmental studies 
than by research, apparently because of the aforementioned problems.
The Commission attached great importance to the Departmental studies, to 
"the subjective impressions of those who have direct, disinterested knowledge 
of the quality of local authority performance in two major services. They 
both showed that size was related to performance" (1969,Vol.1,para. 221).
Time, which we have discussed, is yet another difficult factor.
The Murtala/Obasanjo regime had only four years to execute eight objectives, 
local government reform being only one of them. Moreover, being a 
military regime, there was little or no room for research. The reform 
effort was shrouded in almost total secrecy. Yet if a high level of 
perfection is craved, considerable time is necessary, but policy decisions 
frequently cannot await research results, and doubt regarding their 
reliability will make governments even less willing to be patient. This 
attitude will be further aggravated if the Researchers disregard the 
political and administrative possibilities of implementing the proposals 
made.
Despite these limitations of research, it would be wrong to conclude 
that it is worthless. "A strength of many recent reports has been 
that their 'evidence' has not been confined to the 'opinions' of 
interested parties acting as witnesses. The provision of 'intelligence' 
is a valuêible function of a support team..." (Wood,1976,p.45). An 
important usefulness of the research on the effects of size on output was 
in fact to point the way for further, more sophisticated studies in the
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future, A secondary value was that pitfalls emerged which the 
commissioners knew they must avoid in their report. On the other hand, 
lack of research led the Nigerian government to make questionable 
value-judgements and sweeping declarations, such as, that any local 
government with less than 150,000 people is inefficient (Guidelines,1976p.4). 
It would be interesting to speculate on how the military regime hit upon 
their population range of 150,000 to 800,000 in the absence of research.
But we can do no more than speculate. *
Royal Commission's Recommendations
Using the evidence before them in considering their terms of reference 
and how best to achieve the reform objectives, the Royal Commission, 
like the Nigerian Government, posed one fundamental question: "What size
of authority, or range of size, in.terms of population and of area, is 
needed for the democratic and efficient provision of particular services 
and for local self-government as a whole?" (1969,Vol.1,para.8 ). The 
Commission answered this question by applying a number of principles 
(see Appendix III)to the country as a whole. They arrived at the 
conclusion that the greater part of England should be divided into 58 
unitary authorities, embracing both town and country, responsible for 
almost all executive action in relation to local government services.
The major towns which are the focal points for the commerce and cultural 
life of the surrounding area would also be the centre for local government. 
The Commission recommended that the minimum size for all the main services 
should be a population of some 250,000, and a maximum of 1 million population.
The Commission also expressed concern in terms of size and remoteness 
if an all-purpose unitary authority had a population greatly exceeding a 
million. To forestall this, it proposed a two-tier system for the 
three largest conurbations which was similar to the London pattern in
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operation since 1963. In these three metropolitan areas around 
Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester, responsibility for services would 
be divided between the top-tier or metropolitan authority, whose key 
functions would be planning, transportation, water supply, sewerage, refuse 
disposal, police, fire and ambulance services, and major development, 
and twenty lower-tier or metropolitan district authorities, whose key 
duties would be education, personal social services, health and housing.
The Commission also recommended that throughout the 61 areas, local 
councils initially representing the displaced boroughs, urban districts 
and parishes should be established to represent and communicate the wishes 
of cities, towns and villages in all matters of special concern to the 
inhabitants. Their major task would be to represent local opinion, but 
they would have the right to be consulted on matters of special interest 
to local inhabitants and could play a part with services appropriate to 
their resources and subject to the agreement of the main authority.
The Commission further recommended that these 61 unitary and 
metropolitan authorities should be grouped, together with Greater London, 
in eight provinces, each with its own provincial council. Provincial 
councils would be elected by the authorities for the unitary and 
metropolitan areas and Greater London, but would also include co-opted 
members of between 20 per cent and 25 per cent. The major task of these 
councils would be to settle the provincial strategy and planning framework 
within which the main authorities would operate, thus replacing the 
regional economic planning councils, and to collaborate with central 
government in the economic and social development of each province.
In line with the recommendations of the Maud Committee on Management, 
the Commission proposed the abolition of aldermen and limited council 
membership to 75. The number of committees should be small with a 
central committee to work out priorities. Every authority should appoint
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a chief executive, chosen regardless of professional background.
Delegation to officers should be freely exercised. Local offices 
should be established where the public can seek advice.
The main issue which the Commission faced was the choice between 
essentially one-tier and two-tier local government with Mr.Senior 
disagreeing with the Commission's proposals. He believed that the right 
approach was to create city regions consisting of five provincial councils,
35 city regions, 148 district councils and numerous local councils (see 
Diagram 6.4). His City Region concept was similar to the unitary 
authorities since both wanted the merging of town and country. But the 
35 Senior City Regions were larger: 20 of the 35 would have populations in
excess of 1 million each. All members of the Commission were agreed that 
units of this size were too large to be all-purpose authorities, hence his 
proposal of 148 district councils. Senior's City Regions would be directly 
elected and responsible for the planning,transport and development 
functions, capital investment programming, police,fire and education, while 
the directly elected district councils would have health, housing and 
personal services functions. The difference between the Commission's 
proposals and those of Mr.Senior can be illustrated by a diagram (Diagram 6.4)















As we said earlier, the main point of dispute was over the 
principle of unitary authorities. 35 City Regions perfectly fitted 
with the evidence of government departments but the Commission rejected 
this plan because they were convinced of the value of all-purpose county 
borough type authorities: "where responsibility for local government is
undivided, then co-operation between services is much easier" (Richards, 
1978,p.44). Since the units proposed by Senior were too big to be all­
purpose authorities, smaller units had to be created. The Report noted that 
the evidence of the Department of Education and Science inspectors did 
not support the Department's claim that an education authority should have 
a population of half a million; the Commission therefore accepted unitary 
authorities of 250,000 people, or even less in a few cases. Senior's 
proposals were a radical departure from the existing structure, in contrast 
to the Commission's which tried to respect existing local boundaries 
wherever possible. As Richards says, "the argument against unitary 
authorities is that it is impossible to define areas which are suitable for 
the operation of all local government services. One is forced to choose 
either areas suitable for planning purposes which are too large and remote 
for personal services, or a frame work suitable for personal services, that 
is too small for planning" (1978,p.44) (see Appendix 111 for details).
In short, the unitary concept of the Royal Commission was clearly influenced 
by a systems view of local government which emphasized the interdependency 
of the diverse activities of local authorities and the need to plan • 
comprehensively for goals that could not be achieved by any one service in 
isolation.
Reaction to Commission's Report
Public reaction to the unitary authority concept was in general 
unfavourable. Of the four principal local authority associations
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only one, the Association of Municipal Corporations, supported the 
proposals, but the others, like the Conservative Party, favoured a two- 
tier system to prevent the risk of rural interests being disregarded by 
dominant urban authorities. The Senior alternative proposals appeared 
to carry greater support "but this ignored the fact that the Senior 
scheme would have produced fewer and larger education authorities and that 
his proposed boundaries would do more to disturb present administrative 
and social pattern" (Richards,1978,p.45 ). There was an evident desire 
for increased representation, more 'democracy' and a minimum of reform.
A Government White Paper (Reform of Local Government in England) 
in 1970 proposed a new local government structure based on 51 unitary 
areas and five metropolitan areas - Merseyside (Liverpool), Selnec 
(Manchester), West Midlands, West Yorkshire and South Hampshire. The 
Commission's proposals for eight provincial councils were deferred but 
the establishment of local councils was accepted. Other recommendations 
included the abolition of the office of alderman, improvements in 
councillors' allowances, fewer committees, delegation of more detail to 
officers, review of non-financial controls and less statutory control.
The Labour Government intended to promote a Bill in the 1971-2 session 
of Parliament to introduce the new structure. However, in the June 1970 
General Election the Labour lost power, and with it, their concept of 
unitary authorities. The Conservative Government which came to power 
favoured a two-tier structure, and in 1971 published their own White Paper 
(Local Government in England; Government Proposals for Reorganization, 
HMSO,1971) containing alternative proposals which formed the basis of the 
Local Government Act 1972 which was implemented in 1974 (see Appendix IV).
In 1970 the Labour Government had also proposed a new local government 
structure for Wales based on three unitary authorities; one for Newport 
and Monmouthshire, one for Cardiff and East Glamorgan, and a third for 
Swansea and West Glamorgan. The remainder of the country was divided
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into counties and local councils. The proposals were largely opposed 
by the Welsh population and did not materialise because of the subsequent 
change of Government (see Appendix IV for details of the various proposals).
Local Government Reform Principles in Nigeria
In Nigeria, the Government applied the following general principles 
to the country also (Guidelines,1976,pp.3-6);
(a) All the statutory and public service functions of local government should 
be concentrated in multipurpose single-tier institutions with complete and 
self-contained budgets, so that the whole system of local government within
an area can be identified, costed and co-ordinated;
(b) in order to achieve sufficiently la^ge scales of operations to be able 
to perform all the types of functions reasonably economically, whilst 
remaining sufficiently local, looal governments should, as far as possible 
serve local populations of between 150,000 and 800,000, provided that 
these limits may be varied in exceptional geographical circumstances, and 
provided further that there should be no upper limit to the size of local 
governments covering major towns so as to ensure that each town is within
a single unit;
(c) regardless of population, no town or city should be split between two 
primary local governments. The whole planning area surrounding a town 
should be in the same primary local government as the town itself. This 
should apply not only to places which have been formally constituted as 
Planning Areas now, but those which are likely to be so constituted within 
the next ten years. Where two or more towns, whether they are actually 
contiguous or not, are nevertheless close to each other as to make up a 
conurbation, the whole should, with the planning peripheries, be in the 
same local government area. Urban local governments should be
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exceptional. No urban area with a population of less than 150,000
should be established by separating it from its surrounding former 
Division(s) and even at that level, the remaining area should not have 
less than 150,000 inhabitants. The special requirements of towns
within local government areas can best be catered for by subordinate 
Town Councils;
(d) at the other end of the scale, local governments with less than
150,000 total population are in some cases inevitable especially where 
population densities are very low, but local governments covering less 
than 150,000 should be kept as few as possible. In no State should the 
average population of local governments be below 150,000, Only in this 
way can more sophisticated services be provided. Very small local 
governments, apart from their facing financial disadvantages, cannot offer 
attractive career prospects for well-qualified staff. Otherwise one of 
the fundamental objectives of the reforms, which is to raise the quality
of local public services, will not be met. Poor quality staff are unlikely
to provide good quality services;
(e) local governments should, in most cases, be coterminous with Divisions,
with such adjustments as may be appropriate. Some existing very large 
local authorities already have sub-divisions within them, called 
Administrative Areas, Development Areas etc. Again, with appropriate 
adjustments, these could serve as the basis for the new local governments. 
Where large existing local authorities are to be sub-divided, they should 
be within the overall limits above, and be as few as possible. An 
average population of 400,000 or more within a large local government should 
be preferred;
(f) it is not the intention of Government to destroy the organic unity of 
the traditional chiefdoms, emirates or similar institutions. Where a
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large traditional emirate or chiefdom is to be subdivided into several 
local governments, the latter will not become 'emirates' or acquire new 
traditional heads. The local governments will be modern functional 
institutions. The traditional emirates and chiefdoms will remain, 
although their functions will be changedto accord with the present day 
circumstances;
(g) where a local government is coterminous with an existing local government 
authority with a single Emir or Paramount Chief, and it is desired that
this Emir or Paramount Chief shall be the active President of the new 
Local Government Council, there will be a single council only for the local 
government, with the Emir or Paramount Chief as President. This may also 
apply if the local government consists of more than one former emirate 
or other traditional authority, but one of the latter cover the greater 
majority of the whole population, and if the Emir or Parmount Chief is 
fully acceptable to the populations of the minority elements as council 
president. The minor chiefs would in this case be members of the local 
government councils;
(h) where a local government is coterminous with a single former local 
goverment authority, it may be more consonant with local tradition or 
opinion that the Emir or Paramount Chief should be ceremonial president 
only. In this case, for normal business, the council should be presided 
over by a chairman. In such cases there may be a Traditional Council in 
addition to the Local Government Council.
The application of these principles or recommendations will be 
discussed in the next chapter, 'Implementation', because they were 





Accepting the concepts and implementing them are
two very different things (Taylor, 1972, p.251).
We p o i n t e d  out in Chapter 1 that the implementation stage is the achilles 
heel of administrative reform because most reforms fail at this stage.
This is due to the fact that most reformers are not genuine in their inten­
tions or because they are outsiders to the situation they are trying to 
reform. In other cases, highly prestigious bodies like the Redcliffe- 
Maud Commission (1966-69) invested with the task of reform discovered that 
their recommendations were politically unacceptable and they therefore 
fell by the wayside. This was not too surprising since the Commission 
was appointed by a Labour Government that was no longer in office at the 
implementa-tion stage. The Conservative Government did accept the 
Commission's diagnosis of local government defects, their reform objec­
tives and strategies, and the recommendation that a population of 250,000 
was necessary if an authority was to be an effective provider of major 
services such as education.
Despite the fact that most of the recommendations of the Commission 
were modified or rejected (see Appendix IV) , the reform was still inple- 
mented because the vast majority of proximate decision-maJcers had 
broadly accepted the need for reform which revolved around the generally 
accepted weaknesses of the former structure of local government.
Second, the Government, the Opposition and the electorate were committed 
to local administrative reform. This became apparent in 1967-8 when 
several major recommendations of the Mallaby, Maud and especially the Fulton
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Reports were accepted. Third, Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister, 
made it clear that the Government intended to act quickly when he pre­
sented the Redeliffe-Maud Report to the Commons. Fourth, the Conserva­
tive Party led by Mr. Heath had campaigned in 1970 on a platform of 
modernizing government, and little wonder that Mr. Walker a close associate 
of Mr. Heath and an ambitious politican who was keenly interested in local 
government reform as shadow minister, became the minister in-charge.
Thus, all the crucial implementation variables (see Chapter 1) were 
favourable at the passing of the Local Government Bill in 1971 and the con­
sequent Local Government Act 1972. Britain undertook a conç)rehensive 
reform Cas against selective reform or incrementalism) because the leader­
ship was strong, committed, willing and united. The time (see Chapter 6) 
was propitious: the Conservative Party had just won the general election 
in 1970 and was still popular in 1971-2. Many civil servants, tradition­
ally renown for opposing reform, siç>ported this one in principle. A good 
example is Dame Evelyn Sharp, a powerful and experienced permanent sec­
retary. The reform agents Cthe Commission) were also strong and committed. 
They were respected experts and they maintained the reform momentum by 
generating a lot of public debate and an atmosphere of reform. The socio­
political environment was equally favourable. The electorate was keenly 
interested in seeing some changes: there was "widespread agreement among
witnesses on the need to change the present local government system"
(Hoyal Commission on Local Government in England, 1969, Vol.l, para.109). 
Both the Government and the Opposition were also agreed on the need for 
structural reforms and whatever arguments ensued were restricted to the 
type of reform; "at no stage was a serious anti-reform lobby in evidence" 
CWood, 1976, p.183).
A comprehensive local government reform was also carried through 
In Nigeria because the Murtala/Obasanjo Government which initiated and 
implemented it was keenly interested in the reform. It was such ' a
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crucial element in (their) political programme' that they could
not afford to entrust it completely unto a commission (see Chapter 6).
We should note, however, that the recommendations of the Federal Government 
were highly influenced ty the 1974 Public Service Review Commission (Udoji 
Commission). The following are some of the recommendations of the Com­
mission which were adopted by the Murtala/Obasanjo regime: (a) States 
operating a multi-tier local government system should re-examine the 
structure with a view to adopting a single-tier system; (b) Ministries of 
Local Government should establish research and development planning units 
to assist local government in improving the effectiveness of their admini­
stration; (c) The Council, which should continue as the policy making body 
for the Local Authority, should forbear from interfering with administrative 
matters, which should be fully delegated to the Executive Secretary; (d)
The revenue-sharing arrangement between state and local government should 
be reviewed with the object of ensuring that local authorities are provided 
with adequate funds for performance of their functions; Ce) In order to 
be able to recruit and retain competent staff the salaries and conditions 
of service of local government staff should not be less favourable 
than those of civil servants; (jf) Each state should establish a Local 
Government Service Board to develop and implement common policies dealing 
with personnel matters and to apply the same in all local government 
authorities in the state; and (g) Statutory recognition should be given to 
the administrative function of traditional rulers, and they should be 
more closely integrated as a parallel but coinplementary system for 
projecting government image at the local level (Public Service Review 
Commission, 1974, pp.118-133).
Like in Britain, all the implementation variables were propitious at ^
the time of implementation of the Nigerian reform: the socio-political en­
vironment was favourable; a new regime had just come to power in 1975 after 
almost a decade of Gowon's corrupt government Csee Chapter 5). The people 
were definitely yearning for a change and they welcomed the coup d'etat that
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brought Murtala to power, and his promise to reform local government. This 
was shown by the nation-wide demonstration in support of the new regime and 
its policies; the press called the advent of Murtala's regime 'a golden oppor­
tunity' for the 'rebirth of a nation' (Nigerian Herald, 6 August 1975); and 
the university students who since 1972 had had an average of three violent 
riots every year against Gowon's regime not only welcomed Murtala's govern­
ment but the National Union of Nigerian Students placed a two-year self- i
imposed ban on rioting as a gesture of its support for Murtala. The political 
structure of the nation was also favourable to reform. The military had no 
room for legislative processes, arguments and opposition. This not only 
killed any resistance to reform but it also speeded up the implementation.
The reform agents, the military, were very sincere in their attempt to 
reform the local government structure. This genuineness and sincerity of 
purpose led the Military Government to undertake the reform themselves 
rather than entrust it to a commission vhich would have wasted time and given 
rise to dissension of opinion as to whether or not reform was necessary, 
and if necessary, what structure it should take. The reform strategy 
Csee chapter 6) matched the occasion perfectly. One of the strategies which 
we have not mentioned, however, was the compulsory retirement, immediately 
after the regime came to power, of known 'dead-wood' civil servants who '
would have opposed or delayed the reform. These civil servants had been
known to block past reform attempts because their interests were at stake.
Their retirement aided the serene and auspicious socio-political environment 
and strengthened the image and power of the Government.
Another strategy which the Military Government used and which we 
briefly mentioned in the last chapter, was to employ the blessing and co­
operation of traditional rulers. They had perceived real or imaginary 
threats that they would be adversely affected by the reform but the Govern­
ment turned the scale in their favour by promising to restore their status 
and powers which had been whittled down by previous governments :
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Nothing in these reforms could be construed to mean an attempt 
at reducing or abolishing the traditional functions of our Emirs,
Obas, and Chiefs. On the contrary, the reforms recognize the 
crucial nature of the position of the traditional authorities and 
care has been taken to preserve the organic unity of our traditional 
institutions and societies (Guidelines, 1976, foreword).
The support of the traditional rulers gave the reformers an added
influence and power. By eliciting their support, the Government overcame
the greatest hurdle and thus they had ample room to implement the reform
smoothly and quickly.
In Lee's matrix, time and leadership are two crucial variables (1970,
pp.77-89). His hypothesis about reform implementation is confirmed in
both Nigeria and Britain: that a comprehensive strategy can be implemented
if the leadership of reform agents and the internal structure of the reform
agency are strong and united and if the social environment and the political
structure are favourable. The first variable# 'time', we have discussed
in chapter 6 because it is a strategy that is equally important to the
implementation stage as to the other stages of administrative reform.
Leadership or the role of 'homo politicus' which we briefly mentioned in
that chapter too and which we have briefly touched on here will be discussed
fully later in this chapter. Backoff's hypothesis that the greater the
comprehensiveness, complexity, and magnitude of changes, the lesser
the probability of implementation can only be assumed to be true a priori.
It is certainly difficult to prove in the case of the 1974 and 1976
reforms in Britain and Nigeria respectively because his hypothesis failed
to take into consideration other important variables such as leadership,
time and socio-political environment of the country concerned. The changes
in both countries were complex and comprehensive, yet they were implemented
because the reformers had the will and the power to do so, and the time
and socio-political atmosphere were propitious.
We will divide this chapter into two: the legislative process of 
implementation, and the actual changes (structures, elections, committees, 
etc.) that were made. In the first part we will concentrate our attention
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on Britain because the legislative process was lacking in the case of 
Nigeria. We mentioned in the last chapter, though, that some con­
sultations did take place in Nigeria. In the second part we will concentrate 
on the changed system ip Nigeria particularly because the changes that took 
place in Britain are fairly familiar and relatively easy to obtain. We 
will, however, reduce some of the structural changes in Britain to an 
appendix (see Appendix IV).
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 1971-2 
The White Paper
In February 1971 the new Conservative Government's proposals emerged 
in a twelve-page White Paper (liOcal Government in England: Government 
Proposals for Reorganization), and a consultative document was published 
for Wales (Welsh Office, 1971). The White Paper convering local govern­
ment in England recognized the validity of the arguments for large autho­
rities for the effective and efficient operation of some services and for 
smaller authorities for grass-roots democracy but argued that regional or 
provincial areas would be too large for the operation of local government 
services. Hence the Conservative Government 'solution' of a two-tier 
structure was proposed, consisting essentially of counties and districts 
CSharpe, 1978, p.83). Metropolitan counties were proposed in the densely 
populated conurbations, each divided into metropolitan districts having 
more powers than other districts. The detailed geographical applica­
tion of these principles propounded by the White Paper were set out in a 
separate circular. Department of the Environment Circular 8/71.
Thus there are two styles of local government system, the metropolitan 
and the non-metropolitan. What distinguishes them is the allocation of 
responsibility for education, including libraries, and the personal social 
services (see Appendix I) . The White Paper argued that a population range 
of between 250,000 and a million was needed for effective performance
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of these functions. In the conurbations it is possible to form second- 
tier districts compact in size which fall within this population range.
Here the districts can undertake education and the social services.
The Conservative scheme, of six metropolitan counties (Merseyside, Greater 
Manchester, West Midlands, West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Tyneside) 
which differed slightly from the Labour's in that South Yorkshire and 
Tyneside were included but South Hampshire was left out, were to have 34 
metropolitan districts.
In order to enhance representative democracy and make for intimacy of 
the electorate and their representatives, it was proposed that the second- 
tier authorities in the rural areas should have a population far below 
250,000. The pattern here is similar to the previous one in that powers 
should be distributed between county and district with major functions 
remaining with the former. 38 non-metropolitan counties were recommended 
by the White Paper and the accompanying Circular from the Department of 
the Environment outlined boundaries for the counties. Isle of Wight, the 
smallest non-metropolitan county with a population of 111,000 is the only 
one that does not pass the 250,000 limit. At the other extreme were some 
non-metropolitan counties with populations of over a million. The largest 
non-metropolitan counties, Essex, Hampshire and Kent seem too big to be 
satisfactory representative authorities responsible for education and 
social services. The boundaries for metropolitan districts were also 
outlined in the Department of the Environment Circular. Here the population 
range lay between 182,000 for South Tyneside and 1,168,000 for Birmingham.
A radical reorganisation of boroughs and urban and rural districts 
was proposed to provide larger districts which would have greater 
resources and thus be better fitted to undertake the responsibilities 
allocated to them. This turned out not to be too radical since many of 
the districts had a population and rateable resources far below those 
of the defunct county boroughs. Clearly the status of a local authority 
was to depend not only on size but also on the nature of the area
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and its surroundings. A Local Government Boundary Commission was to 
make proposals for the arrangement of districts outside the metropolitan 
counties and its report in 1972 proposed 278 districts with an average 
population of about 100,000. In the most remote rural areas district 
population fall as low as 40,000. As far as possible the new district map 
was formed by amalgamations of existing authorities.
The place of the rural parish was also recognised by the White Paper 
but it was to have powers rather than duties. It was subsequently agreed 
that former boroughs and urban districts with a maximum population of
20,000 could form third-tier councils.
The effect of these reforms varied from place to place. Only dis­
trict boundary changes affected the five shires of Salop, Wiltshire, 
the Isle of Wight, Cornwall and Hertfordshire. In other places, adjustments 
to county boundaries and/or the merging of former counties either in part 
or as a whole took place. Many of the new shires were amalgamated with 
one or more former county boroughs, which,inevitably, resented their 
reduced status. The practical effect was less felt where the county 
borough was already the geographical headquarters of the administrative 
county. Plymouth, Portsmouth and Southampton^for instance, felt it more 
than Norwich and Nottingham. The practical effect was most felt in the 
metropolitan areas where not only were there new boundaries, but also 
new types of authority.
The Welsh consultative document proposed that Wales should be re- 
organzied into seven new counties and 36 districts. Glamorgan was to be 
split into two and five other counties Clwyd, Dyfed, Gwent, Gwynedd and 
Powys were to be established along the lines of their English counterparts. 
The Local Government Act later divided Glamorgan into three sections with 
South Glamorgan containing only two districts, Barry and Cardiff. Com­
munity councils could also be created at the parish level (see Figure 7.1).
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The Bill
The Bill of 351 pages which was presented to Parliament on 
November 4th, 1971 contained no major changes from those discussed above 
except that all six metropolitan counties had been reduced in size, 
with territory being conceded to the neighbouring counties. Glossop,
Skip ton and Harrogate, and Ellesmere Port, which were originally planned 
to be in Greater Manchester (Tameside district), West Yorkshire (Leeds 
district), and Meryseyside (Wirral district) respectively were returned to 
their traditional counties. In addition, Durham, Northumberland, Cheshire, 
Lancashire, Derbyshire, Staffordshire, North Yorkshire and Warwickshire 
were to benefit from smaller changes. There were also exchanges of 
territory between shire counties, designed, again, to restore 'natural 
loyalty of people towards their counties'. The new counties of Avon and 
Teeside (later to be renamed Cleveland) were reduced in size, the former 
losing the Frome area to Somerset, the latter Easington to Durham and a 
large part of Stokesley Rural District to North Yorkshire. Brackley was 
returned to Northamptonshire, Lowestoft to Suffolk, Long Eaton to Derbyshire, 
Aldershot to Hampshire, and the Ingleton area of the Yorkshire dales to 
North Yorkshire. Furthermore, Sedbergh Rural District Council was transferred 
from Yorkshire to Cumbria. It was proposed that Colchester and the adja­
cent north-east Essex area were to be added to Suffolk, leaving a smaller 
Essex county based more clearly on Chelmsford and Southend, on the grounds 
that the ColChester-Ipswich area should be treated as one and that most 
councils in the area had asked for the transfer. The new Humberside county 
was extended to take in a substantial part of north Lincolnshire (Grimsby 
and Scunthorpe). New counties, most of which were continuations of 
existing counties,were also renamed in the Bill. The name Tyneside was 
changed during the parliamentary proceedings to Tyne and Wear. Malvern 
became known as Hereford and Worcester. Teeside was renamed Cleveland but 
Avon, Cumbria and Humberside retained their names.
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In the allocation of functions the Government had made con­
cessions to the AMC and the district council associations which gave 
the districts responsibility for clean air zone, the maintenance of minor 
urban roads, municipal public transport undertakings (except in metro­
politan counties), and some local plan-making.
Taking into consideration the politico-administrative inportance 
of local government reform, one can say that the Bill had an easy passage 
through the Committee Stage and in Parliament, except for matters of 
details. The Labour Party's opposition to the Bill was weakened by 
their acceptance of the unpopular Royal Commission's scheme of unitary 
authority. The Labour Party's opposition to responsibility for education 
being given to districts instead of metropolitan counties was also un­
popular since it would diminish representation and participation. The 
Labour Party also critized the Government for drawing boundaries too 
tightly around the metropolitan areas with the consequence that these autho­
rities would find it difficult or impossible to obtain the land needed for 
housing development in the foreseeable future. Again, this proved un­
popular because the 'fringe' areas of the metropolitan counties were content 
to remain rural or semi-rural rather than being included in the conurbations. 
Furthermore, the Labour Party accused the Conservative Government of 
gerrymandering because it had merged Labour controlled county boroughs 
in Conservative-controlled counties. More specifically, the division of 
Glamorgan into three parts is so flagrantly party-political that it evoked 
an unprecedented accusation of indefensible political gerrymandering from 
Lady Sharp, the former Permanent Secretary of the old Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government (Sharpe, 1978, p.84). New Society dubbed the Bill 
"a pure political carve up, devoid of all justification in terms of social 
geography or of good planning" (18 February 1971, p.259). We return to 
this point below (see section on 'The Role of "Homo Politicus"').
Thus, as Richards puts it, "during the second reading debate in the 
House of Commons on the Bill the most lively issue concerned a question of
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procedure rather than substance: it was whether the proposals for Wales 
should have been presented in a separate Bill" (1978, p.50). Although the 
standing committee met on at least 51 occasions and the report stage was 
lengthy, no major changes in principles took place and only alterations 
of detail were made. Only minor structural and technical amendments, 
mostly introduced by the Government, took place in the House of Lords, except 
for the return of refuse disposal to counties from non-metropolitan districts, 
which the Government had proposed but which was defeated in Parliament.
The Bill had a relatively easy passage in Parliament despite the 
importance of local government reform because 'a general weariness had 
surrounded the whole question', As we said before, there was a general 
agreement that some reorganisation was necessary if further central govern­
ment's erosion of local powers was to be stemmed, and if the capability of 
local government was to be enhanced. Secondly, there was general acceptance 
of the 1972 plan among the public, the Government and the association 
of local authorities (jexcept, of course, the Assocition of Municipal 
Corporations). "The Royal Commission had ignored the extent to which the 
county was a social unit as well as an administrative entity and that as a 
social unit it commanded considerable loyalty. In contrast the Con­
servative plan respected existing boundaries to a far greater extent, 
especially in relation to the counties" (Richards, 1978, p.51). Thirdly, 
although there were protests, lobbies and campaigns, these were unsuccessful 
because they were uncoordinated and were sometimes confusing. Lastly, 
although there were a few individual MPs who tried tc secure changes
favourable to their constituencies, it was clear that there were more urgent
social and economic issues facing Parliament. "In 1972 local government was 
far from being top of the politcal agenda" (Richards, 1978, p.51). Thus,
the Bill became an Act on 26 October 1972.
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Local Government Act 1972
The Local Government Act 1972 gave effect to the proposals con­
tained in the Bill creating a new local government structure in 
England and Wales, with a relocation of functions. It also contained new 
provisions covering the administration of local authorities including such 
matters as registration of electors and conduct of elections, general pro­
cedural arrangements, staffing,discharge of functions and finance. This 
Act largely replaced the Local Government Act 1933 and incorporated,with 
some modifications, the provisions of the London Government Act 1963 re­
lating to local government in London. However, the structure of London 
local government was barely changed and remained as contained in the 1963 
Act.
The new structure contained in the 1972 Act became fully operational 
on 1 April 1974. The Act divided England and Wales into counties and 
districts, with Monmouthshire and Newport transferred to Wales. There 
are 45 counties in England and eight in Wales, of which only five are 
entirely coincident with the boundaries of the former administrative 
counties. Six of the English counties are termed metropolitan counties, 
embracing the major urban conurbations of Greater Manchester, Merseyside, 
South Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear, West Yorkshire and West Midlands. The 
remaining 39 English counties are often referred to as non-metropolitan 
counties (see Figure 7.1) .
In the six metropolitan counties there are 36 metropolitan districts 
with similar constitutions to those of other districts but extended func­
tions Csee Appendix I). There are 296 non-metropolitan districts in England 
and 37 in Wales, some of which are wholly urban, some wholly rural and 
many others both urban and rural in composition. This has resulted in a 
large reduction in the number of second-tier authorities, which previously 
amounted to 1,333,made up of county and non-county boroughs and urban and 
rural districts (see Figure 7.1). District councils were enpowered to 
submit a petition to the Privy Council for borough status and many sub-
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missions were made and approved. Procurement of borough status entitles the 
council to elect a mayor and deputy mayor but has little other practical 
importance.
At third-tier level, English rural parishes remain and new parishes 
may be created and existing ones abolished. Hence the pattern of parishes 
can change,and as the earlier distinction between rural and urban dis­
tricts has been removed, there is no restriction on the districts in 
which parishes can be created. Former rural parish councils continue and 
new ones were to be established in former boroughs and urban districts 
where the Secretary of State so directed. The population limit for new 
parish councils is either 150 or 200 electors, the lower limit applying 
where a parish meeting has requested one. In Wales, community councils 
supersede the former boroughs, urban districts and rural parishes.
Permanent Local Government Boundary Commissions were established 
for England and Wales to review local government boundaries and local 
electoral arrangements. The reorganisation reduced the total number 
of principal councils (above third-tier level) in England and Wales, 
including London, from 1,425 to 456. There was, however, still a great 
diversity of population, areas and rateable values within the same cate­
gory of authority, although much less than before the reform Csee Tabled 
7.1 and 7.2 and compare with Tables 5.1 and 5.2).
The hiatus between the Act in 1972 and its actual implementation in 
1974 was necessary in order to make adequate preparations for the 
changeover from the old authorities to the new. In particular it was 
necessary to assemble resources of staff and accommodation, to establish 
administrative arrangements and for the new councils to become familiar with 
their functions and activities. Time was needed for elections to be held 
(between March and June 1973) so that the new councils could take up their 
executive responsibilities and the 1972 Act provided a period of overlap 
during which the old and the new authorities co-existed, although the
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TABLE 7.1 : POPULATION RANGES FOR EACH TYPE OF AUTHORITY
Type of Authority Lowest Population Highest Population
English Metropolitan Tyne and Wear West Midlands
Counties • C l ,1 9 3 ,0 0 0 ) (2 ,7 7 7 ,0 0 0 )
English non- Isle of Wight Hampshire
Metropolitan c m ,  000) (1 ,4 5 0 ,0 0 0 )
counties
Welsh Counties Powys Mid Glamorgan
C io i,o o o ) (5 4 0 ,0 0 0 )
London boroughs Kingston-on-Thame s Croydon
C136,000) (3 2 9 ,0 0 0 )
English Metropolitan Souty Tyneside Birmingham
Districts C182,000) (1 ,1 6 8 ,0 0 0 )
English non- Teeside Avon
Metropolitan C24,000) (4 2 2 ,0 0 0 )
districts
Welsh districts Radnor Cardiff
C IS ,670) (2 8 6 ,0 0 0 )
SOURCE : Compiled from Richards, 1978.
TABLE 7.2 : RATEABLE VALUE (.IN £MN) RANGES FOR EACH TYPE OF AUTHORITY
Type of Authority Lowest Rateable Value
Highest Rateable 
Value
English metro­ Tyne and Wear West Midlands
politan counties (116 (386)
English non­ Isle of Wight Essex
metropolitan (12) (205)
counties
Welsh counties Powys South Glamorgan
C8) (45)
London boroughs Sutton City of Westminster
C26) (311)
SOURCE : Compiled from Richards, 1978.
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new ones had no operational fucntions at thaf time.
Before the new councils were elected, joint committees were set up 
for the new administrative areas composed of elected representatives of 
the appropriate existing authorities. The essence of these committees 
was to prepare a mass of advice for the in-coming regime, make arrange­
ments for the smooth take-over by the new authorities and to help co­
ordinate policies and strategies. They were also to take basic manage­
ment decisions, including those on committee and departmental structures, 
ideally adopting a corporate management approach as advocated in the 
Bains Report (see chapter 6).
One particular difficult problem in the change-over period was the 
appointment of staff by the new local authorities. The main objectives 
were to redeploy existing staff in the most effective way, to protect 
the interests of staff and to assist the public by the smooth and efficient 
transfer of functions. In consequence the customary procedure of public 
advertisement was used only for a limited number of very senior posts, 
mainly chief executives to county councils and metropolitan districts.
Most other senior professional, technical and administrative posts were 
filled from among local government officers within limited recruitment 
areas. Where this procedure did not produce a suitable applicant, the 
Local Government Staff Commission normally gave approval for the national 
advertisement of the post but restricted it to serving local government 
officers in England (excluding London) or Wales. This restriction was 
intended to safeguard the interests of staff during the reorganisation 
period when many posts were at risk aid some might face redundancy.
The majority of staff undertaking specific functions were transferred 
to the appropriate new authority without formal selection.
Implementation in Nigeria
As we pointed out earlier, local government reform in Nigeria lacked 
the legislative process because the country had no legislature at the
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time. All that we will do here, therefore, is give a broad analysis 
of the arrangements that were made to bring the implementation to 
success. Details will be discussed in the next section. There were 
consultations, however, (see chapter 6) but these were more or less part 
of the Military Government's strategy to facilitate the implementation of 
local government reform. We must note, however, that everything that we 
have said concerning the Guidelines was mandatory on the states. All the 
recommendations contained in the Guidelines were to be adhered to. Indeed 
in order to enhance its legality, it was renamed The Draft Local Government 
Edict and the contents of all subsequent edicts by the states were iden­
tical to the Draft. The Guidelines and the Draft therefore formed the 
common denominator for all the states but their provisions (detailed 
substance, not principles) were adapted, to a limited extent, by individual 
states in order to accommodate local circumstances. Here then is another 
contrast to the reform process in Britain: the local authorities are 
created by the Parliament in Britain, which is typical of a unitary 
system of government but in Nigeria local authorities are created by and 
derive their powers from the states which is typical of a federal system 
of government.
In 1976 the Federal Military Government directed that all local 
authorities in the country be dissolved. For example, the existing 
Divisional Development Councils and Development Committees in Bendel 
State were dissolved on 26th May 1976 and Anambra State abolished the 
Divisional, Urban and Community Councils of the former Divisional Admini­
stration system on August 1st. Kwara dissolved its Local Government 
Authorities and Cross River State its Development Administration system 
on August 1st 1976.
All the states promulgated local government edicts (e.g., Kwara 
State Local Government Edict No.8 of 1976, Rivers State Local Government 
Edict No.8 of 1976, Kaduna State Local Government Edict No.l of 1977, 
etc*) which provided the necessary legal status on which the new authorities
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were to operate. They made provisions for elections into the new 
councils and for the establishment of Traditional Councils and Local 
Government Service Boards. Perhaps their most important provision, like 
the Guidelines, was that for the first time the whole country was to 
have a uniform unitary system of local government; "All the statutory and 
public service functions of local government in Nigeria should be con­
centrated in multi-purpose single-tier institutions called Local Governments" 
(Guidelines, 1976, p.3). Subordinate councils could be çreated but these 
were to have no powers, functions and financial allocations except those 
derived from their 'parent' local government. This again is an interesting 
contrast to the multi-tier local government system in Britain.
Apart from these statutory measures, necessary administrative actions 
were also taken to ensure the successful implementation of these reforms. 
Caretaker Committees were set up during the transition and administrative 
officers (usually state civil servants) termed Sole Administrators were 
appointed. These were to see to the smooth changeover from the old
authorities to the new. Their duty included (a) The transfer of functions 
from the states ministries to the local authorities; (b) the transfer, 
recruitment or secondment of staff from the states civil services; (c) the 
preparation of estimates for the new local authorities; and (d) the assess­
ment and take-over of physical assets.
Steering Committees which were designated Implementation Committees 
in some states were set up (a) to make all necessary arrangements for the 
registration of voters, compilation of voters' list, erection of polling 
booths, printing of ballot papers, etc; (b) to delineate or divide each 
local government into single member constituencies for the purpose of the 
elections; (c) to make general arrangements for the planning, supervision 
and conduct of elections; Cd) to study in depth the relevant policy papers 
containing the Federal Government decisions on local government reform 
and what their implications are for each state; (e) to demarcatej, with the 
help of Government surveyors, etc.if necessary, the state into a number
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of local government authorities; (f) to merge or divide areas into 
local authorities in order to achieve the minimum population of 150,000 
as directed by the Federal Government; and (g) to take traditional loyalties 
into consideration when making such demarcations; or as the Guidelines 
put it, "the new local authorities must be coterminous with existing 
Divisions, with such adjustments as may be appropriate" (1976,p.5)
Elections into local councils, which could be direct or indirect, 
were held in various parts of the country between November 1976 and 
January 1977. All these arrangements were completed at different dates 
in different states between January and Februry 1977. In accordance 
with the provision of the Guidelines and the edicts the 75 per cent 
elected and 25 per cent nominated councillors elected their chairmen 
(in reality each council had to submit a list of three candidates to 
the Governor who alone could make one of them the chairman - see 
chapter 8 for our comment) and supervisory councillors and the new local 
government councils were inaugurated on 6th January 1977 in Bendel, 24th 
February in Benue, and 10th February 1977 in Imo State. By 1st April 
1977 Nigeria's 299 local authorities became fully operational.
THE REFORMED LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM 
Structure
Whereas Britain opted for a two-tier system which apparently strikes 
a compromise between the need for large areas on grounds of functional 
efficiency and the desirability of smaller units in the interest of 
community representation and involvement, the Guidelines stipulate that 
Nigeria should have "multi-purpose single-tier institutions called 
local government with complete and self-contained budgets, so that the 
whole system of local government within any area can be identified, costed 
and co-ordinated" Cl976,p.3). Where appropriate, however, the local 
authorities could have subordinate units to which they could delegate 
some of their powers and functions. It was hoped that such subordinate
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units would further enhance representation and pariticpation. In order 
to 'efficiently' perform its duties and still remain 'local', the 
Government directed that each local government area should have popu­
lations of between 150,000 and 300,000, with possible extension to
400.000 for large councils and even higher figures (800,000) where a 
single urban area is concerned. Peirmission had to be taken from the 
Federal Government before any state could create an authority of less than
150.000 population.
TABLE 7.3-.POPULATION VARIATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS IN SOME STATES 
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SOURCES : Compiled from Statistical Digests of some states, 
and from 'Progress Reports' sent in by some states 
to the National Conference on Local Government Reform, 
University of Ife, 1977.
A brief look at Table 7.3 shows the extent to which local authorities 
in 9 states (chosen randomly) were created in accordance with the Federal 
Government's guidelines. Of the 140 authorities in the nine states, 133 
have populations within the range stipuUl-fced by the Government. In other 
words, only 7 of the 140 local authorities (5%) are outside the guide-
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lines, and for which special permission had to be sought for their 
creation before they started to function. By April 1977, a total of 
299 local authorities were fully operational in Nigeria.
It is interesting fo compare Tables 7.1 and 7.3. As in Britain, 
there are considerable variations in sizes of local authorities in 
Nigeria although these are far less bizarre than before the 1976 reform 
(compare Tabler 5.3 and 7.3). Unlike in Britain where each metropolitan 
county exceeds the one million population mark, in Nigeria there is no 
local authority with more than the upper limit of 800^000 people. Just 
as one can point to the disparity in population of two English metro­
politan districts, Birmingham (J., 168,000) and South Tyneside (182,000) so 
also one can point to the disparity between Kano Metropolitan Authority 
(711,354) and Oguma Local Government (89,560). There are diversities as 
well in areas and revenues (Table 7.4) but again much less than before 
the reform in 1976 (eee chapter 5).
TABLE 7.4; IE VENUE RANGES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS IN SOME STATES,
1977-8 (TN NAIRA)
State Highest Lowest
Sokoto Sokoto L.G. (4,412,372) Anka L.G. (1,782,778)
Ogun Abeokuta L.G. (2,857,720) Ijebu North L.G. (1,690,773)
Kano Kano Metropolitan U2,522,940) Kazaure L.G. (1,794,320)
Imo Aba L.G. 17,782,670) Bende L.G. (3,027,139)
Bauchi Akko L.G. (2,937,404) Dass L.G. ( 796,928)
SOURCES ; Compiled from Statistical Digests of some states, 
and 'Progress Reports' delivered at the National 
Conference on Local Government Reform, University 
of Ife, 1977.
The degree of change involved varied from state to state. Its 
practical effect was most felt in the northern states where large 
emirates had to be broken up into a number of local authorities. In Kano 
State, for example, the former Kano Emirate was divided into 16 new local 
authorities. Subordinate authorities were also established so as to bring
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the electorate nearer the government (see Table 7.5). Nineteen 
local authorities replaced the former five insokoto State, and in 
Bornu State, the former Bornu Local Authority was broken up into eleven 
new local governments.. There were formidable changes in the structure 
of local government in other parts of the federation but attempts were 
made not to disturb loyalties of the people to their local authorities. 
There were adjustments to existing boundaries, for example, in Bendel State 
where the fourteen Divisional Development Councils became nineteen local 
governments. Kwara State now has twelve local authorities instead 
of the former eight, with changes only in Igbirra Division which is now 
divided into Okehi and Okene Local Governments; Ilorin Division which was 
divided into three new local authorities (Asa, Ilorin and Moro); and 
Igbomina/Ekiti Division which becomes two local governments, Ifelodun 
and Irepodun. Eight new local authorities now replace the former seven 
in Niger State. Lagos State created eight new local governments out of 
the former seven local councils. The existing Lagos City Council was 
divided into two - Lagos Island Local Government and Lagos Mainland 
Local Government. Slight boundary changes were made at Ikorodu, Ikeja 
and Epe local authorities; Mushin Town Council was divided into Mushin 
West and Mushin East Local Governments; and Awori Ajeromi and Egun Awori 
District Councils were amalgamated to form Badagry Local Government. Thus 
every local government has an identifiable governmental character. As a 
third-tier of government, it has elected officers who are ejected to 
be responsible to the electing citizens.
In Britain corruption and maladministration is to be checked by 
the ombudsman. The Local Government Act 1974 established two commissions 
for local administration, one for England and the other for Wales, each 
embodying parliamentary and local commissioners. The commissions make 
the necessary administrative arrangements including appointing staff, 
providing accommodation and publishing information about the procedure
G0 LO lO'H m  iH+JId iH 'd'H H  CDd roOi0A
(0M(U tj■P GIdId
1Id U  5  P0) w Ida O G àG > %Id 0 Id«  El Q
mvvOTfooooooL O m o ) m r ^ r ~ o o M  vDrocNjr'Oomv'^r
, OOvOiHri r H ^ n ^  CvjCOCNK>r^»HVVX)— " -vjro^ij'^vOromm
ID rH V CD iH CD CN a 'd'
m CN in O CN 'd' a ar~ 1—1 in VD r-' in n 0» in r*
r* 00 0» iH (N <D iH a m
ro o rH CD a CD a a d\






p 'O do Id d T 3H a d
Id aG g G
P 0 • H G
• H N r H 0) G 'dx: TO U 0 p (I) d G Id
u > Id •O G 'O > P •G U
• H Id > d Id d Id d Id • H Id
a P 6 H a P p ^ 3 a Ü



































>  + i II Id&Q P « U
&
p Sk •do•O GId d Ids tpG kT) Id IdC rHId d ka Id
Id TJs G IdId Id Pi
Id .. 0)
Id r H-H w dk 3 w
• H Ida a
Id
G §
* H • H Idk P kd P




k > 1 0











p 1G •H0) iHw oH Ak < Ü0) a k> M PQ s 0)lb w 2
1—1 o oId GÜ Id0 aa < iH
;
t! B a 2
(d  i 4  n r l ^
j Q  b >  - n  Id  ^ G G N
Q «3 à  g  rt Q
•g
CN m  un VÛ
< H
Id d a id pip 'd d w <o Id d 'd 3 a
'd a d M id H
Id a a 2G g G < id W
■H 0 H G •d - a G
M N G rH <D G p H P P a p
Id k d 0 "H m CO d G Id H m P 0)> Id nd G > P .G k > 1 " d P
Id > d id d id d 10 - H Id G id D
P Ô H a 15 P P hi a U a a a ü o
. , , . . , . . . *
a a o iH CN a a a r» a CJ>
iH r H r H rH iH r—1 P a P P o p Q O<N
294
for making complaints. The commissioners investigate the complaints.
The office of the ombudsman is absent in Nigerian local government but the 
Guidelines made provisions for public scrutiny of the accounts and records 
of proceedings of the council.
Urban Areas
Communities may be considered large either by population, and/or 
by territory. Where both the population and territory are large the main . 
problem will be that of dividing the community into units. There are 
two options : (a) constitution of large urban centres into separate local 
government units and the rest into one or more local government areas; and
(b) merging some areas with the main town and constitution of the rest into 
one or more local government units.
The Guidelines provide that urban centres with populations of 
more than 150,000 could be constituted into separate local government 
areas. In fact it stipulates that no town or city should be split between 
two primary local governments; and that "the special requirements of towns 
within local government areas can best be catered for by subordinate Town 
or Ward Councils" (1976, p.4).
Thus the 1976 reform tried to solve the existing structural prob­
lems of local government by supplying a full description of local govern­
ment with the following attributes; the first criterion is that of 
autonomy. The new local government unit is established by law "to exercise 
specific powers within defined areas" and they have their "own identity, 
powers, and sources of revenue ... and functions for which they are 
responsible to the State" (Guidelines, 1976, p.3). Some of these powers 
and functions are exclusive to local governments while others are held 
concurrently with State Governments (see Appendix I). In other words, 
as creatures of the state, the new local governments are subject to 
state control in the concurrent list. This control notwithstanding, local 
authorities have a substantial degree of autonomy - in functions.
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administrative and fiscal affairs (see, however. Chapter 8). The 
second attribute is that a local authority now exists as a corporate
entity - with a given area and population.
FUNCTIONS OF NEW LOCAL AUTHORITIES
Local authorities are statutory corporations created by State 
Edicts or by Act of Parliament in Britain and limited in their activities 
to the powers and duties prescribed in the legislation. If they act un­
lawfully, the actions will be ultra vires and the courts can prevent this.
Local authority functions in both countries are of two main categories : 
those which they have a duty to perform (mandatory functions) ; and those 
which they can perform at their discretion (permissive functions) . The 
majority of functions are compulsory - as, for instance, refuse disposal 
and the provision of public conveniences. On the other hand the provision 
of local entertainments or libraries is a service which many local 
authorities are empowered to provide if they believe it necessary, but there 
is no compulsion and it ranks as a permissive function. A number of func­
tions such as the provision of public health and education are mandatory 
in Britain whereas they are permissive in Nigeria (See Appendix I) .
The reasons for allowing such functions to be permissive in Nigeria are 
due to the weak financial position of local authorities and lack of ade­
quately qualified personnel.
Local authorities may also acquire additional powers, giving some 
measure of flexibility and enabling enterprising authorities to do 
pioneering work. Furthermore, authorities' functions \ary over time, 
either by the allocation of new activities, such as consumer protection 
services, or by the transfer of functions to other bodies, such as water 
supply to the new water authorities-or corporations.
Since the system of local government in Nigeria is unitary, there 
is no division of functions between levels of authorities. In England and
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Wales, all local authority services in any area can be provided by one 
or both of the principal councils, namely a metropolitan county and/or 
metropolitan district, a non-metropolitan county and/or non-metropolitan 
district, or the Greater London Council and/or a London borough. In some 
cases concurrent powers are exercised whereby some aspects of a service 
are provided at one level and other aspects at another, planning being 
one example. District councils can also in some instances undertake duties 
on behalf of county councils on an agency basis. The underlying philosophy 
behind the division of local authority functions is to allocate to the 
counties those functions which need substantial resources and/or can be 
most effectively administered over large areas, such as strategic planning, 
major highways and police. At district council level, functions are allocated 
which are best provided in smaller units and where local knowledge and 
control are important, as with housing and local amenities.
It is easier to understand the range and scope of local authority 
services if they are grouped in a meaningful way. Richards (-1978, 
pp.63-8) has classified them into four groups :
(a) PROTECTIVE - protecting the individual from various dangers, 
through fire brigades, police forces, main drainage, refuse removal, food 
inspectors, weight and measures inspectors and the licensing of public 
premises;
(b) COMMUNUAL - for the benefit of all, such as the provision of roads 
and paths, street-lighting, planning and leisure services;
(c) PERSONAL - giving direct assistance to individuals, such as educa­
tion and welfare services; this is now the most costly part of local 
authority services in both countries;
Cd) TRADING - these have diminished with the nationalisation of gas and 
electricity undertakings and the transfer of water supply to the regional 
water authorities in 1974 in Britain. In Nigeria, water supply has been 
taken over by the water corporation of each state; Kwara State allocated
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8.2 million naira in 1976 for the development of thirteen modern markets, 
a service that falls within the jurisdiction of local government. Many of 
the functions which one would term as trading are already in the hands 
of special purpose bodies (see chapter 8). Nevertheless, there are some 
trading services remaining, such as civic restaurants, public transport 
facilities and airports Csee Appendix I for details of allocation of 
functions).
FINANCE
Without an adequate and e2q>anding financial base, local governments, 
no matter how enthusiastic and hardworking they may be, will not be in 
a position to deliver local services to the people at an acceptable level 
and at the right time. The bane of pre-1976 reform efforts of local govern­
ment was finance. One major disadvantage from which most of the grants in 
Nigeria suffered was that they were paid in arrears and hence much depended 
on the ability of the local authorities concerned to finance their projects 
from their own limited resources before collecting grants from the 
Regional/state Governments.
The strength of the 1976 reform was its financial provision. As a 
first step, the Federal Government wrote off all the debts of the local 
authorities so as to give them a clean start. The Guidelines state that 
"if meaningful local government is to be expected in Nigeria, much larger 
financial resources are needed. In respect of local resources the only 
one which can be made to yield really large sums is Property Rating 
the use of which should be extended to all local governments ..." C1976, 
p.13). Following the recommendations of the committee appointed by 
the Federal Government (Report of the Committee on the Federal and State 
Governments' Financial Contributions to Local Governments, 1977, mimeo) 
it was decided that the Federal Government should allocate 5 per cent 
of its retained revenue to all the local governments in the country 
while each state government would allocate 10 per cent of its total
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recurrent revenue to the Government's contribution, distributed to each 
state according to population and 25 per cent on the basis of equity among 
the states. The allocations from both Federal and State Government 
sources to the local authorities in each state are paid into the State 
Local Government Fund from which they are distributed to each local govern­
ment - the formula being 75 per cent according to population and 25 per 
cent on the basis of equity. Thus the Federal Government allocated NlOO 
million to State Governments for onward transmission to local authorities 
in 1976/77. This was increased to N250 million in 1977/78 but reduced to 
N150 million in 1978/79. Again this was doubled to N300 million in 1979/80.
The 1976 reform has therefore introduced a new formula of revenue- 
sharing which is comparable to the Brazilian, Dutch and United States 
systems. The effect of the reformed system of finance on local government 
in Nigeria can be seen in Table 7.6. Before 1976, state government grants 
ranged between 3 per cent and 10 per cent of the total local government 
revenue (except in Kwara State with 22 per cent in 1972/73) , but the 
percentage has now gone up sharply to between 75 per cent and 85 per cent 
in 1977/78 on the average. At the same time in Britain, local authorities 
in England and Wales received 65 per cent of their expenditure from 
central government grants. This over-reliance on state grants is a grave 
development in Nigeria because it makes local authorities dependent on 
another level of government which has hardly proved reliable in the past.
On a comparative basis it seems as if local authorities in Nigeria 
are financially better than before the reform although, they are still 
spending only about 10 per cent of all public ejq>enditure as against the 
30 per cent spent by their English and Welsh counterparts. The local 
government share of total public expenditure varies from state to state.
In 1976, for example, local authorities in Kwara State spent as low as 3.6 
per cent of total public spending while the figure was as high as 18.5 per 
cent in Lagos State and even higher (22 per cent) in Anambra State in 
1979. As a proportion of total local government revenue, the grant
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figures  ̂per cent to 10 per cent for Nigeria in 1972/73 was far 
less than the United States percentage of 31,3 per cent (1967) and 40 per cent 
in the United Kingdom (1970). With the new system, however, the 5 per cent 
Federal and 10 per cent State Government allocations have raised the Nigerian 
grant as a proportion of total revenue to a ratio of about 80 per cent and 
placed it roughly on the same level with Brazil and second only to the Dutch 
ratio of almost 90 per cent. It has now outstripped the United State with 
38.3 per cent in 1974 and England and Wales with 65 per cent in 1976.
The sound financial state of the local governments is evident in 
Kaduna State where the fourteen local authorities estimated to spend a total 
of N42,982,155 in 1977/78 on recurrent account while their estimatad revenue 
amounted to N55,399,101, leaving an estimated surplus of N12,416,946. The 
Federal Government provided N17,091,345 of the estimated revenue, while the 
Kaduna State Government provided Nil,491,875. This sound financial base is 
true of all local governments in Nigeria, with Bauchi State local authorities 
having a total aggregate surplus of N361,701 and Kano with a surplus of 
over N5 million (see Table 7.7).
Apart from these grants, local governments in Nigeria, like their 
British counterparts, are expected to fully develop local revenues such 
as rates, community and property tax. For example, the Kano State Local 
Government Edict No.5 of 1977 states that the revenue of local government 
shall consist of :
(a) moneys derived from community tax and any rate imposed by the
local government;
(b) moneys payable to the local governments under the provisions of
any other enactment;
Cc) moneys derived from licences, permits, dues, charges, or fees specified
by any bye-laws or rules made by the local government;
Cd) revenue derived from any public utility corporation, or any service 
or undertaking belonging to or maintained by the local government;
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(e) rents derived from the letting or leasing of any building or land
belonging to the local government;
(f) statutory allocations;
Cg) any sums of money which may lawfully be assigned to the local govern­
ment by any public corporation;
(h) interest on the investments of the local government;
Ci) such sums of money as may be granted to the local government;
Cj) such sums of money as may be paid to the local government by
a joint board; and
(k) such other moneys as may lawfully be derived by the local government
from any other source not hereinbefore specifically mentioned.
Like local authorities in England and Wales, those in Nigeria can take 
loans for capital development projects, and State Governments were directed 
to give 'revolving loan funds' to the local governments. One can conclusively 
say that the decision of the Federal Government on revenue sharing has 
provided a framework within which great strides forward can be made in the 
provision of a sound financial base for local authorities.
THE REFORM AND TRADITIONAL RULERS
We have pointed out the immense influence the traditional rulers, 
especially the Emirs in the north, wielded on local government in Nigeria 
(see chapters 2, 4 and 5). The Emirs had always resisted any attempts to 
have their power and influence curtailed. They wanted to have a say in 
the appointment of staff and the administration of local government. 
Furthermore, they were not prepared to accept any form of reform that 
would divide their usually large emirates into numerous local authorities.
In fact, one can say that the failure of pre-1976 local government reform 
efforts was due mainly to the power struggle between elected councillors 
and the traditional rulers Csee, Adamolekun, 1977, pp.30-42).
The 1976 reform has made a great attempt to reduce the inter­
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ference of traditional rulers in the administration of local governments, 
without destroying their status in the society. The Head of State was 
aware of the importance of traditional rulers as agents of Government in 
public enlightenment (this was demonstrated in 1976 when the traditional 
rulers campaigned vigorously to get the citizens to register for the local 
government elections; the improved percentage of voters is shown in 
Table 7.8), as tax collectors, and as agents of law and order. Moreover, 
General Murtala realised that traditional rulers are effective agents of 
mass mobilisation, especially for socio-economic and political developments. 
In order to placate the traditional rulers, especially in the north where 
big emirates have had to be split into many local authorities, the Govern­
ment states that ;
Nothing in these reforms could be construed to mean an attempt at 
reducing or abolishing the traditional functions of our Emirs,
Obas and Chiefs. On the contrary the reforms recognise the crucial 
nature of the position of the traditional authorities and care 
has been taken to preserve the organic unity of our traditional 
institutions and societies (Guidelines, 1976, foreword).
The traditional rulers on their part accepted the reform for a number of
reasons. First, they had little or no choice in the face of a determined
military government. Orders were orders and they were meant to be obeyed.
Any form of opposition from the traditional rulers would have been summarily
thwarted.




1976 Local Government 
Election Registration
No. As % of 1952 Population No.
As % of 1976 
Population
Bendel 650,130 43.9 1,595,839 47.04
Benue 327,266 23.38 1,245,778 37.23
Kwara 178,239 33.28 1,263,106 51.14
Ogun 421,453 43.94 974,239 45.56
Oyo 921,841 37,77 3,277,632 44.76
Ondo 497,247 52.06 2,968,195 78.88
Plateau 276,197 22.52 863,337 30.90
Rivers 282,036 45.78 1,198,010 50.52
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The way the military regime dismissed some influential permanent 
secretaries and top military personnel proved the extent to which they 
were ready to go to achieve their policies. Therefore, the military 
government confronted the traditional rulers with a combination of threat 
and promise. They either accepted the apparent gains the reform promised 
them, or they would lose everything. Second, like everybody else in the 
country, the traditional rulers welcomed the new regime, as demonstrated 
by the historical visit made by top traditional rulers, such as the 
Sultan of Sokoto and the Oni of Ife, to Lagos to see General Murtala. Under 
the former regime, and especially after 1973, the powers and status of the 
traditional rulers were at their lowest ebb with some of them reportedly / 
flogged on the order of some of Gowon's governors. The traditional rulers 
felt that the new regime would restore their powers and status. Third, 
for the first time since independence, the traditional rulers were taken 
into confidence in the reform effort. They were not just passive spectators 
or outsiders in the reform; they were really involved (see chapter 6) . 
Fourth, the promise of the creation of 'traditional councils' allayed 
whatever fears they might have had that their powers and status would be 
eroded by the reform. Thus, although their emirates or areas of juris­
diction were divided into many local authorities, they still maintain 
their suzerainty over such former areas in religious and traditional 
matters (see their functions below).
The Guidelines state that Traditional or Emirate Councils should be 
presided over by an Emir or Paramount Chief. And the composition of the 
council should include all traditional title holders, one or two represen­
tatives of each local government council "if this is deemed appropriate 
and any other persons who may be desired to make the council broadly 
representative of the major facets of life in the area" (jGuidelines,
1976, p.6).
The functions which the Government expects an Emirate or a Tradi­
tional Council to perform are :
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(a) To formulate general proposals as advice to local government;
(b) to harmonize the activities of local government councils through 
discussion of problems affecting them generally, and giving advice and 
guidance to them;
(c) co-ordination of development plans of local governments by joint 
discussion and advice;
(d) community tax assessment within the area as a whole in consultation 
with local government councils, and announcement of tax. Also to aid,
as is the usual practice, in the collection of tax;
(e) determination of religious matters where appropriate;
Cf) support for Arts and Culture;
(g) chieftaincy matters and control of traditional titles and offices, 
except where these are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the 
Emir or Chief in which case the council's function shall be advisory to 
the Emir or Chief;
(h) determination of customary law and practice on all matters including 
that relating to land;
Ci) making representations or expressing opinions to Government or any 
other organization on the collective behalf of the local governments in 
the area;
(j) deliberating on or making representations or esq)ressing opinions to 
Government or any other organization on any matters which it deems to be 
of importance to the Emirate or Chiefdom as a whole, or which may be 
referred to it by Government or other organisations; and 
(k) Emirs and Chiefs should be responsible, as hitherto, in assisting 
Government in the maintenance of peace(Guidelines, 1976,pp.7-8).
From the foregoing it has become clear that the influence of trad- 
tional rulers in local government will be mainly through, their membership 
of the created emirate or traditional councils. It was recommended that 
each local government or groiç) of local government councils should have
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a traditional council consisting of traditional rulers and the chairman/ 
chairmen of the local government council(s) in the area. In order to 
function effectively and efficiently, the traditional councils were given 
permission to have their own staff as well as grants from the state and 
local governments. For instance, Bornu State created five Emirate Councils 
Bornu, Dikwa, Fika, Biu and Bade - and a Traditional Council, Gwoza. For 
the 1977/78 financial year, a total provision, of Nl,051,000 was made to 
these councils, distributed as follows :
Bornu ; N335,000 Biu ; N154,000
Dikwa : N181,000 Bade ; N112,000
Fika : N178,000 Gwoza : N 91,000
The State Government contributed 50 per cent of each amount shown above 
and the local authorities concerned contributed the remaining 50 per cent.
MEMBERSHIP OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS
In chapter 6 we discussed personnel management and we will deal 
here with the elected members of local authorities. The primary 
functions of all councillors ought desirably to be the direction and control 
of council affairs, making key decision)^ monitoring progress and the broad 
supervision of officers and their work to ensure that agreed policy is 
implemented, that ratepayers secure value for money and that there is 
an absence of waste or graft. It is the duty of councillors to investigate 
complaints lodged by members of the public and to elicit the facts.
In order to guarantee that their objectives of the reform are adhered 
to, especially those of efficiency and democracy, the Nigerian Government 
recommended that membership of local government councils should be pre­
dominantly elected either by direct or indirect elections from local 
communities. But up to 25 per cent of the membership of each council 
could be reserved for members nominated by the state governor which, it 
was argued, would ensure the representation of a wide range of groiç>s
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(Guidelines 1975, p.8). This arrangement, however, is quite a departure 
from representative democracy because it makes the council less sensitive 
to a change in local opinion than a wholly elected body might be (see 
chapter 8) . The life of a council is ejqjected to be about three years 
unless previously dissolved by the state governor after due enquiry, for 
incompetence or incapability. The elections were not to be fought under 
party affiliations because the ban on partisan politics was still in 
force during the first elections in 1976/77.
/
The Guidelines and the Edicts made provisions for the position of 
a chairman. Thus, each local council is to have a chairman who is elected 
for three years like the councillors. The council elects three candidates 
from its own membership listed in order of preference and the state 
governor "appoints one of the three persons proposed as chairmen to be chair­
man of the council or, where two or three persons are proposed, nominates 
any one of them to be chairman of the council" (Kaduna State, 1977, pp. 11-12; 
Kwara State, 1976A, p.54; Rivers State, 1976, p.54).
For election purposes, each local government area was divided into 
single-member constituencies and each constituency elected one member by 
select ballot. Ogun State was divided into 134 constituencies, Kwara 
State 214, Gongola State 2 ^  and Rivers State 189 constituencies. Table 7.9 
gives in details the allocation of seats for every local government in 
Kwara State.
TABLE 7.9: ALLOCATION OF CONSTITUENCIES PER LOCAL GOVERNMENT: THE 1976 




Population Registered Voters No. of Constituencies
Asa 164,157 80,622 17
Borgu 147,487 59,020 15
Edu 152,758 78,803 16
Ifelodun 178,214 110,013 18
Ilorin 474,385 203,029 27
Irepodun 212,215 129,657 18
Kogi 124,000 63,892 12
Moro 162,647 79,571 17
Okehi 250,899 134,484 20
Okene 197,511 112,451 18
Oyi 248,181 138,271 20
oyun 157,272 73,293 16
TOTAL 2,469,727 1,263,106 214
SOURCE : Kwara State, 1977, pp.3, 5 and 79
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The edicts enacted by the states, like the local Government Act 
1972 in Britain, prescribed procedural arrangements for meetings, notice 
required, number of members to constitute a quorum, method of voting and 
like matters. Decisions on ordinary business must be made by a majority 
(2/3 majority in Nigeria) of the members present. Minutes of meetings 
must be available for inspection by local government electors. In 
Britain, the press and other members of the public can attend council and 
committee meetings.
COMMITTEES
The committee system which. Nigeria adopted from her former colonial 
master is a characteristic feature of English local government, whereby the 
work of the local authority is sub-divided between groups of councillorf, 
sometimes supported by co-opted persons, and smaller in size than the whole 
council. Prior to the reforms in 1974 and 1976 in Britain and Nigeria res­
pectively, most local authorities were structured on the basis of depart­
ments operating under the direction and control of committees, which pre­
pared budgets and thus became competitors for their share of the total 
available resources. The larger authorities provide a wide range of services 
which are interrelated and hence no one service should be treated in isolation
The Bains Report placed great emphasis on the corporate approach to 
management in local government, believing that the traditional departmental 
procedure was no longer appropriate to secure the most effective use of 
resources. Hence the study group recommended that management activities be 
concentrated in a policy and resources committee supported by a chief 
executive and a management team of officers. In this way an authority can 
formulate more realistically its long-term objectives covering all services, 
and make forward planning projections, decisions as to priorities and 
assessment of financial implications. The basic philosophy is that at 
policy stage councillors decide and officers advise, while at the ensuring 
execution stage councillors monitor and officers perform. This represents an
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over-simplification, as policy and administration cannot always be 
clearly distinguished and the boundaries can become blurred. The adminis­
tration of policy frequently concerns the councillor more significantly 
than the policy itself since the worries of electors stem from policy 
implementation.
As we said in chapter 5, a tremendous similarity exists between 
Nigeria and Britain with respect to the whole language of discourse about 
local government reform. Little wonder then that the Guidelines, like the 
Local Government Act 1972, gave local authorities a discretionary power to 
set up committees, joint committees and sub-committees to enable them to 
discharge their functions. The Act and the Guidelines gave local authorities 
greater freedom in the organization of their internal structures, and they 
have streamlined their committee systems and reduced the number of committees,
Committees can be classified as follows :
(a) STATUTORY AND PERMISSIVE : Statutory committees are those which local 
authorities are by statute compelled to set up, namely the education 
committee of a local education and the police committee of a local government 
authority. In England and Wales they must also have a social services 
committee of a social services authority while local authorities in Nigeria 
must have a finance and general purposes committee. The Finance and General 
Purposes Committee is to be responsible for (i) the regulation and control 
of the finances of the local government; (ii) the consideration and award 
of contracts; (iii) the implementation of the decisions of the local govern­
ment with which no other committee or bo(fy is charged and for the general 
running of the affairs of the local government; and Civ) such other functions 
as the local government may, from time to time, delegate thereto (jexcept 
the power of levying a rate or tax or of borrowing money) (Kwara State,
1976A, p.59; Kano State, 1977, p.51).
Permissive committees are those which a local authority is not 
compelled to establish but can do so if it wishes. The edicts state that
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"a local government igay appoint such other standing or ad hoc committees 
in addition to those specified above for any general or special purpose 
that in the opinion of the local government would be better regulated 
and managed by means of,a committee and may delegate to a committee so 
appointed, with or without restrictions or conditions, any function exer­
cisable by the local government" (Kwara State, 1976A, pp.59-60: Rivers 
State, 1976, p.65) ;
(b) STANDING AND SPECIAL : Standing committees are set up on a relatively 
permanent basis and are normally renewed annually. Special committees are 
set up to deal with specific short-term matters, such as extensions to 
council offices or a review of house-improvement policy, and are disbanded 
when the objective has been realised;
Cc) SERVICE AND MACHINERY : Service committees administer services or 
functions of a local authority, such as leisure services or highways.
Machinery or co-ordinative committees are concerned with administrative 
machinery such as personnel;
(d) JOINT COMMITTEES can be appointed by two or more local authorities
to deal with matters of common interest. This arrangement offers considerable 
flexibility and is ideally suited to the management of such facilities as 
sports centres, or control of water and atmospheric pollution; and
(e) JOINT BOARDS consist of the nominees of two or more authorities and 
they administer a service in which the appointing authorities have a mutual 
interest. They differ from joint committees in that they are separate from 
and independent of their constituent authorities,and are almost invariably 
bodies corporate with a perpetual existence and their own financial powers 
(see, Kano State, 1977, pp.54-55). Typical exanç>le would be joint planning 
boards set Lp by the appropriate ministers, or in the case of Nigeria, 
state commissioners.
Thus every local government in Nigeria was to have a chairman and 
not more than four supervisory councillors who will devote most of their
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time and energies to the affairs of local government. These super­
visory councillors will also exercise 'political control' over the 
Departments of their local government. They will each chair a committee 
"concerned with the political direction of a group of departments or of 
a single department such as in the case of education ... and (they) will 
automatically be members of the Finance and General Purposes Committees 
which will in effect be the 'cabinet' of the local government" (Guidelines, 
1976, p.9).
The committee system, despite its alleged disadvantages (see Jackson, 
1970, pp.138-142), therefore enables local authorities to deal with their work 
effectively and efficiently. The wide range of functions and variety of 
detailed matters requiring decisions by the principal authorities could 
not be handled at full council level without massive delegation to paid 
officers, which would destroy the democratic principle and result in 
councils being no more than rubber-stamps. Committees comprise a council's 
workshops, where officers' technical knowledge and councillors' assessment 
of public needs are integrated and a balanced solution formulated.
THE ROLE OF 'HOMO POLITICOS'
As we said in chapter 3, an adequate analysis of reorganization can­
not be fully explained as only necessary response to the socio-economic and 
political changes in Nigeria and Britain. Equally important are the 
actions which reformers have to take to effect structural changes, and 
these actions are determined by their perception of environmental changes 
as well as their environment. Since the reforms in both countries were 
carried out by the decision-makers, their personality and interests must 
then come to bear on initiating and implementing reform. Their perception 
or interest may be fashioned by their party political ideology or by 
expediency or as was the case in Nigeria, by the need to redeem the image 
of the military in the eyes of the people.
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The initiation and execution of local government reform under the 
Murtala/Obasanjo regime (Obasanjo took over as Head of State when Murtala 
was assassinated in 1976) was successful because their regime was so 
strongly committed to it. As we said earlier on, Nigeria was at its lowest 
ebb by 1975. It was therefore necessary from the beginning for the 
Murtala/Obasanjo regime to present a radical alternative to its corrupt, 
inefficient and 'direction-less' predecessors. Moreover, there was a threat 
of public disorder as exemplified by violent riots, high rate of armed 
robbery and disparaging articles in the press about the role of the army 
in politics. Gowon's policies became unpopular, especially when be back­
pedalled on his initial decision to return the country to democratic rule 
by 1976. Furthermore, some elements in the army were known to be getting res­
tive. Finally, the nation wanted a change. The new government therefore 
started by dismissing all known corrupt and inefficient civil servants and 
top military officers. The former state governors were dismissed and a 
series of inquiries instigated into their corrupt practices. The structure 
of the Military Government was modified so that the new state governors 
were no longer members of the Supreme Military Council but were responsible 
directly to the Supreme Headquarters. Thus it was impossible for these 
new state governors to operate state governments as their personal fiefdoms.
The regime followed these reorganisations up by creating seven new states 
to bring the number to nineteen, and as a first sign of their willingness to 
restore democracy to the country in 1979, reformed the local government system. 
The creation of seven more states and the reorganization of local government 
brought the government nearer to the people than ever before. Murtala was 
a dedicated, dynamic and charismatic leader who loved democracy and he 
received mass reverence because the people knew he was acting in their 
interest. The support his regime gave to the reform effort led to its 
successful implementation.
In Britain, the role of 'homo politicus' in the reform can be 
illustrated by the actions of Richard Crossman (the initiator) and Peter
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Walker (the executor). When Crosaraan was Minister of Housing and Local 
Government he had to decide the fate of the proposals for local govern­
ment boundaries being made to him by the Local Government Commission.
He reported in his diary :
I soon discovered that as a Labour politican these are for me not 
merely decisions about the boundaries of local authorities but 
decisions which will influence the boundaries of constituencies ... 
every time ... I alter a county borough boundary I may affect the 
fate of the M.P. sitting for this borough ... Politically all I 
have to do is prevent 30 or 40 Labour seats going to the Tories 
(Crossman, 1975, pp.64-5,132).
The general problem which Crossman faced was simple : "how I can best
adjudicate to avoid bringing Conservative suburbs into Labour cities like
Leicester and Nottingham and so undermining safe Labour Parliamentary
seats" and giving a built in majority to the Conservatives on the new
local councils. Naturally enough. Crossman did not broadcast the fact
that when taking boundary decisions he took "the greatest care to see that
politically they were acceptable to the Labour group (js) on the town
council(s) and to the Labour member(s)" (Crossman, 1975, pp.75-6,
160, 240, 312).
Another example and in a similar vein, is that of Henry Brooke who 
was leader of the Conservative opposition on the LCC and as Minister of 
Housing and Local Government "he was anxious to see the Herbert Commission's 
proposals adopted primarily for the political advantage that he saw in them 
of putting an end to Labour's control of London" (Rhodes, 1970, p.108).
The action of 'homo politicus' was also conspicuous at the imple­
mentation stage of the 1974 reform. For instance, Mr. Walker, a devout 
Tory, was vigorously opposed to a unitary system which he saw as a 
radical departure from the status quo. He attached great importance to the 
evolution of a new structure through building on the existing multi-tier 
system rather than through radically changing areas and authorities. 
Furthermore, he surely had the political gain to be made by the Conserva­
tive Party in mind when he merged county boroughs, normally Labour, into 
counties normally Conservative. Southport, a town council under Conser-
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vatlve control, got some concessions during the implementation of the 
reform. Southport is interesting because its inclusion in, and 
Ellesmere Port's exclusion from, Merseyside made Conservative control of 
that new metropolitan county a very real possibility in an election year 
favourable to the party. Even in more general terms, party bias is dis­
cernible for Mr. Walker was resurrecting, albeit in an attenuated form, a 
very long-standing Conservative desire to neutralise the radical propensi­
ties of the cities by placing them under the umbrella of the Conservative- 
voting shires (Sharpe, 1978, p.84). Certainly these are just some of the 
examples where one can say that the political interests of the reformers 
have over-riden the declared objectives (democracy and efficiency) of 
the reform.
CONCLUSION
The Murtala/Obasanjo regime realised that to achieve national 
development and national stability, a firm foundation, for a rational 
government at the local level is imperative. They implemented all their 
reform programmes and even went further to ensure that local government is 
enshrined in the constitution as an autonomous third level of Government. 
They realised that not only on the institutional level, but, more important, 
on that of the general climate, the development, stabilization and ex­
tension of local government contribute towards the democratization of 
customs, to the education of the citizens and to preparing them in this 
way for an active participation in public life.
The reform in Britain was gerrymandered to suit the Conservative 
Party rather than the public. This is hardly surprising because, as 
Sharpe says, "new boundaries mean a new basis for determining majorities 
and therefore which party will win. No party in power dares miss the 
opportunity to ensure that whatever the ostensible reasons for boundary 
change may be, its interests are not only protected but if possible 
enhanced" (1978, p.84). However, the mere fact that the reforms were
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carried through by the Conservative Party is a great achievement. But as 
we shall see in chapter 8, an adequate evaluation of the reform can not 
be undertaken on the basis of the role of party politics, though insofar 
as the pursuit of party advantage undermined the necessary relationship 
between diagnosis and remedy, it was likely to be one major contribution 
to the ultimate failure of the reform.
The process of local government reform is such a complex thing 
that it can never be devoid of problems. It is therefore necessary to 
evaluate the reform. Did the reformers stick to the reform objectives?
Do the end products of the reforms contribute to the stated goals such 
as democracy, efficiency, national stability and economic development? 
These questions will be answered in the next chapter and we shall give 
our own recommendations (see chapter 9) as to how the problems that 





Now that the survey is completed I realise that I have shifted 
from seeking dramatic and speedy remedies for administrative 
failings to recognizing the many obstacles in the path of 
reformers (Caiden, 1970, p. xi)
This chapter will attempt a systematic evaluation of the reform 
process in both countries, paying particular attention to their 
implementation. The critiques we offer will enable us to put forward 
our own fresh approach in the next chapter.
THE PURPOSE OF EVALUATION
We shall not devote all our energy to what critics have termed the 
'popular mythology' (Dearlove, 1979, pp. 1-19) or 'traditional orthodoxy' 
(Stanyer, 1976, p.17) of local administrative reform, that is, an 
optimistic reliance on prescriptive liberal theories of representative 
government to explain the practice of local government which inhibits 
the development of empirically based theories more carefully attuned to 
the reality, and not the ideology, of the local situation today. The 
almost universal 'popular mythology' of 'large is efficient whereas small 
is democratic' is pure assertion made without adequate research or 
evidence. Fairly obviously, it is also part of this orthodoxy to assert 
that small is inefficient whereas large is undemocratic, and there is the 
view that it is not really possible to attain both democracy and 
efficiency within the one local government system. Given the assessment 
of the system of local government in both countries as inefficient and the 
concern to ward off even more central control, there has been the consistent 
and untiring advocacy of the need for larger local authorities. But, at 
the same time, there has been a certain sneaking anxiety about the
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implications of all this for the democracy of local government. It 
was widely believed in both countries that the calibre of councillors 
had declined. Another rule of reform relates to the issue of central 
control and local autonomy and derives frcm the orthodox explanation 
for the extent of central control. If you wish to decrease central 
control, and so increase the extent of local autonomy, then you should 
provide new sources of local revenue, so reducing local dependence upon 
the central government. This sequence is fairly familiar: "Commitment 
first, theory second; and facts last, or not at all." (Dearlove, 1979, 
p 38) .
To question these 'traditional orthodoxies' would be to question 
the rationale of the objectives of the reforms and this would require 
a separate thesis. A critical consideration of the orthodoxies on 
local government and its reorganization is not the same as a critical 
consideration of the reality of reform itself, and demolishing the 
literature does not tell us much about the political implications of 
reform. Thus to toe the line of questioning the 'traditional 
orthodoxies' would be to concentrate on the theory of local government 
reform at the expense of good empirical studies of the implemented 
reforms, which is contrary to our intention. Instead we will be 
concentrating on evaluating the implemented reforms in Nigeria and 
Britain in terms of their reform objectives, or more specifically, in 
terms of the ordinary men and women whom the entire administrative 
apparatus is designed to serve. Undoubtedly this will also involve 
some evaluation of their reform objectives since we need "to adopt a 
less narrow perspective where we engage in questioning, research, and 
wider reading, and try to transcend the artificial specialization 
imposed by disciplinary boundaries" (Dearlove, 1979, p.10).
In fact, the job is only half done if we do not give some evaluation
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of the objectives and the strategies of reorganization. After all the 
reformers might probably have seen only a part of the whole or they 
might have misunderstood the situation completely. Moreover, re­
formers often declare romantic objectives like democracy and efficiency 
to veil their undeclared intentions such as more power to the central 
government; reform may be an overt strategy designed to place the 
control of government in particular hands - a strategy that is seen as 
necessary and possible by certain groups at particular points in time 
when they feel that they are not winning, and cannot win, within the 
established rules of the governmental game. Short-term political 
victories can get converted into longer-term strategic gains if they 
can become institutionalized in new constitutions, structures and 
processes of government (see Chapter 7). The governmental power of 
various groups is partly a result of the rules that have been made to 
govern, as "some publics have been able to shape political institutions 
and practices ... This is ... a matter ... of the institutional 
framework of politics, and the very rules of the political game itself, 
being systematically biased in favour of certain interests rather than 
others" (Newton, 1976, p,236).
Reform attempts in both countries since the Second World War 
conformed to an almost predictable pattern both as to the nature of the 
recommendations submitted and the results achieved. The insignificant 
progress being made as a result of these studies suggests that perhaps 
the proposals are not related sufficiently to programmes, are not 
imaginative enough to cope with modern complexities, and represent 
merely a futile exercise in trying to achieve a neat but sterile 
administrative structure.
Thus, in any evaluation of the results of a reform, it is not enough
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to make our judgements merely on the basis of our 'expertise' in
local administration and disregard the voice of the people. The
people must consent to reform to make reform meaningful. The reformers 
must be reminded that the means are important only insofar as they help 
in the attainment of the ends. The mere fact that a reform is
undertaken and completed is a major achievement but in most cases not
as many changes are made as might be expected. The success of reform 
rests not merely on immediate accomplishments, but on the machinery it 
sets in motion for continuing attention to organizational improvements.
Although the reform in Britain is radical, it is definitely less 
radical than had been envisaged in 1966 when the Royal Commission was 
established, and it is much less radical than the reform in Nigeria.
The Local Government Act 1972 is littered with decisions which would 
seem to conflict with the original theoretical objectives, for 
example, the unresolved structural-functional tangle relating to the 
complicated division of responsibility between counties and districts 
for services such as highways and town and country planning. Though 
such decisions could be defended, the case relied on an extremely narrow 
interpretation of the concepts of democracy and efficiency and it was 
apparent that political expediency was a more important factor. Indeed, 
it is sometimes difficult to see exactly where the Government did stand 
firm during the consultative and legislative processes. Exceptions 
to the 250,000 population size were allowed, the 'whole built-up area' 
concept of the metropolitan counties was breached, the 'clear-cut 
division of powers' disappeared, and there was little in the way of a 
move towards the promised 'stronger' local authorities. The combination 
of powerful local government vested interests and a Conservative 
Government pursuing a policy which attempted to build on the existing
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organization of local authorities ensured that tradition was frequently 
considered the more important whenever and wherever it conflicted with 
change.
In Nigeria, there still is a discrepancy between bureaucratic 
values of formal organizations like local government and social norms of 
behaviour. There is a wide gap between the laws of the statute book 
and the actual behaviour of the officials. Yet we know that reform of 
structure, if not followed by changes in patterns of behaviour, is 
insignificant. Functions which should be the exclusive preserve of 
local authorities are still being eroded by state governments and the 
impunity with vdiich many local authorities have been dissolved without 
due inquiry by a high court judge as stipulated by law shows that the 
reform is more theoretical than practical. In short, reorganization 
was taken on its own terms at the level of its public face and ideology 
as being solely about increasing democracy, efficiency, and effectiveness 
in the general effort to create better government in the public interest, 
without a corresponding change in social and political norms of 
behaviour of state government and local government officials.
Reform in both countries was therefore based on a mixture of 
theoretical, institutional and political objectives. The need for 
governmental leadership and action ensured that any concern for theory 
was frequently subordinated to tactical considerations. We showed in 
Chapter 5 that the objectives as enunciated by the Royal Commission 
and the Federal Government were not only open to different interpretations 
but they were also vague and elusive. The vagueness results from the 
elusive nature of the theoretical diagnosis of local government defects 
which were made. What did both governments mean, for instance, by 
their assertion that local government was undemocratic ? It is in terms
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of responsiveness or representation or participation or their 
dependence on central government grants ? Or is it, as it has been 
suggested, because of the intrusion of party politics into local 
government ? The calibre of councillors was said to have declined 
yet everybody knows that there is no objective way of measuring 
councillor calibre. Have the reforms rectified these defects ?
In the foregoing chapters, attention has been given to the overall 
objectives of decentralization policies and to some of the major 
environmental (historical, ecological, social, economic and political) 
conditions which influenced the structural and operational reform of 
local government. Since the problem of local government reform was 
considered in the light of these objectives and environmental factors, 
the consequences of seme objectives often proved incompatible with those 
deducible from certain ecological conditions. This pertains to the 
overall structure of local government and administration as well as to 
size and boundaries of local authorities. In both countries, there 
was 'tension' between the desire of the governments to promote 
democratic decentralization, and political conditions which made such 
a policy undesirable or socio-economic conditions which are dysfunctional 
to the development of local representative institutions with discretionary 
powers. The desire for efficiency caused both governments to favour 
relatively large local units, but the geographic isolation of many 
communities made this difficult to realise. A merger of cities with 
neighbouring villages seemed desirable, again for reasons of efficiency, 
but this was avoided because of the risks involved in grouping 
sociologically and culturally heterogeneous populations. Furthermore, 
scale enlargement was a strong argument for providing services for large 
areas, but this was deemed detrimental to large-scale popular
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participation in decision making which is preconditional to local 
democracy.
As we noted in Chapter 6, there were differences in the strategies 
applied by the two countries. This was not unexpected because of the 
historical, social, economic and political differences between them. 
Britain went about the reform through a Royal Commission while the 
Nigerian Government decided to carry out the reforms itself. These 
strategies, however, have their own advantages and disadvantages. The 
Commission served a valuable purpose in maintaining a reform momentum 
and in creating a new agenda for public debate. Commissions are 
agents of change and the success of the Redcliffe-Maud Commission lay 
in the attraction of its report to the Government (and in the hostile 
reactions which produced an alternative approach attractive to the 
Opposition) . The Government was able to adopt a set of proposals as 
its own which, it could claim, had emerged form an impartial, expert 
inquiry. It could continuously quote this 'expert advice' as a 
defence to its proposals (Rhodes, 1975, pp. 191-3). Also, the use of 
a Royal Commission enabled a lot of research to be carried out and it 
afforded the public the chance to air their vieve, thereby minimizing 
resistance to reform. Furthermore, the use of the Commission enabled 
adaptation of the local government structure to new needs and conditions, 
without disrupting the continuity of the operations of local institutions.
The Nigerian Government decided to go it alone because they did not 
want a commission over which they would have only limited influence.
The time factor was very important to the Federal Government because 
they had to implement eight programmes within four years, and local 
government reform was just one of them. The political set-up and the 
political situation of the country did not warrant the use of a commission. 
Nigeria was under a military regime and like all military regimes , it
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wanted quick and precise action; a complete restructuring of the 
local government system was necessary so that the Government could 
carry out its new political ideals of democracy and self-reliance.
The governmental and administrative machinery needed thorough and 
drastic overhaul to turn it into an effective instrument for achieving 
development objectives.
Both approaches have their disadvantages. Difficulties can 
arise through delay while a commission sits - such delay can, on 
occasion, aggravate the issue or cause it to be interpreted rather 
differently (as happened in the case of local government in Britain 
in the post-1958 period when attitudes hardened and structural 
weaknesses became increasingly apparent). Stagnation can result from 
advice which may prove to be politically unacceptable. Governments 
can find themselves in the embarrassing position of seeking to avoid 
implementation without wishing to launch a frontal attack on the 
findings of a body of experts appointed by government. Finally, by 
appointing a commission the Government loses control of the timetable. 
Though deadlines are often set - two years in the case of the Redcliffe- 
Maud Commission - they are rarely met. A Government which sets up a 
commission during its first year or two of office can be fairly sure 
that the report will arrive shortly before a General Election is due, 
at a difficult time for implementation to be feasible should the issue 
be controversial. This, of course, was just what happened to the 
Redcliffe-Maud Report. On the other hand, the appointment of a 
commission at a later stage in the life of a Government frequently 
results in the publication of a report after the next election, when 
that Government may well be no longer in office. Thus the appointment 
of commissions can be regarded in most cases as "a recipe for delay"
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(The Guardian, 31 October 1968),
The strategy adopted by the Nigerian Government did not give room 
for necessary research and consultations. Critics could therefore 
point to the fact that the Government's recommendations were pure 
guess-work not based on any empirical evidence. They could also accuse 
the Government of high-handedness since the implemented reforms were not 
based on a broad concensus of the people. A sensible reform cannot be 
dictatorially imposed with one stroke of the pen. It needs cooperation 
of all concerned. A hurried radical reform like Nigeria's is disruptive 
and could be harmful. Moreover, an entirely new system may not adapt 
well to its environment and consequently become little more than a 
blueprint. Finally, drastic reforms may cause strong resistance and 
even violent opposition.
It is difficult to give a general judgement about these two 
approaches. There may be cases in which drastic reform of the existing 
system offers the best solution for a new government (as in Nigeria's 
case) , whether because of the environmental conditions or political 
expediency or for other urgent reasons. Even then, however, the 
government must realise the risks involved in introducing a new system 
overnight, and the likelihood that much of the old system will continue 
to function, since community power structures tend to be highly resistant 
to change. The 'Government by Commission' approach is likely to meet 
with greater success. Not only can more allowance be made for 
ecological conditions, but the government is able to test the opinions 
and reactions- of the people and to change its policy in line with the 
general concensus of the people. The success of either approach 
depends to a great extent on the government's ability to rally support 
for its proposals or to force them down the throats of national and
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local communities in spite of opposition.
Although our evaluation of the objectives are interrelated 
because the reform objectives themselves are greatly linked to one 
another, such as efficiency to democracy or efficiency to functions 
and size of local authorities, nevertheless we shall be evaluating 
them under the following headings; Function and Size, Democracy, 
and Efficiency.
FUNCTION AND SIZE
In Chapter 6, we mentioned that the need for a systematic approach 
to local government reform led both countries to search for a correlation 
between the functions of local government units and the size and area in 
which these can be most effectively exercised. In pursuance of this 
objective, the Royal Ccanmission recommended a unitary system of local 
government which was rejected on the ground that a single local authority 
is bound to be the wrong size for the discharge of at least some of the 
functions of local government (Local Government in England; Government 
Proposals for Reorganization, 1971, para. 9). It is doubtful, however, 
whether the new two-tier system meets this criticism. There was no 
justification made for the allocation of services adopted by the 1972 Act 
in terms of functional efficiency. Rather, the selection of housing 
and planning as the chief activities of the district authorities was 
motivated mainly by the need to operate these services close to the 
people, a principle that was admitted to rest more upon the demands of 
democracy than upon any need to achieve 'efficiency* (Local Government 
in England; Government Proposals for Reorganization, 1971, para. 13).
One is justified, in view of this insistence on democracy, therefore, to 
say that the new authorities are unsuitable to discharge their democratic
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functions effectively.
Another problem about the Royal Commission's proposals is that the 
unitary authorities were too small for the effective performance of some 
of their functions such as education, development and transport planning. 
The new counties are bigger than those proposed by the commission, but 
with their average population of around 500,000, the criticisms of the 
Redcliffe-Maud authorities advanced by the White Paper still apply. We 
can assert, along with the Royal Commission, that it is almost impossible 
to determine the relationship between the efficient operation of a certain 
function and the maximum and minimum size of local units; we should note 
that, despite the claims of the White Paper, the size and organization of 
the new counties was arrived at more as a matter of administrative 
convenience, political needs and respect for tradition, than by any 
analysis of the type of authority necessary to administer any particular 
service.
In giving its reform proposals, the Royal Commission mounted a lot 
of research to look at the realities of modern life and likely developments 
in the future, in order to give some sort of social and economic coherence 
to the new areas. In particular, attention was paid to the growth and 
scale of commuting and even to the distance which individuals travel 
between their home and their shopping centre, it being suggested that a 
single local authority should ideally cover all these various aspects of 
an individual's daily life. It is ridiculous that such an analysis 
could be rejected in favour of building on the existing organization 
which the government itself had pronounced ineffective and antiquated. 
Furthermore, with the possible exception of the new county of Humberside, 
traditional boundaries have been followed, which further hampers the 
expansion and development of the conurbations be ond their traditional 
boundaries which they have over-flown. The 'whole built-up area' concept
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of the metropolitan counties was abandoned. It is depressing to find 
that the lack of congruity between the local government boundaries and 
the actual pattern of life which characterized the existing system was 
not just reproduced but also exacerbated. To the Conservatives, winning 
elections is an inevitable counter-weight to the rational solution of the 
size and shape of local government units. They were anxious to preserve 
the historic counties and protect the wealthy suburbs and countryside 
frcm urban demands for housing space. Care was taken in delineating 
the boundary between Hampshire and Dorset in 1972 not to divide a safe 
Conservative seat, while the Conservative town of Newmarket might logically 
have been in Cambridgeshire but was retained in Suffolk to balance Labour 
strength. The population range for each type of county authority is 
still astounding (see Chapter 7). In short, many of the local authorities 
(especially the districts) are neither small enough nor do they relate 
well to the facts of social geography. Our line of argument is that if 
the Government wanted to achieve efficiency and democracy within the same 
structure of local government, it should have made the upper tiers of 
local government bigger than at present constituted so that they could 
perform the major services efficiently; while making the lower tier (the 
districts) much smaller than at present so that they could perform 
the minor personal social services and help to increase the participation 
of the citizens in local affairs (see Chapter 9).
One of the primary aims of the 1972 Act was to create a system that 
is sufficiently flexible to match function to area and to ensure that 
decisions are taken as locally as possible. It is difficult to claim 
that the new system is better in relation to this goal than the old. "The 
vast bulk of the country was covered by a two-tier system under the old 
order so that the function-to-area 'fit' argument was already as close to 
being met as the new" (Sharpe, 1978, p. 88). Where it was not - in the
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county boroughs - the successor districts are either larger than the 
county boroughs they superseded, or they are the same size. Either way, 
there has been no increase in local decision making. Moreover, it must 
be remembered that under the new system some major functions that were 
entirely the responsibility of the county boroughs have been treuisferred 
to the much larger counties. In short, it is difficult to see how the 
objective of matching function to area and of ensuring that decisions 
are taken as locally as possible has been achieved.
Another aim of the Act requires that local government boundaries 
follow population settlement patterns. This objective is based on the 
assumption that the basic settlement form is now the service centre and 
its hinterland. The service centre may be defined as the continuously 
built-up area of a town and its hinterland as the surrounding ring of 
satellite communities. These communities are embedded in a semi-rural 
and rural environment but, it is argued, they owe their existence to 
their proximity to the service centre and its accessibility to them in 
terms of employment, shopping and a myriad of private and public services. 
Thus the hinterland is said to be just as much a part of the town as are 
the suburbs that form the rim of the town's continuously built-up core.
The basic settlement pattern, so this argument continues, is, then, 
no longer one of urban entities that are sharply differentiated in socio- 
econanic terms from their rural surroundings, but a series of service 
centres and their hinterlands - spread cities - whose boundaries meet and 
overlap to cover most of the country and especially the central population 
core of England (where over two-thirds of the population live) that runs 
frcm Greater Manchester and Merseyside in the north-west to London and 
the south-east region. In these areas, which Sharpe termed 'the coffin', 
we may no longer talk of urban and rural but rather of different degrees 
or urban-ness.
329
Translated into local government boundaries, this aim of the 1972 Act 
implied the abolition of the old county boroughs, which, broadly speaking, 
did not usually embrace even the whole of the built-up areas of cities, 
and the creation of new Authorities that embraced some approximation of 
the spread city.
The need to match the local government structure to this alleged 
reality rested on three grounds. First, the objective linkages of the 
town plus hinterland will have already generated a subjective community 
of interest among all the inhabitants of the spread city through the links 
of employment, shopping and social activities. Secondly, and more 
decisively, planning and the related functions of traffic management, 
highways and public transport can only be effectively and efficiently 
undertaken if their jurisdiction covers the whole of the spread city 
since in planning terms service centre and hinterland are interdependent. 
The extent of settlement in the hinterland, for example, can directly 
affect the prosperity of the service centre economy, and, equally, the 
level and pattern of public and private services in the service centre - 
employment opportunities, car parks, shopping facilities, traffic 
control, public transport, cultural and educational services - affects 
those in the hinterland. Thirdly, retaining the old county borough 
boundaries was inefficient and irrational. Put in the more formal 
terminology of public goods theory (see Foster et al, 1980) , we may say 
that the public goods services it provided had effects - they confer 
benefits or exact costs - over a much wider area than the built-up core.
The extent of each service's externalities varied, but they were all well 
beyond the boundaries of the county borough. Extending the boundary was 
therefore an improvement on the status quo in the sense that it would 
come closer to internalising these service externalities and thus making 
possible a sharing of the costs and the benefits of the public goods more
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equitably among those affected.
How far does the new system fulfil these three interrelated aims ? 
In one sense it never could, simply because the three aims conflict to 
some extent with the first main objective which seeks to keep decisions 
as local as possible. It clearly fails in some of the metropolitan 
counties which do not even embrace the continuously built-up area. 
Elsewhere, too, the boundaries of the shire counties are only a very 
crude approximation to the actual influence areas of the cities they 
encapsulate. To some extent this is because the spread city model 
cannot be applied in many areas outside the 'coffin*, simply because a 
distinctive rural society still persists there. Also, many influence 
areas overlap.
Furthermore, the claim that there were economies of scale to be 
reaped by reorganization could only be based on the assumption that local 
services generate certain fixed costs irrespective of the population size 
of the authority. If the average population served by local authorities 
was increased it followed that unit costs of the service would fall.
The difficulty with this assumption is, first, that these fixed costs 
have never been identified. They have only been assumed to exist and 
we may presume that the faith in their existence is derived not so much 
frcm evidence of their existence as the pervasive influence of the 
economic theory of the firm. Secondly, the assumption seems to be that 
the long-run cost curve declines at the same point and for the same level 
of output for all services - education, social welfare, highways and so 
forth. Equally, too, they are assumed to operate over a very wide 
population range so that any enlargement of any existing authority would 
apparently reduce service costs. Finally, the belief in "the apparently 
limitless fixity of fixed costs was matched by an equally firm belief in 
the absence of diseconomies of scale" (Sharpe, 1978, p. 92). All of
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these assumptions would be more plausible if there had been any evidence 
under the old system that they might be correct. But there was little 
or no evidence that scale did bring lower costs (Newton, 1974, p. 54).
To sum up the discushion of the functionalist goals, we may say that 
if the new system seems to fulfil them to a much greater extent than the 
other objectives which it was created to achieve, the functionalist 
objectives are based on a number of shaky assumptions. Not only are 
these objectives based on shaky assumptions, but they have been the prime 
determinants of what is perhaps the fundamental defect of the new system 
in Britain, and that is the enormous scale of the new authorities.
Despite the claim of the 1972 White Paper that the new units would be 
created,'above all else', on the basis that 'a genuine local democracy 
implies that decisions should be taken as locally as possible', the local 
units, the districts, are on average in excess of 120,000 population. In 
seme of the remoter rural areas this means 'genuine local democracy' 
operates in areas of 40 miles across, and districts where the seat of 
government is 20 miles frcm quite large population centres within the 
district are quite common. At the county level, which provides most of 
the major functions, the situation is even more extraordinary. The 
average population of the English and Welsh counties is in excess of one 
million and in seme instances the seat of government is a half-a-day's 
travel time from the largest centres of population within the county. In 
Devon, for example, the largest city - Plymouth - is 40 miles from the 
county seat at Exeter.
The reformers were very concerned with improving service performance, 
and it was the assumption that this improvement could be achieved by 
increased scale. This dominant emphasis on scale effects meant that the 
other major requirement of local government - that it should be democratic 
is overwhelmed. The result is that the primary local authorities in the
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new system (the counties and the metorpolitan districts) are too large 
to correspond to anything that anyone can recognise as a community in the 
sense that they can command the loyalties of the citizens, evoke a sense 
of identity among them, or correspond to their patterns of movement.
Not only is the democratic criterion overwhelmed, it is also undermined 
by the incorporation of functionalist criteria within it in the sense 
that making local government units functionally effective is also seen 
as making them more democratic. The reasoning behind this connection 
runs something like this : democracy implies the capacity of government to
act. It therefore follows that enhancing the capacity of a local 
authority to act, making it more functionally effective that is, also 
enhances democracy (Wood, 1976, p. 24) .
One of the defects found in the existing sturcture of local government 
was the rural-urban dichotomy. It was argued that a town which is a 
natural commercial, social and cultural centre for the surrounding 
hinterland should also be its administrative centre. In some cases 
the distinction between town and country has remained, at the second-tier 
level especially. Bath is a separate authority, an island wholly within 
another district; the same is true of Cambridge. Among third-tier 
authorities the difference in status between town and parish tends to 
emphasize the urban-rural dichotomy even more clearly than before the 
reform.
Furthermore, the separation of planning functions between county and 
district councils causes delays, duplication of resources and inter­
authority disputes. Their satisfactory operation demands a high level 
of cooperation between the two different types of authority, which is 
not always achieved. The division of functions, such as the maintenance 
of minor roads and local planning powers (see Appendix 1), may be 
confusing to the average elector and the existence of two or even three
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local authorities administering the same area does not give the impression
of optimum effectiveness. One can also argue that the two-tier structure
leads to fragmentation and loss of a corporate approach. Cooperation
between counties and districts can be hindered by local loyalties, party
political differences, and a natural tendency of district councils to
strive for maximum independence. In theory, concurrent powers should
provide excellent opportunities for cooperation but this is not always
the case in practice, with one authority waiting for the other to provide
the particular service and the result that nothing is provided.
Alternatively, both authorities may provide similar services in the same
area causing unnecessary and expensive duplication.
The structural-functional defects of the present system are beautifully
summed up by Norton:
It has certainly failed to achieve administrative areas in many 
cases in which urban centres and interdependent rural hinterlands 
can be treated as a unit ... the dispersal of local government 
functions among not only new counties and districts with strange 
and unfamiliar names and areas but also among new health and water 
authorities appear to have created a more difficult set of problems 
for the public. Accessibility is less and involvement is less.
The interests of different groups of authorities remain antagonistic 
and have to be reconciled at the centre (1980, p. 273).
Most of these criticisms can also be levied on the Nigerian reform.
There was no research to back up the recommended population range of
150,000-800,000. In the event, many local authorities in the south are
too small to be able to perform their functions effectively and efficiently,
while those in the north are too large for the democratic participation
envisaged by the reformers. Indeed, it would appear that the Federal
Government paid more attention to administrative convenience in restructuring
local government than to efficiency. Furthermore, given the large expanse
of the area of the country (Nigeria is four times bigger than Britain), it
would seem that the democratic objective cannot be realised by less than
three hundred authorites. This necessitated some states, such as Anambra,
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Kano and Rivers to create 'subordinate' authorities. Unfortunately 
these so-called 'subordinate' authorities have no powers, no finances, 
no personnel and no functions except those delegated to them by their 
'parent' authorities. Surely if the Federal Government was sincere in 
its declaration that local authorities should exercise democratic self- 
government close to the local levels of the society and should perform 
functions in which success depends on community responsiveness and 
participation, it should have given real recognition to these second-tier 
authorities. Likewise, the Federal Government declared that a population 
of not less than 150,000 was the minimum necessary for local authorities 
to be functionally effective and efficient. Whatever criteria might 
have been used to arrive at this magic figure, there are problems.
Firstly, the minimum size concept based on a cost-benefit relationship 
not only depends on the number of inhabitants, but also on population 
density, number of children per family, communications and such like. It 
is definitely difficult to determine an absolute local government area 
on a total population basis. Any attempt to ascertain a minimum level is 
therefore of limited use. Secondly, it remains to be seen how a local 
authority of 150,000 people can generate enough resources to maintain its 
fiinctional integrity' and carry out its tasks at the level demanded by 
present-day society. Thirdly, the resulting low level of achievement is 
likely to induce and has induced state governments to exercise close 
control or even to transfer some functions from local government.
Fourthly, the financial weakness of small local authorities causes 
frustration and the effect this has on representative local government can 
only be harmful. Finally, it would be difficult to recruit staff of 
sufficiently high calibre, particularly when set against the counter- 
attraction of state civil services. Thus, without an adequate revenue 
that would enable them to recruit qualified staff, it is difficult to see
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how they can perform their duties, such as economic planning, housing and 
education, effectively.
Furthermore, and like in Britain, there is still a bewildering 
difference in the populations of local authorities (see Table 7.3 ). It
is surprising that a local authority like Kazaure with a population of 
293,754 and a revenue of Nl,794,320 is expected to have the same powers 
and functions and perform them to the same standard as Kano with a 
population of 711,354 and a revenue of Nl2,522,940. Perhaps an even 
more serious criticism of the new system, with the possible exception of 
northern Nigeria, is the great emphasis that was placed on traditional 
loyalties in drawing the boundaries of local authorities. In Anambra 
State, the new, all-purpose authorities replaced, and are coterminous 
with, the former administrative divisions. This is true of most of the 
southern states. Even in the north, there were minimal changes in Niger 
State, and in Kwara State where Borgu, Edu, Kogi, Oyi and Oyun local 
authorities retain their old boundaries.
There were some clear improvements, however, on the old systems in 
both countries. Very many weak and lilliputien authorities were removed.
In Britain, county boroughs were abolished, the number of local authorities 
was reduced by a quarter, and the chaotic system of delegation in the 
county areas was abolished. In Nigeria, the 'giant' authorities in the 
north were broken up and for the first time in the history of the country, 
there is a uniform system of local government whose existence is guaranteed 
by the constitution. The American city-manager system in Oyo, Oçfun and 
Ondo States, the Development Administration system in Bendel and Cross 
River States, the Native Authorities in the northern states and the two-tier 
French préfectoral system in Imo and Anambra States all disappeared with 
the 1976 reform. Until 1976, local authorities used to be created and 
financed by regional/state governments, but with the new system the
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Federal Government is a major financier of local authorities and it is 
therefore not easy for state governments to withhold or withdraw their 
grants for political reasons. In the past there was a lot of 
gerrymandering with regional/state governments establishing and dissolving 
councils as they wished. This will be legally and constitutionally 
difficult under the present system. Furthermore, not only did the 
constitution guarantee local government as a third-tier of government in 
the country, but it also guaranteed their functions. Thus a local 
authority could take a legal action if it feels that its functions are 
being eroded by the state government. Lastly, in both countries, the 
bewildering ranges in population, size and revenue among the same type of 
local authority have been reduced.
DEMOCRACY
Representation
The Nigerian and the British Government emphasized the need for 
local government to be truly democratic: "Above all else, a genuine
local democracy implies that decisions should be taken - and should be 
seen to be taken - as locally as possible" (Local Government in England: 
Government Proposals for Reorganization, 1971, para. 8). The Nigerian 
Government wanted power returned to those people who should exercise 
decisions locally. Yet we noted in Chapter 6, following Dilys Hill 
(1974), that democracy is a concept that is open to many interpretations, 
and in so far as this concept of local democracy has been further 
developed, it has appeared to rest more upon the need for government to 
be local than upon any precise analysis of what is required for a system 
of local government to count as truly democratic. Furthermore, one 
doubts the claims made for local government as an instrument of 
representative democracy mainly because of the influence of party politics
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on'local government and the low turn out at local elections. If elected 
representatives are to be accountable, they must have control over the 
matters for which they are brought to account. In the new county authorities 
the members are faced by increasingly complex and difficult policy decisions, 
taken by the local party caucus and/or by a large organization whose head 
office, and therefore whose chief policy advisers, may be located some 
fifty miles from where the members and their electors reside. This is 
equally true of the majority of local authorities in Nigeria. In Kwara 
State, for example, a councillor and his electors who live in Egbe are about 
72 miles away from Oyi Local Government headquarters where decisions are 
taken. A councillor living in Baruba has to travel over 135 miles to get 
to Kogi Local Government headquarters in New Bussa. In these circumstances, 
and given Nigeria's poor communications system, it is difficult to believe 
that the elected members will be any better placed, in terms of either of 
the skill or of the time and energy that they are able to devote to the job, 
to make any serious contribution to policy-formulation, or to exercise any 
real control over the way in which the authority does its business.
The Royal Commission suggested the reformed system would make a wider 
cross-section of the public readier to offer itself for election thereby 
restoring the primacy of the councillors (Royal Commission on Local Government 
in England, 1969, Vol. 1, p. 146). This is pure assertion based primarily 
on hope. We accept that the new authorities are larger than the existing 
ones, but their very size means that heavy burdens are laid upon the part- 
time councillors, responsible not only for running the authority but also 
for attending to the wishes of their electors. It is certainly difficult 
and time-consuming to pursue the individual case through the complex local 
government machinery; yet the councillor must do this on behalf of a large 
number of his constituents in addition to attending to policy. Particularly 
if the councillors are going to follow the ethos of the Bains Report by
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closely Involving themselves in the authority's business, then it would 
become an almost unbearable burden for the vigorous people, holding down 
responsible jobs elsewhere in the community, whom the reformers seem to have 
in mind as the new generation of councillors. The problem of long distances 
to council offices and meetings and the work-load of the councils are much 
reduced in the non-metropolitan district councils. But it is doubtful if 
'people of calibre' would readily serve on the councils because of their 
size and resources. Moreover, the mere fact that those who serve on district 
councils cannot have a say in the major services such as education, social 
services, transport and road planning must surely deter competent people 
from wanting to serve on the councils.
The simple fact that voting figures, now running at about 35-38 per cent 
of the total electorate (and seems to be falling year by year), have not 
improved, shows that apathy in local council affairs is still widespread.
In some areas seats are uncontested. A survey undertaken for The Times 
(6 August, 1977) revealed a 'widespread lack of public confidence' and the 
leading article warned that unless the central government took action 'they 
will be condemning local government to an era of public distrust'. Confirmation 
of these findings was contained in the Prime Minister's Committee on Local 
Government Rules of Conduct (1974, pp. 3, 35) which recognized that "there is 
at present a great deal of disquiet about conduct in local government", and 
therefore, the need to 'secure public çonfidence' from what a wider ranging 
government investigation into the same problems termed a 'grudging electorate' 
(Royal Commission on Standards in Public Life, 1976, p. 117). Further 
evidence of public distrust and governmental concern was provided by the 
Committee on Financial Aid to Political Parties (1976), and in a survey 
undertaken for the Royal Commission on the Constitution which pointed to a 
"'we' and 'they' situation" and a "sense of grievance" in which "people 
tended to feel powerless in the face of government and cut off from it" -
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especially if they cane from "working class households" (1973, pp. 18-21). 
These problems are aggravated not only because local elections are so poorly 
supported that councillors are not really very representative of their 
constituents, but also because the councillors are amateurs, part-timers 
with varying interests and ability. Inevitably the officers have to become 
involved in policy matters. Given their limitations, the councillors (even 
committee chairmen) can do little more than try to set very general 
objectives and operate with a 'consumers council' role with regard to 
controlling the administration. Thus, the calibre of councillors is not 
likely to improve as long as people feel that local government is not 
democratic enough. Anxiety about declining councillor calibre is a crude 
but direct way of highlighting the relative autonomy of local government.
In Nigeria, the customary way of measuring the calibre of councillors 
is by their educational achievements. The reformed system, it was hoped, 
would encourage capable and fairly well educated people to offer themselves 
for service. Nothing since 1976 has shown any improvement. In Oyi Local 
Government, for example, two of the supervisory councillors were primary 
school teachers, the chairman was a dispenser and all the other councillors 
have elementary education only. Moreover, men of calibre are likely to be 
attracted to serve in the State Assemblies, or the House of Representatives 
or the House of Senate than on local councils. Our survey (see Table 8.1) 
shows that 42 per cent of those interviewed said that they would rather 
contact their Ministries of Local Government to have their problems solved 
as against the 26 per cent who said that they would contact their councillors. 
This is an indirect way of passing judgement on the calibre of the new 
councillors. The citizens still feel they are hopelessly incapable of 
solving their problems.
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TABLE 8.1: IF THERE WAS SOMETHING YOU FELT VERY STRONGLY THAT THE LOCAL
AUTHORITY OUGHT OR OUGHT NOT TO BE DOING, WHAT WOULD YOU DO? (%)
A. CONTACT LOCAL COUNCILLOR
B. CONTACT MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
C. SIGN A PETITION







Turn-out is still very low with only 24.9 per cent of registered voters 
actually voting in the 1976 elections (Oyediran, 1977, p. 26). The total 
number of uncontested seats is bewildering. Table 8.2 shows that a total 
of 525 seats in states for which data is available were uncontested,
TABLE 8.2: LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION, 1976: DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS AND
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES
STATE Total No of Seats
Returned
Unopposed
No of Seats 
Contested
% of Contested 
Seats
No of Contesting 
Candidates
Bendel 186 24 162 87.1 515
Benue 194 28 166 85.5 512
Kwara 214 66 138^ 64.4 323
Ogun 134 64 70 52.2 175
Ondo 251 122 120^ 47.8 303
Oyo 436 115 317^ 72.7 937
Plateau 248 39 209 84.2 659
Rivers 189 67 122 64.5 332
t o t a l 1,852 525 (28.3% 
....... 1 ) 1,104 71.66 3,756
Note: a = No candidate was nominated in 10 wards.
b = Elections were not held in 9 wards due to irregularities in 
nomination process, 
c = Four (4) seats were not contested at Ilesa Local Government area.
Source : Oyediran, 1977, p. 26.
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TABLE 8.3: ACTUAL VOTERS AS PERCENTAGE OF REGISTERED ELECTORS IN THE
1976 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS
STATE REGISTERED ELECTORS ACTUAL VOTERS PERCENTAGE
Bendel 1,595,839 780,009 48.88
Benue 1,245,778 493,556 39.62
Kwara 1,263,106 297,940 23,59
Ogun 974,239 183,689 18.85
Ondo 2,968,165 249,103 8.39
Oyo 3,277,632 663,273 20,23
Plateau 863,337 403,257 46.70
Rivers 1,198,010 270,392 22.57
Source: Oyediran, 1977, p. 28
representing 28.3 per cent of the number of seats; while Table 8.3 portrays 
the low turn-out of the electorates. This low turn-out could be due to the 
fact that Nigerians had not had an oportunity to vote for over a decade until 
the local elections in 1976 and because of their apathy in local council 
affairs. Another reason could be due to the exclusion of party politics 
from the elections.
In both countries, therefore, the new systems have failed to bring forth 
a new type of councillor better able than his predecessors to hold his own 
with the officials. This problem is made more difficult by the fact that 
there is no objective barometer for measuring councillor calibre. It is 
certainly not enough to measure a councillor's capability by his educational 
achievement alone. Furthermore, the new structures have not improved 
democratic representation and responsibility because scale enlargement 
leads to a less favourable ratio of democratic representation, that is, there 
will be more voters per elected representative. In the light of these
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evidences, one can say that the crisis of local representative democracy 
is yet to be solved.
Political Parties and Democracy
The military government excluded party politics frcm the 1976 local 
government elections in Nigeria. It is true that party politics played 
a major role in the demise of the existing system and escalated the rate 
of corruption in local government administration especially before 1966 
(see Chapter 4). But we regard the exclusion of partisan politics from 
the new system as a serious aberration. It is one of those unfortunate 
complications arising from a law made by the military for civilian use. 
Party politics at the local level provides a training ground for political 
aspirants at the state and national levels. National and local issues 
can no longer be entirely divorced and the party system enables consistent 
policies to be pursued over reasonable periods of time, and ensures that 
councillors are made more responsive to the wishes of the electorate. 
Moreover, strong and vigorous political parties can revitalise the 
elected member whose impact is being eroded by the increased technical 
expertise of officers. Furthermore, parties in local government are 
bound to arouse electoral interest. Fundamentally, however, party 
involvement "renders responsibility for the general level of council 
achievement visible to the public, facilitates judgement at the polls, 
and through the ups and downs of party fortunes at successive elections, 
brings shifts in public feeling forcibly to the council's notice" (Warren, 
1952, p. 191). Although local partisan politics is barred in scane states 
in the United States of America and in Canada, and although there is a lot 
to be said against party politics in Nigeria (see, for example. Wraith, 
1972), it is surely myopic, given Nigeria's historical development, to 
expect politics to be kept out of local councils in present day Nigeria.
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In fact, our survey shows that 84 per cent of those interviewed said that 
local elections should be fought on a party political basis. All one 
can say is that party politics in local government should be sensibly 
operated. The democratic objective of the reform was also undermined by 
two elements: the provision which empowers Governors to appoint up to
25 per cent of council members, and the provision for indirect elections 
to some councils especially in the north. These provisions create an 
'elite* which is insufficiently responsive to the needs and wishes of the 
local population, and make the council less sensitive to a change in local 
opinion than a wholly elected body might be.
In Britain, if emphasis is to be placed, as the Bains report recommends, 
on the involvement of as many members as possible in the directing of the 
council's work, even to the extent of having members of the minority as 
well as of the majority party on the central coordinating committee 
(Working Group on Local Authority Management Structures, 1972, para. 4.27)y 
then responsibility for council decisions, even for decisions taken along 
political lines, will be blurred, and the opportunity of the electorate 
for passing a political judgement on those decisions commensurately 
reduced. Second, and more seriously, the two-tier system is bound to 
reduce the degree to which electors feel able or willing to influence 
events, not only by creating confusion about which council is responsible 
for what decisions, but also by requiring him to vote for not one but 
two local authorities. All the evidence suggests that people can only 
cope with a very small amount of exercise of the franchise, the only 
elections that ccme near to attracting serious interest or giving a 
fairly accurate picture of opinion being those for Parliament. But even 
if voters do take an increased interest in local government, the 
predominance of party politics will mean that they will be effectively 
prevented from voting on the council's actual record. The 1981 local
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government elections lend weight to the view that the overwhelming 
majority of electors treat local elections merely as an extension of the 
political contest at national level, and vote for their councillors not 
on the record of the individual candidates, or even of the council 
administration, but rather according to their current view of the performance 
of the national government on purely national issues such as unemployment 
or monetarism.
The reorganization has increased the impact of party politics in 
local government because by amalgamating party and non-party authorities 
the party system has almost invariably spread to the whole. Before the 
reform, 46 per cent of the 1,166 local authorities for which satisfactory 
information is available had full party political systems. Out of 330 
of the 422 new authorities, 63.7 per cent have party political systems 
(Norton, 1980, p. 273). It is doubtful if this increased political party 
affiliation will enhance the democratic quality of local government. If 
Mallaby's (1974) declaration is true that people of experience and ability, 
attracted to local government by feelings of care and conpassion for 
neighbouring camnunities, are turning away from service on district and 
county councils organized on a party political basis as they fail to see 
what party politics has to do with domestic issues, then to expect an era 
when 'men of calibre' will fill town councils is illusory since party 
politics is on the increase.
Parti cipation
Another aspect of local democracy which the reformers in both 
countries had in mind is participation. Democracy requires that local 
inhabitants participate in the process of political decision making 
regarding local affairs through their local representative institutions. 
Territorial democracy, according to Bulpitt (1972, pp. 285-7), rests on
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the 'Traditional Orthodoxy' of community, participation, local government, 
decentralization and democracy. But this 'popular mythology' is 
ambiguous about how power is actually to be shared between people. The 
traditional ideal of local people attached to their community and involved 
in its affairs is quite compatible, in theory and practice, with government 
by a local elite. Nor is it clear to what extent the citizen is expected 
to take part beyond the act of voting. If, however, we expand the 
concept beyond mere voting to encompass things like participation in 
decision making or physical participation in community activities and 
affairs, then the reforms have failed to enhance democracy except in 
parish meetings, and at district or town level in Nigeria.
We have expressed our doubts about the ability of elected members 
adequately to understand, or control, the activities of their council.
This is relevant to popular as well as to representative democracy, since 
information about particular decisions, and the ability to bring pressure 
to bear, are most naturally provided to the citizen by his elected 
representatives. "Direct influence of this sort may still be possible 
in the district councils, and indeed the weak administrative structure 
that those authorities may suffer frcm, combined with the emphasis that 
they lay on the localization of decision-making, could lead to excessive 
attention being paid to particular hard cases, to the detriment of proper 
long-term planning" (Buxton, 1973, p. 266). The councillor's dual role 
as a policy-maker and people's representative is a difficult one to 
balance. If, in the district councils, this balance is disturbed, it 
can at least be said that citizens are exercising some influence over 
decision-making, even if the long-term interests of the general electorate 
may not be thus best served. In the counties, however, rather more 
tangible factors may have to be invoked in the search for elements of 
popular democracy.
346
We have also pointed out that the size of the new counties and the 
remoteness of their headquarters, may prove.a serious handicap to their 
citizens. These factors are bound to increase the citizen's difficulty 
in finding out from officials what the council is up to. Citizens 
will also find it hard to believe that such officials would be open to 
persuasion from those who are affected by their plans and decisions.
Just as the new counties are too small to be efficient, so also they are 
too large for popular democracy which the Government seemed to regard as 
the most important objective of the reform. The report of the Royal 
Commission on Local Government in England indicates that "more than 
three-quarters of those interviewed were conscious of living in a local 
ccmmunity, which was defined as the 'home area'" (1969, Vol. 1, p. 62)'. 
However, this 'heme area' was not necessarily identified with one of the 
major local authority areas (e.g. borough or rural district). In rural 
areas, the heme area was mostly the 'civil parish or something smaller'.
The Government failed to capitalize on this survey to create second-tier 
authorities which would be small enough to cater for the democratic 
objective. In short, the new authorities cannot ideally serve as local 
authorities because the allegiance of their citizens tend to be 
restricted to a much smaller area than that covered by these new 
authorities. In fact the citizens of the new metropolitan districts are 
far more removed from the seat of government than before the reform, and 
they will suffer the added confusion of the presence of an additional 
'upper' tier of local authrority. Some of these developments, particularly 
with regard to the reorganization of county boroughs, were necessary on 
grounds of efficiency; but the increased size of local government areas 
must reduce the popular democracy of the new system.
The problem of size and the remoteness of the local government 
headquarters is no less serious in Nigeria. Except in the north where
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the large native authorities have been broken into smaller local 
authorities, sane of which are still very large by any standards, it is 
difficult to see how the citizens' participation has been enhanced by 
the reforms. In most parts of the country the old boundaries have been 
followed in drawing the new ones, and in the south especially, the 
reform merged many existing small authorities. In these places, 
therefore, the problem of participation has been left unresolved despite 
the government's avowed declarations. Amalgamation of former councils 
has a harmful effect on the citizen's influence on local government.
First it leads to a less favourable ratio of democratic representation 
since there will be more voters per elected representative. Second, it 
increases the need for appointed and specialized staff which may dwarf 
the role of local representatives in local government and administration. 
Finally, it increases the distance between the citizen and his local 
government; consequently, his influence on local government and 
administration will diminish proportionately. There is no doubt that it 
is this distance from the centre of government which has influenced the 
attitude of those whom we interviewed: 52 per cent of them feel that the 
present local government set up is neither the best nor the most effective.
As we said above, the increased influence of the non-elected officers 
is a blur on democratic participation in the new systems in both countries. 
The attempt to introduce corporate planning into the English local 
government especially has probably served to strengthen the hands of those 
officers who are less intimately involved in the direct provision of 
services to the public and so are more able to take those decisions which 
are defined as being in the interest of the 'community' as a whole and 
in the long run without taking- into consideration the effects of their 
decisions on individual citizens or group of citizens. In addition, a 
key thrust of contemporary reorganization has been the quite overt concern
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to 'close up' local authority decision-making to public intervention.
The Committee on the Management of Local Government pointed out that "a 
systematic approach is required to ensure that the component parts of 
the organization are not distracted by the pressure of current problems"
(1967, Vol. 1, p. 48), and the report of the Working Group on Local 
Authority Management Structures recognized that "some policy changes will 
inevitably be in the nature of a reaction to outside events" (1972, p. 12). 
These developments will hinder, rather than enhance participation.
Central-Local Government Relations
The independence of local government from central control, and the 
degree to which local government is entrusted with further powers are 
important elements both in increasing the responsibility of local 
government and in increasing the disposition of the citizens to take 
local government seriously. Considerable criticism was directed at the 
Royal Commission's proposals because they did not involve any extension 
of the powers of local government (Walker, 1970, col. 447); but even 
after the reform, there is considerable evidence that the democratic 
process is being eroded along with local authorities' sense of responsibility, 
by the extent and nature of central government controls, the move towards 
uniformity and the unsympathetic statements made by government leaders.
The transfer of local government services away from local government is 
particularly disturbing. The National Health Service Reorganization 
Act 1973 took away the remaining personal health services of local 
authorities, while the Water Act 1973 left them with the minimal 
responsibilities of testing water purity and administering local sewerage 
needs. The Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 required local - 
authorities to unify local social services under a single committee, with 
a director of social services whose appointment must be approved by the
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Minister, providing a consolidating and centralizing impact (Ashford, 1976). 
Added to these are the limitations on local autonomy in the services which 
local government does control that have been imposed by statutes such as 
the Housing Finance Act 1972, All these do not augur well for local 
democracy.
It is generally said that local authorities are agents of the central 
government and that they lack any real autonomy because of their 
constitutional position, a public desire for uniform services, and an 
increased dependence upon central government grants. These assertions 
may be simplistic but they are true, especially in relation to financial 
dependence. The Written Evidence of H.M Treasury to the Royal Commission 
was well aware of the fact that expenditure by local authorities formed 
a major part of total public expenditure. It regarded it as "therefore 
inescapable that the central government, and in particular the Treasury, 
should be increasingly concerned with the need for forward planning and 
effective control of the movement of local authority expenditure as a 
whole". It correctly concluded that the "need to exercise closer 
control over the expenditure of local authorities as a whole is not
easily reconciled with the need to give them greater individual freedom to
determine both their total expenditure and its distribution between 
services" (1969, pp. 4-5) . This view was substantiated in 1977 when the 
Labour Government said: "The dilemma which faces central government is to
secure and promote an effective local democracy with genuine political
choice and at the same time fulfil their responsibilities for the management 
of the economy and for the standard of public services" (Local Government 
Finance, 1977, p. 3) . These statements should cause us concern in view 
of the fact that local government is increasingly dependent on central 
grant.
It is a pity, however, that the reform did not take the implications
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of the setting of the contemporary econanic situation into serious 
consideration. At the most general level, the problem of local government 
can be seen as an aspect of the overall problem of the public sector in a 
capitalist economy. This is a problem that centres on the sources of 
state revenue and the scale of public expenditure, and on the scope and 
direction of state intervention. It is a problem that becomes acute at 
certain moments, such as now when the Government rate support grant is 
reduced, resulting in a reduction in working balances, increased rates, and 
cuts in local expenditure in real terms. The problem of local government, 
therefore, would appear to be its long-standing fiscal crisis - the 
tendency for local government expenditure to outpace locally generated 
income, especially in metropolitan areas. At the core of local government 
struggle for democracy is the problem of the scale of its expenditure and 
the nature of its interventions, a problem left unsolved by the reform, and 
despite the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry into Local 
Government Finance (1976), is still unsolved by the Government. This 
problem is indeed the reason for Mr. Heseltine's recent threat to cut 
government grants to local authorities that 'overspend*. The Guardian, 
in its leading article, warned that "it is now an urgent priority to 
defend local democracy frcm Mr Heseltine's centralist urge" (3 June, 1981, 
p. 12). One wonders if Mr Heseltine needs reminding that "local 
government is the only representative political institution in the country 
outside Parliament; and being, by its nature, in closer touch than 
Parliament or Ministers can be with local conditions, local needs, local 
options, it is an essential part of the fabric of democratic government" 
(Royal Commission on Local Government in England, 1969, Vol. 1, para. 28).
CentialH-ocal relations in Nigeria have not improved with the reform. 
Unlike the reform in Britain, Nigeria's did restore a number of functions 
to local government. But like in Britain, local government has become
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more dependent on State and Federal Government grants, and the nature 
and scope of intervention is causing concern. The relationship between 
the new local authorities and the state governments do not indicate a 
relaxation of central control. Firstly, the edicts stipulate that a 
Governor may refuse approval of duly elected candidates for chairmanship, 
and at least three candidates have to be presented to him out of which he 
chooses one to become the council's chairman. This is a blur on the 
principles of representative democracy and gives a Governor the chance 
to dispense patronages to his cohorts or pliant rear-guard chiefs in 
the home area. Secondly, the edicts provide that "every chairman of a 
council shall render his services to that council on such basis as the 
Governor may determine" (see, for example. Section 27 of Kwara State 
Edict No. 8 of 1976) . This is undemocratic and reflects the state 
government's desire to control the local authorities as much as they can 
while claiming to exhort the principles of 'participatory democracy '.
Thirdly, ccmplaints have been heard that even the new Nigerian constitution, 
which endows local government with the status of a ' third tier of 
government' gives insufficient consideration to the problem of central 
control (Azinge, 1978). The most evident problem, like in Britain, is 
in relation to the duplication and sharing of funtions. Unlike in 
Britain, however, the friction is not between two levels of local 
government but between the local authorities and the states which created 
then. This friction is not brought about by the structure of local 
government, however deficient the structure may be, but by the discrepancy 
between the laws of the statute book and the actual behaviour of state 
government officials. The reformed system has not been followed up by 
a change in the pattern of behaviour of state government officials on the 
one hand, and as we shall see later, of local government councillors and 
officers on the other hand. It is depressing to find that the old practice
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whereby regional and state governments took over local government services 
rather than strengthen their resources is still in vogue. We will return 
to these points later including the power of dissolution which has been 
used to excess since October 1979. First, let us analyse the more 
obvious forms of control.
(a) Policy Control
Close supervision of all major policy decisions is still pervasive. 
Local authorities are required to reach a technical standard of 
administrative performance acceptable to the state governments. Before 
any project can be embarked upon the relevant department in the local 
government organization is required to seek the advice of the appropriate 
specialists in the state ministries. Under the old system each chief 
officer of a local authority department was required to consult their 
counterparts in the central ministry for approval of items to be included 
in the department's submission to its own finance committee when the 
authority's budget was being prepared (Yahaya, 1975). This is still 
part of the general budgetary procedure. Complex projects are 
supervised throughout implementation by an official of the appropriate 
state government ministry. For example, local education authorities are 
guided by the ministry of education in all professional decisions 
concerning the development and maintenance of primary education. Inspectors 
check school records, especially records of cash transactions and fees.
Even when projects have been included in the approved development plan 
for the year, specific sanction must be obtained frcm the ministry of 
finance on each one. Some state governments have even gone so far as to 
pay grants in respect of educational buildings direct to the contractors 
after awarding the contracts themselves, necessitating the processing of 
claims in the state capital with all the attendant bureaucratic delays. 
Grants are used by the centre as a flexible instrument reflecting changes
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in central policy. The grant mechanism is used to try and ensure that 
proper records are kept, to check on expenditure trends and to prevent 
fraud.
Policy control is not restricted to initiatives taken by local 
councils. States direct authorities to pursue policy objectives. This 
is clearest in the field of primary education which consumes by far the 
largest proportion of local expenditure on services (see Tables 8.4 and 
8.5). But it also extends to minor areas, such as requiring local 
authorities to participate in road safety campaigns. Local authorities
are also given guidance on how to use their powers. In Kaduna State,
for example, local councils were urged by the state government to encourage 
self-help, to teach people how to use the resources available under
Operation Feed the Nation, and mobilise the masses. Local authorities in
parts of Kwara have been told to extend property rating. In Kaduna 
State, councils have been told to give primary education priority in 
their development plans and were warned that funds for 'low priority 
projects' would be diverted to primary education by the, state. In Lagos 
State the central authorities have urged councils to pay particular 
attention to the construction and maintenance of roads, public conveniences 
and markets. In Cross River, local authorities have been advised to 
ccmplete existing projects before embarking on new ones, to intensify 
their revenue collecting efforts, and to keep their traditional rulers 
out of party politics. In 1980 local governments in Ogun State were 
instructed to select twelve roads for priority development, this being a 
major area of concentration by the state government in its rural 
development policy. Lists of selected projects were to be submitted to 
the state House of Assembly since Members saw this as their right as 
elected representatives of the people (New Nigerian, 6 February, 1980).
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TABLE 8.4; DISTRIBUTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING BETWEEN SERVICES, 
1962 - 1980









Administration 497.5 11.2 9.0 11.7
Judicial 403.9 9.1 — —
Education 1,486.0 33.4 57.9 75.6
Health 627.9 14.1 3.7 4.8
Works 1,177.4 26.3 4.0 5.2
Agriculture 26.6 0.6 2.1 2.7
Trade and Industry 3.0 0.1 — -
Other 232.6 5.2 — -
TOTAL 4,434.9 100 76.7 100
a = estimates
Sources ; Anambra State, Local Government Approved Estimates, 1979-80; 
Eastern Region, Native Treasury Estimates










Administration 2,039.8* 17.7 2,814^ 14.17
Judicial 1,209.5 10.5 — —
Education 1,907.7 16.6 13 ,681 71.3
Health 941.3 8.2 1,325 6.9
Public Works 2,812.0 24.4 569® 2.9
Social Services 1,809.9 15.7 802 4.2
Agriculture 484.4^ 4.2 —— -
Trade and Industry 307.1^ 2.7 — -
a Includes district council funds 
b Includes animal and forest resources 
c Includes ccanmercial undertakings •
d Includes Public Complaints Bureau, public debts charges, payments to the
capital development fund, revenue & grants to statutory bodies & contributions 
to other authorities. 
e Includes housing and 'lands and survey' departments.
Sources: Ministry of Economic Planning, Northern Nigeria (1966); Ministry of 
Economic Planning & Rural Development, North Central State (now 
Kaduna State) 1976
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The states now have their representatives even more closely involved 
in the daily management of local affairs through the secretaries to the 
new local authorities than before the reform (see Appendix II). These 
chief executives are generally civil servants from the state's ministry 
of local government, responsible to the permanent secretary. The local 
government edicts confer on the secretaries the functions previously 
conferred on residents, district officers, divisional officers, sole 
administrators and similar officials of the state governments. In addition 
they now become the chief executives with all the local authority 
departmental heads answerable to them. In Anambra, for example, the 
administrative organization of each local authority 'revolves around' the 
chief executive who is responsible for the implementation of all council 
decisions. The secretary, significantly, is "responsible for ensuring 
that the decisions of the council accord with Government policies (emphasis 
mine). When any decision of the council appears at variance with 
Government policy, it is the duty of the Chief Executive to advise the 
council and clear the position with the appropriate Ministry before 
carrying out the decision" (Anambra State, 1976, p. 13). The integration 
of the local administration is further emphasized by the duty placed on 
secretaries to "perform such other functions as assigned to them by the 
State Government, for which they are held directly responsible to the 
Ij Cabinet Office" (Anambra State, 1976, p. 14). Secretaries also control 
the deployment of staff within the authority, subject to overall control 
by the state's Local Government Service Board. In our survey, 98 per 
cent of the secretaries who were interviewed said that their allegiance 
is first towards their boss in the ministry rather than the chairman of 
the local authority. This is not surprising since their salaries and 
promotions come frcm the states' civil services. It is for these 
reasons that they are regarded as district officers in a different guise.
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and "the duality of their role tends therefore to militate against the
autoncsny of the new Local Governments" (Aliyu, 1978, p. 284) . In
addition, local government inspectors have been appointed and authorised 
to attend council and committee meetings, inspect accounts and other 
records and advise the local authorities on the use of their powers.
This system seems to perpetuate the over-centralization of the old,
leading one expert to conclude that "Local Governments are not going to
be as autonomous as would appear from the Guidelines" (Aliyu, 1978, p 284).
However, it must be remembered that a lot depends on the calibre of
state ministry staff, and this has not always been high enough to guarantee *
effective control in pursuit of better administration.
Policy control extends beyond decision-making to envelop the choice 
of crucial decision-makers within local political institutions. The 
Federal Government's policy statement gave state governors the power to 
select from their council nominees the chairmen of a council and its 
committees or make the decision for the council if it cannot agree within 
a prescribed period on a choice of candidates. The choice of members of 
General Purposes Committees (the local authority's cabinet), political 
heads of departments and the chairmen of any other standing committee 
are also subject to the approval of the state governor. Most states 
adopted these controls by including them in the edicts which put the 
federal policy into effect. Conflicts have occurred between local 
authorities and state governors over the approval of council nominees.
Some governors have been suspected of using this power as a political 
weapon. There have been moves in some states to amend the edicts to free 
councils frcm central control over the selection of key office-holders. 
Elsewhere, however, the central power seems to have been extended by state 
executives issuing instruction as to which functions would come under the 
jurisdiction of each supervisory councillor and how various committees
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would be composed.
An unusual feature of the new system is the provision for nominated 
members to be appointed to local councils. This stems from the naive 
misconception contained in the Federal Government's policy document that 
such a group of councillors could 'concentrate on the development of their 
Local Government area' in a non-partisan way (Guidelines, 1976, para. 25). 
How it could be thought that such an activity can be non-partisan is not 
made clear. Nevertheless, the edicts provide for the nomination by the 
state governor of up to 25 per cent of council members. This power, 
then, is not the more usual one of co-option, whereby local councillors 
bring into their committees people whose advice, experience or expertise 
they value. It is rather one of central control to be exercised by the 
state executive. It should therefore be of some concern when a nominated 
member is selected by the state executive to be chairman of a local 
council or to occupy some other important post such as supervisory 
councillor. In Bauchi State, for example, nominated members occupy 35 
per cent of Icey posts and 70 per cent of the chairmanships. Elsewhere 
in the northern states, however, the proportion of chairmanships occupied 
by nominated members falls to 25 per cent. The requirement that at least 
75 per cent of local councillors should be elected is, nevertheless, a 
considerable improvement on the system in operation prior to the military 
takeover, when in the north, for example, only 33.7 per cent of councillors 
in local government were on average elected (Campbell, 1963, pp. 66-8).
Accompanying this control of the membership of council is a continuing 
state control over the appointment of traditional rulers. The new 
system allows for a greatly reduced role for emirs, chiefs and other 
traditional heads of communities. However, they have been assigned 
responsibilities which could turn out to have considerable local 
significance, such as determining religious matters, advising local
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authorities on policy, 'coordinating' development plans, assisting in 
the assessment and collection of camnunity tax, determining and declaring 
customary law (including that affecting land tenure) and assisting in the 
maintenance of law and order. These responsibilities, combined with the 
natural authority still assigned to traditional leaders by communities 
in many parts of Nigeria, suggest that they will remain a potent force in ' 
local politics for some time to come.
The significance of the fact that the state executive has to 'recognise' 
traditional leaders before they can occupy these positions varies from one 
part of the country to another. The succession to a title in some of 
the larger dynasties may be self-evident so that state endorsement is a 
formality. In seme parts of the country, such as Anambra, traditional 
titles relate to relatively small ccmmunities within the new local 
government areas, and the state executive has decided not to 'meddle' in 
the 'primary processes' of community selection involved. The identification, 
selection and installation of traditional leaders devolves on their 
committees (Anambra State, 1976, p. 11). However, the ultimate endorsement 
of traditional leaders in most areas rests with the state executives.
(b) Budgetary Control
Overall control of the local budget has not diminished in intensity.
Each budget has to be drawn up according to a prescribed format. Any 
departure from this requires central approval. The budgetary process 
commences with a circular frcm the ministry which sets out the principles 
which should guide the authority in drawing up its estimates of revenue 
and expenditure. 'Preliminary' estimates are prepared on the basis of 
these principles. Some items of revenue and expenditure even require 
prior approval by the ministry before they can be included in the preliminary 
estimates. These 'advance proposals' include changes in the level of 
local taxes, new administrative posts and an intention to continue a
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commercial undertakings which has run at a loss for three consecutive 
years. Ministry officials assist in the definition of policy objectives, 
advise on the reasonableness and feasibility of budgets and issue 
warnings: "the existence of these constraints eloquently articulate the
weak and dependent status of local authorities" (Adedeji and Rowland, 1972, 
p. 227). The professional staff of other ministries are authorised by 
the ministry of local government to check estimates relating to their 
policy area. The state ministry of education, for example, checks the 
estimates of local education authorities to decide upon the services and 
projects to be undertaken and to evaluate their financial soundness. It 
is also concerned to test whether the right calibre of staff are being 
employed and to prevent money for salaries being diverted to other 
purposes. On the revenue side the ministry of education fixes the per 
capita rates which local authorities can levy for such specific items as 
school furniture, buildings, books and stationery. Officials from the 
ministry work closely with the local authorities in the preparation of 
estimates and their advice must be complied with.
After a budget has been processed by a local authority and its 
committees it is passed to the ministry for local government for approval. 
No authority has the power to raise any revenue or incur any expenditure 
unless it is embodied in a centrally approved budget. The state 
government can specify the proportion of expenditure to be allocated to 
recurrent and capital programmes and, within these, the proportional 
allocation between departments and the percentage for salaries and wages. 
An authority with a poor revenue record may have its budget cut.
Comparable controls are exercised over capital expenditure, including 
procedures and principles to be followed in the preparation of capital or 
development plans. The ministry can alter a plan after consultation 
with the local authority concerned. Any disagreement between a local
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department and a central technical ministry is settled by the ministry 
for local government. Before development plans are approved the competence 
of local authority staff is checked, and the ministry satisfies itself 
as to the adequacy of local administration and whether costs are realistic, 
reasonable and correct (Aliyu and Koehn, 1980). Councils are advised on 
which kinds of capital projects they should concentrate.
Budgetary control is the main instrument by means of which the centre 
ensures that local policy making and expenditure are consistent with 
state policies and priorities. In addition inspectors from the central 
ministries are entitled to attend all council meetings, and are beginning 
to emerge as more powerful than either the secretary or treasurer to the 
council (Aliyu and Koehn, 1980, p. 45).
(c) Control over Internal Organization
Extensive central controls over the internal administrative organization 
of local government have always been enforced, and these have not been 
reduced by reform. Under the old system the appointment of senior 
officials, such as clerk to the council, treasurer and supervisor of 
works, required central approval. Conditions of service for local 
government service were regulated and salaries were determined by technical 
departments at the centre. The management of local authority staff was 
carried out in accordance with a common set of staff regulations for local 
authorities in each region. The central government required certain 
committees to be appointed, such as an establishment committee for 
personnel functions. Financial procedures were closely controlled by the 
memoranda issued by the central ministry (Campbell, 1963). And the 
centre decided what criteria and standards had to be met before an 
authority could be classified as needing less -direction from above.
The Financial Memoranda in use since the reform and endorsed by the 
local government edicts do not relax the centre's control of internal
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council procedures. They contain instructions which 'shall be observed 
and CCTnplied with by all Local Governments, for the better control and 
management of the financial business of Local Governments in the State'.
They provide detailed guidance and instruction of the financial and 
accounting procedures to be followed by all local authorities. These 
go far beyond procedures for the preparation and approval of annual and 
supplementary estimates. They define the precise duties and responsibilities 
of councils, committees and senior officials in regard to funds, stores and 
financial management, including ensuring that there is compliance with the 
Financial Memoranda. They prescribe certain organizational arrangements 
for collecting and accounting for revenues and controlling expenditure, 
including how to organize bank accounts, strong rooms, cash flows, tax 
censuses, payment vouchers and the regular reconciliation of departmental 
spending. They specify the accounting objectives, principles and' 
practices to be followed and the records and statements to be maintained 
and prepared monthly and at the end of the financial year. Procedures for 
the preparation of local development plans are prescribed. Councils are 
reminded that 'these Financial Memoranda are mandatory and shall apply to 
all local governments and all institutions in which a local government has 
a substantial financial interest, unless the authority approving such an 
arrangement specifically directs that certain provisions of the Financial 
Memoranda shall not apply either partially or wholly to any institution'.
Local authority accounts are subject to audit by the state 
government's auditor, and controls over staffing arrangements have 
increased. The Guidelines (1976) stipulate that each state should set up 
a combined local government service for the more highly trained cadres.
This service was to be strengthened ' far beyond the limits of existing 
staff by transfers and secondments from the state administrations. Local 
Government Service Boards (LGSB) would be given responsibility for the
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deployment of all members of the combined staff and would delegate 
internal postings and minor disciplinary matters to a local authority's 
establishment ccmmittee. Gradings, pensions, gratuities and other 
retirement benefits were to be brought into line with equivalent posts in 
the state civil service. The only choice open to the states when 
reorganizing this part of their local government systems was between giving 
the board entire control over postings or allowing local authorities 
to select fran candidates submitted to them by the board after it has 
processed applications and chosen suitably qualified persons.
State governments not only determine the grading structure for local 
authority employees. They also determine where particular officers in a 
specified authority should be placed in that structure. For example, 
the secretaries of Kaduna, Zaria, Katsina and Birnin-Gwari have been 
designated GL.15. The relative grading positions of different officers 
is also specified - heads of departments relative to their secretaries, 
section heads relative to their heads of department and so on. Central 
regulations also determine the number of senior staff to be employed.
In education, for example, the size of school population determines the 
number of education officers to which an authority is entitled, and their 
salary scales.
It is not surprising that conflicts of loyalty arise, leading to 
conflicts within a local authority. Council chairmen perceive their 
secretaries as their senior civil servants. The secretaries, however, 
see themselves as representatives of the state executive. They have taken 
important initiatives in the development of local policies. Some have had 
to be warned against acting as the 'overlords' of their councils after 
they had begun to adopt a supervisory stance, advising councillors on 
the right attitudes to adopt, addressing inaugural meetings and generally 
taking a centralist perspective on local government (New Nigerian, 12
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January and 25 February 1977).
Some states, such as Lagos, have begun to repeal those parts of the 
local government law relating to the position of the paid officers, 
arguing that a gubernatorial system was as appropriate at local level as 
at state, and that the council chairman should be the chief executive of 
the local authority, perhaps even with direct elections to that office.
The state ministry of local government is at the hub of the control 
system. The Guidelines (1976, pp. 11-12) propose the establishment of 
such a ministry in each state to channel the required financial and 
technical support to local authorities.
(d) Centralization of Functions
Appendix I shows the functions which are exclusive and those in which 
local authorities in Nigeria are to 'participate*. This provision was 
later enshrined in the fourth schedule of the constitution. In téms of 
legal and constitutional provisions, then, local government is 
extraordinarily well placed to perform a major role in local development, 
both economic and social. However, the problems of shortage of 
professional staff, lack of finance and the calibre of councillors will 
prevent the devolution of most concurrent functions in the near future 
(Aliyu, 1978, p. 284). In some states even functions in the exclusive 
list, such as markets, motor parks and property rating, have not been 
devolved. In Lagos, for example, the state decided in 1977 to set up a 
new authority to administer the recently ccanpleted Tejuosho market 
though Mainland local council claimed jurisdiction under the 1976 edict. 
Kwara State allocated 8.2 million naira in the same year for the 
development of 13 modern markets to be located in the administrative 
centres of the state's local authorities^ In Oyo the state Property 
Development Corporation has been sued for a housing programme of 25,000 
new housing units by 1983 (West Africa, 28 April, 1980). Many of the
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functions on the concurrent list, such as housing, land-use planning, 
refuse management and water supply, are already in the hands of special 
purpose bodies (Olowu, 1979, p. 5).
The state governments had tended to regard the local authorities 
as their agents. They have not felt constrained by the various formal 
allocations of powers between states and localities which exist in 
edicts, policy statements and the constitution. Thus the picture that 
is emerging is one of a very pragmatic distribution of responsibilities 
with the states engaging in whatever activities they regard as necessary. 
Hardly any function is seen as the sole preserve of local government.
In 1977, for example, Lagos State decided to set up a special purpose 
agency for refuse clearance and disposal in and around the city because 
the local authorities could not cope. At the same time, it was 
announced that the state had spent 1.2 million naira on refuse equipment 
for local authorities in the Lagos metropolitan area (New Nigerian, 8 
January 1977). Kwara State government has been directly involved in 
housing, health, water and agricultural services. Cooperation between 
all three levels of government - federal, state and local - has been 
sought in Niger State in the provision of rural clinics. Local 
authorities and the state forestry department in Bornu have combined in 
an effort to prevent further desert encroachment. Kaduna State's 
agricultural programme has involved grants to local councils for the 
distribution of bulls to mixed farms. There have been joint ventures in 
Imo State between local government and the state water corporation in the 
provision of boreholes, generating plant, pumps and tanks. In primary 
education, which officially became a joint responsibility of federal, 
state and local governments in 1976, both state and local authorities are 
agents for the implementation of a national scheme. In Ogun the state 
government recently spent 6 million naira on textbooks for primary and
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secondary schools. Bauchi State has found it necessary to appoint a 
special committee of civil servants to deal with the duplication of 
functions between state and local government and advise on functions which 
need to be transferred to the local councils, given financial considerations 
and the local government edict.
In some states the weak financial position of the local authorities 
has forced them to look to the state for the provision of services and 
amenities which they would otherwise have provided themselves. In Anambra, 
for example, local councils have pressured the state for better roads, 
especially in food producing areas, and pipe-borne water. In Ondo local 
authorities have asked the state to take over primary education since 
their obligations would incur deficits of between 700,000 and 1.1 million 
naira in 1979-80 when they are not allowed to present deficit budgets. 
Sardauna local government in Congola State has sought greater state 
involvement in the provision of roads which demanded such a large 
proportion of its budget. What all these prove is not just the transfer 
of functions to the states, but, more seriously, the duplication, 
fragmentation and wastage which they entail. The problem is compounded 
by the fact that the state governments themselves are hardly more 
efficient than the local authorities.
(e) Suspension and Dissolution
Local government, unfortunately,finds itself at the centre of political 
and legal controversy in Nigeria, which conpounds political machinations 
with constitutional interpretations. The state executives were given 
the power to suspend or dissolve a council if an executive is satisfied 
that a council was not discharging its functions in a manner conducive to 
the welfare of the inhabitants of its area, or had failed to hold the 
meetings which the law requires. A council can be suspended or dissolved 
for three months after which time elections must be held or the old council
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reinstated. During the period of dissolution the executive council is 
required to appoint a committee of management with the power to discharge 
all the council's functions. The widespread use of this power soon 
after the return to civilian government is a disappointing feature of 
the new system in operation. The fact that it has proved so easy for 
the new state governments to dissolve local councils and replace them 
with decision makers who, if they are representative of or responsive to 
anyone at all it is the state leadership, should cause seme dismay among 
those who have put their faith in local democracy as the guarantor of 
national democracy and stability.
In fact since 1979 virtually all local councils have been dissolved 
and replaced by caretaker management committees appointed by the state 
governor. The justification for this has either been mismanagement on 
the part of local councillors or the state's inability to organize fresh 
elections at the end of the councillor's first term of office. However, 
the dissolutions have been kept in force well beyond the statutory time 
limit of three months. In seme cases there have been court actions when 
the legality of dissolutions has been challenged, as happened in Rivers 
State in November 1979. Elsewhere, allegations of manipulation in 
pursuit of partisan advantage have been made, as in Oyo State in January 
1980 when the state branch of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) accused 
the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), which was in control at the state 
level, of packing the management committees, with which the executive had 
replaced the state's local governments, with its own activists in 
compensation for them not having been chosen as UPN candidates in the 1979 
state and national elections. There have been many other accusations of 
this kind, especially when dissolutions were enforced before the natural 
expiry of electoral terms. In Kwara the NPN itself was accused by the
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Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) of using the caretaker committees which it 
had appointed to 'subjugate' menders of other political parties prior to 
the holding of new local elections, and of appointing its 'agents' to 
these committees. The partisan motivation behind many of the 
dissolutions is evident in the justifications offered for them. In Benue, 
for example, the House of Assembly passed a resolution requesting the 
executive to dissolve all the local councils in the state, claiming that 
the councillors were 'handpicked by the last military administration' 
and that the council chairmen had been victimising their political 
opponents (West Africa, 26 November 1979). Unfortunately partisan 
motives therefore seem to predominate in the use of the dissolution power, 
though allegations of mismanagement are always made. Dissolution has 
been used to punish areas that did not give electoral support to the party 
in power.
It is undoubtedly the case that the wholesale mass dissolution of 
councils is the cause of serious confusion. This confusion is between 
the power of a governor to dissolve a council because investigation has 
revealed maladministration, and the decision to suspend all councils 
more or less indefinitely. The former is an administrative action. The 
latter concerns the whole basis of the system and is therefore a 
legislative matter. In sweeping away all councils the state executives 
seem to be confusing an administrative power of central control with a 
legislative function, that of responsibility for the local government 
system as a whole. It is also hard to believe, when there are mass 
dissolutions, that all local authorities in a state are simultaneously 
guilty of mismanagement, especially when there h$ive been few investigations, 
required by the law, to prove this, though this was claimed to be the case 
in Lagos when the governor suspended every council on the grounds that 
they were "no longer discharging their functions in a manner conducive
368
to the welfare of the inhabitants" (New Nigerian, 26 March, 1980).
Hence it appears as if mass dissolution and the replacement of elected 
councils by appointed committees defies the constitution which guarantees 
representative local government. Dent's criticism identifies the 
political motive behind the fusion of administrative and legislative 
powers :
A further aspect of excess state government power is their 
apparent assumption that since local government is within their 
sphere of legislative competence, they can use this power to 
appoint their own political supporters to management committees 
to run local government councils. Section 7 of the constitution 
GUARANTEES elected local government by elected local government 
councils (1980, p. 1887)'
Similarly, the issue of local government reorganization has become 
a matter of electoral manipulation for partisan advantage. Many of the 
proposals to create more units of local government are designed to give 
the ruling party an advantage in the next round of local elections,' or 
to redress grievances arising from the politically motivated sub-division 
of some states for local government purposes in 1976. The fact that 
the constitution stipulates that a candidate for the governorship must 
win one quarter of the votes in at least two-thirds of the local 
government areas in the state means that a governor who can create more 
local authorities in areas where his party has strong electoral support . 
can significantly improve his chance for a second term of office. While 
there can be no objection to a party promising in its election manifesto 
to reform the local government system in pursuit of improved administration, 
this should be kept distinct in the public mind from attempts to gerrymander 
gubernatorial and other elections. It is a pity, therefore, that many of 
the recently advocated 'reforms' appear to be thinly veiled attempts to 




The new system of local government in Nigeria çontinues very firmly 
in a tradition of central control stretching back tg colonial times.
The new status endowed by the constitution is outweighed by a subjection 
to central controls which extend well beyond the power to veto local 
initiatives and enable central authorities to promote their own policies 
using local governments as their agents. Both sanction and influence 
are used equally extensively. The motives for central control are 
highly political and paternalistic.
Anyone commenting adversely on this is likely to be reminded of the 
grave administrative problems faced by local authorities because of the 
poor calibre of their staff and councillors. These factors in the 
local situation cannot be denied. But it is equally important to 
remember that poor standards of administration are not the exclusive 
perogative of local government. The centre's record has not been an 
unblemished one. Many additional problems are created for local 
government by delays in decision making at the centre, ranging from the 
approval of annual estimates to the countersigning of payment vouchers. 
Councils have often found themselves well into the financial year before 
final approvals are received. Both morale and efficiency can be 
undermined by the late or non-payment of central grants. Badly designed 
forms impose extra burdens on those required to furnish the ministry 
with detailed records and statistics. Problems snowball when complex 
submissions required fran local authorities produce queries from the 
ministry which have to be followed up. Confusion can arise from the 
dispersal of central controls among different central authorities, 
especially when they all apply to the same subject, such as having the 
governor approve councillors' salaries, the commissioner approve heads 
of departments salaries emd the local government secretary approve the
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salaries of other officials. Nor does the centre always rigorously 
observe the requirement to consult a local authority before deleting or 
amending an item on its estimates. Useful advice on development 
planning has been rare. A lack of familiarity with local problems on 
the part of headquarters' staff has led to the issuing of unworkable 
instructions, especially in circulars of general application to widely 
varied circumstances (Adewumi, 1973, p. 47). Central auditors are not 
always familiar with local government accounting methods, and there have 
been cases of cancelled accounts which later turned out to be correct. 
Delays in ccanpleting audit, sometimes up to five years, have often meant 
that they impose no threat to the potential fraud or embezzler. It has 
sometimes been felt that the central authorities have actually discouraged 
the recruitment of qualified staff on the basis of merit in local 
government in order to divert good people into the civil service and to 
make it easier to control local authorities. Good staff have even been 
demoted for refusing to move out of local government into the State's 
administrative service.
Excessive central control can also be dysfunctional in the response 
which it may elicit from repressed local authorities. If circulars are 
expressed in too technical a language for the local officials they "may 
assume that no serious action is anticipated" (Adewumi, 1973, p. 46). If 
local authority personnel requirements are rejected attempts may be made 
to run services without the necessary qualified staff. If the state 
forces its own appointees on unwilling local authorities they have "a 
clever way of frustrating such people ... either by entrusting 
responsibilities in the hands of people more junior to them or creating 
a difficult working climate" (Adewumi, 1973, p. 51). The feeling that 
staff have been imposed by the centre may reduce the interest and 
confidence of the public in local government and consequently the
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willingness to pay tax at a time when tax evasion is already a serious
Aproblem for local authorities (Oyediran, 1974 , p. 551). Local . 
authorities may try to circumvent central controls over contracts for 
capital projects by breaking down contracts into amounts smaller than 
those which require Tenders Board approval or by purchasing materials in 
bulk for contractors to use, again reducing the cost to avoid central 
scrutiny and expert advice which may run counter to the authority's own 
views and intentions (Adewumi, 1973, p. 55).
It is extremely difficult to strike the right balance between 
central control and local autonomy, especially in conditions of under­
development. How that balance works out in practice will depend on a 
number of factors, and not just on formal relationships. Some of these 
are associated with the political and organizational circumstances 
which condition the interaction between different levels of government.
The attitudes of central ministries to local authorities may vary. Local 
authorities in their turn may be able to bargain and negotiate successfully 
with higher levels of government. They themselves will vary in the 
resources which they have at their disposal for resisting central control. 
Central agencies may not be able to present a consistent policy. Local 
governments may receive conflicting guidance from different departments 
on expenditure and levels of service provision. Such incompatibility 
and obscurity may be virtues as far as local autonomy is concerned 
(Harris, 1978).
However, they may be vices if they lead to negative responses from 
local authorities, or undermine their fragile administrative viability, 
or produce a reaction at the local level which is self destructive as 
well as defensive. It seems likely that the present atmosphere and 
machinery of central control over local government in Nigeria will lead 
to expectations of local autonomy being frustrated, with the inevitable
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consequences for locally administered services. Obviously this part of 
the machinery of government cannot be artificially dissociated from the 
political struggles taking place at state level. However, if local 
groups begin to feel that their local institutions can never amount to 
anything more than mere pawns in the games of higher level politicians 
and that the gap between expectations and reality is increasing, government 
at both levels will be brought into disrepute.
Thus, although democracy is one of the guiding objectives behind the 
reinstatement of representative local government in the 1976 reform, it 
is inaccurate to identify it with local government. The doctrinary 
inclination with regard to democracy has led many people "to link, then 
merge and confuse decentralization and democracy" (Fesler, 1964, p. 3). 
Events since 1976 demonstrate that local government is not of necessity 
identical with democracy, and that special measures must be taken to 
ensure that local government is democratic (Smith and Owojaiye, 1981).
The reforms, however, did bring a few gains from the point of view 
of their democratic objective. In Nigeria, the electorate had their 
first chance in over a decade to exercise their democratic rights at the 
polls. The 1976 elections were necessary appetizers for the 1979 state 
and national elections. The voting age was lowered to 18 years from 
21 years and universal suffrage was introduced throughout the country for 
the first time. Lastly, democracy was further strengthened by greatly 
reducing the role of traditional leaders in local government affairs. In 
Britain, a large number of trivial controls have been abolished, local 
authorities now suffer less interference oh planning matters, some local 
powers have been clarified or expanded, the small amount an authority 
can spend for the benefit of its area beyond the services for which it 
has statutory provision has been substantially increased, and the 
government auditor's powers in connection with local authority expenditure
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have been narrowed. We should not exaggerate the loss of municipal 
functions. Local authorities are still critically involved in important 
and fast-growing sectors of social provision. They have made significant 
functional gains such as the 1947 Civic Restaurant Act which empowered 
local authorities to provide and administer restaurants and to supply 
meals to the public; the Clean Air Act, 1956, which allowed local 
authorities to establish smoke control areas; the 1962 National 
Assistance Act which enabled county and county borough councils to 
provide meals and recreation for old people instead of using voluntary 
bodies for this purpose ; and perhaps the most important 'gain' was the 
Town and Country Planning Act, 1947 which introduced a comprehensive 
system for the control of development. Two other innovations which the 
reform brought about are worth mentioning because they are vital for 
democracy. Firstly, under the 1972 Act press and public have a right 
to attend committee meetings. Secondly, the establishment of the office 
of the ombudsman enables claims and grievances of citizens to be dealt 
with equitably. The increasing powers of both central and local 
government to make decisions affecting various rights of the citizen make 
it necessary to provide effective remedies, through the ombudsman, which 
protect him against unjust administrative action.
EFFICIENCY
It is really inconceivable that one can talk of efficiency and 
effectiveness of local authorities in both countries amidst the many 
problems which we have enumerated so far in this chapter. If the 
functional/structural divisions are not based on any rational criteria, 
with a lot of overlapping, fragmentation and duplication of functions 
between different tiers of local government leading to wastage and 
conflicts; if the councils do not have enough resources, both finance
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and manpower, to perform their duties efficiently; if they are not even 
free to exercise basic democratic rights; if representation and 
participation have been killed by excessive central control; if serious 
limitations are placed on local autonomy by national control of its 
expenditure; and if the calibre of councillors and officers has not 
improved with the reforms; then one can certainly conclude that there 
has been little or no improvement in efficiency. In other words, there 
is an intricate connection between the functional/structural and 
democratic objectives on the one hand, and efficiency on the other hand. 
And since our evaluation shows that the first set of objectives have not 
been adequately achieved by the reform, then the last objective, 
efficiency, has certainly suffered too. What we have analysed so far 
therefore portrays the inefficient and ineffective operation of local 
government, especially in Nigeria. What remains for us to evaluate, 
therefore, is the internal administration of the councils.
As with the case of democracy, so with functional efficiency have 
the realities of local government outrun the assumptions on which the 
system is based. At the beginning of the century, the task of local 
government in Britain was mainly one of simple administration, providing 
the basic services and otherwise interfering very little with the 
citizens' free conduct of their affairs. But now, when local government 
is a huge machine handling a variety of complex functions and trespassing 
directly upon private interests, the independence of the elected member 
in pursuing the grievances of his constituents is comprcxnised by his 
formal responsibility for the acts of the council, however little he may 
in fact be in control of policy-making or of official administration. 
Although the councillors' policy-making role may give them access to the 
machine of a kind that popular representatives would not otherwise enjoy, 
it does so by making those representatives part of the machine, implicated
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both in the decisions and in the efficiency of its administration. This 
dilemma is, in our view, the fatal flaw in the position of the elected 
councillor. It is very doubtful whether 'part-time' councillors could 
effectively act either as policy-makers or as the instrument of popular 
democracy. What does seem clear is that, by attempting to sustain both 
roles at once, they are prevented from the proper discharge of either.
The Maud Report, the Redeliffe-Maud Report and the Bains Report all 
made serious attempts to improve the internal management of local 
government. Little has changed, however, since the reform. A survey 
by Greenwood et al (1974, 1975, 1976) which tried to identify the salient 
features of the management structures of the new authorities in order 
to see how they compare with the structures prevalent before reform 
shows that very few local authorities have streamlined the numbers of 
committees. In fact many local authorities have even been forced to 
reinflate numbers of members per committee in order to give members 
'something to do' (Greenwood et al, 1975, p. 7). The Bains Report went 
beyond simply proposing a reduction in the number and size of committees, 
since it also had regard as to the criteria to be used in dividing up 
committee responsibilities. Local authorities were advised to adopt the 
'programme committee' concept, and although this has not been rejected 
explicitly by local authorities, the specific committees set out in the 
Bains Working Group's Report (1972) are not always accepted and several 
traditional committees have survived reorganization (Greenwood et al, 
1975, p. 8).
The survey also discussed the emergence of area committees and the 
use of informal working groups of councillors, but it recognized that 
these were "stilt comparatively rare innovations" (Greenwood et al, 1975, 
p. 9). They declared that the policy ccmmittee was an 'established 
feature' of English local government, and reorganization has brought to
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a head the pre-reorganization movement towards the policy committee as 
the hub of the ccmmittee system. But although the Bains Report stressed 
the quite crucial importance of monitoring and reviewing established 
policies and commitments and wanted to see a performance review sub- 
ccramittee, 'fewer than half' the new authorities have followed this 
crucial piece of advice.
Furthermore, traditional departments have, by and large, retained 
their status and few authorities would appear to have broken frcm the 
professional base. There are a number of authorities, particularly 
counties and to a lesser extent shire districts which still adopt the 
traditional professional-department approach' (Greenwood et al, 1976).
These authorities all have the 'primary corporate mechanisms' of chief 
executives, management teams, and policy committees, but they simply 'do 
not operate in the corporate way that was envisaged by Bains'. The 
truth of the matter is that 'there are sane local authorities where the 
corporate structure exists on paper but it has little or nothing to do 
with the actual operation of policy-making'. Even at a more general 
level, the corporate additions of the chief executive, management team, 
corporate groups, and policy committee have to a large extent been 
overlain onto the ongoing operating structure of line departments and 
service committees (Greenwood et al, 1976).
At a general level, the departmental structures, established at the 
time of reorganization, have changed little since then, and the "tension 
between central departments and service departments has been exacerbated 
since reorganization" (Greenwood et al, 1976, p. 17). New departments 
that have been created out of a number of other departments have ' often 
suffered more fran cutbacks' and have been the subject of major 'conflicts' 
and 'antagonisms'. The continuing strength of the established departments 
and professional groups is revealed in 'the lack of commitment to inter­
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disciplinary working groups in many authorities'; in the 'considerable
doubt in many authorities about the value of central corporate planning
units'; in the fact that 'very few authorities have central research
and intelligence units'; and in the fact that personnel management 'does
not tend to play an important part as was envisaged before reorganization'
and chief officers have had to spend their time 'plugging the gaps'
(Greenwood et al, 1976) , The management team has been a problematic
innovation. Few authorities have taken the Bains advice and created a
small team because of the social problems of resentment, suspicion, and
caranunication where certain officers are excluded. Where a team has
tried to develop a sense of 'collective responsibility' this has frequently
evoked considerable hostility on the part of members. Simply expressed,
it is not clear that the management team has been one of the 
successes since reorganization: unity at a personal level has
not necessarily permeated the authority and subsequently led to 
integrated departmental work relations between the disparate 
departments; agendas have been clustered with too much detail; 
and concensus management has too often obliterated a necessary 
diversity of opinion (Greenwood et al, 1976, p. 22)
On the councillor side, although there are some authorities where
the policy committee assumes a 'coordinating role', and there are others
where it assumes a corporate and 'interventionist' role, the 'largest
group of local authorities' has a policy ccmmittee which assumes a
' commenting ' role where the locus of policy-making is still within the
service committee. These views have been authenticated by Stewart (1975)
who identifies a danger in that management teams see their role not as
the setting of a framework, but the consideration of all the authorities'
activities. He describes vividly how the processes of corporate
management are drowning in seas of paper, policy and resources ccxnmittees
battle with endless agendas, management teams became another committee
through which new proposals have to struggle and inter-disciplinary
groups proliferate, and there is a danger that all activities are dealt
378
with by corporate management.
Another problem which is still hindering efficiency in both
countries, although to a lesser extent in Britain, is corruption. The
Royal Commission on Standards in Public Life (1976) found that of the
179 people, excluding police officers, convicted of offences under the
Prevention of Corruption Acts, there were 14 local authority members
and 70 local government officers. In Nigeria, thé New Nigerian (5
January 1979) spoke of the "corruption and wanton financial mismanagement
that characterized the local government councils so far investigated".
Thus, Norton concludes that the reform in England and Wales has
brought little progress in terms of efficiency:
The changes led to a heavy strain on resources. Workloads 
expanded dramatically, a heavy loss of staff could not be 
made up economically by recruitment, and new standards and - 
new establishments tended to be set at more generous levels. 
Competition among authorities for the rarer categories of 
staff was expensive. Staff commissions set up with an 
oversight on staff matters had only a marginal effect on the 
inflationary tendencies of such a period, concerned as they 
were more with protection of staff interests than with 
economy (Norton, 1980, pp. 273-4).
The reform in Nigeria has brought little or no improvements in the 
internal administration of the councils. The new system is designed to 
equip local government everywhere professionally and financially for its 
task, but as we have tried to show so far in this chapter, it has been 
one big mirage. Finance, equipment and qualified personnel are in 
short supply. Money is unavailable because tax collection is poorly 
organized or, more importantly, as local government becomes more dependent 
on the centre for revenue allocations, higher levels of government fail 
to deliver promised grants on time. Staff are in short supply. A few
examples frcm Anambra State will serve to illustrate the problem. Ihiala 
in 1979 had one social welfare officer for a population estimated at 
203,339. Anambra local government had two community health assistants 
and three health orderlies for nearly 300,000 people. Igbo-Ekiti had 
233 teachers and the same number of auxiliaries for its primary schools.
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Elsewhere the problems are just as great. Zaria cannot maintain its 
roads or dispose of the growing amount of refuse created by a growing 
urban population. In Bornu State the present provision for primary 
education can only cater for 15 per cent of the school age population and 
another 70,000 classes are needed (West African, 7 January 1980), Most 
authorities experience difficulties in organizing revenue collection. 
Implementation is often further impeded by maladministration. These 
factors are an important qualification to the picture we have of service 
provision by Nigerian local authorities.
Consider cible anxiety has always been shown about the high proportions 
of local revenues which are spent on personal emoluments rather than 
projects. Such expenditure has often consumed half the budgets of 
local authorities in the north, for example. This matter should be 
dealt with cautiously. Local government services are often 1about 
intensive, especially in the social welfare and educational fields. It 
should not be automatically assumed that because there is a high level 
of spending on salaries, wages, superannuation and so on that a service 
is necessarily unproductive. It may be difficult to measure the 
productivity of, say, teachers, but that is in the nature of the public 
good being provided. Much of the 'product' of local government will 
inevitably take the form of a service delivered by professionals direct 
to members of the public. The success of local government should not 
only be measured by miles of road built or number of boreholes drilled.
Of greater concern is the high proportion of expenditure devoted 
to administrative costs. Many of these have to be borne in support of 
particular services, but it must be remembered that the expenditure on 
services such as education, health and agriculture also includes the 
cost of administrators and clerical staff as well as teachers, health 
superintendents and agricultural officers. The new system of local
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government does not appear to have reduced significantly the cost of 
administration than under the old system: over .22 per cent in 1979-80 
(see Table 8.6) compared with the Western State where local authorities 
allocated 20.1 per cent of their budgets on administrative costs in 
1965-66, and 16.4 per cent in 1966-67 (Western State, 1967, Tables 6 and 
7), In the north, however, Kaduna's 17.7 per cent is an improvement 
on North Western's 22.4 per cent in 1971 (North Western State, 1971;
North Central State, 1975), but the fact that in Bauchi the bulk of local 
budgets is devoted to administrative costs suggests little improvement in 
priorities there (Aliyu and Koehn, 1980). A certain amount of 
expenditure on new premises was perhaps inevitable in the period immediately
TABLE 8.6: DISTRIBUTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING BETWEEN SERVICES









Administration 1,277.4 14.1 5.6 22.3
Judicial 1,154.7^ 12.7 0.4 1.6
Education 3,077.1 33.9 2.0 8.0
Health 1,089.1 12.0 3.5 13.9
Public Works 1,464.9 16.2 13.3 53.0
Agriculture 237.6 2.7 0.2^ 0.8
Trade and Industry 4.0 0.1 — ——
Other 750.3 8.3 0 ,1= ..... . 0.4
TOTAL 9,055.1 100.0 2 5 . 1 ...... 100.0
a Includes police and prisons 
b Includes trade and industry 
c Community development in Ogun State
Sources : Western State (1968); Ogun State Local Government Estimates
1979-80
following the reorganization of local government, but it is doubtful whether 
much of the expenditure on staff quarters, guest houses, housing for
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district heads, and council accommodation can be justified, especially when 
development objectives have been set for local government.
Two other problems are worth pointing out. First, it is rather 
surprising that the concept of corporate management is still unheard of •
in Nigeria at the tail end of the twentieth century. Second, just as there 
have been problems between state and local government officials, so also 
there is serious conflict within the councils themselves. The difficulty 
of drawing a line between policy and administration at the local level 
has become a source of friction. There have been numerous clashes between 
political functionaries (chairmen and supervisory councillors) and the 
chief executive (secretary to the local government). The political 
functionaries, who are full-time appointees, tend to interfere too often 
in the running of the local authorities. For example, a supervisory 
councillor for works in a local government in Bendel State was reported to 
have dismissed a road labourer without the knowledge of the chief executive. 
Yet the councillors were given no control over staff under the new 
system.
It is certainly difficult to see what significant improvements have 
been achieved by the reforms in Britain and Nigeria, especially the latter. 
Local authorities in Nigeria, however, have made some achievements in 
education and minor constructions such as motor parks and markets. In 
Britain, most of the authorities now have chief executives and all of them 
have management teams.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL STABILITY
In view of the emphasis placed in federal policy statements on the 
significance attached to local government as an agent of development it 
is surprising to note how expenditure on agriculture, trade, industry 
and public works such as roads, has declined to negligible proportions
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in seme states. Yet in 1968 a United Nations expert had noted North 
Central's N.A. expenditure in these fields standing at under 4 per cent, 
canmenting that "high standards of social services can only be maintained 
if the wealth of the community is sufficient to maintain them; and to 
expand the former and ignore the development of the services which increase 
that wealth is to court financial disaster" (Smith, 1968, p. 2).
Assessing the position throughout the country a year or two later Adedeji 
and Rowland noted the relatively insignificant role which local government 
was playing in the development process compared with the states, and its 
'poor performance' in areas relevant to the productive capacity of the 
local economy such as public works, agriculture, forestry and industrial 
development. Much capital expenditure was spent on replacements and 
minor repairs. The total budgetary picture for a state could be dominated 
by a single large authority such as Benin, Bornu or Ibadan, with others 
having no capital budgets at all. Significantly local government was not 
mentioned in the Second National Development Plan for 1970-74 (Adedeji and 
Rowland, 1972, p, 8).
Nevertheless, there were some states in which capital development 
projects were planned. Between 1969 and 1975 in Kaduna State for example 
local authorities budgeted over 7 million naira for development projects 
such as roads, wells, dams, forest improvements and plantations. The 
problem appears to have been one of implanentation, since no authority in 
the state was able to ccxnplete even 50 per cent of its projects during 
the period.
The designers of the new system were aware of these shortcomings and 
clearly wished to see local government making a much greater contribution 
to the development effort. Education is clearly crucial to development, 
and here local government is playing its part. But in other fields there 
has been a move away from involvement in socio-economic development.
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Indeed, it is not uncommon to find some local authorities spending more 
on the maintenance of traditional offices than on agriculture, trade and 
industry combined. Ogun State's 1.2 per cent of local budgets on 
community development does not suggest that local government is in the 
fcrefront of the development effort, and compares unfavourably with even 
the meagre 4.2 per cent spent on veterinary services, trade, industry, 
forestry and agriculture in the Western State in 1966-67. Nor does 
Anambra's 2.7 per cent on agriculture, though it is an improvement on 
the average performance in the Eastern Region in the mid-1960s (see Table 
8.4̂ ) . Also the local authorities have planned a considerable level of 
capital expenditure on markets which, if implemented, should make a 
contribution to development by encouraging trade. But the general 
picture does not support the assumption that local government is serving 
as a mechanism for socio-economic development, and it certainly cannot 
be inferred that the more local authorities there are the greater the 
level of development (New Nigerian, 15 December 1979).
The development role of local government is more clearly understood 
if it is seen as part of the provision of an infrastructure required 
by capitalist production and enterprise. Then the emphasis on the 
construction of markets, council offices, roads, and water supplies is 
more ccanprehensible. The role assigned to local government reflects the 
dominant ideology of the Nigerian political leadership. It is very 
characteristic of municipal government at a time of early capitalist 
development with a democratic ideology. It in part explains why 
' developnent ' at the local level is so often measured by the quantity of 
physical constructions completed, a habit which allows maternity centres 
to remain unequipped and classrooms to be used for storage space (New 
Nigerian, 22 Febiruary 1979). But more importantly the powers devolved 
to local government reflect the interests of those who control the state
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level and the extent to which they are prepared to loosen control over 
important inputs provided by the government to a growing industrial, 
commercial and agricultural business class.
Budgets only reflect in part the priorities assigned by locally 
elected representatives to different local needs and interests. They 
also reflect the powers which the centre is prepared to devolve. They 
should also be seen in the context of varying levels of implementation 
and uncertainty stemming from fluctuations in the regularity of grant 
payments by higher levels of government. All these factors, only some 
of which are controlled by local authorities, mean that there will be 
different patterns of spending and service provision from one part of 
the country to another and from time to time even within a single authority, 
Local traditions will also have their impact on patterns of local 
government expenditure, traditions such as community development through 
voluntary donations and self-help by lineages and kinship groups.
Communal effort releases local government for other objectives. It will 
also alter the pattern of state grant allocations. The role which such 
traditional or communal groups can play in local government will be the 
main theme of the next chapter, 'Recommentations'.
Thus, the role which local government is expected to play in socio­
economic development and national stability is not only ill-defined, but 
it has also become impossible to achieve anything substantial in view of 
the problems we have analysed in this chapter. There is little to 
suggest that the recent reforms have increased local government's 
development capacity. In many parts of the country local authorities 
do little more than administer part of what has become an increasingly 
centralized educational service. Elsewhere, public works absorb the 
resources of local authorities, but much of the expenditure is on 
maintenance work of government buildings. In our survey we asked
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administrative officers to evaluate the problems that hinder economic 
and social development in their local government areas, 26 per cent 
of them felt that one of the problems is lack of understanding of 
state government's goals for development at the local level. 6 per 
cent mentioned the loss of local administrative officers to state 
governments as one of the serious hindrances. The majority of those 
interviewed (54 per cent), however, said that lack of motivation and 
participation on the part of the citizens, is the most acute problem.
The remainder mentioned things like lack of cooperation of local 
authorities with the state government and political opposition to state 
government efforts. When we asked the administrative officers what 
they thought was the most effective way of instilling citizen 
participation in development, 64 per cent of them mentioned citizen's 
involvement in the planning stage. Only 18 per cent of them opted for 
education (adults and children) as the second most important way.
Thus, there can hardly be any development if the people cannot participate, 
And until such a time when the Government restores the 'functional 
integrity' of local authorities and realises that local democracy in its 
various facets is an inevitable part of national democracy can local 






To ra2je the simplified conceptual structures erected by one's 
predecessors is not only a frolic for the young in spirit^ 
but also a necessary step toward the discovery of truths 
that have eluded scholars in the past (Fesler, 1957» p.139).
Nowadays 'realists'- in government talk more about the 
'management' of problems than their solution. Therefore, if our 
recommendations help in the 'management' of the problems which 
we have identified then this research has been worthwhile. It 
is unlikely that any major reform of local government will take 
place in Britain in the next decade although there is talk of some 
'organic change' which would abolish counties, and restore power 
to districts over education and social services (Organic Change in 
Local Government, 1979; Ashford, 198l, pp.192-9^). The present 
structure in Nigeria is not likely to enjoy such a 'permanence' 
because every state government has promised to reform local 
government again. Whatever the case, however, there must be 
arrangements for adapting the present patterns to social, econo­
mic, demographic and technological changes and to change in the 
demands that both countries make on local government. Any 
approach to the reform of local government areas will require 
considerable insight into the area's probable future economic 
and social development in order that sufficient scope for 
development may be given to new units at the time of their 
creation. Since local government cannot be abstracted out of the 
society of which it is a part, participation and efficiency will 
be enhanced if the dynamics within the society or culture, such 
as the institution of age-set in Nigeria, are exploited (see
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below). Restructuring of local government boundaries^therefore, 
should be oriented towards the future rather than the present; 
otherwise, they will soon prove inadequate for what is often con­
sidered to be their major role : social and economic development 
of their areas.
There is considerable merit in retaining a two-tier system 
in Britain, each tier having clear responsibilities, but 
incorporating a reasonable measure of flexibility in its appli­
cation, and endeavouring at all times to secure the right balance 
between efficiency and democracy, recognising that these are 
frequently in conflict. We would advocate, however, that the local 
authorities should be smaller than at present constituted because 
if we take the most basic definition of democracy - that government 
acts in accordance with the wishes of citizens - then democracy is 
undeniably a diminishing function of scale. It may be impossible 
to take Mill's advice and make every town a municipal council (1968, 
p.350) but his insistence on the primacy of the urban entity ought 
to be the starting-point for any future reform and not the hypo­
thetical requirements of the functions it happens to provide. We 
cannot emphasise too sharply that the essence of local government 
is that it should be local.
We must of necessity talk in highly generalised terms, but 
other things being equal, we may say that a small unit is likely to 
be more democratic than a larger unit for a number of reasons.
First, because in small units representatives are more likely to 
be responsive to citizens' views; second, because a smaller unit 
makes it possible for citizens to participate in decision making; 
third, a smaller unit leads to a more favourable ratio of demo-
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cratic representation since there will he less voters per elected 
representative; and fourthly, in smaller units there is a greater 
likelihood of political homogeneity among the citizenry, thus making 
possible more clear-cut majorities on issues and more popular con­
trol of leaders (Barry, 19T^> p.%97). People are no longer satis­
fied with just voting; they want to participate in decision making 
and take part in activities that directly affect them. We do accept 
the need for services to be performed efficiently and that this 
requires larger units of local authority. Perhaps the solution 
to these functionalist claims is to create an intermediate tier 
at the regional level between the centre and locality with powers 
and functions not dissimilar to those of the states in Nigeria or 
the United States of America. This would not necessarily distort 
the unitary system of government in Britain. Such an intermediate 
tier would head off the pursuit of ever-larger local government 
units, either for irrelevant motives like that of reducing the 
workload of central government, or to achieve some functional 
capacity that is either unattainable or should properly be the 
task of the intermediate tier. Furthermore, the need to make more 
accountable the growing number of non-departmental organisations 
that at present exist between central and local government jus­
tifies the creation of intermediate tiers. There may also be a need 
to establish an intermediate tier in response to Scottish and 
Welsh nationalism. Lastly, such an intermediate tier is likely to 
protect local government from further centralisation. This upper 
tier should be responsible for such activities as transport, 
planning, education, police and'fire. District councils could be 
responsible for housing,social services, recreation, libraries 
and public health matters. To overcome the deficiencies at grass-
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roots level and promote participation, neighbourhood councils 
could perform a valuable role by identifying local needs and 
having recognised links with the upper tiers of local government.
In like manner there is a need for a state-like authority to 
co-ordinate matters affecting London as a whole. Certainly the 
Greater London Council is involved in far too many detailed issues 
which are better left to the London boroughs.
A wide-ranging reappraisal would also be needed to embrace 
not only the present local authorities and their areas and 
functions, but also central/local government relationships, 
finance and the ad hoc bodies such as water and health authorities.
A serious attejiqpt should be made to reduce central interference 
with local government and to widen the scope for local authority 
initiative and action to identify and satisfy local needs and 
aspirations. The independence of local authorities has been deeply 
undermined by their reliance on financial help from the central 
government. This problem would be reduced if the recommendations 
of the Layfield Committee are implemented since local councils would 
be free to make their own spending and taxing decisions. Certainly, 
local councils could not attain such financial autonomy without 
fresh taxing powers. To give them such independence, the Layfield 
Report proposed the introduction of a local income tax to replace 
part of the grant and to supplement rates. The target was to 
reduce grant from 65.5per cent at least to 50 per cent; in fact, 
the Committee found that if the objective of grant were limited 
simply to equalisation, to compensate for disparities in re­
sources and spending needs, then grant could fall to UO per cent 
of local revenue (Committee of Inquiry into Local Government 
Finance, 1976, p.219). So the Layfield solution, which we agree
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with, was that local income tax would take up the financing of the 
25.5 per cent of local expenditure previously filled hy grant, 
believing that "a greater measure of financial independence is 
essential if Local Authorities are not to be treated as agents of the 
Departments" (Chester, 1951» pp.30, 369).
The anxiety about declining councillor calibre goes beyond the 
personnel of government to deal with what the fundamental relation­
ship is, and should be, between dominant interests and the inter­
ventions of the local representative bodies of the state. Re­
organisation has long been seen as urgent because of an implicit 
conception of the necessity for dominant interests controlling 
local government more directly. Moreover, reform has held out the 
possibility that changing facets of the local government apparatus 
could actually achieve this result. A number of other issues are 
also involved. We are forced to consider the implications of 
universal suffrage and the rise of the Labour Party. We have to 
pay particular attention to the impact of state intervention and 
public expenditure on dominant interests. Finally, we must have 
regard to the constraints on that intervention - constraints that 
tend to manifest themselves in particular moments of economic, and 
therefore, political crisis, even though we must recognise that 
the problem of state intervention and public expenditure is built 
into the system. These points need to be taken into account 
in any future reform.
We have pointed out that the problem of local government in 
Nigeria is more attitudinal than structural. That is not to say 
that the present structure is perfect. Far from it. In fact, 
the local governments must have more taxing powers so that they 
can generate enough revenue to en^loy adequately qualified staff
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and to reduce their over-dependence on central government grants.
The local authorities need to tighten their taxation methods 
and in^rove the collection of taxes. This will help their financés 
and reduce central controls. But more in^ortantly, there is an 
urgent need for the state and local government officials, espe­
cially the former, to change their attitudes. For me, as for 
Professor Langrod (.1953), democracy implies, above all, the active 
presence of a kind of 'ethics’, of a certain 'public spirit' which 
in particular involves respect for human rights and the rights of 
minorities, fair play, decent methods, tolerance, unselfishness 
and observing the rules of the game. The strengthening of 
democratic local government should be the aim of all patriotic 
politicians.
Apathy which is caused by alienation and ignorance will 
be reduced if the press are empowered to report on council pro­
ceedings. The press is invaluable to local government because it 
will improve the relationships between the electorate and their 
representatives on the one hand, and the local authorities and 
the state government on the other hand. Recent demands for more open 
local government are encouraging - and worth encouragement. Infor­
mation should be made easily available to public, press, the mass 
media and especially the researcher or academics whose recommen­
dations may prove invaluable to local government and the nation on 
the long run. There is an urgent need for local government
information office, local public relations officers, council
r
publication of documents analogous to the consultation and policy 
papers now commonly issued-by state and federal, governments as a 
preliminary to legislation, and many other new devices for 
encouraging genuine discussion between the electorate and their
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representatives. There is also an urgent need to establish the 
office of the oiribudsTnan so that citizen's grievances can be re­
dressed impartially.
The establishment of a national body of local government 
officers, comparable to NALGO in Britain, will enhance efficiency 
and cooperation. Such a national body would encourage joint 
co-operation and reduce duplication and wastage, say, in building a 
dam to supply water to neighbouring towns instead of each authority 
building its own. That would also save money, energy, resources 
and allow more personnel to concentrate on the councils' other 
duties. The establishment of local government associations would 
give local government an added voice in national affairs since 
they would be able to speak, with, a single voice. More significantly, 
such an association would confront a potential governor who wants 
to gerrymander local authorities or who wants to punish a council 
for political reasons.
The efficiency and effectiveness of local government would be 
improved if some form of corporate management and management tech­
niques such as PPBS, 0. & "M., network, analysis, operational research, 
employment of private consultants, work study, cost-benefit analysis 
and the use of computers are introduced.
Fears used to be expressed that frustration would set in among local 
decision makers if an increase in their calibre was accompanied by a 
decrease in the significance of what they were empowered to do. One way 
of avoiding such frustration is to create institutions whose members 
do not ejgect to exercise any discretion. This is what the dis­
solution of elected bodies, and their replacement by agents of the 
centre, effectively does. However, this is likely to pass the 
frustration on to groups at the local level who are excluded from
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even the opportunity to win office throu^ democratic procedures.
The functions devolved to local institutions cannot he disassociated 
from the autonomy with which powers once delegated can he exercised. 
When local government is returned to a representative and democratic 
basis, in line with the requirements of the constitution, some 
further thought will need to be given to whether its present role 
is consistent with the objectives originally laid down for it.
In other words, it is not enough to give local authorities powers 
and functions on paper; they must be given the opportunity to 
perform those functions and exercise those powers if they must remain 
truly democratic.
The central problem here is to separate local government and 
state power in the consciousness of the political community. At 
the moment this is impossible. This is not because voters are likely 
to judge state governments by what happens at the local level and 
the decisions made by local authorities. That will always happen.
It is rather that what happens at the local level in Nigeria is 
critical for the electoral success of individual sthte legislators, 
and perhaps even more importantly, for the returns which are made 
in gubernatorial elections.
What chance is there of local government not being used, as 
it so often has been in the past, as a means by which electoral 
support for candidates for state office can be manipulated? Only 
if local authorities are given a measure of autonomy and devolved 
powers which are free from discrimatory intervention by a central 
(state) government in pursuit of electoral advantage. Central 
controls will always be called for in any system of devolution.
But the more these are used to discriminate against individual 
authorities the more difficult it will be to extricate local
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government from the partisan inclinations of central politicians 
and make it a viable institution in its own ri^t. Only when it 
becomes a working assunption that central control should be used 
for state government policy objectives and not electoral advantage 
can local government play any part in a democratic society (Smith 
and Owojaiye, 198l, p.217).
Giving local government tasks and discretion is only a neces­
sary, not sufficient, condition of its viability as an institution 
for community self-government. Other conditions are obviously 
required, not least a guarantee of free and fair elections. But 
the devolution of real powers with a degree of discretion in tke 
way they are used is an essential prerequisite for a local govern­
ment system to show a degree of responsiveness to local political 
forces rather than be a mere tool in the hands of whoever wields 
power at the centre. Certainly the exploitation of the traditional 
institution of age-set (.see below) will ameliorate things. It will 
elicit responsiveness and participation of the citizens, help to 
improve the power and image of local government and help increase 
efficiency by removing some of the burdens which are presently 
taxing the energy and resources of local government. The establish­
ment or intensification of the idea of community councils or 
neighbourhood communities to handle community development projects 
is likely to achieve the same result in Britain since they bring 
out a strong sense of esprit de corps.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
We define community development as a movement designed to 
promote the voluntary participation of the people themselves in 
efforts to inp)rove their level of living with as much reliance as
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possible on their own initiative, self-help and mutual help, and 
make these more effective. With little to guide us in the 
literature and with little that is significant emerging from 
theorising on the subject, we have to turn to the reality of 
community development in practice to understand fully the aims (see, 
however. Green, 197%, pp.5“l6; Smith, Lees and Topping, 1977, 
pp.237-272; Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1973). Somehow we 
have to examine the variety of experience which exists and, even 
though it may be impossible to devise a framework which would 
embrace all experience, we must nevertheless attenp>t to strike at 
the heart of the transaction in each case in order to discover 
those factors which are common to all.
The Objectives of Community Development
In reality the primary objective of commuaity development is 
simply stated. It is to promote, sustain, support and maintain 
community action. It stands in relation to community action in 
very much the same way as education stands in relation to learning. 
We know for example that learning can take place without any form 
of educational process: we suspect that frequently a good deal of 
education takes place unaccompanied by a corresponding learning; 
and we know also that it is possible for an educational process 
to stimulate a mindless form of learning that we call rote- 
learning. In similar fashion community action can occur without 
the stimulation of community development. It is possible also for 
a highly sophisticated and lavishly supported community develop­
ment programme to coiiÇ)lete its scheme of work without ever -having 
produced any form of real community action. And it is also true 
that it is possible to promote a mindless kind of community action
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in which the energies and aspirations of participants are frittered 
away in activities which deviate them from their best interests.
It is even possible to promote community action as an end in itself; 
it may very well be that there are occasions when it is both nece­
ssary and right to induce some kind of action as a therapeutic 
measure to restore strength or to allow raw social wounds to heal - 
a kind of communal basket - weaving. Valuable though this may be ■ 
in certain circumstances it would not be community development.
Community development as the term itself suggests is concerned 
with development, with going forward towards defined goals, with 
purposeful activity aimed at real achievement. The aim of com­
munity development is community action which must promote de­
mocratic participation, increase self-determination, overcome 
alienation, resolve social problems through self-help and create a 
caring society. The ideal of community action which, it seeks to 
promote is in respect of real problems about which there is genuine 
and deep concern in the community ; it is in respect of problems 
which are competently analysed; it is aimed at realistic and 
realisable goals with the aid of appropriate strategies; it is 
moreover a community action which realistically takes into account 
the costs of action and weighs in the balance of its own interest 
the disadvantages of reaction against hoped for benefit.
At another level, the concept of community development is a 
reaction against the traditional forms of political organisation; 
against "ossified and unresponsive local government" (Green, 197%, 
p.5). More specifically it is a criticism of the representative 
system of government and the inability of political parties to 
make it work. We have tried throughout this thesis to prove that 
local government reform became necessary in Nigeria and Britain
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not only because there have been political,economic, technological, 
cultural and social changes, but also because the social values of 
the citizens of both countries have changed. People are no longer 
satisfied with just voting during elections; they now want to 
partake of decision making and execution. People are no longer 
satisfied that the government-central or local - is providing 
services ; they now demand that these services are performed 
efficiently and effectively. They no longer see the provision of 
services as a privilege; today they see it as a right. They no
longer want a government that is paternalistic, hanging on their
necks like an albatross.
There are three main differences between Nigeria and Britain 
in the type of community development action which we envisage will 
engender participatory democracy, reduce local government workload 
and thereby help ir^rove its efficiency. In Britain it is urban
oriented as against its rural base in Nigeria. In Britain it is
an experiment ; in Nigeria it is indigenous to the culture and 
therefore spontaneous. In Britain it was initiated by the Govern­
ment; in Nigeria it is initiated by the people themselves. Because 
of these differences, we will be treating our recommendations for 
the two countries separately.
Britain
Since the Second World War local government has not actively 
involved many people in more than once-yearly voting. Few people 
attend council meetings. Few attend ward party meetings. Few 
attend election meetings. Yet the system continues. Many people 
have found the organisation.of local political parties (especially 
Labour) ineffective either as a forum for debate about local issues
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which vitally affect them, or, ultimately, as a means of controlling 
their outcome. central proposition is that the newer forms
of participatory democracy embraced by community groups are a 
reaction against old and incapable political institutions. It is an 
essentially political interpretation of cause and effect. First, 
residents are prepared to engage in public debate - prepared to 
discuss their private.interest openly and merge it with collective 
action. Second, more inçortantly, the representative system which 
relies so heavily on the principle of aggregate is particularly 
vulnerable when dealing with issues which have a spaticl component, 
something unique to a particular area at a particular time.
Whereas education or health policy can be reduced to a set of pro­
cedures or rules which are applied in every town or city, planning 
policy depends so much upon what is on the ground. In order to 
be successful, to satisfy resident priorities, it cannot rely on 
aggregate political principles but instead requires local debate 
and locally sensitive solutions.
In short, participatory politics are increasingly recognised as 
a counter to the insensitivity of a progressively centralised 
system of formal constitutional representation. Many politicians 
argued for some institutional form of neighbourhood politics to 
sustain grass-roots debate within the new and larger units of local 
government. Although voluntary organisations and community 
activities have been known in Britain for a long time, and was 
certainly given a boost in the late sixties and early seventies, 
there is every need to intensify them. The need is even more 
urgent now than ever before in the face of the present economic 
and therefore political crisis, and the wave of riots which the 
country is experiencing now. One of the brightest prospects for
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the future health of many local services lies in the growing involve­
ment of the citizens. The Committee on Local Authority and Allied 
Personal Social Services - the Seehohm Committee - (1968) had no 
doubt that the expansion of personal social services which it 
thought necessary, called for a huge increase in the involvement of 
neighbours in their community, however much was also needed from 
the local council and the state. It seems equally clear that the 
present system of national health, if it is to serve the patient and 
avoid the risk of clinical and bureaucratic inhumanity, needs even 
more support from unofficial volunteers than the old system had 
from 'Leagues of Friends' attached to scores of individual hos­
pitals. It has become clear that the existence of representative 
institutions are not sufficient for democracy. If these insti­
tutions are to function well, "socialisation, or 'social training', 
for democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the 
necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can 
be developed. This development takes place through the process 
of participation" (Pateman, 197%, p.%2). Therefore, since the 
'participatory value' of modem local government is 'an iirportant 
element in a modern democracy', populist democracy needs to be 
intensified at the local level (Sharpe, 1970, p.17%).
Following the Seebohm Report, most social service depart­
ments have delegated day-to-day responsibilities to a number of 
teams with a defined catchment area. In the Coventry and Liverpool 
Community Development Project Areas, many service agencies have 
joined together to provide their services from one building.
The archetype for many, perhaps the ideal, is tlie Craigmillar 
Centre in Edinburgh which houses some combination of day nurseries, 
health visitors, home helps, rent collectors, citizens' advice
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bureau, nuns, doctors and general practitioners, probation officers, 
marriage guidance councillors, the RSPCC, the DHSS, an employment 
exchange, research facilities, community workers and social 
workers of . various kinds CCreen, 1974, p.15).
One obvious way in which non-councillors can participate 
in local government is through co-option. The involvement of groups 
in local decision making itself allows many ordinary citizens to 
participate in local democracy. Thus, in 1972, a total of 75 
non-councillors were co-opted onto council committees and sub­
committees in Bromley, the number swelling to over 170 when other 
’official' committees were included. The vast majority of these 
co-opted members were not appointed on an individual basis, but 
rather as representatives of prominent local organisations. Thus, 
the 'populist' element in this direct participation is somewhat 
modified (Cousins, 1977, pp.41-2). Other forms of direct 
participation also exist. For example, local people in one ward 
of the London Borough of Lambeth physically transformed a council- 
owned site into a park and neighbourhood play area with the active 
encouragement of the council (Cousins, 1977, p.41). Such examples 
are still, however, comparatively few. Schemes have been devised 
by some council housing managers whereby council tenants would 
actually manage their own estates, with a committee of their own 
choice and an allocated budget. So far as I know, none of 
these schemes has been put into effect. Yet these are efforts 
worth reviving and intensifying.
The creation of small-scale, urban neighbourhood councils 
or community councils to undertake community development projects 
offer a number of opportunities. First, the whole issue of
401
decentralising control to the public, and of the ordinary person's 
ability to handle the responsibility of his own public decision­
making, can be raised continually, so that people begin to see that, 
at least, they are not as incapable of responsible action as 
their exile from responsibility has led them to believe. The 
unresponsiveness of higher authorities to their efforts will show 
them the practical emptiness of community councils as they stand, 
leading them to demand more effective participation and change. 
Second, and to complement the first, internal self-help projects, 
although not likely to achieve immediate conqprehensive improve­
ments in the quality of life in working-class neighbourhoods,may 
in the long run, give people practical experience of self- 
reliance and their ability to create their own solutions to the 
problems , they face, even if the larger ones still require a 
strategy of nationally co-ordinated campaign. After all, "any 
practical project that breaks down the dependence effect of a 
centralised, paternalistic and none too magnanimous welfare state 
will be a step away from spectating and alienation" (Clarke, 197T» 
p.138). Third, community councils would remove distance and 
other forms of barrier between the government and the governed and 
increase accessibility to local residents. Fourth, they would 
increase officials* awareness to resident needs so that they 
may respond more effectively. Fifth, successes enjoyed by 
community councils on apparently ’uninçortant* issues may have 
feedbacks whose ramifications were totally unforeseen by the 
authorities. For example, community councils should be in a 
good position to keep track of test cases in such issues as 
condensation in council houses and flats, in other parts of
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Britain. Such links and such capitalisation of successes may 
veil create a spirit of optimism that will encourage activity 
throughout an active community council's area, and encourage 
other councils to follow suit. Lastly, such voluntary organisa­
tions would relieve local authorities of some of their burdens and 
therefore help to enhance their efficiency. We must add that these 
benefits are also applicable to Nigeria.
Nigeria
As we said earlier on, community development or rural 
development as it is sometimes called in Nigeria (we will be 
using these two terms interchangeably) has three main features 
which differentiates it from that which we are recommending for 
Britain: it is rural-oriented since about 75 per cent of the 
Nigerian population is still categorised as rural both in the 
spatial and occupational connotations; it is indigenous to the 
culture and therefore spontaneous; and it is projected by the people 
rather than the government. That is not to say that the govern­
ment-central or local- has not initiated some community develop­
ment projects or that they have not offered technical and 
financial assistance to communities that have established 
development projects. Examples of such abound, although the 
government has not been very successful when they initiate them 
for people.
One outstanding feature of many developing countries is the 
magnitude of their internal disparities in the degree of socio­
economic development. Of major importance are the contrasts 
between rural and urban areas. The rural areas in most parts 
of these countries generally exhibit great poverty, poor health
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conditions and ignorance as a result of varying degrees of 
geographical, social and political isolation. In Nigeria, where 
over 75 per cent of the population live and work in the rural 
areas, the emphasis on spatial planning has for a long time been 
on urban areas rather than regional problems which will embrace 
rural areas. This has led to the relegation of the rural areas 
to the background in the spatial economy of the country (see Table 
9.1). Although the Government recently made some attempts to help 
the rural areas, because of the increasing rural-urban migration 
and because of its recent philosophy of self-reliance and 
self-sufficiency in the production of agricultural commodities, 
there is relatively little attention paid to the spatial aspects 
of rural or community development. Economic development takes 
place in 'space*. Yet to be meaningful and successful, the 
spatial aspects of rural development planning should be a 
central element rather than a peripheral one as it is at 
present. We return to this point below (see * Growth Pole 
Hypothesis').
TABLE 9.1
RURAL-URBAN ALLOCATIONS IN NIGERIA: 1975-80 DEVELOPMENT PLAN
Sector Rural Urban
Roads






N 118 million 
N 102 million 
N kl2 million
Source : Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1975, pp.%2%, %08. 
The first objective of the 1976 reform was "to make 
appropriate services and development activities responsive to
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local wishes and initiatives hy devolving and delegating them 
to local representative bodies" (.Guidelines, 1976, p.l). Thus, 
an in^ortant reason for the reform was to develop more effective 
popular participation in local affairs, including activities of 
the central government that are carried out locally. Or as the 
Guidelines (1976, p.l) put it, the reformed local authorities 
are to perform duties which need local responsiveness and under­
standing. Such participation, according to the Government, not 
only enhances the dignity of the individual and the sense of 
community at all levels, but also adds vitality to governmental 
programmes and provides a means for local control over them. It 
makes the programmes more responsive and better adapted to local 
needs. Moreover, through participation, members of the community 
may be induced to do more on their own initiative and to make a 
fuller contribution to government programmes. This amounted to 
fine political rhetoric which, was hardly matched by public invest­
ment and performance in the rural sector. The en^hasis which the 
Government placed on participation and local initiative in the 
Guidelines was not transformed into action because of the implicit 
preoccupation of the Government with transferring a Western model 
of local government to Nigeria. Yet, the mere fact that a type 
of local organisational pattern has been used 'successfully* 
in one country does not necessarily mean that it will be equally 
successful under different circumstances. It is this belief 
that leads us to recommend the integration of our socio-political 
structure, in this case the age-set, into the system of local 
government. Innovation must be coupled with experimentation and 
critical evaluation. Such fresh approach as we are proposing
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should go hand in hand with the modernisation of technical, fiscal and 
personnel procedures which we have recommended, to help the tradi­
tional units meet the emerging problems more effectively.
An important facet of local mentality and attitudes is virtually 
important and neglect of it has been the cause of many a disappointment 
in foreign aid and central government projects. This is that whatever 
is done to improve the lot of the rural poor should reflect what they 
want, or have been successfully persuaded to want. Moreover, they 
should feel that whatever is created is theirs to use, to maintain and 
eventually, where necessary, to replace or enlarge. If the foreigner 
(either the central government or country giving the aid) gives only 
what he thinks is necessary, in the way he thinks is best, he will be 
able to count on little if any self-help on the part of the beneficiaries 
and will have to pay the full price for any local effort he must mobilise 
to carry out his projects, the remnant of which, once he is gone, risk 
being left to fall into disuse. The rural poor must feel that whatever 
is being done in their locality is their idea, their effort (with help 
they choose to accept from outsiders), for their benefit, to build their 
future and that of their children. Basic services such as good elemen­
tary schools and adequate roads from farms to market towns are indis­
pensable prerequisites to economic development, and such services can 
only be provided in adequate measure when local people have the power 
to tax themselves to pay for their own basic services. The impor­
tance of local participation is evident in the results from my questionn­
aire. I asked people, "How practical and effective do you consider 
the suggestion that community development plans should start, like the 
Macpherson Constituion, with a discussion at all levels of the society 
in order to arouse the enthusiasm and participation of the citizens?"
62 per cent of my respondents feel that it is not only practicable, 
admirable and desirable, but that greater effectiveness would be achieved
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if local people are inyolyed in tie initiation and execution of 
deyelopment projects in their areas. In a separate question, about 
74 per cent of the administrative officers whom I interviewed feel 
that the local communities in the areas where they are serving or have 
recently served are involved in development projects designed and carried 
out by the citizens, and it has meant more effective planning. My survey 
also shows the people have ’little enthusiasm’ or interest in community 
development projects initiated for them by the Government. I feel that 
such community development efforts should be intensified and the only . 
effective way is to make use of our traditional institutions, especially 
the age-set concept.
We are not advocating that the age-set system should replace local 
government, but that it should be exploited by integrating it into the 
new system of local government. Some measure of correspondence has to 
be found between local government and the mechanics of age-set. Our 
recommendation takes the form of a synthesis of the substratum and the 
superstratum, that is, of tradition and modernity, a wedding of the 
traditional institution of age-set and the modem quintessence of 
local government. Local authorities will have three main functions Ito 
perform in this synthesis; it will be the organ of co-ordination 
between various administration departments and agencies at the level 
which is closest to community development projects; it will be a source 
of resources - technical, financial, etc. - insofar as it pays part 
of the capital costs of projects and part of the recurrent e^enditure 
where necessary; and thirdly, the local authority will be an agent 
of extension insofar as it is a channel of ideas both ways, between 
itself and its public. These propositions may seem bold, broad and may 
be even vulnerable, but they are nonetheless valuable. Public admini­
stration is a science which must always be open to suggestions which 
may be productive of knowledge. Scientists speculate and guess, they are
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intuitive, all of which is part of the ’context of discovery*.
After all, wisdom does not come to him who gapes at nature with an empty 
head.
THE AGE-SET SYSTEM
An important aspect of African culture is the concept of age-set, 
sometimes-Referred to as age grade or age group • They are known in 
different parts of Africa by different names: it is known as gada in 
southern Ethiopia (Stewart, 1977, p.16); it is called lixula among the 
Tiriki tribe of western Kenya (Sangree, 1965, p.46); the Afikpo people 
of south eastern Nigeria call it ekpe (Ottenberg, 1965, p.16); it is
Aknown as egbe among the Yoruba tribe of western Nigeria (Lloyd, 1965 , 
p.563); and the Tiv people of northern Nigeria call it kwagh (Bohannan, 
1965, p.535). Though age-set systems are described in some ethno­
graphies (see, for example, Gulliver, 1963; Rivers, 1968, pp.136-8;
Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Jones, 1962, pp.191-210), a few of them mention­
ing their significance in tribal societies in Africa, no writer has
Vexhaustively dealt with, this concept in its essentiality, vis-a-vis 
community development and local government. This may be due to the fact 
that the few ethnographers and social anthropologists who have mentioned 
this concept but who have not delved into its socio-political signifi­
cance, are foreigners who are unable to understand its intrinsic 
importance. These anthropologists can be excused for not relating it 
to rural community development and local government since this is out­
side their area of study. We will therefore look into the concept to 
see how it pervades the idea of communality and how it can be used to 
lessen the burdens of local government, and of course central govern­
ment, by bringing about rural community development.
Probably most cultures in the world have linguistic categories 
into which they classify people according to age and position in the life
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cycle: boys, youths, middle-aged men, the elderly, or some such series 
of descriptive terms. In Africa, the list usually runs something like 
this: newly born infant, child on the lap, uninitiated boy , initiated 
bachelor, married man, elder, retired elder. Shakespeare, it will be 
recalled, reported eight such stages. Each of these descriptive terms 
represents a stage or position recognised by the culture. The people 
in that position - who play the roles implied - represent a category 
in the total population. These categories are usually referred to as 
’age-sets*. Thus, age-sets are recognised divisions of the life of an 
individual as he passes from infancy to old age, that is, from infant, 
boy, youth, young married man, elder, and retired elder. The total range 
of age-defined roles may constitute a graded system, which emphasises 
the progressive movement from role to role, that is, from set to set, 
and prescribes the relationships between people in different sets..
There is usually a specific time for moving from a younger set to an 
older one, often ritually established, or at least marked by * rites 
de passage*. In this case there is a periodic achievement of increas­
ing seniority. Persons of junior status must give respect and some 
degree of obedience to those of more senior status; conversely, the 
seniors ejqpect deference but must also acknowledge obligations to 
assist, teach, test, or lead their juniors.
As we said above, age-set institutions are very prevalent in 
Nigeria. I shall, however, use the example of age-set in my local 
government area, where it is called are, to describe its characteris­
tics. Among the Yagba people of Oyi Local Government in Kwara State, 
the are is a socio-political organisation which, is divided into six 
stages (see Table 9.2), each stage marked by ritual ceremonies. The 
age-sets pass through these formal stages together by cooperative 
ceremonies at the tribal level. It normally takes nine years before 
an age-set can graduate to the set above it.
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TABLE 9.2: AGE-SET STRUCTURE AMONG.THE YAGBA TRIBE OF KWARA STATE, NIGERIA

















Heavy building labour and 
work etc.
Tidy up market places & public 
halls
The first stage. Are Mode, have no part to play in community 
decisions. Their role is to tidy up market places and public halls, 
hoe roads from farms to market towns, and act as 'servants * to the 
older members of the community. Theirs is a wholly pre-adult status.
The second stage. Alarin, share with the Are Mode heavy building labour 
and work on roads and paths. In wartime they are expected to help the 
Iba Eta who are the warriors. Members of this third set are not re­
garded as mature enough, to participate fully in ritual or politico- 
jural affairs nor knowledgeable enough to be of consequence in them.
They may attend clan or community assemblies but even their spokesmen 
remain quiet- unless specifically required to represent the interests 
of their age-set. They undertake *police* duties and tasks requiring 
some discretion such as carrying an important message, on the order of 
the elders. The Omo Logun are the experienced warriors and they are 
expected to lead their infantry in wartime. In peace time, they drum 
and sing the younger sets into a state of ecstacy and frenzy during 
communal activities. They participate fully in all ritual and politico- 
jural affairs. Their spokesmen convene and administer community 
assemblies, and in consultation with age-mates, facilitate the approach 
to decisions on matters in discussion or dispute. The Omo Logun are 
fast learning Yagba custom, ritual procedures, ceremonial conventions, 
judicial techniques and details of past precedents. They no longer 
undertake the heavier labouring tasks. Members of the fifth set.
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Iba Erun, are the repositories of experience, knowledgeable of past 
affairs and specialists in the diplomacy essential to delicate matters. 
The last stage, the Ijoye, are the judges and jurors who settle local 
quarrels and disputes and impose fines. The more elderly among them 
are herbalists, fortune tellers and priests to orAcles. They are ack­
nowledged ritual experts and the most efficacious herbalists and 
diviners. When settling difficult disputes they sometimes appear as 
egwugwu or masked spirits to put the stamp of ancestral authority on 
the verdicts of the communal tribunal.
Thus, the following are the general characteristics of the age- 
set system: (a) There is a total ordering on the sets given by the 
order in which they begin recruiting. In other words, the sets begin 
recruiting one after another - it never happens that two Cor more)sets 
begin recruiting simultaneously; (jb) each set recruits members for a 
whole year after which, recruitment ceases permanently; Cc) no indi­
vidual joins a set before the enrolment age; and any individual who 
has not yet joined a set, but who has reached this age, joins a set 
as soon as there is one which is recruiting members, usually nine 
years after the preceding set; Cd) babies that are born just after 
the Are Mode have been initiated or who have not reached the age 
of enrolment at the time, will have to wait for at least nine years 
to get initiated into the next set; (e) all members of a set are auto­
matically promoted to the next age-set after nine years; and Cf) no 
individual is at any time a member of more than one set. Nowadays 
when a considerable number of people leave the community to seek 
employment in the towns and cities, their children have to be initiated 
in absentia, symbolically represented by a fly-whisk.
We should remember that the community which we are describing is 
a rural one, depending mainly on subsistence agriculture. Members 
of the community either work on family/clan farms or they are self­
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employed farmers. It is therefore relatively easy to fit in com­
munity duties around one's everyday work. The duties performed 
by members of an age-set are usually announced at least a fortnight be­
fore the occasion so that every one can plan ahead. For example, if 
a Bailey bridge or a latrine was going to be constructed, the Alarin 
would be told of the day or days of the month when they have to leave 
their farms and go and work on the building of the bridge or latrine. 
Nowadays when some members of an age-set are, for example, nurses in 
the dispensary or are in salaried employment, they have to pay a levied 
amount of money as a substitute if their work does not permit per­
formance of the community duty. This does not preclude the fact that 
such employed persons may still willingly contribute their labour when 
they are free, say, on Saturdays. This also applies to the community's 
'sons abroad' (see below) who not only contribute money, usually a 
fixed percentage of one's salary, but will be required to contribute 
their labour when they visit the community, even if it is no more 
than a symbolic gesture.
Thus, in my local government, as in other parts of Nigeria, the 
social system and the social tradition are favourable to community 
development. Age-sets are still a force in society, and impose on every­
one an obligation to contribute money or labour for community improve­
ments. Equally relevant are the 'tribal improvement unions' which have 
grown up during the last 30 or 40 years as a result of emigration to 
the cities. 'Sons abroad' have formed their 'expatriate' unions and 
have sent money home for development, thus stimulating age-sets in the 
communities themselves which have spent the money in useful and con­
structive ways, for instance, to build and equip a maternity centre 
or to employ midwives to staff it. The functions of these improvement 
unions or omo ibile as they are known, include : Ca) General ethnic 
leadership, and the provision of help for- their members in the cities 
who are in need and succour to those in distress; (b) the channelling
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of communications between political representatives, and the community; 
(c) the organisation of community development projects; and Cd) the 
securing of patronage and community amenities. This favourable atmos­
phere has resulted in a great deal of valuable public work being exe­
cuted. Audrey Smock (JL971, pp.3 2 0 - 4 1 ) ,  like Achebe's A Man of the 
People ( 1 9 6 6 ) ,  gives a detailed and interesting account of the politi­
cal role of such ethnic unions among the Ibo-speaking people of 
eastern Nigeria.
With the help of the age-set institution, therefore, my town and 
the neighbouring villages, for instance, have achieved a lot. Over 
the last decade, we have successfully executed projects - pipe borne 
water supply, a town hall, a post office, two colleges, a modern 
market - worth over six million naira but actually spending about one 
and a half million naira because labour is offered free. The local 
magistrates court is not congested because minor cases are dealt with 
in the traditional way. With the current wave of armed robbery in 
Nigeria, the third age-set help the police in policing the community. 
Whereas a number of people evade taxes imposed by the central and 
local authorities, the community effectively taxes its people because 
they know who can pay what. Lastly, although corruption is very 
rampant in the public sector of Nigeria because the nation's wealth 
is regarded as a national cake to be 'chopped', no one dares embezzle 
a community's money because of the disgrace and social sanctions which 
such an act would incur to oneself and one's family. These are just 
some of the ways in which community action through the age-set insti­
tution have helped in reducing the burden on local government CTables 
9 . 3 ,  9 . 4  and 9 . 5  graphically portray the community development pro­
jects embarked upon by some other communities in Nigeria).
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TABLE 9.3: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN IKWERE/ETCHE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT AREA, RIVERS STATE 1971-79
'Project Total No. Completed
Total Number Nearing 
Completion
Town HaHs 18 15
Markets 27 7
Roads/Bridges 21 2
Maternity/Health Clinics 4 4
Pit Wells 1 -
. Embankments 1 1
Agricultural Extension 8 3
Postal Agency 1 -
Industry 1 -
TOTAL 82 32
TABLE 9./̂ : COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS EXECUTED BY THE PEOPLE OF 
EDU, KWARA STATE, 1977-8
Project Total CostCN)
Construction of 2 Dispensaries and purchase of 20,000
equipment.
Construction of Maternity centres and purchase
of equipment 30,000
Well-sinking and Rural Water Supply and purchase
of equipment. 8,000
Construction of Slaughter Slabs and Slaughter
Houses 10,000
Construction of incenerators and purchase of
waste disposal materials. 8,000
Source : Kwara State of Nigeria, 1978, pp.32-33.
In short, 'voluntary' action at the village level is rooted in the 
age-set system, customs and communal ownership of lands, with sanc­
tions, not unlike those available to local authorities, applied for 
failure of members to contribute their services. These traditional 
organisations, because they reach decisions on the basis of a wide 
concensus of the adult members of the community, are useful for intro­
ducing new ideas and practices Ce.g. political education), effecting 
community improvements and associating the people with government 
programmes of technical -services. In such cases, local leaders may 
need training for their new responsibilities, but if the customary 
form of organisation can be adapted to perform new functions, while 
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of strength in the national structure cii>d merits treatment accordingly.
As the late'Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Ahuhakar Tafawa Balewa, puts 
'it,
to the villager there can be no meaning, no significance in 
national plans and policies unless someone can translate them 
into actual examples locally. Local government should assure 
popular endorsement of policy and its execution so that public 
support and effective authority converge (cited in Weatherhead,
1963, p.167).
Community efforts, with central and local government support, are needed 
to continue to raise a balanced country-wide prosperity, to meet the 
rising expectation, and to alleviate the frustration and dissension 
that can and has threatened national unity. For when a community builds 
a new school or a feeder-road, it often serves as a stimulus for neigh­
bouring ones to do likewise; when the central or local government does 
so it can serve as a source of resentment that a neighbouring area was 
more favoured. In this way community development projects, with the 
support of the government will reduce rather than accentuate sectional 
tensions, and alleviate the strains on national unity.
It is important that we recommend the integration of the age-set 
concept into the present system of local government because the chara­
cteristic pattern of development in Nigeria is lopsided and urban-oriented 
(see Table 9.1). We shall also take a stand on the need for change in 
the existing pattern of policy, and, in the process indicate some of 
the highly desirable advantages that we believe will flow from the di­
rection of change. We shall use the 'growth pole' hypothesis to prove 
the need for the creation of more town councils which will act as 
foci of development and we shall also prove that a meaningful and 
rational attempt at national development and modernisation should 
embrace the aim to arouse and mobilise the zeal of the local/rural 
communities (via age-set institutions) for self-betterment so that they 
will eventually acquire the ability to make a significant contribution
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to the aggregate level of progress achieved by the whole nation of 
which they are integral parts. This latter purpose is graphically 
portrayed in this expression that focusës the basic need of eliciting 
’’the increased participation from the periphery of the social order 
inward to the core”, and accents the fact that ”it is the directional 
flow of this participation which is the key to the movement”
CBraibanti, 1969, p.98). This we shall call the 'Diaspora' hypothesis, 
which is not diametrically opposed to but rather complementary to the 
'growth pole' hypothesis. It helps to bare the root of the matter in 
community development and to draw a sharp conceptual line of distinc­
tion between our approach which seeks to trigger development from the 
grassroots, using mass participation which is traditionally achieved 
through the age-set institution, and those approaches seelcing to 
foster development from the top down. Of course the age-set insti­
tution has to be adapted to meet the modern age and needs. Not only 
will the aim of community development be defeated, but also it may not 
be technologically and administratively feasible, if each village has 
to execute, say, a pipe-borne water project. The solution to this 
problem is a consciously formulated, systematic, multi-sectoral 
programme to attain the integration of the people in the rural areas.
In order to fully harness the potentials of the age-set institution, 
it will be necessary for the state and/or local authorities to delegate 
some powers and functions to the small towns which will form the 
developmental foci of the satellite rural villages around them. These 
towns we refer to as growth, pole centres.
GROWTH POLE STRATEGY: A SUGGESTED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
FOR NIGERIA.
The growth pole hypothesis was first outlined by Perroux in an 
attempt to understand the mechanism whereby developmental impulses are
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transmitted throughout a whole economy. According to him, growth 
poles are foci or centres in abstract economic space "from which centri- 
fu^ilforces emanate and to which centripetal forces are attracted.
Each centre being a centre of attraction and repulsion, has its proper 
field, which is set in the fields of other centres” C1950, p.95).
Rather than allow our present geographical delimitations to cause 
territorial hostility in this era when we should be devaluing such 
frontiers, we should harness it for its economic and human resources 
which will délocalisé not only the "progress of our technique, but also 
the progress of our scientific conception of the world” (Perroux, 1950, 
p.96). Thus, according to Boudeville, a growth pole can be described 
as "a geographical agglomeration of activities rather than as a com­
plex system of sectors different from the national matrix ... Cthey) 
appear as towns possessing a complex of propulsive industries” C1966,
p.112).
For a growth pole to have a beneficial effect on development, 
it must not simply bring about proportional increments in all the com­
ponent units of the economy, that is, achieve mere growth in volume 
and magnitude. It must occasion substantial increments differing in 
size in the component units as a result of significant structural 
transformations, in all dimensions - economic, social and institutional.
Diaspora, which is complementary to growth pole, is also here 
defined as spread effect, an expansionary momentum generated from a 
centre of economic growth and directed towards other regions, re­
sulting in a substantial and sustained increase in demand, incomes, 
investment, production and overall development. Our strategy is 
based essentially on the idea that through concentrating investment 
capacity in a rural town which forms the focus of the satellite 
villages around it, expansionary momentum can be generated in the 
economy of its region.
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Our model begins by assuming the existence of a rural town 
surrounded by a large rural landscape in a certain part of Nigeria. 
Scattered throughout the rural landscape are numerous small villages 
supported primarily by a subsistence agriculture although some people 
may be involved in cash crop production and small scale cottage 
industries. Each of the villages is primarily self-centred; extent 
of the village influence on the landscape is established by prevailing 
modes of movement which in many cases may not be of more than 10 
kilometres radius. Within this space village dwellers live and out­
side contacts are few and infrequent. Relations between the primary 
centre and the rural settlements are weak and at more distant points 
non-existent.
Required to initiate an integrated rural development in such a 
model of rural economic space is the introduction of new factors that 
will promote change and encourage innovation. For instance, an 
effort could be made to introduce new and suitable cash crops that 
will provide the economic base of the rural area. Special attention 
could be given to technical assistance, access to sources of agri­
cultural credit and an agricultural bias to education. Whatever help 
is offered, however, the villager must be left to carry out his 
duties within his custom, again, using the age-set institution in this 
case. These changes in the rural economic base can only be effected 
if the inertia characteristic of the existing spatial patterns in 
the rural areas is overcome. Thus there is need to evolve new and 
different spatial arrangements such as the integrated system we 
suggested earlier and which is elaborated below. In this way market 
towns will emerge in various parts of the rural landscape.
Growth Poles as Instruments of Integration
A clear distinction must be made between historic growth poles 
such as Kano and Ilorin, which have emerged spontaneously as a mani­
festation of the process of polarisation and concentration of economic
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development, and planned growth poles such as New Bussa, deliberately 
implanted or dynamised in the periphery as ah instrument of regional 
policy. In the latter ôase implantation of the pole is usually
achieved on the basis of an 'industrial complex' located in the vicinity
of a relatively large rural centre already in existence or purposely 
created; this industrial complex is formed by a highly dynamic 'pro­
pulsive industry' and by industries of induced growth integrated 
vertically or horizontally with the former and situated near it. More­
over, existence of the complex also induces a series of supplementary 
activities which serve both the industries and inhabitants of the pole.
Use of the growth pole concept as an instrument of regional
policy consists, in fact, of the planned activation of the hypothe­
tical process of spontaneous diffusion of development from the his­
toric pole to the peripheral areas, a process which has been scarcely 
effective in Nigeria. The impact of the growth pole on the economic 
development of its periphery may be visualised in terms of diffusion 
processes, by which economic development spreads to the periphery 
as a consequence, on the one hand, of communication and human inter­
action in general and, on the other hand, of the demand in the pole 
for the raw materials, semi-manufactured inputs or manufactured 
goods the periphery can provide. This induces the corresponding 
mining, agricultural and possibly manufacturing activities and 
determines a degree of dynamism in the periphery and increasing 
integration of local economies in the national economy represented 
by the growth pole.
The idea of deliberately implanting new growth poles in the 
periphery derives from the premise , that this process of diffu­
sion can be induced, accelerated and given greater territorial 
scope. The very fact of implanting a new planned pole, which is 
to act as a new focus for the concentration of activities, already
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implies a measure of déconcentration with respect to the historic 
pole and,through economic interdependence and mutual interaction, 
should represent a step in the integration of the national space- 
economy.
It is therefore important that a well-conceived strategy of 
polarised local development should consider both the implementation 
of new growth poles in the periphery and, at the same time, additional 
action directed toward strengthening and restructuring the urban 
system in general and the networks which link it together. Some 
urban centres should be strengthened in their function as 'central 
places' and assigned a role as regional distribution and service centres 
with broad territorial influence. On the other hand,other small urban 
centres or large rural centres may be able to act as secondary centres 
of industrial growth and, therefore, of population concentration.
The transport and communication networks will provide channels for 
exchange and interaction between the growth poles, the secondary growth 
centres, the regional service centres and the rest of the urban system, 
and their development will make these more accessible to one another. 
Together, these elements should make it possible to transmit the 
dynamizing and integrating impact of the growth poles to the periphery 
and, lastly, to the rural areas.
In the rural areas, villages have to be grouped together to form 
a 'Block' for planning purposes. Each block should comprise an area 
of about 150 square kilometres with a population of about 20,000.
The block should be headed by a generalist development officer who 
will co-ordinate the activities of extension officers in the fields 
of agriculture, animal husbandary, health, rural or cottage indus­
tries, social education, co-operatives, etc. The focus of the inte­
grated work at the block level should be the block plan. The block 
plan will comprise the village plans viewed as a whole and co-ordinated
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in addition to development programmes for which the block is directly 
responsible. Basically it should cover a minimum programme in the 
fields of agriculture (including minor irrigation, soil conservation 
and animal husbandary), rural industries, development of co-operatives, 
elementary education, rural water supply and a programme of minimum 
rural amenities - including health, approach roads and so on.
The concept of the block as a unit of planning and development 
envisages the pooling of all development funds at that level, including 
not only the schematic budget, but departmental funds and local com­
munity effort. The block should act as the common agent for all de­
partments in the field of development both for planning and implemen­
tation of programmes, and should help the villages to evolve techni­
cally sound plans which can be executed efficiently. We must realise, 
however, that unless the technical departments are brought squarely 
into the programme and the block developed as their’common agency 
the objectives of the programme will not be realised. This brings to 
the fore the problem of co-ordination at the level of policy-making and 
at the level of execution in the field. This is where the local 
government has to exert its influence.
At the policy level local governments should set up co-ordination 
committees for the purpose of taking an integrated view of develop­
ment programmes and taking decisions jointly. Certainly it is in­
conceivable that a local authority would be in a position to take over 
the running of all community development projects embarked upon or 
executed by the local people. Yet as we pointed out earlier, it can 
serve as a source of resentment that a neighbouring area was more 
favoured if the local government takes oyer the managemetn of a commu­
nity's projects while leaving others to run their own. The solution 
to these problems is an effective integration of policy and planning. 
The policy and co-ordination committee for community development
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which, we suggested earlier should he made up of leaders of commu­
nities Cthe Ijoye and the Iba Erun), the extension officers, local 
government/officers, local government officials and the generalist 
development officer. In this way the local government would be able to 
know what projects are being planned by each community and would be able 
to offer technical advice as to the feasibility of such projects and 
how their costs can be reduced if two or more communities join hands to 
carry out the projects. A few examples from my local authority area 
will suffice to explain what I mean. In 19.76, eight different villages 
within a radius of 12 kilometres to one another, wanted to establish a 
secondary school each. Then the government stepped in to tell them 
that although their projects were laudable, there was no way each 
village could command enough resources to establish and manage a sec­
ondary school. The government therefore advised that they should' 
pool their efforts and establish a college in a central part of the 
eight villages so that no village could claim that it was located within 
its own boundary. Furthermore, the government promised that they would 
be helped financially and technically if they took its advice, and that 
the college would be run for them once the project was executed. The 
result today is the well-equipped Gbarraga’ Grammar School, the word 
Gbarraga being an acronym.
The role of the age-set system under our model will be to con­
tribute its communal labour, organised along traditional methods.
Thus, while the Ijoye and Iba Erun can be members of the policy and 
co-ordination committee, the Alarin will be working on the construc­
tion site, aided by the stimulus of traditional drumming and music by 
the Omo Logun.
Another example of the possible 'partnership’ which our model 
advocates is in the realm of roads and buildings construction. In 
some cases roads and buildings have been built by the communities in
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the first flush of enthusiasm only to fall into neglect, for it is 
more exciting to start something than to keep it going. It is here 
that local government comes into the picture. Local authorities are 
not always as good at taking the initiative as the age-sets, the improve­
ment unions or the community as a whole, but they are better equipped, 
because of their statutory powers, to repair, maintain or extend what 
has been created by the work of enthusiasts.
In the field of agriculture, with the development of well distri­
buted market towns for agricultural produce and other manufactured 
goods the farmer is free from the middlemen traders who habitually 
pay him a very poor price.CAjaegbu, 1972, p.105). With the existence 
of market towns in the rural areas it becomes possible to break down 
the apathy and indifference of a 'static', tradition-bound subsistence 
agriculture, substituting for it the incentive of profit and commercial 
exchange of agricultural commodities for consumer goods. With the 
appearance of market towns serving several villages, the traditional 
routines of rural life are modified and may be eventually replaced by 
new ones.
The spatial framework provided by the existence of market towns 
in relation to the village settlements should be used for planning the 
provision of other rural development projects; for every block there 
should be a growth centre , that is, the market town, and a number of 
peripheral villages. In order for the market towns to be effective 
in stimulating rural development it should be possible for farmers 
to move their produce hence roads and road improvement become neces­
sary. As the market function of a market town develops, the new market 
town becomes a nucleus for a new form of population agglomeration
which in turn attract other activities. Thus local administrative 
functions and other social services such as primary and secondary 
schools, health facilities, postal services and banking facilities can 
be attracted to the market towns. Furthermore, such towns could be
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provided with public water supply, electricity and. all-weather roads. 
Finally, the rural market towns will be most suitable for the 
development of rural cottage industries.
Another aspect of our model of integrated rural development in 
Nigeria relates to the integrated patterns of those ecological, 
sociological, economic and organisational variables which together 
create agricultural land use systems from one area to another. This 
aspect is concerned with the visible and tangible landscape patterns 
which have arisen from man's attempts to produce foodstuffs, agric­
ultural raw materials for industry and livestock as well as the 
invisible but equally significant patterns of land use systems, for 
example tenurial arrangements, the spread of innovations in farm 
operations, farmers' organisations, credit facilities, levels of 
literacy among rural populations and many çthers. Furthermore, there 
are those vital aspects of mobility, of functional circulation, of 
movement of inputs and output which should be spatially examined and 
planned for in relation to the existing settlement pattern. Time and 
distance studies are also an integral component of the spatial aspect of 
rural development, for example, greater attention to location, shape, 
area distances and directions will aid the creation of more efficient 
farming practices. Simply stated, movement exacts a charge on the 
farmer and husbandman; the greater the distance and the more time- 
consuming the move, the heavier the charge on productivity, that is, 
a reduction in output or increased costs. The journey to work of the 
farmer, the propinquity or otherwise of markets, of sources of inputs 
such as improved seed, fertilizers, tools and machinery; of storage 
facilities, of extension staff and so forth, all affect the efficient 
functioning of the agricultural system in the rural areas in a most 
direct way. The role which local government will play in all these 
cannot be over-emphasised. It would be good, at least in the initial
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stages, to leave the rural farmers to organize their labour along the 
traditional lines through the system of age-set whereby members of a 
set exchange ideas and seeds, and cooperate by setting aside some 
days to work together on one another's farms. This is a good 
starting point insofar as it is the revival or encouragement of an 
ancient traditional method of getting things done. Even the most 
academic theorists of community development would agree that the 
words mean nothing until something happens in the way of an improvement^ 
and this is more often than not brought about by manual labour and 
cooperation. After all, the labour itself, and the feeling of 
achievement that goes with it, can generate a spirit that will lead to 
further improvements and to the emergence of leadership, initiative and 
pride; in other words to a real community.
Our strategy advocates a more cooperative and mutually sustaining 
relationship between the local government and the communities. The 
need for a democratic approach to development is here based on the 
premise that since people are the target of any development activity, 
their needs and values must be reconciled with the objectives of any 
development programme in order to secure their commitment to and 
identification with such programmes. Therefore, in order to ensure 
cooperation. and effective direction and utilization of resources in 
local development, an adequate level of planning and consultation is 
imperative (see Figure 9.1).
It is very important that some leaders of the 'improvement unions' 
or 'sons abroad' be included in the planning and co-ordinating committee. 
Most of the 'sons abroad' go to their communities at least once every 
fortnight and they are very intimate with local developments. In 
Nigeria, most councillors are born and brought up within the council 
in which they are serving. Therefore they are not strangers to the 
dynamics of the age-set system and they will not object to some members
cn
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of the * improvement unions* being included in such a committee, because 
C'a) the local communities are likely to trust their educated sons 
more than they will trust any government agent; (b) since the major 
part of development funds come from the * sons abroad*, it is imperative 
that they have a say in how the funds should be used; (c) since most 
of the * sons abroad* are, on average, more learned than the councillors, 
they (the former) are likely to understand the technical, legal and 
financial implications of joint ventures by the communities better than 
the councillors, and they would be able to put their views to the 
communities better than the councillors; (d) the * sons abroad * are 
useful advisers to the village members of the age-set system and 
they would be an invaluable contact point between the village and the 
local government departments; and (e) since the * sons abroad * are 
nearer the seat of state and federal government, say in Ilorin and 
Lagos, they are in a better position to secure patronage, technical 
advice.and community amenities than the local councillors. For example, 
a block of classrooms was donated to the girls * college in my town 
by UNESCO, through the help of Chief Simoyan, an employee of UNESCO,
Such donations will surely reduce the cost of development projects both 
to the communities and the local government.
Thus, the proper development of growth poles.in Nigeria will have 
the effect of forcing on the policy-makers greater awareness of the need 
to modernize agriculture and improve conditions of living in rural areas. 
In a rapidly changing industrializing situation, the agricultural sector 
has a new type of demand pressure put on it. This is not only to 
provide surplus food to feed the urban residents but, more important, 
to produce enormous quantities of raw material which can be stored away 
to ensure that machines and other investments are utilized efficiently 
over a considerable period. To do this, the farmers will in the long run
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have to become less subsistent and more commercial and specialist 
farmn-managers. Such a transformation has implications for the type 
of inputs of seeds, fertilizers, equipment and other farming infrastructure 
which the farmer now considers appropriate. It also affects his idea 
of farm organization and what avenues of credit loans are available 
to him.
With the rural producers, achievement of increasing levels of 
production would involve the use of a * stick and carrot* technique to 
ensure appropriate motivation. Whilst the need of the cities for food 
supplies and industrial raw material could serve as the stick driving 
the farmers to greater and greater production, their enthusiasm can 
be expected to wane if they do not find close-by appropriate goods 
and services on which to spend their increased income. And, as has been 
suggested earlier, a reappraisal of the distribution of existing market 
towns and/or the creation of new ones, and the types of goods and 
services they will provide for the rural masses is a vital and compliment­
ary exercise for a growth pole strategy in Nigeria.
One interesting aspect of the rural dimension of growth pole 
planning is the way it forces attention on the role of frontier areas 
in national development. In Nigeria, this includes the Bamenda Cross 
River Basin, the Adamawa Highlands, the Hadeija - Yobe River Zone, and 
the Middle Belt, a well-watered expanse of land drained by the Niger 
and Benue rivers and suitable for the production of a wide range of crops 
such as rice, soya beans, benniseeds and sugar cane. It also has 
considerable fishing and tourist potentials.
For a growth pole strategy to succeed at the rural level, therefore, 
institutions must be created for the effective organization of the rural 
population for developmental purposes. The task of governmental 
agencies dealing with a myriad of atomistic production units must be so 
frustrating as to be self-defeating. The institution needed must have
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as its primary objective the comprehensive organization of rural 
communities for development and must serve as the channel for all the 
relations of agencies of government with these communities, A 
successful process of "incorporation* of marginated rural populations 
would not only mean an expansion of the internal market, but would 
at the same time improve the living standards of these populations, 
stem rural-urban migration, and bring about a process of social and- 
cultural change and their gradual integration in the "urban* patterns 
of life. Moreover, with surging feelings of confidence, efficacy and 
self-reliance widely and deeply infused into rural minds and institutions, 
the national mind and institutions may, in their turn, increasingly 
become the foci of affluent accession of identification, loyalty and 
supportive orientation in rural circles and populations. Furthermore, 
there is the possibility that the evolution of the type of policy 
of community development being espoused here may eventually help to 
lend institutions of local government the enviable criteria of 
stability and legitimacy they now lack.
CONCLUSION
To usher in a viable system of community development, therefore, 
there needs to be a thorough-going and purposeful reappraisal of 
current policy in order to correct the aberrations that plague it and 
warp the functional perspective of government action programmes designed 
for community development. This implies that systematic steps be 
instituted to re-think the true nature and directions of those efforts 
that are appropriate to the task of vigorously and realistically 
attacking the roots of rural physical and mental degradation. Inescapably, 
part of the reassessment of aims and methods should include a keener 
appreciation of the constructive potentialities of projects resting 
on a base of intermediate technology and processes and the acquisition
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of middle-level technical know-how. There should also he increasing 
manifestation of a firm conviction to invest more of available 
societal resources in meeting the challenge of rural animation. And, 
as the crowning step of this innovative refashioning, there should emerge 
a bolder and settled realization of the centrality of consultation with 
the wishes and desires of the local people and their spokesmen as well 
as their co-optation and participation in decisions about programmes 
and projects to be undertaken and their order of selection. Better 
still, the people should be allowed to decide on what projects they 
think they need, and receive help from whosoever suits them, with the 
government providing resources and technical assistance.
An innovative approach such as is being adumbrated here is likely 
to be rewarded with developments and changes with far-reaching 
impact in both the national and community spheres of activity. The 
curve of national output of goods and services will likely move 
upward because of the varieties of small-scale and cottage industries 
that might be called into being in rural locations and whose products 
will significantly add to the aggregate of national productive wealth. 
These include bakery, black-smithing, carving, carpentry, knitting, 
pottery, motor repairing, weaving, welding, and many of their ilk. This 
state of affairs will also increasingly be conducive to wholesome 
economic diversification. The varied resource-endowments of the rural 
areas'will form a variegated base for underpinning multifarious local 
crafts and other productive forces thus lending a healthy heterogenity 
to national economic growth. Knowledge of simple and intermediate 
technology and skills will become slowly but surely diffused through all 
strata and sections of the population. This will represent a modest 
spread of the technical milieu and calculated, over time, to breed in 
the behaviour and outlooks of the rural folks the beginnings of those
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disciplined and rationalistic patterns of thought and action that 
are widely and highly regarded.as a vital psychodynamic dimension of 
modernization. More concretely, moreover, many types of employment 
opportunities will tend to develop in the village and community locations. 
This latter development will spell no small gain in a country suffering 
from a staggering burden of unemployment, underemployment and related 
socio-economic maladies.
Eventually, local exploitation and use of local resources for 
local processing industries will tend to burgeon and loom larger and 
larger in the national economic ken. At the moment, far too many of 
these raw materials that are known to exist remain untapped and unutilized 
because they are not directly needed by the sophisticated, high 
technology industries that are erroneously exclusively regarded as 
the sine qua non for economic development and as inherently urban- 
oriented. Through close and active involvement at the planning and 
take-off stages, and in the administration of these modest, 
small-scale enterprises, the local community leaders will have the 
opportunity to know the ropes with respect to basic secondary organis­
ational capacities and entrepreneurial skills .that are required 
throu^ organic -,notmechahical-solidaristic activities. This again is 
a vital pre-condition of any serious design for the emergence of modern 
business aptitude and associational effectiveness at the level of 
the rank-and-file of the population.
The current tendency toward over-centralizing control of the various 
processes involved in community development in the hands of local 
agents of remote authorities, no matter how well-meaning, tactful, 
perceptive and sympathetic these may be, poses a serious hindrance 
to the realization of the desirable qualities of flexibility and 
equity in resource-allocations to various development sectors. For
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only local leaders and representatives are capable of articulating 
the needs of their communities and communicating and representing them 
before the decision-makers with that degree of validity peculiarly 
vested in the sufferer. Flexibility in the present context connotes 
the basing of decisions on resource allocations on criteria that 
incorporate a balanced and hard-headed grasp of the nature and require­
ments of all the groups and sectors such that the justice of 
commensurate allocation proportioned to felt-need and relative import 
of each in the overall scheme of things developmental will redound 
to the centre and the periphery alike. A thriving order of community 
development relying on the principle of local consultation will help 
to make assurance doubly sure that the needs of communities are 
equitably considered and not neglected or submerged.
Planning must be a democratic social process aimed at the development 
of local initiative, local leadership, local functional groups and 
village organisations, keeping the community as the essential focus.
It must be a problem-solving process aimed at the fullest utilization 
of local resources. It must be a meaningful process comprehensive 
enough: to break through the interlocking vicious circle of underdevelopment 
and lead to a self-generating growth with increasing opportunities 
for higher levels of income, consumption and aspiration. Local planning, 
to be successful, must integrate the efforts of the people with those 
of the governmental agencies. Local planning cannot be isolated from 
national goals. It must, while satisfying local needs, be geared to the 
fulfilment of national priorities. Implicit in the whole process of 
planning is the growth of the community gaining enhanced ability to act 
together. The community becomes a centre of creativity in the larger 
community of the local, state and national government, and the broad 
aim of the administrative agencies or change agents is the promotion
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of this creativity. Recruitment, training, organization, control, 
encouragement and supervision, technical support and guidance, financial 
and budgetary patterns, indeed the entire work complex and administrative 
outlook must subserve and strengthen this purpose. I cannot but say 
again that these propositions may seem bold, broad and may be 




Today reform may be not only respectable but also desirable
for the sake of the future (Caiden, 1970, p. 23).
In the previous chapters we have outlined the process of local 
administrative reform in Nigeria and Britain. All that remains to be 
done here is to recap the major themes which were treated in the thesis 
and further expatiate and elucidate the answers to the hypothetical 
questions we set outselves in Chapter 1.
In Chapter 1 we said that a diagnosis should indicate the symptoms 
which have to be translated into a coherent picture on the basis of which 
action can be planned and carried out with a reasonable assurance that 
objectives will be achieved. We also mentioned a number of conditions 
which necessitate administrative reform. Most of these conditions were 
found in Nigeria and Britain. The existing local administration in 
both countries had failed to meet the demands put on them. The impact 
of growth took them by surprise and they could not keep up with the 
times (see Chapters 3 and 4), The pattern of human settlement was 
always ahead of the pattern of organization.
There were other conditions which necessitated a diagnosis and hence 
the reforms in both countiiriES. The 1975 coup d'etat which brought 
Murtala to power provided an opportunity for a thorough reappraisal of 
local government. The effect of the military take-over on local 
government proves our hypothesis that local government is an organism 
which must respond to environmental and political changes. Furthermore, 
the large-scale overhaul which local government faced under the Murtala/ 
Obasanjo regime corroborates what we said in Chapter 1: that major
administrative reforms are usually the direct outcomes of very serious 
crisis conditions faced by a government, such as the take-over of power, 
through revolution or otherwise, by political groups who differ strongly
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from those previously in office. And there is no doubt that the 
Murtala/Obasanjo regime was ideologically different from those previously 
in office (see Chapter 7). We also mentioned in Chapter 7 that the 
threat of public disturbance and the fact that seme sections of the armed 
forces were known to be restive made the 1976 reform necessary. In 
Britain we discussed the rise of the Labour Party, universal suffrage and 
the effect of the Second World War as some of the conditions which 
necessitated reform (see Chapters 3 and 4). In Nigeria and Britain, 
poor economic performance and the need to rationalise government 
expenditure was also an important factor pushing for reform (see Chapters 
3 and 5).
Furthermore, it became necessary to reform local government in both 
countries because the administrative systems were thought to be 
inefficient and ineffective. Corruption was very rampant in Nigeria. 
Other factors which we identified in Chapters 3 and 4 as responsible for 
structural and behavioural changes were the growth in the size and type 
of clientele served by local government; changes in problems and needs, 
and, therefore, in organizational programmes as to the proper 
responsibilities of local authorities; technological developments such 
as the motor car which enabled extensive movement of people and local 
government representatives; advancing knowledge in medicine, such as 
the discovery of quinine to cure malaria, which lowered the rate of 
mortality, thus leading to a population explosion and urbanization; the 
growing impact of party politics in local government and its implications ; 
changing and usually rising qualifications of personnel, such as the rise 
of professionals in local administration. The social and economic 
changes which we analysed in Chapter 3 meant that local government has 
expanded its scope and therefore needed expert advice to tackle these 
complex problems. The late 1960s brought both an emphasis on efficiency
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and management in public administration, and the emergence of new demands 
for local democracy, participation, community power and professional 
autonomy. All these changes, as we noted in Chapter 5, were taking 
place while the structure of local government remained relatively static.
The changes mentioned above have been accompanied by equally 
important developments in social thinking and public attitudes. One 
such development in Britain has been a new approach to unemployment and 
poverty. Social attitudes in the nineteenth century were very much 
bound up with the administration of the poor laws, founded on the belief 
that it was chiefly up to the individual to meet his own needs and find 
employment; public relief was discouraged by the principle of 'less 
eligibility' and the stigma of pauperism. Widespread unemployment 
caused by the depression of the 1880s and followed by the reports of the 
Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, which sat between 1905 and 1909> led 
to acceptance of the view that unemployment is more often the result of 
wider, impersonal forces over which the individual has little control 
and should be tackled by prevention, not deterrence.
The second aspect was the growing realisation that social ills - 
poverty, high death-rates, ill health, bad housing, unemployment and the 
plight of the destitute elderly - are interconnected. The social 
services of the twentieth century were developed to meet those needs and 
the movement was logically followed by by the Seebohm Committee who 
recommended the unified administration of the local authority personal 
social services, to reflect the fact that families and individuals have 
needs which have to be looked at together and not dealt with in watertight 
ccmpartments (Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal Social 
Services, 1968).
Thirdly, there has been a great expansion of all governmental 
activities in Britain and Nigeria, especially in the social services.
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accompanied by a change in the role of the central government. A wider 
distribution of the benefits of greater national wealth required the 
government to play a more positive role in order to eliminate poverty, 
to maximise welfare and achieve a greater degree of both economic and 
political equality. The assumption of this role has led to a great 
change in the whole concept of social policy embracing social security, 
health and welfare services, education and the improvement of the 
environment. In the local government field this has resulted in a 
significant change of emphasis. The main services are no longer those 
needed to meet the environmental problems in cities or law and order in 
Nigeria - they are the personal services aimed at individuals, whether 
they live in towns or in the country. Similarly, there has been a 
change of emphasis in the balance between central and local government.
The part played by central government in prescribing what services ■ 
should be provided, and to what standard, has enormously increased and 
these decisions in turn depend upon the national economy and the ability 
to pay.
Thus, local government reform became necessary in both countries 
not only because of the aforementioned socio-economic, technological and 
political changes that have taken place, but also because the social 
values of the citizens have changed. The public demands resulting from 
industrialization and urban living have forced local authorities to 
extend or adjust traditional services and to provide a wide range of new 
services. People are no longer satisfied with just voting during
elections; they now want to partake of decision making and execution. 
People are no longer satisfied that the government - central or local - is 
providing services; they now demand that these services be performed 
efficiently and effectively. They no longer see the provision of 
services as a privilege; today they see it as a right. In short, they
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no longer want a government that is paternalistic. Clearly human 
geography, patterns of life, social thinking, the functions of local 
authorities and the nature of local administration had all changed so 
drastically that the need for new institutions became inevitable.
Our analysis in Chapter 6 shows that it is perfectly possible for a 
developing country (Nigeria) and a developed one (Britain) to have 
identical reform objectives such as democracy and efficiency. It was 
inevitable that there were differences between the two countries in the 
emphasis placed on some reform objectives. For instance, both economic 
development and national unity were conspicuous reform objectives in 
Nigeria but they were only implicitly expressed in Britain. After all, 
if each local authority in a country effectively and efficiently 
performs its functions, would the aggregate not be a sound and efficient 
nation ?
As for reform strategies, our research proves that it is not 
impossible to devise a strategy with universal applicability, although 
with each country adapting the strategy to its own circumstance or 
environment. Our treatment of the reforms in both countries as a 
process is a strategy that is likely to meet with success in any 
administrative reform. Thus, it is necessary to first diagnose the 
defects in the existing administrative system, set objectives and 
strategies, implement the reform objectives, and have a feedback mechanism 
for the purposes of evaluation and modification of plan as originally 
indicated. The process approach is ccanprehensive in its scope and does 
include and focus on the interaction between and among individuals and 
organizations and thereby throws light on the dynamics of administrative 
behaviour. And in order to effectively implement the reforms, it is 
either that the Government allows for a legislative process so that the 
whole issue can be debated by the citizens and their representatives, or
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the reforms are forced on the people in countries without a mature and 
effective democratic institution. In either case, the usefulness of 
research cannot be over-emphasized.
Perhaps the implementation stage is the most important in a reform 
(see Chapter 7). Our research confirms Lee's hypothesis (see Chapter 1) 
that time and leadership are two crucial variables in reform implementation. 
The reforms in Britain and Nigeria were carried through because the 
reformers were strongly committed and genuinely interested in it and 
because the socio-economic and political environments were favourable.
Thus Backoff's hypothesis that the greater the comprehensiveness, 
complexity, and magnitude of changes, the lesser the probability of 
implementation can only be assumed to be true a priori. It is certainly 
difficult to prove in the case of the 1974 and 1976 reforms in Britain 
and Nigeria respectively because his hypothesis failed to take into 
consideration other important variables such as leadership, time, and 
socio-political environment of the country concerned. Our research 
proves that the reforms in both countries were comprehensive and complex, 
yet they were implemented because, as we said above, the reformers had 
the will and the power to do so, and the time and socio-political 
atmosphere were propitious.
In Chapter 1 (p. 47) we said that there are a number of methodological 
points to be considered in evaluating a reform. We also set ourselves 
seme hypothetical questions (p. 52) which we tried to answer in the body 
of the thesis. We saw in Chapter 8 that it is not sufficient to base 
our evaluation purely on the reformer's goals and declarations, hence 
the importance of our fieldwork. In quest of greater accuracy, we, like 
Joseph Campbell's protagonist in The Hero With a Thousand Faces (1975), 
had to enter areas in which revelations are harmful and persistent 
inquiry is discouraged. Our fieldwork did prove that the reforms are 
not as successful as the reformers want to claim. It is therefore very
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important that any evaluation should be based on the people's feelings 
and attitudes, those whom the entire administrative apparatus is 
designed to serve. It is very difficult to see how the reforms in both 
countries have greatly improved democracy, economic development and 
efficiency except within a very rudimentary and narrow range such as the 
reinstatement of representative local government in Nigeria or the 
introduction of corporate management structures in Britain. Although 
we do not mean to undermine the achievements of the reforms in both 
countries which we analysed in Chapter 8, our research shows that
many of the problems identified before the reforms have not been solved 
(see Chapter 8). There are still a lot of structural problems facing 
local government in both countries; central control has not diminished; 
there has been no dramatic change in development; local skills and the 
so-called councillor calibre have not changed or improved; there are no 
considerable improvements in social welfare and levels of satisfaction; 
public apathy in local affairs has not declined; and duplication, waste 
and corruption have not been stemmed, especially in Nigeria. Perhaps 
the most important thing which our research revealed is that the 
reformers deviated from some of their reform objectives at the implementation 
stage, mainly for political and administrative expedience (see Chapters 
7 and 8).
Chapter 9 attempts to provide solutions to the post-reform problems
analysed in Chapter 8. Any future reforms in both countires must take
\
the implications of the setting of the contemporary economic situation 
into serious consideration. At the most general level, the problem of
(local government can be seen as an aspect of the overall problem of the 
public sector in a capitalist econaay. This is a problem that centres 
on the sources of state revenue and the scale of public expenditure, and 
on the scope and direction of state intervention. At the core of local
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government struggle for democracy is the problem of the scale of its 
expenditure and the nature of its interventions, a problem that any 
future reforms must solve. Our hypotheses (the use of neighbourhood 
councils, the age-set concept and the growth pole) are likely to help in 
solving many of the problems we have identified. Surely, they would 
enhance democratic participation, bring about even development, help in 
reducing the work-load of local authorities thereby improving their 
efficiency, and give people practical experience of self-reliance.
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APPENDIX I
NIGERIA; LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANDATORY FUNCTIONS;
Social Conveniences or Amenities;
1. Markets and motor parks ;
2. Sanitary inspection, refuse and nightsoil disposal;
3. Control of vermin;
4. Slaughter houses and slabs;
5. Public conveniences;
6. Burial grounds;
7. Registration of births, deaths, and marriages;
8. Provision of community and local recreation centres;
9. Parks, Gardens, Fuel Plantations;
10. Control of hoarding, advertisements etc;
11. Naming of roads and streets.
Taxation and Control on Private and Public Utilities and Services;
1. Licensing, supervision and regulation of bake houses and 
laundaries;
2. Licensing, regulation and control of the sale of liquor;
3. Licensing and regulation of bicycles, hand carts, and other
types of vehicles except those mechanically propelled, and canoes;
4. Control and collection of revenue from forestry outside the 
"Forest Estate" or gazetted Forest Reserves;
5. Collection of vehicle parking charges;
6. Collection of property and other rates, community tax and
other designated revenue sources.
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPTIONAL FUNCTIONS (these are run concurrently 
with the State Governments)
Welfare Functions.
1. Health Centres, Maternity Centres, Dispensaries, Health 
Clinics, Ambulance Services, Leprosy Clinics and preventive 
Health Services;
2. Abbatoirs, Meat Inspection;
3. Nursery, Primary and Adult Education;
4. Information and Public Enlightenment;
5. Scholarship and bursaries;
6. Public libraries and reading rooms;
7. Agricultural Extension Services; Veterinary Services;
8. Rural and semi-urban water supply;
9. Road and street lighting and drainage;
10. Provision of homes for destitutes, the infirm and orphans;
11. Provision of public utilities;
12. Pipe sewerage systems.
Protection and Environmental Functions
1. Fire Services;
2. Control of water and atmospheric pollution;
3. Control of beggars, of prostitution and repatriation of
destitutes;
4. Public housing programmes;
5. Operation of commercial undertakings;
6. Control of traffic and parking;
7. Regulation and control of buildings;
8. Town and country planning.
Source; Federal Republic of Nigeria (1976), Guidelines 
for Local Government Reform, Kaduna, Government Printer, 
pp.2-3.
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Education and Related Services
Education
Libraries
Museums and Art Galleries*
Housing and Town Development 
Certain reserve powers, e.g. 
over-spill 
Town Development
Town and Country Planning and 
Related Matters 
Structure Plans 
Local plans (in special cases) 
Development Control (strategic 
and reserved decisions) 
Acquisition and Disposal of Land 
Clearance of Derelict Land* 
National Parks (subject to 
existence of boards)
Country Parks*
Footpaths and Bridleways 
Commons - registration 
Caravan Sites - provision*
Gipsy Sites - provision 
Smallholdings and Cottage 
Holdings.





Public Transport (co-ordination) 
Road Safety
Street Lighting.
Education and Related Services 
Museums and Art Galleries*
Housing and Town Development 
Housing
Town Development
Town and Country Planning 
and Related Matters 
Local Plans (most) 
Development Control (most) 
Acquisition and Disposal of 
Land.
Clearance of Derelict Land* 
Country Parks*
Footpaths and Bridleways 
Caravan Sites - provision* 
licensing and management 
Gipsy Sites - management 
Allotments
Highways and Related Subjects 
Highways - can claim powers 
over unclassified roads in 
urban areas.
Public Transport - operation.
Environmental Health 
Food Safety and Hygiene 
Control of Communicable 
Disease
Control of Office, Shop and 
Factory Premises
Consumer Protection 
Weights and Measures 









Police (subject to amalgamation)
Fire
Recreation and Tourism 
Swimming Baths*
Parks and Open Spaces*
Physical Training and Recreation*
Licensing and Registration Functions 
















Recreation and Tourism 
Swimming Baths*
Parks and Open Spaces*
Physical Training and Recreation* 
Publicity for Tourist Attractions









NOTE;This Table ignores minor variations which may exist in Wales.
METROPOLITAN COUNTIES
Education and Related Services 
Museums and Art Galleries*
METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS 
Social Services
Education and Related Services
Education
Libraries
Museums and Art Galleries* 
Housing and Town DevelopmentHousing and Town Development 
Certain reserve powers e.g.over-spill Housing 
Town Development Town Development
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Town and Country Planning and
Related Matters
Structure Plans
Local Plans(in special cases)
Development Control (strategic
and reserved decisions)
Acquisition and Disposal of Land* 
Clearance of Derelict Land* 
National Parks (subject to 
existence of boards)
Country Parks*
Commons - registration 
Caravan Sites - provision*
Gipsy Sites - provision 
Smallholdings and Cottage Holdings,
Town and Country Planning 
and Related Matters 
Local Plans (most) 
Development Control (most) 
Acquisition and Disposal 
of Land*
Clearance of Derelict Land* 
Country Parks*
Footpaths and Bridleways 
Commons - management 
Caravan Sites - provisions* 
licensing and management 
Gipsy Sites - management.








Weights and Measures 
Food and Drugs 
Trade Descriptions 
Consumer Protection
Highways and Related Subjects 
Highways - can claim 
maintenance power over 
unclassified roads in 
urban areas.
Environmental Health 
Food Safety and Hygiene 
Control of Communicable 
Disease
Control of office, shop and 
Factory Premises.





















Recreation and Tourism 
Swimming Baths*
Parks and Open Spaces*
Physical Training and Recreation*
Recreation and Tourism 
Swimming Baths*
Parks and Open Spaces*
Physical Training and Recreation* 











* = Concurrent functions.
Source; Richards, 1978, pp.181-184
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APPENDIX II
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF SECRETARIES 
 _____OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS_______
The Secretary to the Local Government as the Chief Executive to the
Local Government Council will be responsible for;
(i) co-ordinating the work of all the departments of the council;
(ii) initiating policy proposals for consideration by the council;
(iii) implementing policy decisions of the council;
(iv) giving general guidance and advice to the council on all matters
pertaining to the treasury and the conduct of its business;
(v) maintaining a proper system of accounts in according with the 
provisions of the law and the instructions contained in the 
Financial Memoranda;
(vi) satisfying himself that the council is discharging its 
responsibilities for supervision of its finances as detailed in 
the Financial Memoranda;
(vii) ensuring that the council appoints an annual Board of Survey 
on revenue earning books;
(viii) handling all personnel matters affecting the councils in 
accordance with existing regulations;
(ix) submitting monthly progress reports on council activities to 
the Ministry of Local Government and Social Development;
(x) security within the Local Government Authority area;
(xi) setting targets and measuring performance of council staff;
(xii) submitting monthly Intelligence Report in respect of the area 
to Government;
(xiii) co-ordinating Government functions in the area;
(xiv) any other duties that may be assigned to him by the Ministry 
of Local Government and Social Development or the Government.
Source ; ANAMBRA STATE (1976)
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APPENDIX III
ROYAL COMMISSION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND 1966-1969 VOLUME 1 
CHAPTER 1. Main conclusions and how they were reached 
Main conclusions
1. The pattern and character of local government must be such 
as to enable it to do four things: to perform efficiently a wide
range of profoundly important tasks concerned with the safety, 
health and well-being, both material and cultural, of people in 
different localities; to attract and hold the interest of its
citizens; to develop enough inherent strength to deal with national
authorities in a valid partnership; and to adapt itself without 
disruption to the present unprecendented process of change in the 
way people live, work, move, shop and enjoy themselves. These 
purposes have guided our assessment of the present and our proposals 
for the future.
2. We are unanimous in our conviction that local government in 
England needs a new structure and a new map. Ten of the 11 
members of the Commission agree about t̂ he principles on which the 
new structure and map should be based.
3. England (outside London which was not within our terms of
reference) should be divided into 61 new local government areas, each 
covering town and country. In 58 of them a single authority should 
be responsible for all services. In the special circumstances
of three metropolitan areas around Birmingham, Liverpool and 
Manchester, responsibility for services should be divided in each 
case between a metropolitan authority whose key functions would 
be planning, transportation and major development, and a number 
of metropolitan district authorities whose key functions would be 
education, the personal social services, health and housing.
4. These 61 new local government areas should be grouped, together 
with Greater London, in eight provinces, each with its own provincial 
council. Provincial councils would be elected by the authorities 
for the unitary and metropolitan areas (including, in the south
east, the Greater London authorities), but would also include co-opted 
members. The key function of these councils would be to settle the 
provincial strategy and planning framework within which the main 
authorities will operate. They would replace the present regional 
economic planning councils and collaborate with central government 
in the economic and social development of each province. They will 
therefore play an essential part in the future adaptation of 
local government to the changes in ways of life and movement that 
time and technical progress will bring.
5. Within the 58 unitary areas and, wherever they were wanted, 
within the three metropolitan areas, local councils should be 
elected to represent and communicate the wishes of cities, towns.
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and villages in all matters of special concern to the inhabitants.
The only duty of the local council would ,be to represent local 
opinion, but it would have the right to be consulted on matters of 
special interest to its inhabitants and it would have the power to 
do for the local community a number of things best done locally, 
including the opportunity to play a part in some of the main local 
government services on a scale appropriate to its resources and 
subject to the agreement of the main authority.
How main conclusions were reached
6. In the light of all the evidence presented to us, of our review 
of the present pattern and working of local government and of
our efforts to foresee the future, we became convinced that there 
are four basic defects in the existing structure. Together 
these structural defects seriously reduce, and will increasingly 
reduce, the chances of ensuring that local government works 
efficiently and economically, is understood by the citizens who 
elect it, and holds their interest. The following are the four 
basic faults:
i. Local government areas do not fit the pattern of life
and work in modem England. The gap will widen as social, economic 
and technological changes quicken.
ii. The fragmentation of England into 79 county boroughs and 
45 counties, exercising independent jurisdictions and dividing 
town from country, has made the proper planning of development 
and transportation impossible. The result has often been an 
atmosphere of hostility between county boroughs and counties and
this has made it harder to decide difficult questions on their merits.
iii. The division of responsibility within each county between
county council and a number of county district councils, together
with the position of county boroughs as islands in the counties, means 
that services which should be in the hands of one authority are 
fragmented among several. The difficulty of meeting comprehensively 
the needs of families and individuals is thus greatly increased.
iv. Many local authorities are too small, in size and revenue,
and in consequence too short of highly qualified manpower and 
technical equipment, to be able to do their work as well as it could 
and should be done.
7, Partly but not wholly because of these structural faults,
and in spite of the devoted efforts of councillors and officers, there 
are serious failings in local government's relationships with the 
public and with national government:
i. The complex local government machinery seems, and often is,
irrelevant and therefore impotent in face of the problems that confront 
people in their daily lives, either collectively or as families and 
individuals. Hence, the feeling of many people that local 
government cannot help them and the frequent sense of frustration 
among councillors and officers.
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ii. Parliament and central government doubt the ability of 
local governors, within the straitjacket of the present system, 
to run local affairs.
iii. The variety in size and type of local authorities, and the 
existence of several local authority associations reflecting 
that variety, mean that local government seldom acts effectively 
as a single body in its dealings with central government.
8. In considering what changes are needed to correct these 
structural and other defects there is one fundamental question.
What size of authority, or range of size, in terms of population 
and of area, is needed for the democratic and efficient provision 
of particular services and for local self-government as a whole?
9. After examining each of the main services in turn, we decided 
that answers to that question must be found by seeking to apply to 
each part of the country the following general principles:
i. Local authority areas must be so defined that they enable 
citizens and their elected representatives to have a sense of 
common purpose.
ii. The areas must be based upon the interdependence of town and 
country.
iii. In each part of the country, all services concerned with the 
physical environment (planning, transportation and major development) 
must be in the hands of one authority. Areas must be large enough 
to enable these authorities to meet the pressing land needs of the 
growing population, and their inhabitants must share a common 
interest in their environment because it is where they live, work, 
shop, and find their recreation.
iv. All personal services (education, personal social services, 
health and housing), being closely linked in operation and effect, 
must also be in the hands of one authority, as strongly recommended 
by the recent report of the Seebohm Committee.
V. If possible, both the 'environmental' and the 'personal' 
groups of services should be in the hands of the same authority, 
because the influence of one on the other is great and likely to 
increase. Further, concentrating responsibility for all main local 
government services in a single authority for each area, as in the 
present county borough, would help to make the idea of local 
self-government a reality. Through allocation of priorities and 
co-ordinated use of resources, a single authority can relate its 
programme for all services to objectives for its area considered 
as a whole.
vi. Authorities must, however, be bigger than most county boroughs 
(and all county district) are at present, if they are to command the 
resources and skilled manpower which they need to provide services 
with maximum efficiency.
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vii. The size of authorities must vary over a wide range if areas 
are to match the pattern of population. But a minimum ^pulation 
is necessary. What this should be is a question of great 
difficulty and we received much evidence about it. We concluded 
that this pointed to a minimum of around 250,000. Though 
authoritative witnesses would prefer a higher minimum for education - 
perhaps as high as 500,000 - we did not accept that this was essential. 
Moreover, a minimum above 250,000 would be too high to provide coherent 
and reasonably compact areas in many parts of the country. It would 
also be unnecessarily large for the other personal services (the 
personal social services, health and housing), which must be kept 
together with education.
viii. At the other end of the scale, authorities must not be so 
large in terms of population that organization of their business 
becomes difficult and the elected representatives cannot keep in 
touch with the people affected by their policies. This is 
especially important in the personal services. There was little 
evidence to guide us but we concluded that a population of not much 
more than 1,000,000 should be the maximum for the personal services, 
though much would depend on the social and geographic characteristics 
of each area.
ix. Where the area required for planning and the other environmental 
services contains too large a population for the personal services, a 
single authority for all services would not be appropriate; and in 
these parts of the country, responsibilities must be clearly 
divided between two levels, and related services kept together.
X .  The new local government pattern should so far as practicable 
stem from the existing one. Wherever the case for change is in doubt, 
the common interests, traditions and loyalties inherent in the present 
pattern, and the strength of existing services as going concerns, 
should be respected.
10. In considering what the new local government structure should 
be, we first concentrated on the 'city region' since this was the idea 
strongly advocated for the whole country by the Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government, the department with chief responsibility for 
English local government. We examined various possible local 
government maps of England in turn, and the following points emerged:
i. The city region idea has value because it takes account of the 
fact that people are now much more mobile than they were.
11. Witnesses put forward a variety of possible areas as city 
regions, ranging in number from 25 to 45 for the country as a whole. 
This suggested that the city region was not an idea which could be 
applied uniformly all over England, and in some parts of the country 
it did not seem to us to fit reality. In a number of areas it does 
provide the clue: around the great urban concentrations of
Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester, and also in areas where a big
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town is the natural centre for a wide area of surrounding countryside 
and smaller towns. But in others, such as the south west, insistence 
on the idea of the city region seemed to mean creating artifically 
constructed areas whose people have no sense of looking to a city 
centre or of sharing interests peculiar to themselves; and in the 
south east the idea leads to no clear local government pattern 
because the influence of London overshadows that of other centres.
iii. Many suggested city regions would be so large as to need a 
second operational tier of authorites if local government is 
not to be too remote for effective contact between the elected 
representatives and the people. But many of these second-tier 
authorities would be too small to find the resources needed for the 
main local government services; and in any case the present splitting 
of personal services which ought to be concentrated in one authority 
would be reproduced over a large part of the country.
11. We therefore next considered various alternatives to applying 
the idea of the city region to the whole country. We examined
a series of maps illustrating the other main proposals for a new 
structure put to us in evidence. These proposals were: 
a single tier; two tiers of various kinds and sizes; main 
authorities performing most functions but with a level above them, 
covering a 'province', to perform the rest. Other maps which our 
staff prepared for us showed that the country could be divided into 
130 to 140 areas which had some measure of coherence because of internal 
social and economic ties, but many of these areas have populations 
far too small to enable them to employ the range of staff needed 
for the efficient provision of any of the main services.
12. Meanwhile we had become increasingly convinced by those who
emphasised the need for an organ of community at grass-roots level.
Our conclusion was that any new pattern of democratic government
must include elected local councils, not to provide main services, but 
to promote and watch over the particular interests of communities 
in city, town and village throughout England.
13. Our examination of England had also led us to the conclusion that
local government, however organised,needs to include a new 
representative institution with authority over areas larger than any 
city region, not unlike the eight areas of the present regional 
economic planning councils. This provincial council would handle the 
broader planning issues, work out provincial economic strategy in 
collaboration with central government and be able to act on behalf
of the whole province.
14. Assuming therefore that whatever arrangements were made for the
operation of the main local government services there would be need 
for complementary institutions 'above* and 'below', at the levels of 
the province and the local community, we decided to re-examine each 
part of England in turn, apply our general principles and ask 
ourselves where there are areas in which operational responsibility 
for all local government services can appropriately be concentrated; 
that is to say, areas which
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i. can properly be treated as coherent units for carrying out 
the 'environmental' group of services;
ii. have populations broadly within the range of 250,000 to not much 
more than a million, the size that we had concluded would be appropriate 
for the efficient performance of the 'personal' group of services;
iii. can be looked after effectively and democratically by one council.
Where areas existed that met all these three conditions, the argument 
in favour of one authority for each of them would be decisive.
Elsewhere responsibility would need to be divided between authorities 
at two tiers; and we recognised that this would be necessary where we 
found that the planning problems of big urban concentrations had to be 
dealt with over areas containing such large populations that a single 
authority would be unwieldy and, for the personal services, remote.
15. In working out possible boundaries with these alternatives in mind 
we had to judge in each case where the balance of advantage lay, by 
weighing a number of different considerations, and in particular these 
three;
i. The pattern of living - that is to say, the distribution of population 
and industry and the pattern of travel for employment, shopping, 
entertainment and other purposes, together with prospective developments 
likely to change these facts and modify the social and economic future
of the area.
ii. Democracy and efficiency - the best practicable balance between 
the needs of efficiency (in terms of population, geography and 
resources of money, manpower and technical equipment) and the 
requirements of effective representation.
iii. The present pattern of local government.
16. It was this survey that resulted in our final conclusions. It 
convinced us that over most parts of the country, 58 in all, a single 
authority should be made responsible for all services, but that in 
three metropolitan areas (additional to Greater London) the unit 
needed for comprehensive planning, transportation and major 
development was both too large for unitary government and large enough 
to be sub-divided into units suitable for education, the personal 
social services, health and housing; in each of these three areas 
therefore responsibility for services should be divided between one 
metropolitan and several large metropolitan district authorities.
Source; Royal Commission on Local Government in England (1969), Vol.l, 
Report, Cmnd 4040, London,HMSO, pp.1-6.
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